Honble YADAV, J. —This special appeal is directed against the judgment of learned Single Judge rendered in SB Civil Writ Petition No.1933/1980 Hari Ram Vs. Vikas Adhikari, Panchayat Samiti, Raisinghnagar, District Sriganganagar whereby the writ petition of the contesting respondent Hariram was allowed and the present appellant was directed to reinstate the contesting respondent on the post of Jeep Driver. It is further directed by learned Single Judge that for determination of wages and computation of amount due against the present appellant, the contesting respondent may approach the Labour Court under section 33-C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2). Facts necessary to be noticed for disposal of this appeal briefly stated are that initially the contesting respondent was temporarily appointed as Jeep driver for a period of six months by the appellant Vikas Adhikari vide order dated 19.8.1978 (Anx.l) to the writ petition. Thereafter again the services of the contesting respondent were extended upto 20.8.1979 which is marked as Anx.2 to the writ petition. The services of the contesting respondent were terminated by the appellant Vikas Adhikari vide his order dated 1.10.1980 which was impugned by the contesting respondent under Article 226 of the constitution of India before the learned Single Judge. (3). After service of notice upon the appellant a return was filed on behalf of the Appointing Authority and it was alleged that the contesting respondent was continued in temporary service without any valid order after 20.8.1979 as contemplated under the Rajasthan Panchayat Smities and Zila Parishads Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred as Service Rules, 1959). It is further alleged by the appellant that there is only one sanctioned post in the Panchayat Samiti against which a permanent driver namely Raghunath was working who was dismissed from service in the year 1975. After his dismissal in the year 1975 an another person was temporarily appointed as driver between the period 1975 to 1978 who died in accident and after his death the contesting respondent was temporarily appointed on the said post. Shri Raghunath driver preferred a revision against his dismissal which was allowed by a competent authority, therefore, after reinstatement of Raghunath driver on his post, the services of the contesting respondent will be deemed to have been automatically terminated under sub rule (6) of rule 23 of the Service Rules, 1959. Shri Raghunath driver preferred a revision against his dismissal which was allowed by a competent authority, therefore, after reinstatement of Raghunath driver on his post, the services of the contesting respondent will be deemed to have been automatically terminated under sub rule (6) of rule 23 of the Service Rules, 1959. It is also alleged that the contesting respondent made an application for amendment in his writ petition which was allowed by the court and by way of amendment the contesting respondent raised a new plea to the effect that his services cannot be terminated without complying with the mandatory provisions as contemplated under sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (4). According to learned single Judge the contesting respondent served with the appellant for more than 240 days, therefore, his services could have been terminated only after complying with the procedure prescribed under Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. According to the learned Single Judge since the mandatory provisions of the aforesaid Act is not complied with, therefore, the impugned termination order Anx.5 deserves to be quashed. Learned single Judge had also recorded a finding of fact to the effect that the appointment of the contesting respondent was made on the post of Jeep Driver vide order dated 19.8.1978 for a period of six months and the term of appointment was extended upto 20.8.1979 thereafter the contesting respondent was allowed to continue on the post of driver and his case for regularisation and extension was referred to Commission. It is also held by the learned single Judge that the case of the contesting respondent for regularisation was pending consideration meanwhile the State Government allowed the revision filed by Raghunath driver and ordered for his reinstatement. The Commission neither refused his concurrence with regard to continuence of the contesting respondent and his regularisation in service nor approved for extension and regularisation of the services of the petitioner made by the Panchayat Samiti but fact remains that the contesting respondent continued in service of the appellant upto 1.10.1980. (5). We have heard learned counsel for the appellant Shri Vijay Bishnoi and the learned counsel for the contesting respondent Shri O.K. Vyas at length and perused the relevant material on record. (6). (5). We have heard learned counsel for the appellant Shri Vijay Bishnoi and the learned counsel for the contesting respondent Shri O.K. Vyas at length and perused the relevant material on record. (6). Almost all the points urged before us and also almost all the decisions cited in support thereof had been argued and placed before the learned single Judge and the learned Single Judge rightly addressed himself to those points. The learned Single Judge has given cogent and convincing reasons in support of his judgment holding that admittedly the provisions of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have not been complied with irrespective of the fact that the contesting respondent has fulfilled the condition precedent by serving the appellant continuously for more than (wo years. It is correctly held after analytical discussion by the learned Single Judge that neither the contesting respondent was given one month notice nor he was paid retrenchment compensation as required under Scc.