JUDGMENT Ajoy Nath Ray, J. 1. The challenge in this Writ petition is mainly directed against the Proviso to Clause 24(f) of certain executive regulations, which were promulgated by the Government of West Bengal, i.e., by the Governor and notified in the Calcutta Gazette published on 21st of January, 1994. The effect of the said Proviso is that if the staff is aggrieved by the order of any disciplinary action of the internal management and the said action leads to dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank, he or she might prefer a reference to an Arbitration Committee, which will be appointed by the Chairman of the said Board. 2. The said Board is defined in sub-clause (15) of Clause 2 as the State Board for Anglo-Indian Education, West Bengal. The Chairman of the said State Board, as apparent from the resolution dated 7th September, 1992, an Annexure to the Writ petition, is the Minister-in-Charge of Primary and Secondary Education. 3. If the Proviso stands, the effect would be that a Teacher, dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank in accordance with the prevailing rules, and by the Management, would still have a residuary right of reference and that reference would be to an Arbitration Committee, which is nominated by the Minister-in-Charge. 4. The Proviso concludes by affirming that the decision of the Arbitration Committee will be final and such decision will be binding upon all concerned. If, therefore, the Tribunal, which is nominated by the Minister, is of the opinion that the dismissal of the Teacher, say, should be set aside, or that the teacher should be re-instated, then that decision of the Arbitration Committee will prevail and the order of dismissal passed earlier by the School Management will stand superseded or set aside. 5. The Proviso, therefore, cannot but be looked upon as a provision for appeal. Although, it is couched in the form of a mere proviso, and although the proviso occurs at the very end of the section, the effect of the same is surely and certainly to give a final say in regard to dismissal, removal from service or reduction in rank of the school staff to the Arbitration Tribunal and to take away such final say from the School Management. 6. The objectors before me are substantially the Anglo-Indian Schools. 6. The objectors before me are substantially the Anglo-Indian Schools. The principal ground upon which the objection has been sought to be sustained by them is invasion of minority rights and breach of the fundamental rights contained in Article 30 of our Constitution and especially the first Sub-Article thereof. 7. That the Anglo-Indian Community is a minority community is beyond dispute. Many a case concerning minority rights has been decided by many a Court in India involving the Anglo-Indian community. The Anglo-Indian community is Indian because they are in India and they are with an English connection, because their mother tongue is English. It is by reason of their mother tongue that they are singled out as a minority community. Such linguistic minority is within the purview of Article 30, just like a religious minority. That those, whose mother tongue is English, represent a minority community in India hardly requires any discussion or detailed argument, although many educated Indians write and speak English quite fluently, yet they cannot claim English to be their mother tongue too. 8. The Sixth Regulation published also on 21.1.94 itself recognises English as the mother tongue of the Anglo-Indian Community and thus clarifies the manner in which the said community becomes a minority. 9. Mr. Gupta submitted that it is now established by a long line of decisions of the highest Court in India that minorities have a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice and that such right of intramural administration includes the right to manage and administer the Teachers who teach in such minority institutions. It was the argument of Mr. Gupta that by reason of the inclusion of the Proviso mentioned above, the right to administer the Teachers of the Anglo-Indian Schools is in effect removed from within the four walls of the Anglo-Indian schools to an outside place and vested with an outsider. The same is an offence against Article 30 of the Constitution, because it unduly interferes with the right of the minority institution to manage itself and conduct its own disciplinary proceedings to a final and effective conclusion. 10. There are other challenges made by Mr. Gupta to other clauses of the said Regulation, but the principal challenge is to the above Proviso and it is that principal challenge which I shall deal with first. 11. 10. There are other challenges made by Mr. Gupta to other clauses of the said Regulation, but the principal challenge is to the above Proviso and it is that principal challenge which I shall deal with first. 11. The State of West Bengal opposed the petition, Although the learned Advocate General did not find time to appear at all in support of the State's case, the best assistance possible was rendered by his learned Junior. The State made, in effect, two points. It was first contended that the entire regulation, prior to its promulgation and publication was considered by all persons concerned including the Anglo-Indian schools and that the finalised draft had been approved. The second point made was this that the Anglo Indian schools are not in reality minority institutions at all. 12. Both these points, in my opinion, should be and can be summarily disposed of. 13. In regard to the first point of a finalised draft, it is my opinion that where a constitutional challenge involving the violation of a fundamental right is in issue before the Court, the finalisation of an agreed draft or a previously concluded understanding between the parties is too lightweight a defence to merit the Court's consideration. If there is no estoppel against a statute, there is all the less an estoppel against the Constitution and still less against the rights conferred by the Third Part thereof. Moreover, the pleadings before me do not establish that the impugned Clause or the Proviso had been agreed in the final draft. There had, no doubt, been certain discussions amongst the parties concerned, but upon a persual of the pleadings and the annexures, it is impossible to conclude that the inclusion of the Proviso to Sub-clause (1) of Clause 24 of the Regulation had been categorically agreed upon by all concerned. 