JUDGMENT P. A. Mohammed, J. 1. The petitioner is a private limited company called 'M/s Glasco Carriers Pvt. Ltd.' engaged in the business of dealership in liquified petroleum gas (LPG) under the Indian Oil Corporation (hereinafter called I.O.C.). The substantial prayer in this writ petition is to give a direction to respondents 12 and 13 who are police officials to provide police protection to the petitioner's work of loading and unloading and transportation of LPG cylinders from and to the Indian Bottling Plant of the I. O. C. at Nadakkavu in Udyamperoor. 2. In view of the commissioning of the Bottling Plant at Udayamperoor, I. O. C. expected to bottle and transport more number of LPG cylinders throughout the State. In order to meet this additional demand, I. O. C. decided to enter into contract for transporting of the LPG cylinders. The petitioner made discussions with the officials of the I. O. C. on 11 - 1 - 1994 and offered its willingness to accept the work order as per Ext. P1 letter dated 11-1-1994. By Ext. P2 letter I. O. C. has granted the work order to the petitioner, subject to its execution during the period from 7-12-1994 to 31-10-199. The petitioner thereafter filed an application to the Regional Labour Commissioner, Central, Ernakulam for issue of a licence in respect of the work Accordingly Ext. P3 licence was issued by the Licensing Officer, Ernakulam, Government of India in Form No. VI under S.12(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Pursuant to a joint conference held on 15-1-1994 in the office of the Labour Commissioner, Central regarding the engagement of labour in the LPG loading and unloading at Udayamperoor Plant of the I. O. C. the petitioner decided to start the work with effect from 20-1-1994 in execution of Ext. P2 work order. Thereafter the petitioner sent its lorries for loading to the loading place of the plant, but the other contractors resisted loading by the petitioner's truck on the ground of insufficiency of work. However, I. O. C. started supplying minimum 15 truck loads from 12 2-1994, The other contractors frequently created obstructions and when the obstructions continued, the petitioner filed Ext. P6 representation before the 12th respondent who is the Commissioner of Police (City) Ernakulam. However, I. O. C. started supplying minimum 15 truck loads from 12 2-1994, The other contractors frequently created obstructions and when the obstructions continued, the petitioner filed Ext. P6 representation before the 12th respondent who is the Commissioner of Police (City) Ernakulam. However, the police protection was not granted to the petitioner on the ground that the first respondent had produced an interim order of injunction evidenced by Ext. P7 alleged to have been obtained by him from the City Civil Court at Madras in O. S. No. 835 of 1994. It is in that situation the petitioner came before this court with the present writ petition. 3. The petitioner's case for police protection was fully supported by the counsel appearing for the I. O. C., the 8th respondent in this case. In fact, the arguments advanced by the petitioner were endorsed by the eighth respondent. The case of the first respondent is that there is a subsisting contract between him and I. O. C. for loading and unloading work and that contract period will expire only on 31-10-1994 and hence I. O. C. has no power to grant fresh tender to the petitioner. As there is alleged violation of the contract the first respondent appears to have approached the Madras City Civil court and obtained Ext. R1(1) order of temporary injunction in O. S. No.835 of 1994 on 8-4-1994 restraining the I. O. C. from giving the work to the petitioner till the expiry of the tender period in his case. 4. It cannot be said that I. O. C. has no authority or power to appoint additional contractors for doing the loading and unloading work in view of the subsisting contract with the first respondent. It was in order to meet the additional demand due to the commissioning of new bottling plant, Ext. P2 work order was granted to the petitioner. Clause.20 of the Transport Contract Agreement relied on by the petitioner in the petition is thus : "The Contractor/s shall not have exclusive right to operate truck/s at the Plant/Refinery and the Corporation will be at liberty to appoint one or more additional Contractors either to run concurrently with the Contractor/s separately." The first respondent did not dispute the containing of the above clause in the Transport Contract Agreement executed between the I. O. C. and the first respondent. The above Clause in unequivocal terms provides that the contractor has no exclusive right to operate trucks at the plant premises. It is also the right of the I. O. C. to appoint one or more additional contractors to carry on the work concurrently with the existing contractor. Therefore, the first respondent cannot contend that the I. O. C. has no right to appoint additional contractors, It is clear that the additional contractor was appointed in view of the commissioning of new bottling plant at Udayamperoor. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain the efficacy of Ext. P2 work order and all the impediments in the way of execution of the work are necessarily to be removed. It is pertinent to note that this work order has to be fully executed on or before 31-10-1994. 