Judgment B. L. Yadav, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India the prayer is that the order dated the 24th of December, 1983 ( Annexure 2) purporting to have been passed under Section48-E (1) of the tenancy Act, 1885 (for short "the Act") in Batai Case No. of 1980-81 by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Bettiah (respondent no.2), be quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. 2. The essential fact of the case is that a number of applications were filed by the petitioner under Sec.48-E (1) of the Act, they were numbered as Batai Case Nos.2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 of 1980-81. A Board was constituted on the 1st of August, 1981, as is clear from the order-sheet dated the 15th of January, 1982 (Annexure 1)and the proceedings in the Board were in progress in accordance with law. The Deputy Collector Land Reforms (respondent no.2), for the reasons best known to him, withdrew the case from the Board on the 15th of january, 1982 (vide Annexure 1), in view of purported exercise of power presumably under sub-section (10) of Sec.48-E of the Act, and decided the case himself by the impugned order dated the 4th of December, 1983 (vide Annexure 2), holding that the petitioners failed to prove that they were Bataidars of respondent no.4 and that the sale-deeds executed by respondent no.4 in favour of respondent nos 5 to 15 were genuine. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners advanced intense and sharp arguments to the effect that the jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 48-E of the Act for withdrawing the proceeding, could be exercised within a period of six months from the date of appointment under sub-section (3) of section 48-E of the Act. Only in that event the Collector shall decide the case himself in accordance with the provisions of the section. But the proceedings were withdrawn from the Board before completion of six months. The Board was constituted on the 1st of August, 1981 and six months would have been completed on the 1st of February, 1982 ; whereas the proceedings were withdrawn on the 15th of January, 1982 prior to that (15.2 1982) The impugned order contained no reasons. Hence the entire proceedings and the impugned order (Annexure 2) passed by respondent no.2 are manifestly erroneous and without jurisdiction. 4. Hence the entire proceedings and the impugned order (Annexure 2) passed by respondent no.2 are manifestly erroneous and without jurisdiction. 4. Even the names of several learned counsel for respondent nos.4 to 15 appear in the cause list, but none of them has appeared when the case was called out and taken up for hearing. Even the learned counsel for the petitioners was directed to ascertain whether any of the counsel for the respondents are available, but none of them turned up. Under the circumstances i have no option but to decide the case on merits. 5. The short question for determination is whether respondent no.2 could withdraw the proceedings from the Board prior to six months from the date when the Board was constituted and whether the impugned order contained reasons. 6. As regards the first point, Ex-Abundanti Cautela, the relevant statutory provision of sub-section (10) of Sec.48-E of the Act is set out :- "if the Board fails to record its findings or transmit the record its findings or transmit the records as required under sub-section (7) within a period of six months which shall be reckoned from the date of its appointment under sub-section (3) the Collector may withdraw the proceeding from the Board and decide the dispute himself according to the provisions of this section. " 7. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that in case the Board fails to record its findings "within" a period of six months, the Collector may withdraw the proceedings from the Board and decide the dispute himself. What is the meaning to be assigned to the expression "within" is not statutorily defined nor judiciary interpreted, hence it is convenient to take the aid of Dictionaries. But in doing so, the Court has to bear in mind that a word is used in Dictionary in different senses according to its context, the Court has to select the correct meaning which would be relevant to the context. But in doing so, the Court has to bear in mind that a word is used in Dictionary in different senses according to its context, the Court has to select the correct meaning which would be relevant to the context. I am reminded what Sir Samuel Johnson, an english poet, Critic, Essayist and Dictionary maker said about the use of dictionary in following words :- "dictionaries are like watches, the worst is better than none, and the best cannot be expected to go quite true, every honest Lexicographer agrees, knowing that no matter how keenly he strives to make his book go true he would inevitably lose the battle with what might be called linguistic in determinacy, since indeterminacy will be the prime fact of his professional life, he will often be tempted to deny and resent, like the grammarians of the 17th and 18th Centuries, as the radical in-stability of languages. " With the aforesaid precaution certain Dictionary meaning may be noticed : 8 In Strouds Judicial Dictionary (Volume 5), (1) word "within" in relation to a period of time does not usually mean "during", or throughout the whole of it. It is more frequently used to delimit a period inside which certain events may happen. (See O Bryand, in Reynolds V/s. Reynolds, (1941)VLR 249 ). (2) where some thing is to he done "within" a stated time, before a stated date, that means that it is to be done at some time during the course of the stated time, immediately preceding the stated date. (Thames V/s. Lambert, 4 LJKB 153 ). 9. In Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Edition), the expression, "within", when used relative to time has been defined variously as meaning any time before the expiration of not beyond, not exceeding, not later than. 10. In Bouviers Law Dictionary word "within" means in or at the end of. 11. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the word "within" in respect of a time limit means in the limits of not outside or beyond, immediately before the end of and not beyond. 12. According to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary the word "within" means in the limits of not going beyond. 13. 11. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the word "within" in respect of a time limit means in the limits of not outside or beyond, immediately before the end of and not beyond. 12. According to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary the word "within" means in the limits of not going beyond. 13. In view of the aforesaid meaning to the expression "within" in the present context it means some time during the course of the stated time, to be precise it means immediately preceding the stated date (i. e. six months period from 1st of August, 1981 would come to 1st of February, 1982 ). 14. In other words, till the preceding date of completion of six months, i. e.31st January, 1982 the respondent no.2 shall have no power of authority to withdraw the proceedings from the Board. He can do so only on the date immediately preceding the completion of six months and not prior to that. 15. The Legislature has indicated the method how the period of six months has to be counted. It has been provided that from the date of appointment six months period shall be reckoned. This is mandatory In the present case the Board was constituted on the 1st of August, 1981 and the period of six months would be completed on the 1st of February, 1982. The proceedings were withdrawn on the 15th of January, 1982, for which there was no power or authority. It could have been withdrawn only on the 31st January, 1982, or in any case on the 30th of January, 1982 and not prior to that date. Withdrawal of the proceedings on the 15th of January, 1982 was without jurisdiction and against the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 48-E of the Act. 16. The next question is whether reasons have been recorded in the impugned order. There is a latin Maxim "cessante RATIONS LEGIS cessat IPSA LEX, which connotes that reason is soul of iaw or an order, where reason ceases from an order it is of no consequence. 17. In State of West Bengal V/s. Atul Kishore Shaw, AIR 1990 SC 2205 , it was observed by the Apex Court :- "giving of reasons is an essential element of administration of justice. These days a right to reason is a sound system of judicial review. 17. In State of West Bengal V/s. Atul Kishore Shaw, AIR 1990 SC 2205 , it was observed by the Apex Court :- "giving of reasons is an essential element of administration of justice. These days a right to reason is a sound system of judicial review. A reasoned decision is not only for the purpose of showing that the citizen is rcceiviag justice, but also a valid discipline for the Tribunal or Court itself. Therefore statement of reasons is one of the essentials of justice. " 18. Under the circumstances the initial order withdrawing the proceeding itself was without jurisdiction and without any reason. Consequently all other proceedings subsequent to withdrawal would also be without any authority. 19. In view of the premises aforesaid, the writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned order dated the 24th of December, 1983 (Annexure 2) is hereby quashed, so far as it relates to the petitioners and the matter is remanded to the Board to proceed in accordance with law and decide the matter afresh recording its findings within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. By the time the proceedings are decided, there shall be no interference with the possession of the petitioners In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ Petition Allowed.