JUDGMENT - Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J.:---This writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is challenging the order of the Revenue secretary dated 21-7-1989 which has affirmed the order of the Mamlatdar of Tiswadi taluka dated 16-8-1988 whereby the learned Mamlatdar in exercise of the powers vested on him under sub-section (3)-A(c) of section 26 of the Goa, Daman and diu agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter called the Act) declared the petitioners along with the respondent No. 3 as beneficiaries of the bund "Sancorla", situated at Naroa. 2. The petitioners case is that the respondent No. 3 is the owner of a paddy field known as owners in possession of a garden property coconut trees, mango trees, jackfruit trees and teak trees situated to the west of the said paddy field of respondent No.3 The said property which is known as "Ambrem", Kharadi" and "Ponta" is bearing survey Nos. 3/1 46/3 and 5/1. The paddy field "sancorla" has a protectice bund running marginal to the river Mandovi all along its length. The survey records indicate that the area of the said paddy field is 11.34 hectares In pursuance to the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 26 of the Act the then Government of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu by Notification dated 23-1-1981 declared the said bund as a protective bund. The said Notification was published in the Government . Gazette on 5-2-1981. As there were breaches in the bund the respondent No. 3 by application dated 9-4-1980 made to the director of Agriculture, Soil Conservatuion Division, requested that the bund be repaired by the Government in order to safeguard the yearly produce as well as the growth of the land. It was claimed in the said application that the protective bund of the pady field was in a condition of unsafety to the fieldfor over 15 years due to the continuous movement of the barges. It was claimed in the said application that the protective bund of the pady field was in a condition of unsafety to the fieldfor over 15 years due to the continuous movement of the barges. In pursuance of the said application, the respondent No. 2 Mamlatdar made an order dated 20-9-1980 requesting the director of Agricultural to take up the work of repairs of the bund after mentioning that the respondent No. 3 has conveyed his inability to repair the bund defending his paddy field " sancorla" In the said order the Mamlatdar further directed that the expenditures incurred with the repairs should be recovered from the beneficiaries of the paddy field "sancorla" It was stated that the petitioner No. 1s husband was alive at the relevant time and despite of that he was not made aparty to the order or poceedings. Subsequent to it the Soil Conservation Division addressed a letter to the respondent No. 3 dated 24-2-1983 concerning the repairs of the bund with reference to his letter to the respondent No. 3 dated 24-2-1983 informing him that in pursuance of his application the bund had been surveyed and an estimate for a total work was worked out for Rs. 49,970 which was technically sanctioned by the Executive Engineer on 6-6-1980. Therefore, the Mamlatdar directed to take up the work in September, 1980 but the work was not taken up. The bund was declared as protective bund only in January, 1981. During the lapse of about 6 months the bund breached at many places and therefore a fresh survey was conducted and a detailed estimate for 300 metres was worked out at Rs. 46,696/- Thereafter the Mamlatdar issued a directive to take up the work under order dated 27-5-1982. Then accordingly tenders were called for repairs of the bund of the paddy field "Sancorla" and accordingly the repairs were carried out. The petitioners have also stated that as the respondent No. 3 had inundated the paddy field " Sancorla" causing damages to their property due to infiltration of saline water in his garden they along with the first petitioners late husband and her late mother-in-law filed a civil suit in the District Court, Panaji, bearing No. 42/82 against the respondent No. 3 and the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu for damages. The respondent No. 3 resisted the suit claiming that the breaches in the bund had occurred due to the constant movement of the barges along the Mandovi river. The suit was partly allowed and the respondent No. 3 was restrained from flooding the petitioners property. However,as it was held that there was no negligence on the part of the respondent No. 3 proved by the petitioners, the claim for damages against him was disallowed. It seems that the respondent No.3 after the order declaring the bund as a protective bund and in view of the aftermath of the suit tried to take advantage of the fact of the petitioners having contended in their suit that the imundation of the paddy field "Sancorla" of the respondent No. 3 was causing damage to their property. That in view of that contention it