ORDER : J.N. Bhatt, J. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Deputy Collector, on 18th January, 1982, which came to be confirmed in revision by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, on 11-4-1983, under the provision of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The short question which has surfaced in this petition is as to whether there is violation of the provision of Section 7 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidations of Holdings Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short) or not. 3. The petitioner purchased an agricultural land bearing survey No. 7 admeasuring 1 Acre-6 Gunthas situated in village Gundiyala by a registered sale deed for an amount of Rs. 1,150/- on 18-2-1975 from respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5. The petitioner is also owner and occupant of the agricultural land bearing survey No. 583. Between those two fields, there is no other field but there is an intervening road to the extent of 5 to 6 (in width) for right of way. The road between two fields of the petitioner is east-west. One side of the road is blind, that means there is no thorough-f are. Thus, on one side of the road, petitioner has one field of his ownership and occupancy bearing survey No. 583 and the new field purchased by him, as aforesaid, bearing survey No. 7, is on the other side of the road. 4. After the purchase of the said agricultural land bearing survey No. 7, mutation entry in the name of the petitioner in the revenue record of the Government effected by Talathi-cum-Mantri of the village and the said mutation entry is given Number 824 on 15th March 1975. Lateron, the Mamlatdar cancelled the said mutation entry, on 9th March 1976, contending that newly purchased land of the petitioner has been declared fragment. 5. Even after cancellation of the mutation entry, the petitioner has been in occupation and possession. The petitioner has been cultivating the said field and he has improved the same along with other field bearing survey No. 583. Thus, according to the case of the petitioner, he has made substantial improvement by making expenditure in the newly purchased field. 6. 5. Even after cancellation of the mutation entry, the petitioner has been in occupation and possession. The petitioner has been cultivating the said field and he has improved the same along with other field bearing survey No. 583. Thus, according to the case of the petitioner, he has made substantial improvement by making expenditure in the newly purchased field. 6. Respondent No. 2 - Deputy Collector, however, issued a notice on 25-10-1982, by registering Fragment Case No. 74/81-82 against the petitioner alleging that by the aforesaid transaction of sale of the field bearing survey No. 7, there is a breach of the provision of Section 7 of the Act. The enquiry was held and the order was passed on 18-1-1982 holding that the said transaction of sale in-respect of field bearing survey No. 7 is in violation of provisions of the Act. Therefore, this transaction came to be set aside and fine of Rs. 50/- is imposed on the respondents No. 3 to 5 and the petitioner is directed to vacate the said field, if he is in possession. 7. Being dissatisfied by the aforesaid order passed against the petitioner by the respondent No. 2 - Deputy Collector, the petitioner preferred revision application which came to be rejected on 11th April, 1983. This order passed by respondent No. 2 - Deputy Collector is confirmed in revision preferred by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner has come up before this Court challenging its legality and validity by filing this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. Following three contentions are raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner :- (i) That the order passed by respondent No. 2 and confirmed in revision is illegal as there is no breach of the provision of Section 7 of the Act. (ii) That the exercise of the powers for taking action under Section 7 is not done within reasonable time; and (iii) That while passing an order under sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act, mechanically order is passed without proper application of mind. 9. First contention is that the exercise of powers under Section 7 of the Act is required to be done within reasonable time and in the present case, such an exercise made by respondent No. 2 - Deputy Collector, cannot be said to be within reasonable time. 9. First contention is that the exercise of powers under Section 7 of the Act is required to be done within reasonable time and in the present case, such an exercise made by respondent No. 2 - Deputy Collector, cannot be said to be within reasonable time. In other words, it is contended that for taking any action for the breach of provision of Section 7 powers under Section 9 must be exercised within reasonable time. There can hardly be any doubt about this proposition. Though there is no statutory period of limitation prescribed for taking action under Section 9 for committing breach of the provision of Section 7 of the Act, it has to be exercised within some reasonable period. 10. Under Section 9, statutory powers are conferred on the authority to pass proper orders for declaring the transactions contrary to the Act, to be null and void and also to pass consequential orders of imposing of fine as well as summary eviction. But such statutory powers like any other powers under the statute have to be exercised within reasonable time. What is the reasonable period, obviously would depend upon the facts of each case. 11. It is a settled proposition of law that when the power is conferred to effectuate the purpose, it must be exercised in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner is also inherent itself, detriment its exercise within reasonable time. No time limit is prescribed in Section 9 of the Act and if the authority concerned is allowed to exercise such statutory powers at its sweet-will or at its whim, at any time, then the very purpose of the provisions of Revision or Appeal will be frustrated in many cases. Therefore, the authority concerned is bound to exercise such powers within reasonable time and if the Court comes to the conclusion, in a given case, that such powers are not exercised within the reasonable time, the orders in exercise of such powers can safely be quashed and set aside. 