JUDGMENT S.R. Misra, J. 1. THESE two appeal arise out of a common judgment and decree dated 29-7-80 passed by IVth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr in Civil Appeal no. 413 of 1980, arising out of suit no. 244 of 1977. 2. SINCE common questions of facts and law are involved in these two appeals, they are being decided by this common judgment The facts of the case, in brief are that plaintiff filed a suit with the allegations that Smt. Punia got executed a sale deed dated 18-6-76 from the plaintiff by way of misrepresentation. Plaintiff wanted a loan of Rs. 1000 from the defendant and defendant asked him to execute a document in lies thereof. Therefore, plaintiff went to (he Registration office and marked his thumb impression on a document after obtaining Rs. 1000 on 18- 6-1976. The defendant fraudulently got executed she aforesaid sale deed whereas the same was without any consideration and the contents whereof were never explained or read over to the plaintiff 3. THEREAFTER, the matter was agitated before the Gram Panchayat. It was decided in that Panchayat that defendant will execute the sale deed in regard to the property in question in favour of the wife of plaintiff. On 20-7-1976, the plaintiff along with defendant and her son, went to the (Registration office. He had also purchased stamp of Rs. 1125 and a deed was prepared, But when the aforesaid sale deed was read over and explained to the plaintiff, it was found that the name of son of defendant was also incorporated along with wife of plaintiff, to which the plaintiff raised objection and, therefore, no sale deed could be executed. Hence the suit was filed. 4. THE defendant contested the suit on the ground that plaintiff had executed the sale dead after receiving whole consideration of Rs. 15,000 and understanding the contents of the sale deed fully well. THE theory of Panchayat was denied. It was on the request of the plaintiff that the defendant agreed to execute sale deed for half of the property on payment of Rs. 7,500. Plea of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act was also raised apart from other formal pleas The learned Munsif after considering the evidence on record and hearing the parties, held that the sale deed in question was liable to be cancelled on the ground of misrepresentation and for want of consideration. 7,500. Plea of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act was also raised apart from other formal pleas The learned Munsif after considering the evidence on record and hearing the parties, held that the sale deed in question was liable to be cancelled on the ground of misrepresentation and for want of consideration. Theory of Panchayat was believed by learned Munsiff and the suit was held not to be barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, appeal was filed by defendant. Appeal was allowed in part by order dated 29-7-80. While suit for cancellation of -sale deed was decreed on payment of Rs. 6,500 by the plaintiff to the defendant within a period of one month the suit was not decreed in toto and, therefore, plaintiff as well as defendant, feeling aggrieved have approached this court by means of these two appeals. 5. IT was urged on behalf of plaintiff Kalua by the learned counsel representing him before this court, that the plaintiff was an illiterate person and was not conversant with the technicalities of law. Naturally, he was totally ignorant about the contents of sale deed and with the bona fide belief that he was signing a receipt for Rs. 1000. which he was taking from the defendant, he affixed his thumb impression. Moreover, the plaintiff is a very poor parson as apart from land in dispute, he does not have a single inch of land anywhere. 6. LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff further urged that the judgment and decree passed by trial court is based on appraisal of material evidence on record. The trial court has recorded a finding of fact that the document relied upon by defendant is nothing but a fraudulent and fabricated one. The payment of Rs. 14,000 as consideration has been rightly disbelieved by trial court. The findings thus recorded by trial court, being essentially those of facts the lower appellate court grossly and manifestly erred in law in interfering with these findings and modifying the decree of the trial court. Therefore, the judgment and decree of lower appellate court deserve to be set aside. On the other hand, learned counsel for the defendant contended that once the plaintiff admitted execution of the sale deed, and acceptance of Rs. 1000, the onus of proof lies on plaintiff to establish that the document was fraudulent. Therefore, the judgment and decree of lower appellate court deserve to be set aside. On the other hand, learned counsel for the defendant contended that once the plaintiff admitted execution of the sale deed, and acceptance of Rs. 1000, the onus of proof lies on plaintiff to establish that the document was fraudulent. The plaintiff having been miserably failed to establish to he is estopped from challenging execution of the said sale deed. Thus, the trial court erred in decreeing the suit for cancellation, and, appellate court, in the alternative, was justified in partly allowing the appeal directing the plaintiff to pay another amount of Rs. 5,500 in addition to Rs. 1000, which was already admitted by plaintiff to have been received, to the defendant. 7. HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the judgments and decrees, as well as record of the case, it is clear that the trial court recorded finding after consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record. The plaintiff is admittedly an illiterate man. He, therefore, deserves the same protection, as has been held in Daya Shankar v. Smt. Bachchi, 1982 Alld. 376, to which a Pardanashin lady is entitled. Morever the appellate court committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that a sum of Rs. 5,500 was paid to Bahori Lal with whom, the land of plaintiff was mortgaged. In the statement of PW 1 Kalua, question was put, and in reply thereto, he stated that this amount was paid to Bahari Lal, by him, prior to the date of the sale deed. It was admitted the statement of DWs that the amount of Rs. 14000 was paid prior to the execution of the sale deed. Thus, theory of payment of Rs, 5,500 to Bahori lal cannot be believed and the appellate court without considering this aspect of the matter, as well as in the absence of