14. That the Anglo-Indian Schools are not really minority institutions, is again a point not worthy of any very long treatment. Case after case was relied upon by Mr. Gupta, which will be mentioned later, where such Anglo-Indian Institutions were treated as minority institutions, without practically any argument. 15. The Code of Regulations for what were previously European schools was first made in 1929. Now, the Anglo-Indian schools are the successors (or atleast some of them are,) to those European schools. Case after case was relied upon by Mr. Gupta, which will be mentioned later, where such Anglo-Indian Institutions were treated as minority institutions, without practically any argument. 15. The Code of Regulations for what were previously European schools was first made in 1929. Now, the Anglo-Indian schools are the successors (or atleast some of them are,) to those European schools. The said Code of Regulations was considered in Division Bench judgment of our Court (State of West Bengal and Ors. vs. Daughters of The Cross and Ors., 88 CWN 766). That case also turned upon Article 30 of the Constitution. The successful respondents in that case are the tenth proforma respondent herein. It was practically not disputed before the Division Bench that the minority rights could be claimed by .the Daughters of the Cross. I do not propose to dilate any further on this issue and the Anglo Indian community, singled out by their minority mother tongue, is, in my opinion, a minority community and the Anglo-Indian schools can claim minority rights available to educational institutions. 16. It is a matter of no importance whether such minority institutions charge fees or not. Atleast it is a matter of no importance, so long as the fees are not scandalous; this atleast was not an issue before me. Nor, is it necessary that a linguistic minority must at the same time be also a religious minority, so as to be able to claim minority rights. The learned Advocate appearing for the State pointed out that the Indians are not all Christians. That might well be. But that' is not a relevant factor. If they are already a minority by reason of their minority language, it does not in the least matter that they are not wholly, but only largely composed of Christians, or that there are members of the Anglo-Indian community who profess some other faith; like Buddhism or Jainism. 17. A stiff opposition was put up to the petition by Mr. P.K. Roy, who appeared on behalf of the Association of Teachers for Anglo-Indian Schools. What he said was also adopted by the learned Advocate appearing for the State. Mr. Roy objected to the locus standi of the petitioner and I shall deal with that objection subsequently. I must first deal with the argument of Mr. Roy that the impugned Proviso is no an encroachment upon a minority right at all. What he said was also adopted by the learned Advocate appearing for the State. Mr. Roy objected to the locus standi of the petitioner and I shall deal with that objection subsequently. I must first deal with the argument of Mr. Roy that the impugned Proviso is no an encroachment upon a minority right at all. This is the principal point of contention in this case. In dealing with this point, I shall have to refer to the authorities relied upon by Mr. Gupta and also relied upon by Mr. Roy. 18. Mr. Gupta first referred me to the decision of a Nine Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Another vs. State of Gujarat and Another, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1389 . Many parts of the case were placed before me, both by Mr. Gupta and by Mr. Roy. But since an appellate provision to an outsider body from the disciplinary authority of a minority management is the principal issue before me, I shall deal with only those parts of this case, although authoritative to the extreme, which he1p guide and bind no in that regard. 19. In that case, two Ss. 51A and 52A form the subject matter of discussion and decision. Section 51A related to a prior approval being necessary in regard to a disciplinary decision, but it is 52A which contained a provision regarding reference of a dispute arising in regard to disciplinary proceeding between the governing body and a member of the teaching, other academic or non-teaching staff. 20. That was in effect an appellate provision. The provision in this section also was made by way of a contemplated reference. The reference envisaged in s. 52A was that one Member of the Tribunal would be nominated by the Governing Body one member by the person who had suffered the adverse order passed by the Governing Body of the College and that an Umpire would be nominated by the Vice-Chancellor. 21. The right of nomination by the Vice-Chancellor was seen by the Court as an important and crucial power. It was with respect, with a great degree of practical experience observed that if the two Arbitrators appointed by the two contestant sides differed, the Vice-Chancellor's nominee could veto the action of the Managing Committee. 