12. In light of the aforesaid legal background, a few necessary relevant data and factual aspects may be enumerated here. 12. In light of the aforesaid legal background, a few necessary relevant data and factual aspects may be enumerated here. The disputed agricultural land-field bearing survey No. 7 was purchased by the petitioner, on 18-2-1975, by registered sale deed, and notice issued by the Deputy Mamlatdar, under Section 9 of the Act for committing breach of the provision of Section 7 is dated 25-10-1982. Thus, initiation of the proceedings by issuing show cause notice and exercise of powers under Section 9 of the Act, firstly commenced on 25th October 1982, which means, almost after seven years and eight months. It is found from the record that the petitioner has spent substantial amount for the improvement of the land in question. The delay of seven years and eight months is a gross delay and such a period of seven years and eight months, by no stretch of imagination, could be said to be a reasonable time in exercise of the powers under Section 9 of the Act. Apart from that even the date of sale which is by a registered document, is excluded from the consideration and the date on which the mutation Entry No. 824 came to be recorded is considered, then also there is a gross delay. The said entry was made in revenue record on 15-3-1975, by Talathi-cum-Mantri of the same village. The Deputy Mamlatdar rejected the said entry on 9-3-1976, stating that it was in respect of a piece of fragment. Even if this date is considered, then also there is a delay of about six years. Same authority who had cancelled mutation entry, issued notice under Section 9 for breach of the provision of Section 7 of the Act on 25-10-1982. Thus there is a gross delay during the period of six to seven years. The (petitioner has spent substantial amount for the improvement of his field. He has been in occupation and possession and enjoyment of the land. In fact he has purchased the field for the purpose of agricultural purposes or operations. On the facts of this case, this Court has no option but to h old that the powers exercised by the concerned authority namely respondent No. 2 under Section 9 of the Act was grossly belated stage as there was unreasonable delay in exercise of such powers. Such an exercise would be undoubtedly not only unjust, unreasonable but is manifestly illegal. Such an exercise would be undoubtedly not only unjust, unreasonable but is manifestly illegal. In, similar situation, this Court has taken identical view in Special Civil Application No 1583 of 1977, decided on 21-6-1984. Thus, the view which this Court is inclined to take is also very much re-enforced by tire earlier decision of this Court Under the circumstances, first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is required to be accepted. 13. In so far as second contention is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention of this Court to the provision of Section 7 of the Act. Relying on this provision, it is contended that as such there is no breach of the provision of Section 7. It would, therefore, be interesting to refer the said provision of Section 7 of the Act. It reads as under :- Section 7 :- Transfer and lease of fragments:- (1) No person shall transfer any fragment in respect of which a notice has been given under sub-section (2) of Section 6 (except to the owner of ) a contiguous survey number or recognised sub-division of a survey number. Provided that the holder of such fragment may mortgage or transfer it to the State Government or a land mortgage bank or any other co-operative society as security for any loan advanced to him by the State Government of such bank or society, as the case may be. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in (any law for the time being in force or in any instrument or agreement), no such fragment shall be leased to any person other than a person cultivating any land which is contiguous to the fragment. 14. The evident purport and the main design of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act and particularly of the provision of Section 7 is that the fragment must pass into the hands of the owner of an adjoining land who can economically and efficiently cultivate it, because in any case, he would be cultivating his personal land and he would be able to take care and to devote personal attention to the cultivation of the fragmentation by virtue of its immediate proximity. Considering the main purpose of Act and the aforesaid provision of Section 7, it could not be contended that an intervening road between two fields would set apart the fragmentation from the land owned by the purchaser. Considering the main purpose of Act and the aforesaid provision of Section 7, it could not be contended that an intervening road between two fields would set apart the fragmentation from the land owned by the purchaser. In such a situation, that is to say, there cannot be a breach of provision of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act. 15. The very important question which arises at this stage is with regard to impart correct meaning of expression "contiguous survey number" occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act. The petitioner has purchased the field which is alleged to be fragment bearing survey No. 7 is on the other side of the road which is also not a thoroughfare and his own field is on one side of the road. Having regard to the entire scheme of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, it cannot be said that intervening road makes the adjoining field non-contiguous. The Act has two main designs - one it is encroached fragment and two - if they are fragments they come into ownership of the person who owns contiguous land so that the fragments are consolidated and they could be more economically and effectively cultivated. Therefore, expression contiguous which is used in sub-section (1) of Section 7 by the Legislature has to be interpreted. If the owner of such land is not permitted to purchase fragmentation, the fragmentation will continue to be owned by some one who cannot effectively and economically cultivate it. Thus the main aim of the provision of Section 7 is that the fragmentation must pass into the hands of the owner by an adjoining land which can successfully, efficiently and economically make use of it, as in any case he would be cultivating his own land and he would be able to devote personal attention to the personal cultivation of the fragmentation by virtue of its immediate proximity. 