A. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the parties are represented by their respective learned Advocates. Heard the submissions of the learned Advocates for both sides at length. By this Revisional Application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Code) the petitioner-accused (hereinafter referred to as accused) has prayed the Court for quashing of the relevant proceedings, being G. R. Case No. 1813 of 1978, arising out of Barasat P. S. Case No. 90 dated 27. 8. 1978, before the Special Judge at Barasat on the grounds made out therein, mainly on the ground of inordinate delay in the trial of the relevant case, infringing his right to speedy trial, as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) IT is contended by the accused that he had joined the West Bengal Health Service as a Surgical Specialist on 1. 5. 1967 and was posted at Jhargram Sub-Divisional Hospital, Midnapore. He had also served as Officiating Sub-Divisional Medical Officer in the said Hospital between 1969 and 1973, in addition to his duty as a Surgical Specialist. He had thereafter joined the Barasat Sub- Divisional Hospital on transfer on 19. 2. 1973 and had opted for a practising post; and was accordingly given permission for private practice by the authorities concerned. He served the said Hospital till 15. 1. 1979 on transfer to Bhatpara State General Hospital. ( 3 ) ON Pradip Chakraborty had lodged a First Information Report with the Barasat Police Station against him on 27. 8. 1978 at about 1. 45 a. m. to the effect that he came to know that one Abdul Lagit of Khilkapur, father of Gaffar Ali, who was admitted to the Barasat Sub-Divisional Hospital and had been under the treatment of the accused. The accused had demanded Rs. 150/- from him for his proper treatment. On 26. 8. 1978 at about 22. 15 hours one Sri Ali Logit, accompanied by one Sri Sh,y;1!ual Chakraborty, had offered the accused Rs. 70/- only, which was received by him. On such allega lions the aforesaid Barasat P. S. Case No. 90 dated 27. 8. 1978 was started against the accused for alleged offences punishable under Section 161, I. P. C. , and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. As noted, the relevant case was started as far back as 27. 8. 1978. On such allega lions the aforesaid Barasat P. S. Case No. 90 dated 27. 8. 1978 was started against the accused for alleged offences punishable under Section 161, I. P. C. , and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. As noted, the relevant case was started as far back as 27. 8. 1978. It is submitted by the learned Advocates for both sides that the charge-sheet in the said case was submitted on 30. 7. 1984, after a little less than 6 years. It is neither disputed that not a single witness has thereafter been examined by the prosecution in connection with the relevant case. The relevant case is accordingly pending for about 10 years since the submission Of the charge-sheet therein without examination of any witness whatsoever. That being so, there could be little denying that there has indeed been an inordinate delay in the trial of the relevant case. ( 4 ) IT was in 1979 that the Honble Supreme Court had declared in Hussainara Khatoon that right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. A series of decisions had since thereafter reaffirmed the said principle and there seems to have never been a dissenting note there from. A Division Bench of this Court in Ranjit Kumar Pal v. The State had held about eleven years thereafter; that the broad interpretation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right of an accused to have speedy trial, further observing therein that the prosecution cannot have the luxury of dragging a case in a court of law for years together. It had further been held therein that long delay in the disposal of criminal proceeding prejudicially affects the defence of an accused. Administration of justice requires that the accused is entitled to have as much protection as the prosecution is entitled to. A Single Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shyam Lachmandas Ajmani v. The State of Maharashtra, had as well held that inordinate delay and laches in the prosecution without any progress of a criminal proceedings amounts to harassment of the accused warranting interference under inherent powers of the Court. In another Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in R. Mahadevan Iyer v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. In another Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in R. Mahadevan Iyer v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. , it had been held that criminal proceedings not completed even after a lapse of 12 years heavily prejudiced the accused in his defence in respect of the incidents extremely old in point of time. It had been held therein that the High Court is justified in quashing prosecution exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code if the right of speedy trials violated. The Orissa High Court in the decision in Rabindranath Rout v. The State of Orissa, had also quashed a criminal proceedings on the ground of delayed trial holding that the same constitutes denial of justice. In a Writ Petition, being No. 268 of 1987, and a few other Criminal Appeals, before a Division Bench of the Supreme Court. It was further urged on behalf of the accused that a time limit should be fixed for concluding and criminal proceedings as without such a time limit, the guarantee of right to speedy trial would remain in a mere platitude. The Division Bench was of the opinion that the said contention raised a very important constitutional question which is likely to arise more often in many cases and that the decision on the question would have far-reaching consequences in a large number of criminal cases pending in Courts all over the country. The Bench had accordingly directed the cases to he placed before a Constitution Bench. Before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antuly etc. etc. v. R. S. Nayak and Anr. etc. etc. it was contended that no fundamental right flows from Article 21. It was argued, it was only a facet of a fair and reasonable procedure guaranteed by Article 21 and nothing more. It was also argued that violation of this right docs not result in quashing of the charges and/or conviction. It was submitted that the right, if at all there is Onee, is an amorphous one, a right which is something less than other fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution. On the Other hand, proponents of the right wanted the Court to go a step forward and prescribe a time limit beyond. which no criminal proceeding should be; allowed to go on. Without such a limit, they submitted the right remains a mere illusion and a platitude. On the Other hand, proponents of the right wanted the Court to go a step forward and prescribe a time limit beyond. which no criminal proceeding should be; allowed to go on. Without such a limit, they submitted the right remains a mere illusion and a platitude. The Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision had held Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined, as quickly as possible, in the circumstances. The Court had further observed that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide for an early investigation and for a speedy and fair trial. If only the provisions of the Code are followed in their letter and spirit, there would be little room for any grievance. The fact, however, remains unpleasant, as it is, that in many cases, these provisions arc honoured more in breach. Be that as it may, it is sufficient to say that the Constitutional Guarantee of speedy trial emanating from Article 21 is property reflected in the provisions of the Code. Their Lordships in the aforesaid decision had issued certain guidelines in regard to speedy trial, some of which arc set out below: (1) One cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out; delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there must be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is-who is responsible for the delay! (2) Each and every delay docs not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. (2) Each and every delay docs not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. (3) "it is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U. S. A. too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial (4) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges of the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order - including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded -- as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. ( 5 ) BEARING the aforesaid principles of law in mind the aforesaid long delay in the trial of the relevant case pending since 27. 8. 1978 for about 16 years may itself be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice 10 the accused amounting to his persecution. ( 5 ) BEARING the aforesaid principles of law in mind the aforesaid long delay in the trial of the relevant case pending since 27. 8. 1978 for about 16 years may itself be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice 10 the accused amounting to his persecution. As held by the Supreme Court in A. R. Antulays case in every case of complaint of denial of right 10 speedy trial, as in the instant case, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. But unhappily for the prosecution no explanation whatsoever could be offered by them (prosecution) for such a long delay in the trial of such a case which could neither be justified by it. There is neither any whisper by the prosecution that the accused had made any contribution to the delay in the relevant proceedings. Regard being had to the nature of the alleged offence and the other relevant facts and circumstances in the instant case, it would indeed result in further persecutiollof the accused if the relevant, proceedings is allowed to continue even though there has been no progress whatsoever in the trial of the case for long 16 years. It would, therefore, be expedient in the interest of justice to quash the relevant proceedings. 6. In view of the discussions above, the Revisional Application succeeds. The relevant proceedings before the court below, being G. R. Case No. 1813 of 1978, arising out of Barasat P. S. Case No. 90 dated 27. 8. 1978, be hereby quashed. Let the petitioner-accused be discharged from his Bail Bond, if on bail. Petition allowed.