Bisheshwar Alias Vishwanath v. VIth Additional District Judge. Varanasi
1994-03-23
S.NARAYAN
body1994
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT S. Narain 1. THIS writ petition is directed against order dated 6th April, 1990 passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi (respondent no. 2) releasing the disputed property in favour of landlord, respondent no. 3, and order dated 29-9-93 passed by respondent no. 1 affirming the said order, in revision. 2. THE dispute relates to a garrage at ground floor of building no. D. 39/26, Khudai Ki Chowki, Varanasi. Respondent no. 3 is landlord of this building One Kanti Lal was tenant of the disputed accommodation. THE landlord filed suit for ejectment against him in Civil Court, Varanasi. THE suit was decreed for his ejectment and the judgment was affirmed by the High Court An application for execution was filed against him and warrant of delivery of possession against him was issued by the executing court on 22nd March, 1986. Respondent no. 3 filed an application for release of the said accommodation on 4th March, 1988. He also prayed that the accommodation vacated by one Vimal Kant Varma consisting of two rooms and; a kitchen be also released in his favour which is adjoining to the garrage room. The petitioner filed an application on 30-9-1986 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for allotment of the premises vacated by Sri Kanti Lal. He further filed an application on 15th January, 1987 that the application of the landlord for release of the disputed premises be rejected. He also filed an affidavit in support of his application stating that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and genuine. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer after taking into consideration the report of the Rent Control Inspector and the affidavit filed by the landlord came to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was bona fide on considering the number of members of his family and the total accommodation with him. He also heard the arguments rifted on behalf of the petitioner in opposition to the application for release filed by the landlord but took the view that a prospective allottee has no right to contest a release application filed by the landlord. The petitioner aggrieved against the said order filed revision before the District Judge, Varanasi-. Respondent no.
He also heard the arguments rifted on behalf of the petitioner in opposition to the application for release filed by the landlord but took the view that a prospective allottee has no right to contest a release application filed by the landlord. The petitioner aggrieved against the said order filed revision before the District Judge, Varanasi-. Respondent no. I held that the petitioner has no right to file revision against an order of release passed in favour of the landlord under Section 16 (1) (b) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He accordingly dismissed the revision by his order dated 29-9-1993. The petitioner has challenged these orders in the present writ petition. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that the view taken by respondents nos. 1 and 2 that a prospective allottee has no right to the contest the release application, or to adduce evidence showing that the need of the landlord is not bona fide is erroneous in law. 4. THERE are two questions. Firstly, whether a prospective allottee has a right to contest the release application and secondly, whether he has a right to lead any evidence to show that the version of the landlord that his need is bona fide, is incorrect. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a prospective allottee has vested right to get his allotment application considered on merits only after rejection of release application of the landlord and unless he is given right to contest the release application a landlord may obtain an order of release of accommodation on false averments or by concealment of material facts. 5. THE question as to what are the rights of a prospective allottee to contest the release application was considered by the Full Bench in Tallb Hasan v. Ist Additional District Judge, Nainital, 1986 (I) ARC 1. THE question referred to the Full Bench was as follows:- "Whether a prospective allottee has a right to file an objection and content the application for release made by the landlord for a building or a part thereof after deletion of the orignal rule 13 (4) of the Rules under the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972?" 6.
THE question referred to the Full Bench was as follows:- "Whether a prospective allottee has a right to file an objection and content the application for release made by the landlord for a building or a part thereof after deletion of the orignal rule 13 (4) of the Rules under the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972?" 6. THE Full Bench, after considering various case law, held that "the right of prospective allottee to have his application considered hence arises only after the rejection of the landlord's application under Section 16 (1) (b) A fortiori prospective allottee comes into picture only after the disposal of landlord's application for release under Section 16 (1) (b), and, only if the same is rejected" and further observed in para 29 "......that prospective allottees have no locus standi in the disposal of an application for release under Section 16 (I) (b)". Another argument was also repelled that a prospective allottee has a right to be heard and the Court observed:- "The third submission of the learned counsel is that the rejection of the allottee's application entails civil consequences and consequently on the principle of sudi alteram partem the prospective allottee is entitled to be heard even in an application under Section 16 (1) (b). The submission is devoid of any merit. The principle of audi alteram partem presupposes existence of some right or interest in the subject-matter of the lis. We have demonstrated above that the prospective allottee has no right or claim against the landlord nor any interest in the accommodation in dispute. He has, therefore, no right to the heard in opposition to an application, for release filed by the landlord even on the above principle". 7. IT was suggested to the Court that if a prospective allottee does not get a right to the contest the release application, the landlord may collude with the Rent Control Authority and obtain an order in his favour on false allegations. But the Court repelled this argument that there is no presumption that the Rent Control Authorities will act dishonestly and the Statute cannot be Interpreted on such presumption. 8.