16. Having regard to the factual scenario emerging from the record of the present case, there can be no doubt that the authorities below have, unfortunately, failed to appreciate real purports and designs of Section 7. The true spirit of Section 7 is not interpreted by both the authorities. 16. Having regard to the factual scenario emerging from the record of the present case, there can be no doubt that the authorities below have, unfortunately, failed to appreciate real purports and designs of Section 7. The true spirit of Section 7 is not interpreted by both the authorities. Expression "contiguous" means just across the narrow road, particularly when there is no other land which is immediately adjacent or touches the land in question of the petitioner. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court and under the circumstances of the case, the sale transaction by virtue of which the petitioner became owner of the field bearing survey No. 7 cannot be voided as being in contravention of the provision of Section 7. Therefore, the interpretation made by both the authorities that there is a breach of the provision of Section 7(1) is totally perverse and illegal. Under the circumstances, the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is required to be subscribed to. 17. The last submission raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the impugned order passed under Section 9 with regard to the penalty for breach of Section 7 is without application of mind. In light of the facts and circumstances of the case, this submission is also full of substance. It would be interesting to quote Section 9 so as to properly appreciate this contention. The provision of Section 9 reads as under :- Section 9:- Penalty for transfer or partition contrary to provisions of Act. (1) The transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be void. (2) The owner of any land so transferred or partitioned shall be liable to pay such fine not exceeding Rs. 250 as the Collector may, subject to the general orders of the (State) Government, direct, (Such fine shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue). (3) Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of, any land, the transfer or partition of which, either by the act of parties or by the operation of law, is void under the provisions of this Act, may be summarily evicted by the Collector. Section 9 provides penalty for transfer or partition contrary to the provisions of the Act. Section 9(3) providing summary eviction by the Collector could be resorted to after full application of mind. Section 9 provides penalty for transfer or partition contrary to the provisions of the Act. Section 9(3) providing summary eviction by the Collector could be resorted to after full application of mind. In other words, before passing summary eviction order by the Collector under sub-section (3) of Section 9, the authority is obliged to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case. "May be summarily evicted by Collector" shows the intention of the Legislature that the authority is conferred with the discretion. Once the transaction for transfer or partition is held to be contrary to the provisions of the Act, does not ipso facto' necessarily mean summary eviction as contemplated under Section 9(3) of the Act. It is necessary for the authority concerned to consider whether there is a fit and proper case for passing an order for summary eviction taking over all facts and circumstances into consideration. It is not like one plus one is equal to two. Once transaction is held to be void, automatically summary eviction should not be passed. Had that been the intention of the Legislature expression may would have been shall. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the authority concerned to exercise the powers under Section 9(3) of the Act to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and even while avoiding any transaction or process of partition is bound to consider other facts and circumstances before exercising his discretionary power for summary' eviction. It appears from the facts and circumstances of the present case that this aspect is not seriously examined and considered by the authorities below, and summary eviction order is passed without proper application of mind. Not only that even issuance of she w cause notice does not specify such an imposition of penalty by the authority as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act. Notice is too vague and general. It is also necessary for the authority first to specify in the notice about such an action to be taken in purport of the exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 9(3) of the Act. Nothing has been done in the present case. Notice is too vague and general. Therefore impugned orders are also vulnerable on that count also. Hence the third contention is also required to be accepted. 18. Nothing has been done in the present case. Notice is too vague and general. Therefore impugned orders are also vulnerable on that count also. Hence the third contention is also required to be accepted. 18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances narrated, hereinbefore, while viewing in light of the aforesaid legal position as discussed aforesaid, this Court has no hesitation in finding that the impugned orders passed by the respondent No. 2 under Section 9 for violation of provision of Section 7 of the Act and confirmed by the revisional authority respondent No. 1 are illegal and therefore, they are quashed. 19. In the result, this petition is allowed with no order as to costs. Rule is made absolute. Petition allowed.