Judgment : The petitioner, while holding the post of Superintendent in the Geological Survey of India as a Central Government employee, joined the respondent No. 1. The National Institute of Homoeopathy, which is an autonomous organisation under the Ministry of Health and Welfare, Government of India and a registered Society, on deputation as Administrative Officer in 1984. While so serving on deputation in the National Institute of Homoeopathy he was placed under suspension in March 1986 and thereafter disciplinary proceedings were also started against him in respect of particular charges. Subsequently the petitioner moved a writ petition which was disposed of by G. N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was) on 17th April, 1989 by directing the respondents to complete the disciplinary proceeding within a period of four months from date and it was also directed that if such disciplinary proceeding could Dot be completed for some unsurmountable reasons not on account of the respondents, in that event the respondents would have the liberty to ask for extension of time before the Court in the same proceeding by giving notice to the petitioner. It was further directed that if the disciplinary proceeding was not completed within the specified time or within the extended time, if extension was granted, in that event the disciplinary proceeding would stand quashed. The disciplinary proceeding was however not completed within the aforesaid period of four months. The respondents prayed for extension of time before the Court and the application dated 18.8.89 for such extension of time was disposed of by Manoranjan Mallick, J. by order dated 21.3.1990. The learned Judge by that order allowed extension of time for three months only subject to the condition that the writ petitioner would be reinstated and would be posted in any equivalent post in Calcutta till the enquiry proceeding was concluded As it was found that the respondents had taken some proceedings in the departmental enquiry after the expiry of the initial period of four months without obtaining extension of time from the Court, the learned Judge quashed sucb proceedings which were taken after the expiry of the original period and directed that the Inquiry Officer would have to continue the enquiry as it stood prior to the date on which the period of four months expired. It was clearly recorded in the said order that no further extension would be granted. It was clearly recorded in the said order that no further extension would be granted. The learned Judge also directed reinstatement of the petitioner with effect from 1st April, 1990 and also directed the writ petitioner to co-operate in the proceeding and observed that if the petitioner did not attend inspite of notice the disciplinary proceeding might be conducted ex parte. Thereafter in course of time the petitioner was repatriated to his parent department, namely, the Geological Survey of India and he has also since retired from service in 1992. 2. In the writ petition the petitioner prayed for different reliefs including the relief of repatriation. As I have already mentioned the petitioner has since been repatriated to his parent department and has also retired. At the time of hearing it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that his retiral benefits are not being settled by his parent department an the ground of pendency of the departmental proceeding initiated by the borrowing department. It is the contention of the petitioner that such departmental proceeding is not at all pending and the same stood quashed in view of the orders passed by the learned Judges as referred to above. It is the grievance of the petitioner now that the borrowing department is not communicating to the parent department of the petitioner that the departmental proceeding stands quashed, and in the absence of such communication from the borrowing department, the parent department is not settling the petitioner's retiral benefits. 3. At the time of hearing a dispute is raised on behalf of the concerned respondents that this writ petition is not maintainable in this Court and the petitioner has to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal and not this Court for any relief which he may desire to seek in respect of his service matter. Realising the merit of such contention the learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the petitioner does not press his prayer for relief against the Central Government authorities, namely, the respondent Nos. 5 to 9 in this writ petition. He further submits that this Court may now grant relief to the petitioner in this writ Court may now grant relief to the petitioner in this writ petition only against the borrowing department and its authorities namely, the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. 5 to 9 in this writ petition. He further submits that this Court may now grant relief to the petitioner in this writ Court may now grant relief to the petitioner in this writ petition only against the borrowing department and its authorities namely, the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. It is, on the other hand, contended inter alia by the learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 that this writ petition against the said respondents is also not maintainable because the respondent No. 1, the National Institute of Homoeopathy, being a registered society and an autonomous organisation, is not State or authority within the meaning of Article 12 or 226 of the Constitution. In my opinion such a plea is a belated one and is evidently of no substance. Such plea has not been taken in the affidavit-in-opposition. In the earlier writ petition also no such plea, as it seems, was taken by the respondents and as we have already seen G. N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was) gave specific direction upon the respondents for completion of the departmental proceeding within a particular period with liberty to pray for extension of time in a particular situation. Then again, far from challenging the jurisdiction of this Court in the matter of passing any direction upon the respondents under Article 226 in respect of the matter, the respondents subsequently made an application to the Court for extension of time for completion of departmental proceeding and obtained such extension. After all these things, it is now too late for the respondents to raise the plea that the respondents are not amenable to writ jurisdiction in this matter. The learned Advocate for the respondents contends that a jurisdictional point can be taken at any stage and the same cannot be defeated on ground of delay. In support of his contention he relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) R. J. Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1971 SC 1552 where a jurisdictional point was allowed to be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court although such point was not raised in the Court below including the High Court. It is however to be noted that there the Supreme Court allowed the point to be raised when the matter went before it in appeal by special leave. It is however to be noted that there the Supreme Court allowed the point to be raised when the matter went before it in appeal by special leave. It was the same lis which was carried and continued up to the Supreme Court. But in our case the position is totally different. Here the present proceeding is not a continuation of the earlier proceeding. This is entirely a new one although the petitioner and the authorities of the National Institute of Homoeopathy are and were parties to both the proceedings. In the proceeding started on the earlier writ petition between the same parties the respondents did not take this plea which they could and should have taken. That being so this point which is now sought to be raised in the present proceeding is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. 4. The main point that has to be now considered is whether the departmental proceeding has been validly concluded to any specific result or it stood quashed in view of the relevant orders of the Court It does not appear that after the prayer for extension of time was granted by Manoranjan Mallick, J. for a period of three months any further steps were taken in the departmental proceeding. Inspite of my repeated queries the learned Advocate for the respondents could not show me anything that pursuant to the order of Manoranjan Mallick, J. any fresh steps were taken in the departmental proceeding. On the other hand, in the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 it has been specifically stated in paragraph 27 thereof that on enquiry the charges against the applicant was held to be proved by the enquiry report dated the 19th March, 1990. It is therefore evident that for establishing that the departmental enquiry was concluded the respondents are relying on the finding recorded in the enquiry report dated the 19th March, 1990. It is therefore evident that for establishing that the departmental enquiry was concluded the respondents are relying on the finding recorded in the enquiry report dated the 19th March, 1990. But the said enquiry report dated the 19th March, 1990 is non est by reason of the order dated 21st March, 1990 passed by Manoranjan Mallick, J. inasmuch as the learned Judge specifically directed that the proceedings taken after the expiry of the initial period of four months granted by G. N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was) stood quashed and that being so in terms of the said order of Manoranjan Mallick, J. dated the 21st March, 1990 the said enquiry report dated the 19th March, 1990 stood quashed. Since within three months from the date of the order passed by Manoranjan Mallick, J. (as a matter of fact, ever thereafter) the respondents did not take any steps to proceed afresh from the appropriate stage and conclude the departmental proceeding, such proceeding itself also stands quashed in terms of the order of Manoranjan Mallick, J. dated the 21st March, 1990 read with the earlier order of G. N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was) dated the 17th April, 1989. There is therefore no question of taking of any steps either by the borrowing department or by the lending department on the basis of the invalid enquiry report dated the 19th March, 1990 which stood quashed by the aforesaid order of Manoranjan Mallick, J. Since in view of the aforesaid orders of the learned Judges the departmental proceeding also stood quashed for not being proceeded with afresh from the appropriate stage and concluded within the extended time, that fact also shou1d be formally communicated by the borrowing department to the lending department so that the lending department may thereafter take necessary steps for finalisation of the retiral benefit of the petitioner. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are accordingly directed to inform the lending department formally, within one month from this date, that in view of the aforesaid orders dated the 17th April, 1989 and the 21st March, 1990 passed by the learned Judges the enquiry proceeding against the petitioner, having not been concluded within three months from the date of the order passed by Manoranjan Mallick, J. stood quashed. The Respondent Nos. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are also directed to take consequential steps for settling the service benefits of the petitioner as may be admissible under the law in view of the consequence of the quashing of the departmental proceeding. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly. No cost is however ordered. Let Xerox copies of the operative portion of the above order dated 2.9.94 be given to the learned Advocates for both sides on the usual terms. The prayer for stay is rejected.