But the Court repelled this argument that there is no presumption that the Rent Control Authorities will act dishonestly and the Statute cannot be Interpreted on such presumption. 8. IN Brij Kishore Gupta v. District Judge, Dehradun, 198S (2) ARC 424, it was held that while considering the release application of the landlord under Section 16 of the Act, the authority concerned has only to look into the bona fide requirement of the landlord alone, The authority at that juncture has not to take into consideration the interest of any prospective allottee. This view was reiterated in the case of Smt. Krishna Rani v. District Judge, Dehradun, 1990 (1) ARC 442. At the time of consideration of release application under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act it is a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord and the prospective allottee has no right to contest the release application The duty has been cast upon the District Magistrate to release the building only after the District Magistrate is satisfied that the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant there to is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family as contemplated under Section 16 (2) of the Act. The Prospective allottee comes into picture only after the release application is rejected. The mere fact that unless the release application is rejected, a prospective allottee will not be entitled to get his application for release considered, does not give him right to contest the release application. The right to contest a matter comes to a person only when there is a vested right in him. There is no vested right in a prospective allottee till the release application is rejected. 9. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon Ganpat Rai v. Additional District Magistrate, 1985 (2) ARC 73, in support of the contention that a tenant is entitled to file and writ petition in this Court when order of vacancy is declared. This case has no bearing on the question when there Is admittedly a vacancy and a landlord files an application for release. The petitioner does not claim himself as tenant of the disputed accommodation. 10. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal Andheri, AIR 1986 SC 391 .
This case has no bearing on the question when there Is admittedly a vacancy and a landlord files an application for release. The petitioner does not claim himself as tenant of the disputed accommodation. 10. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal Andheri, AIR 1986 SC 391 . In that case a petition was filed by the petitioner in his capacity as rate payer in the High Court challenging the right of Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Under- taking to use the land for a purpose different from the one for which it had been reserved and discounted under the development plan as well as the town planning scheme and that that it had no right to use it for commercial purpose. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the petitioner had locus standi to file writ petition because the petitioner was vindicating public interest. The Supreme Court made the following observations : - "Public interest litigation is a comparatively recent concept of litigation but it occupies an important status in the new regime of public law in different legal systems. By its very nature the concept of public interest litigation is radically different from that of traditional private litigation. Ordinary traditional litigation is essentially of an adversary character where there is a dispute between the two litigating parties, one making the claim or seeking relief against the other and the other opposing such claim or resisting such relief. While public interest litigation is brought before the Court not for the purpose of enforcing the right of one individual against another, as happens in the case of ordinary litigation, it is Intended to prosecute and vindicate public interest which demands that violation of constitutional or legal rights of a large number of people, who are poor, ignorant or socially and economically its disadvantageous position, should not go unnoticed, unredressed for that would be destructive of the rule of law." A prospective allottee claims that the building in question may be allotted in his favour. He does not claim any public interest. A public interest litigation is for the benefit of the public. The relief is not confined to the person who files writ petition but he seeks relief which is for a large section of public.