21. The right of nomination by the Vice-Chancellor was seen by the Court as an important and crucial power. It was with respect, with a great degree of practical experience observed that if the two Arbitrators appointed by the two contestant sides differed, the Vice-Chancellor's nominee could veto the action of the Managing Committee. It was said that such a power of forbidden to the putting into action of the decision of the Governing Body made a serious inroad into the right of the managing body to administer the institution. 22. It was also said that the reference to Arbitration would involve the institution in litigation. The atmosphere of the institution would not gain by such introduction of litigation into the school. 23. I have read the judgment with the best care that I could bestow upon it and I have done so while reading it with Mr. Gupta and while reading it with Mr. Roy. If that case had stood by itself, I would have no hesitation in pronouncing that by the reasoning of that case, an appellate power in regard to disciplinary proceedings, if vested in an outsider body, would ordinarily have to be held unconstitutional if the same related to a minority institution. If that case had stood alone and if I had no other factors to consider in applying the above ratio, there would be an end or the case. But there are other decisions too. 24. Mr. P. K. Roy submitted that just as the preservation of rights to conduct disciplinary proceedings in the hands or the governing body of a minority institution is today laid down as a constitutional directive in case after case, it has been equally laid down in case after case that reasonable regulation can be introduced so as even to affect minority institutions. 25. Mr. Roy relied upon the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court given by five learned Judges in The Kerala Education Bill case, reported in AIR 1988 SC 956. That case considered, amongst others, an intended s. 12 sub-s. (4) of the proposed Act. By the said sub-section it was provided that no Teacher of an aided school shall be dismissed, removed, reduced in rank or suspended by the Manager, if without the previous sanction of the authorised Officer. That case considered, amongst others, an intended s. 12 sub-s. (4) of the proposed Act. By the said sub-section it was provided that no Teacher of an aided school shall be dismissed, removed, reduced in rank or suspended by the Manager, if without the previous sanction of the authorised Officer. The advisory opinion stated that as Their Lordships were at that time advised, the proposed section was a good one. It is noteworthy that the provision in pari materia (regarding prior approval) with S. 51A of the Gujrat University Act which was subsequently held to be invalid by the Nine Judges' Bench. 26. But we are not so much concerned with the order of the Supreme Court or its advisory opinion, as with the ratio and pronouncement of law made by it. Although such advisory pronouncement is not binding, it is of great persuasive value and the Supreme Court itself has repeated some of the statements of S.R. Das, C.J., made in his Lordship's judgment in that case. 27. Amongst others, it has been particularly repeated after S.R. Das, C.J., that the right to administer does not imply also the right to maladminister the minority institution. Ray, C.J., in the Nine Judges' Bench repeated the said statement. Mr. Roy, in my opinion, correctly submitted that it is good law that it is possible to introduce permissive regulatory measures even in regard to minority institutions. Such measures might relate to health or hygiene and in all cases, in my opinion, such measures must be designed towards the end of procuring greater excellence in the educational standards of minority institution in question. 28. We are not concerned with issues regarding affiliation or aid, but such issues often arise in Article 30 matters. Even from the above two cases, it can be deduced that it is open to a University to prescribe minimum standards of qualifications before a minority institution can claim affiliation. Minimum qualifications of Teachers to be employed by the minority institution can also be set down and this can in appropriate manner be made conditions for grant of aid. That the institutions in question were being aided by the State was a matter which weighed with S.R. Das, C.J., when his Lordship was delivering the advisory opinion. 29. Minimum qualifications of Teachers to be employed by the minority institution can also be set down and this can in appropriate manner be made conditions for grant of aid. That the institutions in question were being aided by the State was a matter which weighed with S.R. Das, C.J., when his Lordship was delivering the advisory opinion. 29. Another Five Judge Bench, this time delivering a judgment in a contested matter, made pronouncements, which are helpful in our case and those were relied upon strongly by Mr. Gupta, This was the 'case of Lilly Kurian vs. Sr. Lewina & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 52 . There also the Five Judge Bench speaking through the single judgment of A.P. Sen, J., had occasion to deal with an appellate provision in regard to disciplinary matters being vested with an outsider body in relation to a minority institution. The clause in the Ordinance in question was Clause 33 Sub-clause (4). The substance of that Clause was that a Teacher would be entitled to appeal to the Vice-Chancellor of the University against any order passed by the Management in relation to withholding of increment, recovery from pay, reduction in rank or dismissal. The case, in my opinion, is very much in point in deciding our case. 30. The said provision of appeal was not upheld by the Supreme Court. It was observed by Sen, J. that the Vice-Chancellor, according to the said Clause 33(4), could not only direct re-instatement, but could also modify the nature of the punishment. It was said that the whole matter was again set at large before the Vice-Chancellor. 