was clear that the petitioners were also the beneficiaries of the bund so as to make them to share the expenses of its repairs. The petitioners have stated that the respondent no. 3 in his written statement in the suit had averred that the bund was constructed by his ancestors, thus practically claiming ownership of the bund and at the same time contended that the petitioners had nothing to do with the said bund. Consequent upon the order of the Mamlatdar dated 20-9-1980 the Government repaired the bund for Rs. 40,000/- and odd out of which the Government had borne half of the costs of the repairs while the other half was to be paid by the beneficiaries of the bund. It was acting upon the respondent no. 3s application to the Government after the repairs were carried on that the petitioners should be held also as the beneficiaries of the bund, that the impugned order was purported to be passed by the mamlatdar in the exercise of the powers vested on him under sub-section (3) -A (c) if section 26 of the Act. 3. 3s application to the Government after the repairs were carried on that the petitioners should be held also as the beneficiaries of the bund, that the impugned order was purported to be passed by the mamlatdar in the exercise of the powers vested on him under sub-section (3) -A (c) if section 26 of the Act. 3. Shri Bruto D Costa, learned Counsel for the petitioners first grievance is that neither at the stage when the bund was declared as a protective bund nor when the Mamlatdar directed the Department of Agriculture to carry on the repairs no when the estimates were prepared nor even when the actual repairs were done, the petitioners were intimated of made parties to any proceedings involving those repairs nor when the estimates were prepared nor even when the actual repairs were done, the petitioners were intimated or made parties to any proceeding involving those repairs. Indeed when the respondent No. 3 made the application dated 4-12-1986 to the Mamlatdar to the effect that the petitioners also should be declared as beneficiaries they had given their say on the application which was replied by them on 12-2-1987. The learned Counsel then submitted that the first order of the Mamlatdar dated 20-9-1980 clearly refers to the bund as defending the paddy field "Sancorla" belonging to the respondent No.3 and directs that the expenditure to be incured with the repairs of the said bund should be recovered from the beneficiaries of the said pady field. The learned Counsel points out that nowhere the order makes anu mention to the beneficiaries of the repaired bund but instead it is expressly stated in the order that the expenditure is to be recovered from the beneficiaries of the paddy field "Sancorla" Besides a copy of this order was marked to the respondent No. 3 alone and not to any other owner or owners of the property or properties adjoining to the said paddy field. Similarly in the letter dated 24th February, 1983 addressed by the director of Agriculture to the respondent No. 3 in which the estimate of the costs of repairs has ben prepared that same makes reference to the undertaking given by respondent No. 3 in his petition that the remaining portion of the bund to the undertaking given by respondent No. 3 in his petiotion that the remaining portion of the bund to the extesnt of 200 metres which did not require any repairs would be maintained by the respondent No. 3 himself. The learned Counsel urged that thereafter when he received the notice consequent upon the letter of respondent No. 3 dated 4-12-1986 he pointed out to the Mamlatdar the contents of the order dated 20-9-19800 which was clearly restricted only to the beneficiaries of the paddy field and not to the owners of any gardens like the property belonging to the petitioners, In the said reply it was also brought to the attention of the Mamlatdar that the repairs were concerning to the protective bund of paddy field "Sancorla" The petitioners also pointed out that in the written statement field by the respondent No.3 to the suit instituted by the petitioners in the Civil Court the respondent No,3 had taken a stand that the bund which was the subject-matter of the repairs had been constructed by his ancestors to protect the paddy field "Sancorla" Inspite of that the Mamlatdar by his impugned order dated 16-8-1988 which was confirmed by the Revenue Secretary under challenge held that the petitioners were liable to share that costs of the repairs on the ground that they were also the beneficiaries of the repaired bund. It was further contended that the bund starts and ends with the respondent No. 3s paddy field and "Sancorla" its area is shown as 11.34 hectares. The learned Counsel made also a grievance that the impugned order of the Mamlatdar has grossly distorted the real scope and the field of the beneficiaries of the repairs for the purpose of determining the liability of those who were bound to share the burden of the expenditure incurred with the said