statement of Bahori Lal and the other relevant documents, erroneously allowed the appeal in part. 8. THUS, from the statements of PWs and DWs, it is clear that fraud was played on plaintiff and the deed was obtained by suppression of material facts taking advantage of illiteracy of the plaintiff, in the garb of advancing ,a sum of Rs. 1000 as loan. 8. THUS, from the statements of PWs and DWs, it is clear that fraud was played on plaintiff and the deed was obtained by suppression of material facts taking advantage of illiteracy of the plaintiff, in the garb of advancing ,a sum of Rs. 1000 as loan. From the statement of PWs and DWs, as well as other evidence on record, it is clear that plaintiff does not have any other land except the land in dispute. He was only 35 years of age on the date of execution of alleged sale deed. No man of ordinary prudence will think of disposing of his bread-earner property for a petty sum of Rs. 1000. THUS' the very execution of sale deed by plaintiff is doubtful. While decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, the trial court has considered the point that Bahori Lal, who is alleged to have advanced loan to the plaintiff in lieu of plaintiff's land, which was alleged to have been mortgaged with him, was not examined in the witness box. This is most crucial aspect of the matter and the judgment and decree of the trial court is based on appraisal of material evidence on record. The appellate court, without considering this aspect of the matter that when in the alleged mortgage a sum of Rs. 7500 was said to be paid, 5000 as principal amount and 2500 as interest, how it could be held that Rs, 5500 was paid to Bahori Lal by the defendant In lieu of sale consideration. Thus in view of aforesaid discussions I am not satisfied that the appellate court has taken correct view of the matter. 9. THE learned counsel for parties cited case laws in support of their respective arguments. They are Smt. Dulari Devi v. janardan Singh. 1990 ALJ 245, as well as 1990 ALJ 749: Rahul v. Kastar Singh, 1991 ALJ 397 : 1925 PC 204; AIR 1963 SC 1289 and 1208 : AIR 1982 Alld. 376 1 1966 ALJ 1080 etc. 10. I have carefully scrutinised all the aforesaid case laws. The special feature of the instant case is that plaintiff is an illiterate person and he has come with the case that the sale deed in question is fraudulent document. In Parasnath Rai v. Tileshra Kuar, 1965 ALH 1980 following the decision of Calcutta High Court in Chinta Dasya v Bhalku Das. The special feature of the instant case is that plaintiff is an illiterate person and he has come with the case that the sale deed in question is fraudulent document. In Parasnath Rai v. Tileshra Kuar, 1965 ALH 1980 following the decision of Calcutta High Court in Chinta Dasya v Bhalku Das. AIR 1030 Cal, 591, where in it was held that rules regarding transaction by a Pardanashin lady were equally applicable to illiterate and ignorant woman, though she may not be pardanashin. But, the plaintiff in these two appeals is male. The following observations are relevant for the purpose of present case, which are extracted from the decision in Daya Shankar v. Bachi (Supra) : "...We are unable to comprehend as to why the broad principle which has been accepted and widely applied in the numerous decision to which we have adverted should not also embrace within its sweep the cases of males who by reasons of their apparent physical or mental incapacity or infirmity or being placed in circumstances where they ate greatly amenable to the overpowering influence of another person are induced to enter Into conveyances and transactions relating to their property. The basic principle is the same and where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court either that the bargain was on the face of it unconscionable or the executant was the victim of physical or the mental handicap or that he was subdued by the complexity of circumstances in which another person had an upper hand, the burden must be cast squarely on the person enjoying the dominating position to show that he secured the deed in good faith." In the instant case, the trial court very rightly held that the plaintiff, being illiterate, could not understand the purport of the sale deed and a, bona fide belief that he was affixing his thumb impression on a paper for having taken loan of Rs. 1000, the sale deed was fraudulently got executed. As already held above, the rinding recorded by trial court was that of fact. Now. the only question remains for consideration is an to whether the case be sent back to the lower appellate court for decision, afresh, on the controversy as to whether the amount of Rs. 1000, the sale deed was fraudulently got executed. As already held above, the rinding recorded by trial court was that of fact. Now. the only question remains for consideration is an to whether the case be sent back to the lower appellate court for decision, afresh, on the controversy as to whether the amount of Rs. 6,500 is liable to be paid by plaintiff to the defendant, it appears to be appropriate and in the interest of justice that instead of sending back this case to the court below, which will certainly prolong decision in the case, the matter be set at rest at this stage itself. 11. ADMITTEDLY, the plaintiff took a loan of Rs. 1000 from the defendant in 1976. The trial court, while decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, over looked this point. If interest is calculated on the principal sum of Rs. 1000, the amount, thus, will come around Rs. 3000 at the rate of simple interest. I, therefore, direct the plaintiff to pay an amount of Rs. 4,000 to the defendant within a period of four months from the date of issuance of the certified copy of this judgment and order. It is open for the plaintiff to deposit the aforesaid amount with the trial court, or, to hand over the same to the defendant after obtaining receipt thereof. If the amount is deposited with the trial court, the defendant will be entitled to withdraw the same. 12. IN the result, both these appeals are disposed of. The judgment and decree of the trial court for cancellation of sale deed, said to have been executed by plaintiff in favour of the defendant, are upheld with slight modification that plaintiff will pay Rs 4000 to the defendant in the manner prescribed in last, but one paragraph of this judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs. The lower appellate court's order is also modified to the aforesaid extent.