M. S. PARIKH, J. ( 1 ) THIS Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dismissing the plaintiffs suit rendered by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court (9th Court), Ahmedabad on 28-12-1987 in Civil Suit No. 792 of 1982. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-appellant filed the suit for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove the electric section pillar erected by the defendant in front of and adjacent to the plaintiffs property. The plaintiffs property is located in panditjis Pole, Sarangpur, Ahmedabad in Khadia Ward 3 and bears Survey No. 2481, hereinafter described as "the suit property". The suit property is abutting on the public road and it is the case of the plaintiff that on the southern side of the entrance door of the suit property the defendant-company erected the aforesaid section pillar. It is the case of the plaintiff that the existence of the said section pillar not only obstructs the passage of the plaintiff, but it also causes annoyance and nuisance inasmuch as passers-by and the people from the neighbouring area would throw dirt and dust nearby the pillar. It is, therefore, alleged by the plaintiff that the erection of the section pillar amounts to a clear obstruction to the enjoyment of the plaintiffs property and it, therefore, deserves to be removed. Plaintiff served the defendant with notice dated 10-6-1982 for this cause and as the defendant did not reply to the notice he was constrained to file the suit in question. ( 3 ) THE defendant resisted the suit by written statement Ex. 9 inter alia on the allegations that the section pillar has been erected for long and at the time of erection of the section pillar there was no representation, written or oral, in respect of the same likely to be causing any obstruction in enjoyment of anybodys property. The section pillar was erected for the smooth supply of electricity in the area and for the immediate search of the fault in the cables as and when such fault arises. It is the say of the defendant that erection of such section pillar is required area-wise so that the defects and faults can be easily detected and in case of power failure the electric supply can be restored. It is the say of the defendant that erection of such section pillar is required area-wise so that the defects and faults can be easily detected and in case of power failure the electric supply can be restored. It is asserted that such an arrangement is very necessary to protect the very sophisticated instruments being used by the public at large and that it is in the public interest to erect such section pillars. According to the say of the defendant the section pillar came to be erected on a public road and not on any private property and that its size and design are strictly as per the technical requirements. The company is at liberty to choose the site where such section pillars are required to be erected depending upon and keeping in mind the technical requirement involved. Since the section pillars are to be erected on public roads it would not be necessary for the defendant to consult adjoining residents of the area before erection of the pillars as alleged by the plaintiff. It is finally the say of the defendant that after erection of the section pillar at the particular place the plaintiff got his property renovated and therefore, it cannot be said that the pillar causes obstruction in the passage to the property and nuisance and annoyance in the enjoyment thereof as contended by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) AS against the aforesaid conclusion of the learned trial Judge the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff could have right of entry on his property from any point thereof. In support of this submission he placed reliance upon a decision of Kerala high Court in the case of Godavari Bai v. Cannanore Municipality, reported in air 1985 Ker 2 . In fact this decision was cited by him before the learned trial judge and the learned trial Judge has observed thus :". . . . . . WHILE interpreting Secs. 3 (3) and 77 of the Kerala Municipalities Act it has been held that construction of building on road margin by Municipality land adjoining such margin owned by private party, the construction is impermissible. . . . . . WHILE interpreting Secs. 3 (3) and 77 of the Kerala Municipalities Act it has been held that construction of building on road margin by Municipality land adjoining such margin owned by private party, the construction is impermissible. It is stated therein that "where the Municipal Council constructed Bunks on the road margin, pathway, of a public street and the land adjoining the public street was owned by a private party, the construction could not be said to be permissible in that the road margin is a part of the public street and the Municipality has no right to construct building on public streets vested in the Municipal Council under Sec. 77 and also because, the plaintiff, the owner of land adjoining the public street has a right of access at every point where her land adjoins the public street. "the trial Court further observed that the ratio laid down in the above decision is not applicable to the present case. The plaintiff made grievance about the fact that in Godavaris case, it was not the building which was sought to be constructed on public street, but they were bunks (small cabin-like structures) which were sought to be constructed in the road margin. In my opinion, upon going through the facts of the case before the Kerala High Court, it is true that the bunks were sought to be constructed. However, the ultimate conclusion reached to by the learned Judge to the effect that the ratio of Godavaris case (supra) would not be applicable