repairs by misconstruing the contents of the earlier order with reference to the beneficiaries of the paddy field which he wanted to read it as referring to the beneficiaries of the repairs of the bund. It was urged by the learned Counsel that there is also no document to show that the repaired bunds name is also "Sancorla".Besides the respondent No 3s plea in his written statement to the suit filed by the petitioners that the bund was constructed by his ancestors clearly anounts to his acknowledging that the bund falls in his paddy field" Sancorla" The learned Counsel also took exception to the line of arguments adopted by the Mamlatdar to the effect that since the petitioners have complained that they were prejudiced by the breach of the bound obviously they were deemed to be held ad beneficiaries of its repairs. Further and in the absence of the clear finding and not only a apolitical one as recorded by the Mamlatdar that the petitioners were the beneficiaries of the repairs it was not open to him to make the petitioners liable for the costs of its expenditure and the Revenue Secretary also in the impugned order has fallen in the same error to the extent that he agreed with the opinion of the Mamlatdar that the liability to share the costs would aries to the petitioners because they were also the beneficiaries of the bound. The learned Counsel thus submitted that what both the Mamlatdar and the Revenue Secretary have done while passing the impugned orders is neither according to the provisions of the Act nor of the Rules. Therefore, both the impugned decisions were bound to be unsettled so much so even on the facts the Mamlatdar could not come to the conclusion that the petitioners were liable to share the expenses since admittedly the bound was only protecting the paddy field and the petitioners land was a garden situated bad falling beyond the said padded field. This much according to the learned Counsel has been acknowledged by the very Mamlatdar himself in his initial order which has been confined by him to the paddy field "sanctuary" only. Hence, at the most the learned Counsel said the Mamlatdar could have enquired who were the actual owners or tenants of that paddy field " Sanctuary" and was not supposed to extend the liability to any other property besides the paddy field "Sanctuary" 4. Shri Lotlikar, learned Counsel for the respondents, has raised the question of the maintainability of the petition. It is on the ground that the same was involving disputed questions of facts. Shri Lotlikar, learned Counsel for the respondents, has raised the question of the maintainability of the petition. It is on the ground that the same was involving disputed questions of facts. According to the learned Counsel this petition was not an appropriate remedy in this case. The question as to whether the petitioners were or not beneficiaries or whether the petitioners property was or not kher land is a question affect which could not be decided in a writ petition. That apart, the learned Counsel submitted, under Clause (d) of sub-section (3)-A of section 26 from any order passed under sub-section (3)-A an appeal would lie to the Government whose deciouse was final. Therefore the question of who is the beneficiary could not be adjudicated in a writ petition. The learned Counsel further urged that a show cause notice had been given to the petitioner No. 1st late husband as to why he should not be declared as one of the beneficiaries. He filed his reply on 12-2-1987 and nowhere he disputed the position that he was the beneficiary of the repairs nor did he contend that his land was Kjajan of kher land. Therefore, it was impermissible for the petitioners for the petitioners in this writ petition to take pleas which involve disputed question of facts after the concerned authorities had decided the matter on the basis of evidence. The learned Counsel contended that even in this writ petition the petitioners had not stated that the land was not khajan or khar land. My attention was invited to section 2(11)(ii) and (iii) according to which khajan land means low land situated near creeks or river sides and kher land means land having adequate irrigation or drainage facilities. It was then contended that nowhere in the definition it was said that gardens could be near creeks or near river sides or even low lands or having adequate irrigation or drainage facilities. The finding of the Mamlatdar was that the petitioners land was benefited by the repairs of the bound and apart from not die-casting this finding the petitioners have not produced also any survey plan of their property to establish its actual features vis-a-vis the river side. The finding of the Mamlatdar was that the petitioners land was benefited by the repairs of the bound and apart from not die-casting this finding the petitioners have not produced also any survey plan of their property to establish its actual features vis-a-vis the river side. The learned Counsel has