He does not claim any public interest. A public interest litigation is for the benefit of the public. The relief is not confined to the person who files writ petition but he seeks relief which is for a large section of public. A prospective allottee cannot claim any locus standi to contest a release application on the principle which has been enunciated by the Supreme Court In the matters of public interest litigation. 11. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is based on public policy and lis an Act in rem and it is a piece of legislation for giving benefit to the public. He placed reliance upon P. Oasa Muni Reddy v. P. Appa Rao, 1974 (2) SCO 723, Rajendra Singh v. District Judge, Kanpur, 1986 (1) ARC 116 and Kaushalpurl v. Jyoti Prasad, 1979 U.P. RCC 88. These cases lay down that U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is beneficial legislation providing protection to the tenants on sound public policy. These cases, however, do not lay down that a prospective allottee has a right to be Inducted as tenant. 12. THE second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that he has a right to lead evidence t show falsehood of a landlord while making averments in the release application or in opposition to evidence led by the landlord in support of his release application. If a prospective allottee has not been given a right to contest release application he cannot be given a right to lead evidence in support of his objection to the release application. It is contended that there will be nothing to show before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the evidence adduced by the landlord is false or he has concealed material facts. The Act gives sufficient power to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to take evidence under Section 34 of the Act.
It is contended that there will be nothing to show before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the evidence adduced by the landlord is false or he has concealed material facts. The Act gives sufficient power to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to take evidence under Section 34 of the Act. Section 34 of the Act provides that the District Magistrate, Prescribed Authority or any appellate or revising; authority shall, for the purpose of holding enquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under the Act, have the same powers as are vested in Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of matters as enumerated under that Section, In that process it is for him to take such evidence as he considers fit. 13. HE has further been empowered to get enquiry conducted through Rent Control Inspector under Sub-rule (I) of Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act in respect of any building which, is alleged to be vacant and in respect of other building also under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act. The power to take evidence by the District Magistrate while; considering the application for release under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act is very wide and he can take evidence from any source including from a prospective allottee but prospective allottee cannot claim any right to adduce evidence. This will further depend upon the nature of evidence adduced in the case, The affidavit is mere assertion of facts on oath and there may be counter assertion in another affidavit. These affidavits may not provide any clinching: material to form a definite opinion regarding veracity of facts. 14. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon Ram Kumar v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Meerut, 1993 (1) ARC 309, wherein the Court observed that Rent Control and Eviction Officer has power to take into Consideration the affidavit filed by this prospective allottee. In this case affidavits were filed by the prospective allottee and after taking into consideration such affidavits the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had rejected the release application. The landlord filed revision against that order and the revising authority allowed the application holding that the affidavits filed by the prospective allottee were to be ignored.
In this case affidavits were filed by the prospective allottee and after taking into consideration such affidavits the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had rejected the release application. The landlord filed revision against that order and the revising authority allowed the application holding that the affidavits filed by the prospective allottee were to be ignored. The Court observed :- "I have considered (he rival contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and, in my opinion, there is no dispute about the legal position of prospective allottee that he could not be allowed to contest the application for release in sense and in the manner the contest is usually taken before the Court. To be more clear, he could not be allowed to file an objection and could not be allowed to adduce evidence in support of the same but the question remains as to whether any material which has been brought by him on record by means of an affidavit or otherwise showing that the application jnoved by the landlord was malafide and it could not be allowed should that be ignored on the ground that prospective allottee has no right to contest the release application". In the ultimate analysis the Court held that the prospective allottee has no light to lead evidence but the authority may place reliance upon any evidence accepted by him and may adopt such procedure as may be relevant and necessary in the circumstances of the case. This case also does not lay down the principle that a prospective allottee has a right to lead evidence. 15. IN the instant case Rent Control and Eviction Officer after taking into consideration the extent of the accommodation of the landlord and his family members came to the conclusion that the landlord required the disputed accommodation. The petitioner had filed an affidavit that the landlord was unmarried and in the application he had wrongly mentioned that he was married. According to the petitioner this question could be decided by taking evidence. The petitioner further contended that the landlord does not have any children. The petitioner had only filed the affidavit and there was no cogent evidence to prove his assertion. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer after making necessary enquiry from the Rent Control Inspector and other relevant record found that the landlord is married. He has three children and two unmarried sisters.
The petitioner had only filed the affidavit and there was no cogent evidence to prove his assertion. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer after making necessary enquiry from the Rent Control Inspector and other relevant record found that the landlord is married. He has three children and two unmarried sisters. He determined these facts after taking into consideration the evidence which was before him and the finding could not be said to be perverse or based on no evidence. 16. THE Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not commit any manifest error of law in recording finding that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine. In the result there is no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.