Judgment B. L. Yadav and J JJ. 1. -these analogous writ petitions have been heard together as they involve similar questions for our determination. Hence it is convenient to dispose them of by this common judgment. CWJC No.2351 of 1993 would, however, be the leading case. The point is as to whether an order dated 21.4.1989 (Annexure 4) would operate as res judicata. 2. Shorn of details, the facts of the case are that the plot in dispute was recorded in the name of one Indrasan Koeri. father of respondent No.6 and after his death Vijay Shanker Koeri (respondent No.6) was recorded. A sale deed dated 4.12.1985 was obtained by Kameshwar Pandey (respondent No, 5)from Indrasan Koeri (father of respondent No.6) ; whereas respondent No.6 by another sale deed dated 25.1.1991 transferred some land in favour of the petitioner. Respondent No 5 filed an application for mutation of his name under Sec.10-B for the Bihar Consolidation of holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 ("the Act" for short)by impleading Vijay Shanker Koeri (respondent No.6) as the only party to the proceeding. The petitioners who were the subsequent vendees from respondent No.6, were not however impleaded The application was decided in favour of respondent No.5 by order dated 21.4.1989 (Annexure 4 ). It is this order which has been held by the Joint Director of Consolidation (respondent No.2) in the exercise of revisional power under Section 35 of the Act to operate as res judicata against the interest of the petitioners. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that as the order dated 21.4.1989 (Annexure 4) was passed without impleading the petitioners (subsequent vendees) as party even though this order did affect the interest of the petitioners, at the same time the matter was not decided on merits, hence it would not operate as resjudicata. 4. The learned counsel for respondent No.6, however, strongly contended that as the vendor of the petitioner, namely, Vijay Shanker Koeri was a party and who expressed his willingness in favour of respondent No.5, the first vendee, hence the petitioners were not necessary party and so the order dated 21.4.1989 (Annexure 4) would operate as res judicata. 5. 4. The learned counsel for respondent No.6, however, strongly contended that as the vendor of the petitioner, namely, Vijay Shanker Koeri was a party and who expressed his willingness in favour of respondent No.5, the first vendee, hence the petitioners were not necessary party and so the order dated 21.4.1989 (Annexure 4) would operate as res judicata. 5. Having scrutinised the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the question for our determination is as to whether the order dated 21.4.1989 (Annexure 4) would operate as res judicata or not, particularly when the petitioners were not party to the proceeding under Sec.10b of the Act. It goes without saying that in order that a judgment may operate as res judicata the parties must be the same or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim litigation. In the instant case admittedly even though they were subsequent vendees but were not made party to the proceedings under Sec.10-B of the Act. It is only the vendor Vijay shanker Koeri (respondent No.6) who was made a party. As he has transferred the plots in question in favour of the petitioners herein, he has no interest nor can be said to represent the petitioners. The petitioners were necessary party but were not impleaded in proceedings under Sec.10-B, of the Act. 6. Res judlcata, expression itself, means a thing or controversy finally adjudicated upon. In order to constitute res judicata it is not enough that the parties are the same, rather the same matter must be directly and substantially in issue and it must be heard and finally decided. Unless it was heard and finally decided it cannot operate as res judicata. In case there is no adjudication of rights and title before the authority concerned, it cannot operate as res judicata. In a case under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 there was no evidence that the matter was heard and finally decided, their lordships of the Apex Court in Malkhan Singh V/s. Sohan Singh, ( AIR 1986 sc 500 ) ruled that there cannot be res judicata as it was not heard and finally decided. (See Shiv Shanker V/s. Baikunth, AIR 1969 SC 971 and subba Rao V/s. Jaganndha, AIR 1967 SC 591 ). (See Shiv Shanker V/s. Baikunth, AIR 1969 SC 971 and subba Rao V/s. Jaganndha, AIR 1967 SC 591 ). In the instant case there is no evidence that the earlier matter under Sec.10-B of the Act, which pertains only to mutation proceedings, was heard and finally decided, hence that order dated 21.4.1989 (Annexure 4) would not operate as res judicata. In our opinion, the impugned order dated 6.2.1993 (Annexure 1 in all the three writ petitions) cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed. 7. Conspectus of the aforesaid discussion is that these three analogous writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned order dated 6.2.93 (Annexure 1) is quashed. The matter is, however, remanded back to the joint Director of Consolidation (respondent No.2) to decide it afresh on merits, treating the order dated 21 4 1989 (Annexure 4) not to operate as res judicata. The matter has, however, dragged on for too long. What is required is expedition. It may be decided within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order There shall be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment be placed in all the files of these writ petitions. Petition Allowed.