also urged that under Clause (c) of sub-section (3)-A of section 26 of the Act the Mamlatdar has to determine who are the actual beneficiaries of the repairs of protective bound and being so the be beficiaries of the repairs need not be only those who are the owners of properties immediately adjoining to a protective bound It is a question of fact to determine who is actually and reasonably protected by the bound and benefited by its repairs. The petitioners have not produced anything to show that their property was not adjacent to the bound and /or that the same was not protected by the said bound. The learned Counsel urged that the correct position on the matter of repairs in terms of section 26 was that first of all the Mamlatdar had to be satisfied about the necessity of repairs and only then he was required to direct the Soil Conservation Department to carry on the repairs. At the stage of making such order the Mamlatdar was not supposed to address to the issue as to who were the beneficiaries of those repairs, Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the description of the beneficiaries of the bound made in the order dated 20-9-1980 directing the Government to execute the repairs is not conclusive and does not proclude the Mamlatdar from re-opening the question at a later stage. Thus the question of deciding who are the be beficiaries lies only after the repairs are completed. Besides the petitioners were heard before they were declared beneficiaries of the repairs. Thus the question of a party making an application to the Mamlatdar to determine who are the beneficiaries becomes irrelevant because the Mamlatdar can act upon suo motu and what the respondent No. 3 has done by his application is only to alert him to the necessity of the repairs and to convey his inability to carry on the same on his own. Being so the exercise done by the Mamlatdar was fully within his jurisdiction. Being so the exercise done by the Mamlatdar was fully within his jurisdiction. It was further contended by the learned Counsel that the question or necessity of repairs was beyond and doubt and the petitioners themselves have so acknowledged when a suit was filed by them against the respondent No. 3 and the Government in the Civil Court by complaining that they were prejudiced by the flooding of the paddy field. It would therefore not lie in the petitioners mouth to say now that they were not the beneficiaries of the repairs. The plea of the petitioners in the Civil Court to the effect that the respondent No. 3 has neglected the repairs was negativated irrespective of the fact that this circumstance had no relevancy on the question of the petitioners liability to contribute to the repairs of the bound as per the order of the Mamlatdar which was passed by him under the powers conferred under Clause (c) of sub-section (3)-A of section 26 of the Act. 5. In order to appreciate the submissions of the learned Counsel it is pertinent to look at the very scheme of section 26 of the Act, namely, its sub-section (3)-A and proviso thereto. 6. Section 26(3) reads that in the case of Khajan and kher lands the duty and responsibility of carrying out works of maintenance, repair and conservancy of banks, bunds or ridges of tanks or rivers or other sources of irrigation shall be that of the tenant and the landlord shall not be liable to make any contribution to the cost of such works. This provision clearly refers to the tenant only and imposes on him the duty to maintain the bunds and to share the cost of its repairs. Indeed the first proviso to sub-section (3) specifies that in the case of repairs to breaches in bunds which may be specified by Government as protective bunds, the Government shall on certain conditions contribute a sum not less than 50%. However, the said proviso nowhere exempts the tenant in principle from sharing the entire responsibility of the cost of the repairs which are required for the maintenance of the bunds. However, the said proviso nowhere exempts the tenant in principle from sharing the entire responsibility of the cost of the repairs which are required for the maintenance of the bunds. However, under sub-section (3)-A, Clause (a) whenever it appears to Mamlatdar that any of the works of maintenance, repair and conservancy referred to in sub-section (3) have been neglected for any reason whatsoever he may, by order in writing, direct that the works shall be carried out by such person as may be specified and the cost thereof sub-section clearly refers to a situation of neglected on the part of the one who was bound to execute (3) is the tenant alone has failed to do his duty by neglecting to execute the repairs or maintenance works for any reason whatsoever, the Mamlatdar can direct that the works be done by any person as specified by him in the order in which case the costs are to be recovered from the beneficiaries of the work which was executed. Proviso to the said sub-section says that in case of repairs to