31. His Lordship opined that the conferment of a right of appeal upon an outside authority like the Vice-Chancellor, took away the disciplinary power of a minority educational authority. His Lordship was unable to interpret the said right of appeal as a regulation or a restriction in the interest of the institution. Since the Vice-Chancellor had no constitutional power to entertain an appeal under Clause 33 (4), the said Clause itself being invalid and unconstitutional, the orders of the Vice-Chancellor were set aside by the Court. 32. Before I pass on to the lesser authorities of pronouncements by smaller Benches of the Supreme Court I must dwell a little upon this Five Judge pronouncements also. 32. Before I pass on to the lesser authorities of pronouncements by smaller Benches of the Supreme Court I must dwell a little upon this Five Judge pronouncements also. There is no difficulty of reconciling one judgment with another in the case of Lilly Kurian, even though such difficulty might be felt in regard to Nine Judge decision. An appellate provision was here declared as invalid, fairly and squarely. The appeal provision related to disciplinary orders passed by the Managing Committee of a minority community. The appeal was to the Vice-Chancellor of the University, but it is quite clear from the opinion of the Court that such a Vice-Chancellor would be no more than an outsider in regard to a minority institution. If we apply the ratio of Lilly Kurian’s case to the Proviso to Sub-Clause (f), what do we find? There is an appeal provided, although the mode of appeal is couched as a reference. The appeal is provided to a Tribunal to be nominated by an outsider. If the Vice-Chancellor of the University is an outsider, then so is a Minister-in-Charge of education. If the Minister-in-Charge of education is an outsider, then so is a Tribunal of Reference which is manned at his choice. 33. In Lilly Kurian's case a Teacher could come up against reduction in rank or dismissal or an adverse order in regard to pay. In the case before, the aggrieved staff can make a reference either for dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank If Lilly Kurian's case is applied to our case, I cannot see how I can help striking down the Proviso to Clause (f). But the judgment must go on, because Mr. Roy relied upon the two Judge decision of the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 311 . In that case an appeal provision from a minority disciplinary body was upheld. The provision was contained in s. 8, Sub-s. (2). It gave a right of appeal to a Tribunal consisting of a single Member, who would have to be a District Judge or one who had held an equivalent judicial office. The right of appeal was conferred in cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. 34. The provision was contained in s. 8, Sub-s. (2). It gave a right of appeal to a Tribunal consisting of a single Member, who would have to be a District Judge or one who had held an equivalent judicial office. The right of appeal was conferred in cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. 34. The judgment in the Frank Anthony's case was delivered by Chinnappa Reddy, J. His Lordship spoke alone for the two Judge Bench. Apart from the provision of appeal contained in s. 8, Sub-s (2). His Lordship also considered the constitutional validity of s. 8, Sub-s. (1)" which required prior approval of the Director for the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination in service of an employee of a recognised public school. Section 8, Sub-s. (1) was held to be invalid following the Nine Judge decision in the St. Xavier's case, mentioned above. But while applying the ratio of the Nine Judge decision to the case before the Supreme Court, Chinnappa Reddy, J. said that the provision of appeal was materially different from the provision in the St. Xavier's case. His Lordship said that the appeal was conferred only in a limited number of cases. That the appellate authority was not the Vice-Chancellor or the Vice-Chancellor's nominee, but a District Judge, or a person who had held an equivalent judicial office; that the manner of appeal was also different from the reference, with the Vice-Chancellor's nominee as an umpire, as was in the case before the Nine Judges. 35. Mr. Gupta placed before me the Delhi Act itself, which was before the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony's case. It appears from s. 11 thereof that according to Sub-s. (6) the Appellate Tribunal would be vested with powers like an appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Tribunal was, however, given power to regulate its own procedure in Sub-s. (5) of S. 11. 