Judgment S. K. Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. In the present writ application, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 22-9-82 passed by respondent no.3 in Ceiling Appeal No.7/1983-84 (Annexure-3) and also order daed 27-2-84 passed by respondent No.2 in Revision Case No.247 of 1983 (Annexure-6) Further prayer has bsen made for a direction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the petitioners. 2. The facts of the case lies in a very narrow compass and are not much in dispute. 3. A draft statement under Sec.10 (2) of Bihar land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus land) Act.1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ceiling Act) was served upon the petitioner No 1. In the said draft, petitioner was allowed three adult units and no land for additional members in the familv was allowed Though unit was allotted to Jonaklal, Prithwhichand and Tej Narain but it is stated that no unit was allowed to eldest Ramdeo All objections were filed as required under Sec.10 (3) of the Ceiling Act taking several points therein. By order dated 2-8-76, the respondent No 4 partly allowed the objections and rejected the rest Being aggrieved an appeal was preferred before respondent no 3 and by order da ted 18-6-1980 appeal was allowed in part. The petitioner moved the Member Board of Revenue against the order and the revision application was admitted. Subsequently, it appears that in view of 32 (A) of Ordinance No 66 of 1981 the sai. d Revision application stood abated This was the circumstances in an earlier proceeding. Case of the peiitioner further is that agagain on 8-7-82, a draft statement under section 10 (2) of the Act was served upon ths petitioner and petitioner was allowed three adults units and no additional members in the family was allotted any unit. Although in the earlier draft statement full unit was allotted to petitioners Nos 2 to 4 but no unit was allowed to Ramdeo petitioner no.1. Being aggrieved the petitioner filed objection under Sec.10 (3) of the Ceiling Act raising various objections. Copy of the objection petition is annexed as Annexure-1. By order dated 22-9-82, respondent No.4 partly accepted the objections raised by the petitioner but negatived the others being aggrieved petitioner filed Ceiling Appeal No.7/83-84 before respondent No.3, who by his order dated 22-9-83 dismissed the said appeal. Copy of the objection petition is annexed as Annexure-1. By order dated 22-9-82, respondent No.4 partly accepted the objections raised by the petitioner but negatived the others being aggrieved petitioner filed Ceiling Appeal No.7/83-84 before respondent No.3, who by his order dated 22-9-83 dismissed the said appeal. Being dissatisfied the petitioner challenged the appellate order before the commissioner, Koshi Division Saharsa being Purnea Ceiling Revision No, 97/83-84. However, subsequently the petitioner withdraw that Revision application on the ground that the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to hear such revision. After withdrawal the petitioner obtained the certified copy of the order of the Collector and Commissioner and preferred Revision before the Member Board of Revenue being Revision Case No.247/83. As the revision was time barred, the petitioner filed a petition under Sec.5 read with Sec.14 of the Limitatiou Act along with the Revision Petition explaining the circumstances in filing the revision application after the period of limitation. The Member Board of Re venue, however by its order dated 27-2-84, dismissed the petition on the ground of limitation holding that ignorance of law is no excuse particularly when the case is argued through a lawyer. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said orderof dismissal has moved this Court in the present writ application. 4. The first contention of Mr. Yadav, is that the revisional court has erred in law in not condoning the delay in filing the revision application by taking into consideration the circumstances under which the petitioner was prevented from preferring the revision before the Board of Revenue. He further submits that when the petition under Sec.5 read with Sec.14 of the limitation Act was filed along With the application, it was incumbent upon the respondent No.2 to give adequate reasons before rejecting the said application Assailing the order as contained in Annexures-2 and 3, Mr. Yadav has urged that respondent No.4 erred in exercising his jurisdiction by not allowing the objections raised before him under Sec.10 (3) of the Act. It is stated that no verification was dope by the Revenue Authority as required under Sec.10 of the Act Assailing the order of the appellate court. Yadav has urged that respondent No.4 erred in exercising his jurisdiction by not allowing the objections raised before him under Sec.10 (3) of the Act. It is stated that no verification was dope by the Revenue Authority as required under Sec.10 of the Act Assailing the order of the appellate court. Mr Yadav has contended that without applying his judicial mind, the respondent No 3 mechanically dismissed the appeal by agreeing with the reasonings given by respondent No.4 According to him, the respondent no 3 being appellate authority was duty bond to give reasons for coming into a finding that the findings of the respondent No 4 were not required to be interfered with. 5. Mr. Amar Nath Gupta, learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, has submitted that it is futile for the petitioners to argue that objections were not considered by the respondent No, 4, inasmuch as, from the impugned annexure-2, it is crystal clear that though objections were filed by the petitioners but no documents were filed by them in support of their objections. He further submits that the order will show that objections were duly considered but as were not supported by any docum ntary evidence they were accordingly rejected. He further submits that if the objections were not considered by the respondent No 4 as alleged by the petitioner, how that some of the objections were upheld by the respondent No 4. Mr. Gupta further submits that revisional court has rightly refused to entertain the revision application on the ground of limitation. law does not, it is contended, permit the revisional court to condone the delay and secondly provision of limitation Act are not applicable before a quasi-judicial authority. lastly, mr. Gupta has contended that it is settled law that the appellate court need not assign its independent reasonings while concurring with the findings of the trial court and in such view of the matter, respondent No.3 cannot be said to have acted with material irregularity in concurring with the findings of respondent No, 4 without assigning any reasons. 