which the Act does not apply, the cost of repairs incurred as a result of such negligence may also be recovered from such person as may be named in the order of the Mamlatdar. This means that in case the bound is a protective bound and the breach has occurred on account of negligence on the part of the owner of any land to which the Act does not apply, the cost of its repairs when ordered by the Mamlatdar can also be recovered from the said owner who has contributed with his negligence for the breaches in the said bound. In that case the said person or owner is to be named in the very order of the Mamlatdar directing such repairs. It is thus clear that in terms of sub-section (3)-A(a) it is only when the tenant neglects to do his duty of looking after the maintenance and repairs of the bound that the Mamlatdar assumes jurisdiction to order the repairs to be executed by the third person, namely, the Government and direct that the costs should be taken from beneficiaries of the repairs. Therefore sub-section (3)-A(a) applies exclusively to tenant while under the proviso if branches in the protective bound are due to the fault or negligence of the owner of any land protected by the bound and to which the Act does not apply the recovery of the costs can be made also from that person which is to be named in the order itself. Hence sub-section (3)-A(a) is different in its scope from the proviso. 7. Being so I find lot of merit in the submission of Shri B.DCosta, learned Counsel for the petitioners, when he contends that under the general provision of section 26 the first issue which the Mamlatdar has to address is to find out whether there is a situation of neglect or negligence in the maintenance of a bound. Only then he must find out as to whether the one who is guilty of such neglect or negligence is or not tenant. At that stage an order must follow specifying that the repairs should be done by a third agency and directing that its costs be recovered from the tenant. It is only under the proviso that the Mamlatdar is entitled to direct, in case the breach occurs on protective bound due to the negligence of the owner, that such costs be recovered from the owner himself. According to learned Counsel nowhere in the impugned order it is shown that the Mamlatdar has addressed to this issue before making the same. The learned Counsel urged that this finding of neglect would amount to a charge of guilt directed either against the tenant or owner and hence the concerned persons should always be a party in the proceedings before such an order was passed. No finding of guilty could be thus given against them in the absence of they being heard on this aspect. The learned Counsel is therefore right when he submits that the whole foundation of the power vested on the Mamlatdar to direct the works of the repairs to be done by somebody other than the tenant who is duty bound to look after its maintenance is the negligence either of the tenant or of the owner of a land responsible for any breach in the bound. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention that in the present case there was an application of respondent No. 3, as the owner of the paddy field "Senatorial", addressed to the Mamlatdar complaining that due to the barges movement damages had been caused to the bound adjacent to its paddy field which he could not repair and therefore, the Government should be directed to carry on such repairs. He has said that this type of situation or application did not appear to be contemplated any where in section 26. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on the rules framed under the Act, namely, Rule 12(a) which refers to the conditions and the manner in which contributions towards the costs of repairs to the bound shall be made by the Government and provides that the costs of the repairs protecting a khajan or kher land payable under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 26 may be paid by the Government thus contemplating two situations, namely, (1) When somebody makes the repairs and asks for directions from the Government and (2) When the Mamlatdar himself entrusts the work of repairs to the Government. Sub-rule (8) to Rule 12-A applies in case of sub-section (3)-A of section 26 and provides for a certificate to be issued by the Soil Conservation Division of the Directorate of Agriculture regarding the completion of the work to be sent to the Mamlatdar containing amongst other details, the particulars of the land benefited by the bound (Clause ii). Sub-rules (9) and (10) lay the procedure for determination of the liability. According to the learned Counsel when the initial order was made by the Mamlatdar in 1980 directing the Soil and Conservation Division to take up the work of repairs the Mamlatdar was expected to act in pursuance of that certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture. Since neither the Act nor its rules contemplate any application to be made by an interested party requiring the Mamlatdar to determine who are the beneficiaries of the repairs all that the Mamlatdar could do was on the basis of the aforesaid certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture. 8. It thus follows that both the orders of the Mamlatdar as well as of the Revenue Secretary appears to be neither according to the provisions of the Act not to the Rules. 