JUDGMENT R.A. Sharma 1. PETITIONER, who claims to be a Pradhan of Gaon Sabha, was suspended by the Sub Divisional Officer on 13-10-1992 (under section 95 (1) (gg) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Against this order he filed a revision which was dismissed by the Commissioner by order dated 2-11- 1993, It is against these two orders that this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. PETITIONER has also filed a supplementary affidavit along with which he has filed an order of the State Government dated 13th December 1993, whereby earlier notification dated 14th October, 1976, which was passed under section 96-A of the said Act, has been withdrawn/cancelled. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. As both Che parties have agreed that this writ petition may be disposed of without calling for counter affidavit, because no factual controversy is involved, it is being decided at admission stage. The power of removal as well as of suspension of a Pradhan under section 95 is vested in the Stabs Government and it is the State Government which has a right to remove or suspend a Pradhan. In exercise of power under section 96-A of the Act the Government vide notification dated 14- 10-1976 has delegated its power under section 95 (1) (g) (removal of Pradhan) and 95 (1) (gg) (suspension of Pradhan pending enquiry) to the Sub Divisional Officer. By the same notification provision for revision was made against the order of Sub Divisional Officer before the Commissioner. In view of the delegation of power by the above notification, the Sub Divisional Officer has suspended the petitioner, and the Commissioner has dismissed the revision of the petitioner. 3. BY delegating its power under section 95 of the Act to the Sub Divisional Officer, the Government] has not denuded itself of its power to suspend or remove a Pradhan under the above provision. The Sub Divisional Officer, while acting under section 93 (1) (g) or (gg) of the Act, exercises the power of the State Government and orders passed by him are, in law, the orders passed by the State Government itself. The Sub Divisional Officer, while acting under section 93 (1) (g) or (gg) of the Act, exercises the power of the State Government and orders passed by him are, in law, the orders passed by the State Government itself. Supreme Court in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503 , while dealing with effect of delegation of power by the State Government to an officer subordinate to it, laid down as under :- "The question then arises, when the Government delegates its power, for example, to entertain and decide an appeal under section 21 (4), to an officer and the officer pursuant to such delegation hears the appeal and makes an order, is the order an order of the officer or of the Government ? We thing it must be the order of the Government. The order is made under a statutory power. It is the statute which creates that power. The power can, therefore, be exercised only in terms of the statute and not otherwise. In this case the power is created by section 21 (4). That section gives a power to the Government. It would follow that an order made in exercise of that power will be the order of the Government for no one else has the right under the statute to exercise the power. No doubt the Act enables the Government to delegate its powers but such a power when delegated remains the power of the Government, for the Government can only delegate the power given to it by the statute and cannot create an independent power in the officer. When the delegate exercises the power, he does so for the Government. It is of interest to observe here that Wills J. said in Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 QBD 391 that "the word delegate means little more than an agent." An agent of course exercises no power of his own but only the powers of his principal. When the delegate exercises the power, he does so for the Government. It is of interest to observe here that Wills J. said in Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 QBD 391 that "the word delegate means little more than an agent." An agent of course exercises no power of his own but only the powers of his principal. Therefore, an order passed by an officer on delegation to him under section 41 (1) of the power of the Government under section 21 (4), is for the purpose of the Act, an order of the Government." As the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer suspending the petitioner is in the eye of law, the order of the State Government, it will not lapse after the order dated 13-12-1993, whereby the Government has rescinded its earlier notification dated 14th October,, 1976, whereby it delegated its powers to Sub Divisional Officer. This orders will remain intact subject to the order which may be passed by the Government or any other authority or officer to whom power may be delegated by the Government. 4. THE Commissioner dismissed the revision of the petitioner before 13-12-1993. THE orders passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, suspending the petitioner, and the Commissioner, dismissing the revision, cannot be said to be bad merely because the notification dated 14-10-1976 passed under section 96 -A of the Act delegating the power to the Sub Divisional Officer and conferring the revisional power on the Commissioner has been withdrawn subsequently. In the end learned counsel for the petitioner ha3 invited the attention of the Court to another order dated 13-12-1993, copy of which has been filed as annexure-2 to the supplementary affidavit. This order recites that in view of the declaration of the Chief Minister of the State, to the effect that power of suspending Gram Pradhans will not be exercised by the Sub Divisional Officers, the suspension orders of all Gram Pradhan shall remain stayed till alternative arrangements are made by the Government. Learned counsel for the petitioner has accordingly submitted for setting aside the order of suspension passed against the petitioner and has further prayed for appropriate direction to the respondents to enforces the above letter/order of the Government dated 13-12-1993. This request made by the learned counsel cannot be accepted. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has accordingly submitted for setting aside the order of suspension passed against the petitioner and has further prayed for appropriate direction to the respondents to enforces the above letter/order of the Government dated 13-12-1993. This request made by the learned counsel cannot be accepted. 5. BY order dated 13-12-1993 the Government has stayed all the orders of suspension passed against the Grain Pradhan all over the State. It is an omnibus order even though the orders of suspension were all individual. Pradhans were suspended by the Sub Divisional Officers by separate orders, in exercise of statutory power delegated to them under section 95 (1) (gg) of the Act. Such an omnibus order cannot be passed by the Government because it indicates non-application of mind to individual cases. Supreme Court in Km. Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P. AIR 1991 SC 537 , has depricated and set aside such an omnibus order, whereby appointments of all District Government Counsel in this State were terminated. Relevant extract from the said cases is reproduced below : "Non-application of mind to individual cases before issuing a general circular terminating all such appointments through out the State of U. P. is itself eloquent of the arbitrariness writ large on the face of the circular. It is obvious that issuance of the impugned circular was not governed by any rule but the whim or fancy of someone totally unaware of the requirements of rule of law." XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX "Viewed in any manner, the impugned circular dated 6-2- 90 is arbitrary. It terminates all the appointments of Government counsel in the districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh by an omnibus order, even though these appointments were all individual. No common reason applicable to all of them justifying their termination in one stroke on a reasonable ground has been shown," For the reasons given above, it is nod possible to issue writ of mandamus to the respondents for enforcing the aforesaid order of the Government dated 13-12-1993. 6. HOWEVER in this connection it may be mentioned that although petitioner was suspended by order dated 13-5-1992, but till now the proceedings under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act have not been concluded. 6. HOWEVER in this connection it may be mentioned that although petitioner was suspended by order dated 13-5-1992, but till now the proceedings under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act have not been concluded. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case this writ petition is disposed of with the following order : "Government of Uttar Pradesh, should conclude the proceedings under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act against the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order before it. In case these proceedings are not concluded within the time mentioned above, the petitioner will be reinstated forthwith, immediately after expiry of two months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order before the Government. It will be open to the petitioner to send certified copy of this order, to the Government, by registered post.