5. The contention of the petitioner is that the injunction order (Ext. P7) alleged to have been obtained by the first respondent from the City Civil Court at Madras cannot be acted upon in this case. Ext. P7 order is extracted below: " By perusing the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof and also hearing the arguments of Mr. C. Madhavan, the counsel for the plaintiff, the act of the first respondent to give work order for the second respondent who did not even participate in the tender and when the period of tender is still in force in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner, the entry of the second respondent due to the encouragement of the first respondent is against the principles of natural justice, I am of opinion that the prayer sought by the plaintiff/ petitioner is quite reasonable and I hereby direct the first respondent to restrain themselves from giving the work order for the second respondent, till the ex party of the tender period given to the plaintiff / petitioner.'' By the above order, I.O.C. is restrained from giving the contract to the petitioner who did not participate in the tender. Here, the reference regarding the tender can only be in respect of the tender which was granted in favour of the first respondent who was the plaintiff in the above suit. What this court now concerned is the work Order as per Ext. P 2 letter dated 12-1-1994. This order in the normal course can operate only in so far as the work granted to the first respondent earlier. What this court now concerned is the work Order as per Ext. P 2 letter dated 12-1-1994. This order in the normal course can operate only in so far as the work granted to the first respondent earlier. There is no case that the work order given to the petitioner as per Ext. P 2 also comes within the ambit of Ext. P 7 order. No attempt is made by the first respondent to establish that the work order as per Ext. P2 granted to the petitioner is the same work which was granted to him as per the contract entered between the I.O.C. and the first respondent. 6. However, it is contended by the first respondent that there is an injunction order restraining the I. O. C. from giving the work order to the petitioner as per Ext P 7. The genuineness of this order is seriously disputed by the. petitioner and the I.O.C. Ext. P 7 is said to be an ex parte interim order passed by the City Civil Court at Madras in O. S.835 of 1994. It does not contain the number of the interlocutory application. It was originally produced by the first respondent before the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Cochin City. The definite case of the police is that protection was denied to the petitioner in view of Ext. P7 injunction order produced by the first respondent. (The first respondent has produced the said order as Ext. R1(1) along with his counter affidavit dated 31-5-1994) The definite case of the petitioner and the I.O.C. is that even though the said order was stated to have been passed on 8-4-1994 it was not served or communicated to them so far. In the counter affidavit dated 31-5-1994 the first respondent has stated that steps had been taken in the proceedings, I. A. 8339/94 in O. S.835/94, to serve notice on the parties in the suit. However, it is uniformly submitted by the petitioner as well as the I.O.C. that no notice has been served on them so far in O. S.835/94. The first respondent however has not made any attempt to convince this court that the order passed in I. A. 8339/94 in O. S.835/94 has been served or communicated to the petitioner and the I. O. C. 7. An order of injunction is generally issued to a party forbidding him from doing certain acts. The first respondent however has not made any attempt to convince this court that the order passed in I. A. 8339/94 in O. S.835/94 has been served or communicated to the petitioner and the I. O. C. 7. An order of injunction is generally issued to a party forbidding him from doing certain acts. If the party does an act in violation of such order, he will be penalised for disobeying it. Such penal consequences cannot be imagined of unless the party has true and correct knowledge of such injunction order. Such knowledge can be available only when the order is communicated to the party. The order of injunction will take effect only from the time when it is communicated to the party It is a settled position that the injunction orders are not addressed to court. However there is a difference in the case of stay order. The stay order is normally addressed to the court and it prohibits the court from proceeding further as soon as the court has knowledge of the order. This distinction is clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathji ( AIR 1967 SC 1386 ). In (Sahu) Nand Kishore v. Shadi Ram and others (AIR 1926 All. 457) it is laid down as follows: "An injunction is however, binding the party to whom it is issued from the time it is communicated, for there" can be no attempt unless the party concerned knows what he is required to do, or to abstain from doing, and a Court cannot punish a man for doing what he did not know, he was forbidden to do." This view gets support from the Principle laid down in Bessesswari Chowdhurany v. Horro Sundar Mozumbar & others (1896-97 (1) Cal. W. N. 226) 8. Now, I will come to the genuineness of the order of injunction said to have been obtained by the first respondent from the City Civil Court at Madias. The order originally produced by the first respondent does not bear the number of I. A. filed in the suit, O.S.835/94. The petitioner for the first time came to know about this order from