8. It thus follows that both the orders of the Mamlatdar as well as of the Revenue Secretary appears to be neither according to the provisions of the Act not to the Rules. Further on facts also the Mamlatdar could have also not come to the conclusion that the petitioners were liable to share the cost of the repairs because admittedly the bound was only protecting the paddy field "sanctuary" as mentioned in the order dated 20-9-1980 and nowhere in the order it was said that the petitioners land which is garden land and falling beyond the paddy field was also protected by the bound. This much appears to emerge from the aforesaid order which is ostensibly confined to the paddy field "senatorial" only. In the circumstances at the most the Mamlatdar could have inquired as to who were the owners and/or tenant of the said paddy field "Senatorial". Thus the submissions of the learned Counsel in this respect appears to be correct and deserving acceptance. Indeed from the letter dated 9-4-1980 addressed by respondent No. 3 to the Director of Agriculture, Panaji, (Soil Conservation Division) which preceded the order 20-9-1980 it is seen that he claims to be the owner of a field situated at Naroa "the bund of which" (sic) is in condition of unsafety for over 15 years due to the continuous movement of barges. This, in my view, amounts to a clear acknowledgment by him that the bund makes part of the said field. In other words the respondent No. 3 in this application claims ownership of the bund along with the paddy field and then makes the request that the repairs of the bund be done by the Government. It is subsequent to this application that we find the Mamlatdars order dated 20th September, 1980 which in so many words makes it clear that as a result of the information given by the respondent No. 3, the owners and the tenant of the paddy field "Sancorla", that he is not in a position to repair the bund defending the said field and the request that the same be undertaken by the Director of Agriculture through its Soil Conservation Division, a direction is made to the Government to take up the works of repairs. A further direction is given in the same order that the expenditure to be incurred should be recovered from the beneficiaries of the paddy field "Sancorla". A copy of the said order was then marked to respondent No. 3 for information with reference to this letter dated 9-4-1980. The record also shows that on 24th February, 1983 the Director of Agriculture addressed a letter to the respondent No. 3 with regard to the same subject of repairs of the bund "defending" the paddy field "Sancorla" wherein an express mention is made to the respondents prayer that the repairs of the bund be executed by the Government but this time restricted to a length of 300 meters only which, according to the respondent, was being affected by the movement of the barges while at the same time it records the respondents readiness to look after the maintenance of the remaining portion of the bund in a length of 200 meters. The said letter thus reflects the stand taken by the respondent No.3 before the concerned authorities on the matter of the necessity of the repairs required to be done in the suit bund in order to protect his paddy field and indicates that the respondent No. 3 has always considered himself as being the owner of the said bund whose partial maintenance he agreed to shoulder.This much is shown to have been recorded in the order of the Mamlatdar dated 20th September, 1980 which again refers to the suit bund as "defending the paddy field Sancorla" whereby the work of repairs of 300 meters length was directed to be undertaken by the Director of Agriculture and wherein the Mamlatdar records once again the undertaking given by the respondent No. 3 to maintain the remaining portion of the bund. The said undertaking is otherwise in consonance with the plea which the respondent No. 3 had already made at the time he filed his written statement while contesting the suit of the petitioner to the effect that the bund in question was constructed by his predecessor-in-title for the purpose of protecting the paddy field "Sancorla" and therefore the petitioners had nothing to do with the said bund further stating that the respondent had always repaired and maintained the bund, as faer as possible during the past years in order to save the property"Sancorla". Being so it seems that the Mamlatdar was absolutely not justified in holding that the petitioners wrer also the beneficiaries of the repairs of the bund. if the bund, according to the Mamlatdar, was protecting the paddy