36. Just as his Lordship decided the important points of difference between the appellate provision before His Lordship and the appellate provision in the St. Xavier's case, so do I find here also important points of difference between the appellate provision which was before the Court in Frank Anthony's case and the appellate provision which is before me. 37. The most important of such difference is the body to which the appeal lie. Xavier's case, so do I find here also important points of difference between the appellate provision which was before the Court in Frank Anthony's case and the appellate provision which is before me. 37. The most important of such difference is the body to which the appeal lie. In our case it is not to a District Judge nor to any other Judicial Officer that the appeal will lie. It will lie to the Chamber chosen by the Minster-in-Charge. The appellate clause, therefore, is much more similar to the Clause in the St. Xavier's case than in the Frank Anthony's case. 38. In regard to the manner in which the reference or the appeal is to be disposed of nothing is provided in the Provision to Sub-Clause (f) at all. The appeal by way of reference is the remedy provided in the Proviso and an appeal by way of a reference was also the remedy provided in the St. Xavier's case. The manner of disposal of appeal was found by Chinnappa Reddy, J. to be an important distinguishing factor. Such distinguishing factor distinguishes the Clause in our case from the Clause which was under the consideration of Chinnapa Reddy, J. 39. The only point upon which the present Clause bears a similarity to the Frank Anthony's Clause rather than to the St. Xavier's Clause, is that the right of appeal is given not in case of any and every dispute, but only in a limited number of cases. Were I, on the basis of this single similarity, to follow Frank Anthony, rather than the far larger Benches in St. Xavier's and Lilly Kurian's case, I would be committing an heresy against the doctrine and law precedent. I am not prepared to do so. In my opinion Frank Anthony's case does not compel me to decide against the run of the earlier and weighter authorities. I conclude, therefore, that the Proviso to Sub-clause (f) should be held to be inapplicable to the Anglo-Indian Schools. This is subject to the decision on the other points which will be dealt with later. Before I leave this principal issue, let me first quote the Proviso which is mentioned by me as inapplicable. I conclude, therefore, that the Proviso to Sub-clause (f) should be held to be inapplicable to the Anglo-Indian Schools. This is subject to the decision on the other points which will be dealt with later. Before I leave this principal issue, let me first quote the Proviso which is mentioned by me as inapplicable. "Provided that if the staff is aggrieved by the order of any disciplinary action leading to the dismissal or removal from service or reduction in rank, he/she may prefer a reference to an Arbitration Committee which will be appointed by the Chairman of the State Board and the decision of the Arbitration Committee will be final and such decision will be binding upon all concerned." 40. Let me also mention that in the Division Bench Judgment in the case of Daughters of the Cross, mentioned above; the appeal provision in the Bengal Code of 1929 was found to be contrary to Article 30. The Fourth Regulation therein permitted an aggrieved dismissed Teacher to make representation to the inspector and the Governing Body was to defer final action until the Inspector's views were received. The Regulation did not find favour with the Court. In the case of All Saints High School vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., reported in (1980) 2 SCC 478 again an appellate power was under review. The appellate power again did not find favour with the Court and it was found to be one of great magnitude. The conferment of such a power upon an outside authority was found to be invalid. Lilly Kurian's case was again ; referred to and quoted by the Three Judge Bench. Unfortunately, Lilly Kurian's case was for some reason or the other not considered by Chinnappa Reddy, J. at all in the Frank Anthony's case. 41. Mr. P. K. Roy relied upon the case of Y. Theclamma vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1210 . A. P. Sen, J., delivered the judgment "in that case and there are passages in the judgment seeking to explain the non-consideration of Lilly Kurian's case directly by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in the Frank Anthony's case. Mr. Roy placed those passages before me and pointed out that the judgment in the Lilly Kurian's case was also delivered by Sen, J. That fact, in my opinion, is a matter of no importance. Mr. Roy placed those passages before me and pointed out that the judgment in the Lilly Kurian's case was also delivered by Sen, J. That fact, in my opinion, is a matter of no importance. The learned Judge, speaking for a Five Judge Bench, will be the authority and the spokesman for Five Judges only so long as His Lordship holds the office of that spokesman. Once the judgment is delivered, the same learned Judge, sitting in a two Judge Bench can do nothing more than can any other learned Judge holding an equal office. If Lilly Kurian's case is in conflict with the Frank Anthony's case and "if Lilly Kurian speaks with a different voice, then Lilly Kurian must be followed in preference to Frank Anthony, because the authority of a larger Bench supersedes the authority of a smaller one, even though both the Benches are of the Supreme Court. If any authority is needed for that proposition, the same can be had from paragraph 12 of the judgment of Beg, J. in the case of Union of India vs. K. S. Subramanian, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2433 . 