the police officers. As there was serious dispute about the genuineness of the order, I. O. C. instructed their advocate at Madras to enquire about the case and to take necessary action to vacate the injunction order. The petitioner for the first time came to know about this order from the police officers. As there was serious dispute about the genuineness of the order, I. O. C. instructed their advocate at Madras to enquire about the case and to take necessary action to vacate the injunction order. After verifying the court records, the Advocate by Ext. P8 letter informed the I. O. C. as follows: "On receipt of the papers from the IOC, I scrutinised the court papers and on the face of it, I found the following discrepancies; A) In the City Civil Court the copy stamp paper on which the orders are typed is not in use. The value of the paper is also wrong. Only Court Fee labels are affixed to the value of Re 1/- on such page. B) It contains no court seal. C) The format used in the order and the method of typing is wrong. D) The order copy is not authenticated by the Court Officer. E) Interlocutory application (I. A. No) number is missing. Interim orders can be passed only in interlocutory petition." Ext. P8 further states that no such suit (O. S.835/94) was filed against I. O. C. and no order was passed against I. O. C. on the date mentioned in the disputed order produced in court. When the I. O. C. received Ext. P8 letter the matter was readily reported to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Ernakulam. 9. In view of the serious dispute with regard to the genuineness of the injunction order produced before the police (Ext. P7) the petitioner made a request to his advocate Sri S. A. Ramalingam at Madras to get an attested copy of the plaint in O. S.835/94 of the City Civil Court at Madras. Advocate Sri. Ramalingam after obtaining the copy from the court, forwarded the same to the petitioner alongwith covering letter evidenced by Ext. P10. Ext. P10 letter states, "I. A. 8339/94 has nothing to do with O. S. No.835/94 which is pending before the XV Asst. Judge. That is a suit for injunction restraining the mortgagee from bringing the property to sale. The parties are different (refer copy of plaint)". A copy of the plaint referred to above is produced by the petitioner as Ext. P9. Ext. P9 indicates that O. S.835/94 is a suit between one D. Gunaraj and Vijay Hemant Finance & Estates Limited. Judge. That is a suit for injunction restraining the mortgagee from bringing the property to sale. The parties are different (refer copy of plaint)". A copy of the plaint referred to above is produced by the petitioner as Ext. P9. Ext. P9 indicates that O. S.835/94 is a suit between one D. Gunaraj and Vijay Hemant Finance & Estates Limited. That suit is nothing to do with the first respondent or the petitioner and I. O. C. Even after the production of Ext. P9 plaint, the first respondent has not produced a copy of the plaint said to have been filed by him in the City Civil Court at Madras as O. S. No.835/94. Failure to do so by the first respondent is fatal to the plea raised by him in the present proceeding inasmuch as the genuineness of the interim order and the suit is questioned by the petitioner and the I.O.C. 10. Ext. P 10 letter further states that Mr. P. T. Thomas (first respondent) has filed the suit against I.O.C. and Gasce Carriers (P) Ltd. (Petitioner) on 22-4-1994 and that suit has been numbered as O. S.3285 of 1994 and posted before the VIII Asst. Judge, City Civil Court at Madras. It is also stated therein that the suit came up before court on 25-4-1994 along with the application I.A. 8339/94 and the court has passed the following order. "No representation for petitioner. Anyhow issue notice to respondents by 16-6-1994". It is further said that no order of injunction has been passed in I. A. 8339/94 on 1-6-1994. The petitioner subsequently obtained the copy of the order passed in I. A. 8339/94 in O. S.3285/94 on 16-6-1994. The original attested copy of that order is produced in the writ petition as Ext. P 13 by the petitioner along with the reply affidavit to the rejoinder filed by the first respondent. From Ext. P 13 it is evident that no injunction order has been passed in that I. A. The order passed on 16-6-1994 is thus: "Notice to R1 and R2 by 18 8-1994". Thus it is evident, even assuming that O. S.3285/94 is a suit filed by the first respondent against the petitioner and I.O.C. no injunction order has been passed against the petitioner and I.O.C. in that case. That suit now stands posted to 18.8.1994. Thus it is evident, even assuming that O. S.3285/94 is a suit filed by the first respondent against the petitioner and I.O.C. no injunction order has been passed against the petitioner and I.O.C. in that case. That suit now stands posted to 18.8.1994. From the above discussion, it is apparent, a real doubt is pervading as to the genuineness of Ext. P7 order said to have been obtained by the first respondent from the City Civil Court at Madras on 8.4.1994. The case of the petitioner is that the order (Ext. P7) produced by the first respondent before the police is a forged document and it cannot be relied upon. He further pleads that appropriate action may be taken against all persons who are involved in the production of the forged document. At any rate, I am prima facie satisfied that there is a real doubt about the genuineness of Ext. P7 order. In that situation, according to me, this court can refuse to place any reliance on the said document. 