6. In order to appreciate the points raised by Mr. Yadav. that the revisional court ought not to have dismissed the revision on the ground of limitation, the provisions as contained is Sec.32 of the Act may be usefully referred "section 32. 6. In order to appreciate the points raised by Mr. Yadav. that the revisional court ought not to have dismissed the revision on the ground of limitation, the provisions as contained is Sec.32 of the Act may be usefully referred "section 32. Revision to the Board of Revenue.- (1) A revision shall lie to the Board of Revenue from any appellate order passed by a, collector or a Commissioner within theirty days of such order ). (2) When a reference is made to the Board of Revenue under section 38 or a revision is filed under sub-section (1) of this section, the Board may, after bearing the parties, confirm, modify or set aside the order. (3) The Board of Revenue may of its own motion or on an application made to it, call for from the Colloctnr any document or record in connection with any enquiry conducted by the Collector or may direct the Collector to institute, for the purposes of this section, an enquiry and to submit his findings to the Board. " 7. From perusal of Sub-section (l)of Sec.32, it appears that before Amendment act 55 of 1982, there was no prescribed limitation for filing revision before the Board of Revenue. By Amendment Act 55 of 1982 such period of limitation has been prescribed as 30 day of order impugned. It is not in dispute that against she order passed by the respondent No.3, the petitioners instead of moving the Member Board of Revenue preferred revision to the Commissioner Koshi Division and on 13-12-83 and the same was withdrawn. It is also a fact that subsequently the revision application was filed before the Member Board of Revenue along with a petition under section 5 read with Sec.14 of the limitation Act. In this connection, provisions as laid down in sub-section (i) and (2) of Sec.14 of the limitation act may be taken into account. Sec.14 (1) read as follows : "in computing the period of limitation for anv suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court" of first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jursidic. tion or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. " Similarly Sec.14 (2) contemplates : - "in computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the application has been prosecuting with due dilgence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other couse of like nature, is Unable to entertain it. " 8. Thus provisions are clear that this relate to the proceeding before the court It is now well-settled that the authorities under the Act including the Board of Revenue is not a court. There is no doubt that the revisional authority and the appellate authority are all creatures of the Act itself. While exercising the power conferred upon the said authorities, they have certain powers of civil court also, but only because a statutory authority exercises some powers of civil court, the same cannot be itself convert a statutory tribunal into a court. Moreover, under the provisions of the Act,. the powers of the revisional authorities sometimes may be subject to the directions given by the State Government. Sec.45 of the Act empowers the Government under certain circumstances for expressing its final say in relation to the matter. 9. In the case of Bhuneshwar Bhagat v State of Blher and others reported in [1988 P. l. J. R.721], a learned single Bench of this Court, while interpreting the provisions of Sec.5 and Sec.29 (2) of the limitation Act vis-a-vis Sec.30 of the Act has held that: "in view of the aforementioned authority active judgment of the supreme Court, in my opinion, there is obsolutely no doubt that section 29 (2) of the limitation Act will have no application in relation to proceedings before the Collector under the said Act. Necessarily, therefore, it may be held that Sec.5 of the limitation Act cannot also apply in a proceeding under Section 30 of the said Act. " Similarly, it has been held in the aforesaid case that Sec.2) (2) of the Act applies only to proceedings before a court and not before any quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities. 10. However, Mr. Necessarily, therefore, it may be held that Sec.5 of the limitation Act cannot also apply in a proceeding under Section 30 of the said Act. " Similarly, it has been held in the aforesaid case that Sec.2) (2) of the Act applies only to proceedings before a court and not before any quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities. 10. However, Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on an order of the apex court in the case of Krishna Kumar Choudhary v. Alliance Agro Industries (P) Ltd and others reported in 1999 (i) P L J R. (S. C.) 3]. In the aforesaid order, it has been observed by their lordships that:- We are of the opinion that Sec.29 of the limitation Act applies to the facts and circumstances of this case and that it is now for the Deputy Collector, land Reforms and the Collector under the act to consider whether the delay in filing the proceeding should be condoned. "from the tenor of the order aforesaid, it appears that the appex court, in the facts and circumstancss of that case has observed as such and it is in exercising of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution. As to why I am of such view will be clear from a decision of the supreme Court in the case of Sakuru y Tanajt [ air 1985 SC 1279 ] where their lordships have held that "provisions of the limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings incourts" and not to appears or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Code of civil or Criminal Procedure " No other authorities could be brought to my notice by Mr. Yadav which holds contrary view to this decision. On such circumstances, in my view, the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Kumar Chaudhary ( supra)is not of mush help to the present case of the petitioner. 11. Yadav which holds contrary view to this decision. On such circumstances, in my view, the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Kumar Chaudhary ( supra)is not of mush help to the present case of the petitioner. 