field "Sancorla" the question of its repairs benefiting any other property does not seem to arise at all. 9. On the other hand none of the submissions canvassed by the respondents learned Counsel appears to be sound or well conceived. At the very outset the objection thrown by the learned Counsel that the petition was raising disputed questions of fact which could not be dealt with unfer writ jurisdiction is impermissible. In this regard, the learned Counsel has not been able to exactly pinpoint the facts required for the determination of the controversy involved in this petition which, according to him, were deemed to be disputed. Obviously the petitioners have referred to some facts but it is more than clear that the facts relied upon by them were only for the purpose of demonstrating that both the authorities below have grossly misinterpreted the relevant provisions of the law and erroneously applied the same to the facts of the case. 10. The next submision about the finality of the order passed in appeal by the Government does not seem also to carry any substance and therefore requires no much elaboration. It is indeed a settled position that under Article 227 writ jurisdiction is always available when orders passed by courts or tribunals are perverse on facts or in law or when the jurisdiction of the said Courts and tribunals has ben exercised without the authority of law by misinterpreting the relevant provisions of the Act. 11. It is indeed a settled position that under Article 227 writ jurisdiction is always available when orders passed by courts or tribunals are perverse on facts or in law or when the jurisdiction of the said Courts and tribunals has ben exercised without the authority of law by misinterpreting the relevant provisions of the Act. 11. So far the other submissions with regard to the finding of the Mamlatdar that the late husband of the petitioner No. 1 was one of the beneficiaries of he repairs of the bund and the contention of the learned Counsel that at the initial stage the Mamlatdar had only to satisfy himself about the necessity of the repairs and was not thus supposed to deal with the aspect of who are the beneficiaries of the repairs because, according to him this question would arise only after the repairs are completed, I must say that the same appear to be the result of a misconception on the part of the learned Counsel in respect of the correct interpretation of the concerned provisions of the Act. At the cost of repetition we have to se that the Act lays down in section 26(3) who is responsible to carry on the repairs of a bund and clearly states that the duty and responsibility of these repairs is of the tenant. Therefore when sub-section(3) -A(a) speaks of neglect to do the work of maintenance and repairs of the bund it obviously refers to the neglect of the tenant who has the duty and responsibility to execute whatever works are necessary for the maintenance of the bund. The learned Counsel seems to have overlooked the distinction between sub-section(3) sub-section(3)-A (a) and the proviso to the said sub-section . Thus while sub-section (3)-A (a) has to be read along with sub-section (3) the proviso to sub-section(3)-A (a) is altogether an independent provision. The learned Counsel obviously missed this important aspect as well as the fact that the crucial point to be decided first by the Mamlatdar was to find out whether the repairs required to be done on the bund were due to neglect either of the tenant in which case sub-section (3)-A(a) would apply, or of the owber in which case the proviso to sub-section (3)-A would be attached. It is only when the neglect or negligence had been determined that the Mamlatdar could assume jurisdiction to order that the repairs of the bund be done through the Government or any third agency and therefore the question of fixing the liability for these repairs would arise at that stage. Hence I am of the firm view that there was no scope for the Mamlatdar to belatedly re-determine in the impugned order who were the beneficiaries of the repairs because that was required to be decided earlier along with the question as to who was responsible for the neglect in carrying of the said repairs. 12. Viewed the things in this light it can be seen that in the instant case there is no finding recorded by the Mamlatdar in the original order dated 20-9-1980 to the effect that there has been any neglect in carrying on the repairs in the bund. Being so it is clear that the Mamlatdar while directing that the repairs should be carried on by the Soil Conservation Division has acted without jurisdiction and the entire exercise in this regard seems to be bad. Admittedly the repairs were sought to be done by the respondent No. 3who has alleged to be the owner of the paddy field which was being protected by the suit bund. The respondent No. 3 was certainly not the tenant of the paddy field although it appears that he was cultivating the same. The repairs were executed