to the present case, cannot be altered. The Kerala High Court has made reference to a decision of the same Court in Thanoor Panchayat v. Kunhiamutty, 1978 Ker. LT 813, which in turn referred to the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in case of Municipal Board v. Mahadeoji, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1147 . The observations of the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Thanoor Panchayat (supra) have been quoted at page 5 and they may be reproduced for the plaintiff has relied upon the same :-"the law may be briefly stated thus : An owner of land adjoining a highway is entitled as a matter of private right to access to such highway at any point at which his land actually touches it. The width of the highway, except where it is the subject of a special enactment is a question of fact. "the principle appearing from the above quotation would have no doubt helped the plaintiff but for the matter being a subject to special enactment and touching the public cause. By virtue of Sec. 12 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the power has been conferred upon the respondent-Company to erect the structure of the nature of a section pillar for the control and supervision of electric supply in the locality. This can be seen from Sec. 12, sub-sec. (1) quoted below :"12. Provision as to the opening and breaking up of streets, railways and tramways.- (1) Any licensee may from time to time but subject always to the terms and conditions of his licence, within the area of supply, or when permitted by the terms of his licence, to lay down or place electric supply lines without the area of supply, without that area - (a) open and breakup the soil and pavement of any street, railway or tramway; (b) open and breakup any sewer, drain or tunnel in or under any street, railway or tramway; (c) lay down and place electric supply-lines and other works; (d) repair, alter or remove the same; and (e) do all other acts necessary for the due supply of energy. "the power can be visualised in clause (c) which includes laying down and placing other works besides electric supply lines. To the above provision the appellant would rely upon sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 12; therefore, that provision also may be quoted :" (2) Nothing contained in sub-sec. (1) shall be deemed to authorise or empower a licensee, without the consent of the local authority or of the (owner or occupier) concerned, as the case may be, lay down or place any electric supply-line, or other work in, through or against any building or on, over or under any land not dedicated to public use whereon, whereover or whereunder any electric supply line or work has not already been lawfully laid down or placed by such licensee. "on a plain reading of Sec. 12 (2), it is clear that for erection of a structure to public road, consent of local authority and not the private owner would be necessary. "on a plain reading of Sec. 12 (2), it is clear that for erection of a structure to public road, consent of local authority and not the private owner would be necessary. In respect of prior consent of the owner or occupier words "any building, or on, over or under any land not dedicated to public use, whereover or whereunder any electric supply or lines or work has not already been lawfully laid down or placed by such licensee" would assume importance. It is admitted fact that the electric supply line has already been laid. It is also an admitted position that the people at large in the locality including the appellant are the beneficiary of the electric supply. Therefore, it is clear on a plain reading of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 12 that no permission would be necessary from the neighbouring occupiers for erecting the section pillar. It is no doubt true that the power under Sec. 12 (1) is subject to limitation as contained in sub-sec. (2) and has to be exercised reasonably and without causing any obstruction in the existing passage of the neighbouring occupiers or without causing obstruction to the public at large. In the present case, bearing in mind the narrow roads of the city the selection of the place for erection of section pillar by the respondent-Company does not appear to be unreasonable. It is not asserted and shown that the action of the defendant-Company is mala fide. ( 5 ) THEN there are the allegations with regard to nuisance and annoyance which have been dealt with by the learned Judge and it would not be necessary to repeat the reasonings on this score. In my opinion, no error has been committed by the learned trial Judge in negativing the plaintiffs case of nuisance and annoyance. ( 6 ) WITH regard to cost awarded by the trial Court, I inquired of Mr. H. B. Shah as to whether he would be seriously arguing against the cause of the appellant on the question of cost. Mr. Shah fairly conceded that since the plaintiff-appellant had moved the process of the Court upon misconception of the position of law on facts as they existed, appropriate order might be passed. ( 7 ) FOLLOWING order is, therefore, passed : The judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the appellants suit as aforesaid is confirmed. Mr. Shah fairly conceded that since the plaintiff-appellant had moved the process of the Court upon misconception of the position of law on facts as they existed, appropriate order might be passed. ( 7 ) FOLLOWING order is, therefore, passed : The judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the appellants suit as aforesaid is confirmed. The order directing the plaintiff to pay cost of the defendant is set aside and this appeal is dismissed with no order as to cost throughout. This appeal stands disposed of accordingly. .