42. Mr. P. K. Roy relied upon the case of All Bihar Christian Schools Association & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR 1988 SC 305 . A provision of scrutiny given to an outsider body was upheld in that case. But a reading of the provision which was upheld will suffice to show the difference between that provision of scrutiny approved by the Supreme Court and the present provision of appeal which is under challenge here. The clause provided that the scrutiny from the decision of the Managing Committee would be by the School Service Board, but that the Board, would only scrutinise whether disciplinary proceedings had been in accordance with the Rules and no more. The scrutiny was in the nature of a supervision of procedure. No scrutiny on the substance, adequacy or appropriateness of the disciplinary order was permitted. It is not so here. Reference before the Minister's Tribunal is not limited in any respect. A different order can be passed by the said Tribunal, whether on merits or on a different appreciation of the case or any other factor which need not even be made patent because the Arbitrators are not usually compelled to give any reasons. 43. Mr. Reference before the Minister's Tribunal is not limited in any respect. A different order can be passed by the said Tribunal, whether on merits or on a different appreciation of the case or any other factor which need not even be made patent because the Arbitrators are not usually compelled to give any reasons. 43. Mr. Roy also relied upon the case of Monohar Harries Walters vs. Basel Mission Higher Education Centra & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp. (2) SC 301. It is a Two Judge decision. It is said there that Article 30 is not violated merely because a Tribunal is constituted under an Act to hear appeals against the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an employee in the service of a minority institution. Frank Anthony. was relied upon for that proposition. Since I have dealt with Frank Anthony itself, to the best of my ability, I need not separately deal with this case, which only applies Frank Anthony to arrive at the above proposition. The said proposition must be read along with other Supreme Court cases, which have struck down the appeal provisions in relation to minority institution in more cases than one. 44. Mr. Roy referred me to the eight propositions regarding minority rights laid down by the Madras High Court and approved by the Supreme Court in the case of St. John's Teachers Training Institute vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., reported in (1993) 3 SCC 595 . He specifically referred me to the seventh of those propositions and said on the basis thereof that regulations of minority institutions for promoting excellence is permitted even if those relate to security of service of Teachers provided the same is with a view to promoting excellence or is in the interest of efficiency of the institution, discipline and the like. The principle is not and cannot be disputed by me. The Supreme Court, in its pronouncements, has gone to the extent of saying that security of tenure is likely to attract better Teachers and is thus in the interest of the institution. It, no doubt, is. The principle is not and cannot be disputed by me. The Supreme Court, in its pronouncements, has gone to the extent of saying that security of tenure is likely to attract better Teachers and is thus in the interest of the institution. It, no doubt, is. But, if such security is sought to be achieved by granting appeals from orders of dismissal to outside bodies, then those very Supreme Court cases have again got to be considered and such appeal provision is to be tested as against the requirement of Article 30, as interpreted by those decisions. Upon the view, that I have take on the authorities mentioned above, it appears to me beyond dispute that the Proviso to Sub-clause (f) is unconstitutional in its relation to minority institution, like the Anglo-Indian schools. 45. In my opinion, the Aligarh Muslim University case, (Azeez Basha vs. Union of India), reported in AIR 1968 SC 662 , relied upon by Mr. Roy is not of much relevance to our case. Mr. Roy showed me from paragraph 19 of the judgment that a minority community cannot claim under Article 30 a right only to administer, but it must also show that it had not up the institution. No particular school is pointed out where the minority right is claimed before me only for management thereof, without the said minority community having sometime or the other set up the school also. 46. I now deal with the point of locus standi. The petitioner before me is the Association of Heads of Anglo-Indian Schools. Mr. Roy said that they are not the institution itself. To my specific question whether Mr. Roy branded them as more busybodies. Mr. Roy specifically answered that he did. It was pointed out on behalf of the State that not all Heads of the Anglo-Indian Schools are themselves Anglo-Indian. 47. The institution themselves, or atleast a good number of them affected by the impugned regulations are proforma respondents before me. Many have supported the case of the petitioner by filing affidavits. 48. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, Senior Advocate appearing for some of those proforma respondents, adopted the arguments of Mr. Gupta, and specifically supported the petitioner's case. 47. The institution themselves, or atleast a good number of them affected by the impugned regulations are proforma respondents before me. Many have supported the case of the petitioner by filing affidavits. 48. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, Senior Advocate appearing for some of those proforma respondents, adopted the arguments of Mr. Gupta, and specifically supported the petitioner's case. In view of this, I conclude that none of the Anglo-Indian schools has shown any objection to any argument advanced by the petitioner or any stand taken by the petitioner, but, on the other hand, many of those institutions have actually shown their open support. I do not see what purpose will be served by ordering a formal transposition of the proforma respondents to the category of the petitioner. It will only delay matters and delay is something which is to be avoided, where discipline in schools is concerned. 