by the Government consequent upon an order of the Mamlatdar without specifying under what provision of the Act such direction was given or could be given by him to the Government for the purpose. We have already seen that under section 26 such order could have been issued only after the Mamlatdar had arrived at the conclusion that somebody had neglected to execute the required repairs either under sub-section (3)-A(a) or under the proviso to the said sub-section. In the facts of the case it seems that the said order was to be passed by the Mamlatdar under the said proviso since admittedly the paddy field had no tenants. In the facts of the case it seems that the said order was to be passed by the Mamlatdar under the said proviso since admittedly the paddy field had no tenants. The proviso stipulates that in the order itself the Mamlatdar was required to name the person responsible for the neglect in case the repairs to the protective bund wrer necessitated on account of the negligence of the owner of the land to which the Act does not apply, thus impliedly meaning that the land was being protected by the said bund, so as to enable the recovery of the costs of the repairs from the person so named in the aforesaid order. Being so it follows that the Mamlatdar, while passing the initial order dated 20-9-1980, has fallen in a totally wrong procedure. The question of determining who were the beneficiaries of the repairs would arise only if the Mamlatdar had come to the conclusion that the breaches in the bund were due to the negligence or neglect either of the tenant in terms. of sun-section (3)-A(a) read with sub-section (3) of section 26 of the Act or of the owner of the Therefore since there was no tenant to the paddy field admittedly by the protective bund, the order dated 20-9-1980 could have been passed by the Mamlatdar only under the proviso to sub-section (3) -A (a) of the Act. Instead it is shown that the Mamlatdar chose to pas the order without even investigating on the causes of the damages which have neccesitated the repairs or holding that the same were due to neglect of the owner of the land protected by the bund. Such order appears to be lacking any jurisdiction and being so the second part of the order, which expressly refers to the recovery of the costs of the repairs from the beneficiaries of the paddy field could, at the most, relate only to those who were supposed to be named in an order to be passed under the aforesaid proviso. By merely saying that the expenditure incurred should be recovered from the beneficiaries of the paddy field "Sancorla" the Mamlatdar has obviously excluded by implication everybody else other than the owner of the said paddy field. By merely saying that the expenditure incurred should be recovered from the beneficiaries of the paddy field "Sancorla" the Mamlatdar has obviously excluded by implication everybody else other than the owner of the said paddy field. The argument of Shri Lotlikar that the reference to the beneficiaries of the "paddy field" made by the Mamlatdar in the order dated 20-9-1980 is only descriptive and aimed at indentifying the bund to be repaired is fallacious because there was no question of describing the bund which has been properly identified by respondent No.3 and for that matter by the Mamlatdar himself who has described the bund as protecting the paddy field"Sancorla" belonging to the respondent No. 3 and situated at Naora of Tiswadi Taluka. This being the position. I am in agreement with the learned Counsel for the petitioners when he contends that the order of the Mamlatdar, dated 16th August,1988, which is impugned along with the order of the Revenue Secretary also under challenge is not an order meant to determine who was liable to incur such expenses had to share the burden of the said expenditure. The powers of the Mamlatdar at this stage would be only to share the liability with regard to the costs of the said repairs. It was at the time of passing of the first order that the Mamlatdar could and should have, in terms of the proviso, named those persons who were liable to pay the costs of the repairs. Since the said order was confined only to the owner of the paddy field the order of the Mamlatdar dated 16th August, 1988 is obviously bad and without any authority of law when purportedly, under sub-section (3)-A(c) of section 26 he sought to declare the petitioners also as the beneficiaries of the protective bund defending the paddy field of respondent No. 3 Thus, in my judgment, the impugned order of the Revenue Secretary upholding the order dated 16-8-1988 is also a wrong order, which seems to have been made without any application of mind being instead entirely bases on clear misconceptions both with regard to the relevant facts as well as to the prevailing law in force. 13. In the result the petition is allowed and the order of the Revenue Secretary dated 27-1989 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs. Petition allowed. *****