11. For the reasons stated herein before, I am not placing any reliance on Ext. R1(1) (Ext. P7) produced by the first respondent along with his counter affidavit dated 31.5.1994. That being so, the contentions advanced by the first respondent on the basis of Ext. R(1) are only to be rejected. 12. The question whether Ext. P7 is a forged document and whether any further action against the persons involved in the production of the document is required in the matter are left to the 12th and 13th respondents, before whom this document was initially produced by the first respondent. Therefore in this connection I hereby observe that respondents 12 and 13 are free to take a decision in this matter in case the document in question is ultimately found to be a forged document. 13. Counsel for the fourth respondent has raised certain preliminary objections during the hearing. According to him all the parties signed Ext. P4 minutes of discussion held on 16-6-1994 are not before court. Fourth respondent is one of the contractors impleaded in this case. The dispute is between the petitioner and contractors who are engaged in the loading and unloading work including the first respondent. From Ext. According to him all the parties signed Ext. P4 minutes of discussion held on 16-6-1994 are not before court. Fourth respondent is one of the contractors impleaded in this case. The dispute is between the petitioner and contractors who are engaged in the loading and unloading work including the first respondent. From Ext. P4 it is evident that a conference was held on 15-5-1994 at the office of the Regional Labour Commissioner, Cochin regarding the engagement of labour for loading and unloading of LPG cylinders at the bottling plant of I.O.C. at Udayamperoor. It is also evident from Ext. P1 that all the Unions had agreed for the rate of charges for loading and unloading. There was some inter se dispute among the labour Unions with regard to the ratio of engagement of workers from among the different Unions. It cannot be said that there was serious dispute between the petitioner and the Unions represented in the conference. From Ext. P4 it is also seen that all the contractors had declared that they would propose to go ahead with the formula of engaging workers to the extent of 75% of the local Unions and remaining 25% by workmen of their choice. Since the main dispute is between the petitioner and the first respondent and contractors absence of all the signatories to Ext. P4 on the party array is not fatal to the case. Therefore, the objection regarding the non impleadment of labour Union is rejected. 14. The prime question to be considered is whether there is any situation prevailing in the area warranting protection from police so as to prevent breach of peace in the locality. When the petitioner sent its lorries to loading site, ether contractors obstructed. At the intervention of police, I. O. C. started providing minimum 15 truck loads from 12-2-1994 onwards. The obstruction by the contractors constantly continued. When the petitioner's truck was taken to the loading place at Udayamperoor on 29-4-1994, certain persons at the instance of the contractors manhandled the driver and supervisor of the petitioner's truck. They as well damaged the truck. They also created a panic in the area and threatened that the petitioner's truck would be set fire. It was in that situation the petitioner submitted Ext. P6 representation before the City Police Commissioner on 30-4-1994. The City Police, Commissioner directed the Asst. They as well damaged the truck. They also created a panic in the area and threatened that the petitioner's truck would be set fire. It was in that situation the petitioner submitted Ext. P6 representation before the City Police Commissioner on 30-4-1994. The City Police, Commissioner directed the Asst. Commissioner of Police, Edappally to enquire into the matter. When the Asst. Commissioner started investigation the first respondent produced Ext. P7 order of injunction said to have been obtained by him from the City Civil Court at Madras on 8-4-1994. Thereafter the police has not provided any protection to the petitioner in effecting the loading work. In fact the petitioner had started work from 12-2-1994 pursuant to Ext. P2 work order. Pursuant to Ext. P2 the petitioner had obtained licence from the office of the Licensing Officer, Government of India for doing the work of loading and unloading cylinders at the establishment of Plant Engineer, I. O. C. Indane Bottling Plant, Nadakkavu, Udayamperoor. That licence shall remain in force till 27-3-1995. Ext. P2 work order will expire on 31-10-1994. When the petitioner has obtained Ext. P2 work order from the I. O. C. and thereafter obtained Ext. P3 licence for doing the work of loading and unloading of cylinders, the petitioner has every right to carry on his work in the enjoyment of his business and profession. The work so obtained cannot be restrained by others creating obstructions and violence. What the petitioner is authorised to do is not an unlawful or unauthorised work. It is the one legally obtained and is compelled to carry out the work before the expiry of the period stipulated in Ext. P2. From what is said above, it is clear that there was law and order problem in the area where the loading and unloading was to take place and the police had frequently intervened. The same situation still continues, Therefore I am satisfied that there is every