49. I do not accept, with respect, the submission of Mr. Roy that the Heads of the Anglo-Indian schools are busybodies. Their working life is primarily concerned with those institutions. If they are not interested genuinely in the affairs of the institution, then who is? Again, with respect, it takes a lawyer and a well-seasoned one, to argue that the Head of a particular institution is a busybody, even when the affairs of that institution itself are concerned. 50. That some of the Heads are not Anglo-Indians is not a matter which disentitles the petitioner from maintaining this petition. I have mentioned how the institutions themselves are parties before me and even if some Heads of the institutions are not Anglo-Indians, the institutions themselves are present and they do not cease to be Anglo-Indian schools because some of their Heads are not Anglo-Indians. It is not necessary for minority institutions to employ teacher only from minority communities. This is an elementary proposition of law, upon which I would not any further dilate. I hold, therefore, that the petitioner has locus standi to maintain the application and that, in any event, the institutions being proforma respondents, the parties aggrieved are sufficiently represented before me. 51. The promulgated regulations seek to affect certain schools other than Anglo-Indian schools also, called "Listed Schools". I hold, therefore, that the petitioner has locus standi to maintain the application and that, in any event, the institutions being proforma respondents, the parties aggrieved are sufficiently represented before me. 51. The promulgated regulations seek to affect certain schools other than Anglo-Indian schools also, called "Listed Schools". Declaration of invalidity made above in regard to Sub-clause (f) or the declaration of invalidity, if any, made below with regard to the regulations, is with regard to and in relation to the Anglo-Indian schools and the Anglo-Indian schools only. The Listed Schools are not the petitioners. The Listed Schools did not appear before me. 52. Mr. Mukherjee appeared for some sixtyfour Teachers employed in certain Listed Schools, but the orders that I propose to pass being in regard to Anglo-Indian schools only, such Teachers of Listed Schools will not be affected thereby and thus Mr. Mukherjee's submissions were not separately considered at length by me. 53. Mr. Gupta expressed the grievance of his clients, supported by the Anglo-Indian schools with regard to other provisions of the promulgated regulation, other than the Proviso mentioned above also. I have to deal with this now. He made grievances about the power to amend the Code which is in Regulation 3. In my opinion, the same can remain because even if the power to amend is removed, a new Code may be passed, of course consistent with the Constitution. The Fourth Regulation states that the power to interpret any provision of the Code is reserved by the State Government in the Department of Education. I do not find anything unconstitutional therein, save only this that I declare the said interpretation subject to any challenge that might be thrown in any Court of law in a competently constituted proceeding. Clause 11 (a) was objected to and the same is set out below: "No pupil shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in a recognised school or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such school or any premises attached thereto unless the parent or the guardian of the pupil has give him/her "no objection" thereto in writing :" 54. Mr. Gupta's submission was that compulsory religious instructions against the wishes of the guardian had never been in force. Mr. Gupta's submission was that compulsory religious instructions against the wishes of the guardian had never been in force. The system has been that if there is any objection, then religious instruction is not imparted to the objectors' wards. The interference in the management of the institution by changing this long standing practice and procedure is unwarranted and unconstitutional. 55. Mr. P. K. Roy referred me to Article 28 of the Constitution and especially the Third Sub-Article thereof. He said that nobody should be compelled to receive religious 'instruction against his guarian's will. 56. I do not find any conflict between the two submissions of Mr. Gupta and Mr. Roy. Religious instructions would not be enforced and is not intended to be enforced the will of the guardians. Where there is no grievance of such a compulsory course in religion, I find an attempted change in the procedure, for the management of the schools so as to ascertain no objection from the parents, to be wholly unwarranted and an unnecessary interference with the rights of minority management. Clause 11 (a) will thus be equally inapplicable to minority institutions as the appeal Proviso. 57. The next objection was with regard to Clause 13. Sub-Clause (a) of Clause 13 should be stated in that regard: "13. Withdrawal of recognition : (a) If, at any time, the DDSE considers on account of any deficiencies or defects that any school no longer fulfils the conditions for recognition laid down in this Code, he may, after giving an opportunity to the school to offer its explanation or defence, if any, recommend to the State Board the withdrawal of recognition of the school, giving reasons of such withdrawal of recognition. Provided that if the deficiencies or defects of the school are capable of immediate or early removal, the State Board may recommend suspension of recognition for such period as it may think fit, to enable the managing committee of the school to remedy the deficiencies or defects to the satisfaction of the State Board." 