11. Section 29 (2) of the limitation Act read as follows :- "where any special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Sec.3 shall apply as if such period where the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sec.4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. " 12. From reading of the provisions aforesaid, it appear that where a period of limitation for filing suit, appeal or application is prescribed in any special or local law different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Sec.3 of the limitation Act will apply. As noticed above, section 32 of the Act prescribes 30 days as period of limitation for filing a revision before the Board of Revenue. Nothing has been shown to me by mr Yadav that any such period has been prescribed in the schedule of the limitation Act for filing a revision application before the Board of Revenue. Filing of application bas been prescribed in Third Division of the Schedule in the limitation Act, Mr. Yadav is unable to point out the provision in the schedule which deals with filing of application before an authority other than a court, 13. In order to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel, I may refer to the provisions of appeal prescribed under tne Act. If one look to the provisions of appeal prescribed of Bihar Act, 1962. It would be clear that while prescribing a period of 60 days for filing an appeal as the time of limitation, provision was made empowering the appellate authority to admit the appeal even after 60 days if he was satisfied that the appellaat was prevented for sufficient cause for such period. This jurisdiction of the appellate court was however curtailed by Amended Act 55 of 1982. This jurisdiction of the appellate court was however curtailed by Amended Act 55 of 1982. After such amendment, Sec.30 of the Act read as follows :- "appeals (1) (a) An appeal. shall lie from any final order passed by any officer vested with the power of the Collector under this Act other than the Collector of the district or any other officer specially authorised in this behalf by the State Government within thirty days, of such an order. (b) An appeal shall lie from any final order passed by the Collector of the district to the Commissioner of the Division within thirty days of such order : provided that no appeal shall lie against orders passed under Sec.5 and Sec.29 before the final publication of the draft statement under sub-section (1) of Sec.11 : provided further that appeal against orders passed uuder Sec.5 and Sec.29 shall be filed within thirty days from the date of final publication under sub-section (1) of Sec.11. (2) An appeal under this section shall be heard and disposed of in the prescribed manner. " 14. From the above discussion, it is amply clear that though previously there was power vested with the appellate authority to condone the delay by admitting the appeal but subsequently legislature has taken away that power from the appellate authority. Similarly, prior to Act 55 of 1982, as stated earlier, there was no specified time limit for filing revision before the Board of Revenue but subsequently, 30 days period has been prescribed for filing such revision. There is no provision in Sec.32 of the Act by which the board of Revenue can exercise its jurisdiction by condoning the delay in filing such revision application. It is well settled by now that power can be exercised by an authority provided such power exists in it. 15. In the present case, uncontrovertedly the petitioners filed an appeal before the Member Board of Revenue much after the period of limitation. However, it is stated that petition under Sec.5-read with Sec.14 read of the limitation Act was filed which hastbeen annexed as Annexure-3 to this writ application. 16. From perusal of the Annexure-5 ?t appears that the petition filed before the Meroher Board of Revenue was not even verified. However, it is stated that petition under Sec.5-read with Sec.14 read of the limitation Act was filed which hastbeen annexed as Annexure-3 to this writ application. 16. From perusal of the Annexure-5 ?t appears that the petition filed before the Meroher Board of Revenue was not even verified. Even assuming that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause for not filing before the member Board of Revenue but the backdrop of the authoritative pronouncement of the apex Court. I am of the view that on thst ground also the revisional authority could not have condoned the delay in filing the revision application Under these circumstances, in my opinion, the first point raised by Mr. Yadav has no merit and has to rejected. 17. The next submission of Mr. Yadav that the respondent No.4 has erred in law in accepting the objections filed by the petitioners in part is also in my view has no leg to stand. 18. ). FROM perusal of Annexure-2 the order dated 22-9-82 passed by the respondent No.4, it appears that the objection petition was considered in details and after examining the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent No.4 allowed one additional unit to the petitioners. It has come to a finding that Sona Devi being the sister-in-law of the land holder is not entitled for any unit Regarding non-verfication by the Revenue Authority has also bsen discussed by the respondent No 4 The respondent No.4 ha* found that though the petitioners did file objections but could not substantiate those objections by filing any document. This order of respondent No.4 was assailed in appeal and respondent No.3, the appellate authority did not interfer with the findings of respondent No 4. fhe respondent No 3 in my view being the appellate authority was not obliged to give its owns reasonings for concurring with the findings of the respondent No, 4. It is now well-settled that if the appellate authority disagree with the findiogof the trial court, it must give cogent reasons for su$h disagreement but in this case, respondent no.3 has concurred with the findings of the resdondent No.3 and as such he was not required to discuss the fact in details. 19. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the findings of the respondent No 3 are ail on facts which have been affirmed by the appellate court in exercising its writ jurisdiction. 19. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the findings of the respondent No 3 are ail on facts which have been affirmed by the appellate court in exercising its writ jurisdiction. The High Court will not interfere with the concurring findings of the fact. 20. In the result, I find no merit in this writ application and as such it is dismissed. However, there will * > e no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.