likelihood of peace and tranquillity in the area being disturbed in case the petitioner employs his truck for loading at the loading site of the plant. In that situation the petitioner is really entitled to police protection for doing the work order issued by the I.O.C. 15. The same situation still continues, Therefore I am satisfied that there is every likelihood of peace and tranquillity in the area being disturbed in case the petitioner employs his truck for loading at the loading site of the plant. In that situation the petitioner is really entitled to police protection for doing the work order issued by the I.O.C. 15. It is finally argued by the contesting respondents that the dispute involved in this ease is a civil dispute and this court cannot interfere in the matter by ordering police protection. The question in this case is primarily concerned with the law and order situation and the removal of obstruction in the enjoyment of the right to carry on his business and profession by a citizen. This cannot said to be essentially a civil dispute; it can be a criminal dispute as well inasmuch as obstruction and violence is involved. Assuming it to be a civil dispute, it does not mean when there is cogent reason from the past experience to believe that there would be breach of peace and tranquillity in the locality as a result of violence and disturbance by a set of persons against the enjoyment of the right by the petitioner, police should not interfere to safeguard his life and property and to create peace in the locality. It is the duty of the police to maintain law and order to remove the obstructions and impediments in the matter of enjoyment of the legal rights by citizens. Enforcement of obedience to law is also a function of the police and when there is constant disobedience police can always be called in aid for enforcement of obedience to law by the persons concerned. 16. In a fast developing society where the complexities of conflicting and contradictory interests of individuals involve, rule of law can be maintained only by supplying swift action by the State if there is constant threat to it by an individual or group of individuals fighting against each other. Sometimes the orders or decrees obtained from civil courts against such threats are found to be in-effective and in order to create efficacy of such orders, or decrees the jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 of the Constitution is invoked. Sometimes the orders or decrees obtained from civil courts against such threats are found to be in-effective and in order to create efficacy of such orders, or decrees the jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 of the Constitution is invoked. In such situation, the court shall be able to perceive, in the facts of each case, where the rule of law suffers and once it is found out, the court shall take effective measures for swift action by the State in the interest of upholding rule of law. That does not mean all the civil remedy available to persons in a dispute are by-passed or attenuated permanently. After remedying the exact situation where the rule of law suffered by supplying instant actions the court can direct the parties to work out their remedies in civil or criminal actions. However, there will be justifying circumstances which persuade the court to invoke the swift action notwithstanding the normal remedy of civil or criminal action available to an aggrieved citizen. A Division Bench of this court in George v. Circle Inspector of Police ( 1990 (1) KLT 741 ) held : "But, if the aggrieved persons have a case that such ordinary civil or criminal action is not an efficacious alternative remedy, and the situation demands speedy or effective relief which could be afforded only by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution, it is open to them to do so; but, before invoking such extraordinary jurisdiction, a duty is cast on the petitioners to plead and prove, prima facie, as to why the alternate remedies are not equally efficacious, and adequate in the facts and circumstances of a given case". The Division Bench laid down the duty cast on the aggrieved petitioners to plead and prove, prima facie, as to why the alternate remedies are inadequate in the facts of the case. However, in the above decision, with great respect, I do not see any fetter on the power of the court while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction under Art.226. The pleading and proof is essential in adjudication of a dispute between the parties. However, the power of the court to exercise the jurisdiction under Art.226, when it is satisfied in a given set of facts, is always there. That power remains undisturbed. 17. The pleading and proof is essential in adjudication of a dispute between the parties. However, the power of the court to exercise the jurisdiction under Art.226, when it is satisfied in a given set of facts, is always there. That power remains undisturbed. 17. In the result, there will be a direction to respondents 12 and 13 to afford adequate and meaningful police protection to the petitioner to carry en its work of loading and unloading and transportation of LPG cylinders from and to the Indane bottling plant at Nadakkavu, Udayamperoor in implementation of Ext. P2 work order obtained by the petitioner from the I. O. C. This order will remain in force till the expiry of the period prescribed in Ext. P2 work order. The writ petition is disposed of as above. No order as to costs