58. Mr. Gupta argued that the recommendation for withdrawal of recognition depends upon a mere subjective satisfaction of the Deputy Director of School Education (Anglo-Indian Schools). Under the regulation reasons for such consideration need be mentioned. Mr. Gupta argued that the recommendation for withdrawal of recognition depends upon a mere subjective satisfaction of the Deputy Director of School Education (Anglo-Indian Schools). Under the regulation reasons for such consideration need be mentioned. It is dangerous to lay down a subjective condition unless the condition also lays down that the Deputy Director will pass reasoned orders in accordance with the Constitutional requirement forbidding arbitrariness. Mr. Roy showed me certain passages from the advisory opinion in the Kerala Education Bill case where the Court adopted a reading down, especially in view of the checks mentioned in the judgment in regard to the impugned provisions. Mr. Roy said that there is the cheek upon the power of the Deputy Director to recommend to the State Board the withdrawal of recognition, in the shape of Sub-clause (c) where the Managing Committee is given a right of appeal against the withdrawal to the Secretary of the Department of Education. If the initial power is arbitrary and unconstitutional, an appeal provision might not in all the cases provide an adequate check. I, therefore, declare that Article 13 shall be inapplicable to Anglo-Indian schools, unless the consideration of the Deputy Director is made by way' of a reasoned order as provided and that the reasons are sufficient to make out an objective case of deficiency or defect or both, as mentioned in Article 13 (a) . Such a declaration prevents multiplicity of proceedings for the aggrieved parties will not have to come to Court again and again asking for objectively reasoned order in each and every case. 59. The next objection was with regard to practically the entirety of Chapter III of the Regulation. The said Chapter is headed "Management and Administration". In substance, two confirmed Teachers are almost compulsorily required to be included in the management of the school. In my opinion, this is clearly encroaching on the right of the administration of the institution. I do not see how such a provision, compulsorily introduced in regard to all Anglo-Indian schools, will necessarily promote either the standard of education or efficiency of the institution. That such a provision of inclusion of Teachers in the Managing Committee already exists in the Rules relating to several Anglo-Indian schools, is a matter of no importance. I do not see how such a provision, compulsorily introduced in regard to all Anglo-Indian schools, will necessarily promote either the standard of education or efficiency of the institution. That such a provision of inclusion of Teachers in the Managing Committee already exists in the Rules relating to several Anglo-Indian schools, is a matter of no importance. If they wish, then can by virtue of their rights of internal management, include in their minority institution not two Teachers but twenty Teachers in their Managing Committee. This does not, however, permit the State compulsorily to include even one Teacher in the minority school administration, if the school itself objects thereto. Thus the entirety of Chapter III is declared invalid and inapplicable in relation to Anglo-Indian schools. 60. The Writ application is thus disposed of with a declaration as made in the St. Xaviers College case that Regulations 11(a), Chapter III and 24(1) Proviso are wholly inapplicable to the Anglo-Indian schools and that no action shall be taken on the basis thereof in relation to those schools or any of those schools. It is further declared that in regard to those schools, the Thirteenth Regulation shall not be applied unless initiated by an order of the DDSE in accordance with the said Regulation and further the said order being reasoned on its face with objective reasons for the conclusion why in the consideration of the DDSE any deficiency or defect exists in regard to the fulfilment of conditions by a school. 61. The interim order passed in this matter merges in this order and will, therefore, be no longer operative. Thus, although no Tribunal of reference might be set up for Anglo-Indian schools in accordance with the provision declared inapplicable to the Anglo-Indian schools, the Managing Committees thereof will be free henceforth to proceed with disciplinary proceedings. 62. There will be no order as to costs. 63. Pending applications, if any, in this Writ matter are also disposed of. 64. Stay of operation of this order is prayed for on behalf of the Teachers' Association and the State, but the same is refused. 65. The other three cases, namely, (1) In re: The Calcutta Christian Schools Society & Ors., (2) In re: The Welland Gouldsmith Educational and Charitable Society and Ors. and (3) The Catholic Mission of Western Bengal & Ors., will stand adjourned till Wednesday fortnight at 2 p.m. 66. 65. The other three cases, namely, (1) In re: The Calcutta Christian Schools Society & Ors., (2) In re: The Welland Gouldsmith Educational and Charitable Society and Ors. and (3) The Catholic Mission of Western Bengal & Ors., will stand adjourned till Wednesday fortnight at 2 p.m. 66. Parties and all others are to act on a xerox copy of this order. Let xerox copy of this order be given to the learned Advocates for the parties on usual terms immediately. Writ petition allowed.