Judgment :- Janarthanam, J 1. M/s. Thirupur Exports (petitioner), located at No. Y/205, Plot No. 4/521, Fifth Avenue, Anna Nagar, Madras - 40, is an establishment covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (Act 34 of 1948 for short 'ESI Act') required to pay contributions, in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 40 thereof read with Regulation 29 and 31 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950, for short ('Regulations') framed under the ESI Act and its Code No. is 51/19162-18. It had been exporting garments. Such garments had been stitched, both within and outside its factory premises. Tailoring charges for garments, stitched outside, had been paid by it and the same had been duly accounted for. 2. The Inspector verified the records of the factory on August 16, 1989 and the verification revealed tailoring charges paid to garments stitched outside for the period between April 1, 1985 and March 31, 1989. Such tailoring charges had been paid to immediate employer-establishment covered or not under the ESI Act. Based on such report of the Inspector, the amount of tailoring charges paid to establishment, not covered under ESI Act, was quantified in a specified sum. In respect of such specified amount, contributions by employer as well as employees had not been paid. This aspect of non-payment of contribution on certain items of wages paid by the petitioner had been reported to the Deputy Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, 147, Sterling Road, Madras-34 (respondent), who in turn, caused a notice dated December 21, 1989 to be served on the petitioner-principal employer to show cause within fifteen days, why contributions as per statement enclosed be not recovered from it. 3. In due deference to the notice so issued, the petitioner-principal employers' representative Mr. K. S. Mathusudhana Rao appeared for personal hearing on October 22, 1990 and November 21, 1990. On those occasions, the said representative of the petitioner, it is said, made statements, oral and writing. After taking all those things into account, the respondent, by his order dated February 5, 1991 under Sec. 45-A of the ESI Act determined the petitioner's liability to pay contribution at Rs. 1, 96, 788.05, which is calculated at 7.25% on the payments of wages made. After taking all those things into account, the respondent, by his order dated February 5, 1991 under Sec. 45-A of the ESI Act determined the petitioner's liability to pay contribution at Rs. 1, 96, 788.05, which is calculated at 7.25% on the payments of wages made. He further directed for the payment of interest at 12% for each day of further default from the date of the order, failing which, the amount would be recovered, as an arrear of land revenue. 4. The petitioner, aggrieved by the said order it is said, presented an appeal before the Employees' State Insurance Court-Appellate Authority, as contemplated under Section75 of the ESI Act and in so doing, it did not deposit 50% of the disputed amount, as required under sub-sec. (2-B) of Sec. 75 thereof. However, it appeared to have filed an application for waiver of the requisite amount of deposit, invoking the provisions in the proviso under sub-sec. (2B) thereof and the waiver application so filed appeared to have been rejected. 5. Thereafter, the petitioner on June 9, 1993, it is said, deposited a sum of Rs. 30, 000. The petitioner also appeared to have made representations to the Director General, Employees' State Insurance, New Delhi in vain. Ultimately, he resorted to the present action praying for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the respondent dated February 5, 1991, raising the plea of jurisdiction, limitation and no efficacious appellate remedy. 6. The petitioner also filed W. M. P. No. 4557 of 1994 for interim stay of operation of the order impugned, pending disposal of the writ petition. 7. Even at outset, I may point out that none of the grounds as raised in the affidavit filed, in support of the petition and reagitated before me during the course of arguments by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is of any merit whatever. To say that the respondent is not having the requisite jurisdiction and power to determine the quantum of contribution payable by the employer, in respect of wages paid by him, is not at all tenable and such a power inheres in such an authority by the express and explicit provision adumbrated under Section45-A of the ESI Act. 8. To say that the respondent is not having the requisite jurisdiction and power to determine the quantum of contribution payable by the employer, in respect of wages paid by him, is not at all tenable and such a power inheres in such an authority by the express and explicit provision adumbrated under Section45-A of the ESI Act. 8. In the case on hand, wages paid to the immediate employer not covered under the ESI Act in respect of the garments stitched, had been taken into account by the respondent for the purpose of determining the liability for contribution as per the ESI Act. If the works of stitching of the garments have been entrusted to the immediate employer, without any supervisory control over the stitching of garments, and without having any right to reject them, it is very well plausible that those garments had been stitched by the immediate employer, being an outside agency, not having any sort of a connection with the petitioner-principal employer and in such a contingency, such immediate employer alone is responsible for payment of the contribution under the ESI Act. If the petitioner, as a principal employer, is having the supervisory control over stitching of garments entrusted to the immediate employer and is having the right to reject them, then it goes without saying that the immediate employer is none else than a person employed by the principal employer for stitching garments, by engaging employees in a different place. 9. The question as to whether the workers employed by the intermediary employer, not covered by ESI Act, for stitching garments, are workers of the intermediary employer or that of the principal employer is capable of being decided, only on materials placed and such disputed question cannot at all be decided in an action of this nature. Such a question can very well be decided, by filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority, as had been provided under Sec. 75 of the ESI Act. In fact, the petitioner has made an attempt in presenting such an appeal to agitate such a question. The appeal so presented was not at all numbered, even as per his own saying, as a consequence of the non-deposit of 50% of the disputed amount, before even the appeal was entertained as per the salient provisions, adumbrated under sub-sec. (2-B) Sec. 75 of the ESI Act. The appeal so presented was not at all numbered, even as per his own saying, as a consequence of the non-deposit of 50% of the disputed amount, before even the appeal was entertained as per the salient provisions, adumbrated under sub-sec. (2-B) Sec. 75 of the ESI Act. Having not deposited such an amount, as required by the said statutory provision, the petitioner cannot be expected to have recourse to the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, by saying that the remedy so provided therefore is not efficacious. So long as such provision is available in the statute, as a living law of land, it is not open to the petitioner to say that such a statutory remedy provided is not efficacious and he is therefore resorting to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 10. The other question that is left out of consideration is a vociferous statement, regarding question of limitation. The liability to pay contribution on the part of the petitioner-principal employer is in respect of the period from April 1, 1985 till upto March 31, 1989. The action in this case had been taken by the issuance of a notice dated February 21, 1989, which is definitely within a period of five years, as had been provided for in the proviso to clause (b) of Explanation of sub-sec. (1-A) of Sec. 77 of the ESI Act. 11. Thus looking at the case from any angle, I am of the view that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed, even at the admission stage and the same is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, W. M. P. is also dismissed.