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We are in general agreement with the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and the instant special appeal is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. But we propose to give additional reasons of our own in support of the judgment given by the learned single Judge extending benefit of sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the contesting respondent and in quashing the impugned termination order (Anx.5) passed by the appellant appointing authority. (7). In the instant case, main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the instant case is squarely covered by the judgement given by the learned single Judge in Prabhu Dayals case (1) according to which if request for extension of service made by the Panchayat Samiti is refused by the Commission and incumbent still continued the such continuation after six months become illegal. Therefore, such employee is not entitled to get the benefit of see. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (8). Therefore, such employee is not entitled to get the benefit of see. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (8). A close scrutiny of the Prabhu Dayals case (supra) leads towards an irresistable conclusion that the learned Single Judge ruled that the Panchayat Samiti by its resolution to the Zila Parishad made a request for granting extension but the same was refused, therefore, continuence in service after refusal become illegal and as such benefit of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was denied in that case. In the instant case the Panchayat Samiti had made a request to the Commission for regularising and also for extending the services of the contesting respondent which was pending on the date of termination. In the present case request of extension and regularisation of service made by the Panchayat Samiti to Commission had neither been approved nor refused. According to the learned counsel for the appellant in such a circumstance, it may be presumed that the request for extension and regularisation of service of the contesting respondent made by the Panchayat Samiti was refused. (9). The aforementioned contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is not acceptable to us inasmuch as, if in such a situation there can be two interpretation, one in favour of subject and other in favour of Stale the court of law will prefer an interpretation which is beneficial to the subject in order to avoid penal consequences to the subject and also to save him from serious prejudice which is likeky to occasion due to acceptance of an interpretation which is based on ad-hoc presumption. (10). Yet there is another reason to repel the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant inasmuch as if his argument is accepted, it will be against the constitutional philosophy enshrined in our Constitution. Now it is well settled that right to life includes right to livelihood. Deprivation of right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law could be violative of Article 21. Thus, it is not possible for us to hold that the request of Panchayat Samiti to Commission for regularisation and extension of the services of the contesting respondent which has neither been approved nor refused should be treated by us as refusal for extension and regularisation of the services of the contesting respondent. (11). Thus, it is not possible for us to hold that the request of Panchayat Samiti to Commission for regularisation and extension of the services of the contesting respondent which has neither been approved nor refused should be treated by us as refusal for extension and regularisation of the services of the contesting respondent. (11). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the learned single Judge is perfectly justified to hold that the facts of the Prabhu Dayals case (supra) is not applicable in the present case. (12). As a matter of fact the decision given by the learned Single Judge in Prabhu Dayals case (supra) does not hold water in view of unreported decision given by a division bench of this court in DB Civil Special Appeal No.555/92 between Gajraj Vs. Rajasthan Agricultural University, Bikaner, decided on 06.8.1993. According to the aforementioned decision when no order has been passed extending the services for a fixed term, it cannot be termed to be an appointment for fixed term, therefore, such termination is not covered by sub clause (bb) of clause (oo) of Sec.2 of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947. According to the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court (supra) if the employee has not passed the test for regularisation of his services then he is not entitled for regularisation but he being temporary employee, his services cannot be terminated without complying with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 because he has already completed more than 240 days in the employment of the appellant. According to the aforesaid decision even availability of selected candidates will not entitle the employers to terminate the services of the employee without complying with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In support of the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench consisting of Honble J.R. Chopra and Honble Farooq Hasan, JJ. had taken into account almost all the decisions of Honble Supreme Court as well as of this Court which were cited before us by the learned counsel for the parties. We are in full agreement with the proposition of law laid down in the aforementioned judgment of this Court. In order to avoid repetition and to maintain brievity, a catena of judgement discussed in the aforesaid judgment in support of aforesaid proposition of law is not being discussed by us. We are in full agreement with the proposition of law laid down in the aforementioned judgment of this Court. In order to avoid repetition and to maintain brievity, a catena of judgement discussed in the aforesaid judgment in support of aforesaid proposition of law is not being discussed by us. In our considered opinion in view of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court, the proposition of law laid down by the learned Single Judge in the case of Prabhu Dayal (supra) does not hold water and is hereby over-ruled. (13). Next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Surendra Kumar Gyani Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2), has been noticed by the learned Single Judge as well as learned Judges in Division Bench case of Gajraj Vs. Rajasthan Agricultural University (supra) but incorrectly distinguished. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and in our considered opinion, the aforementioned case is not applicable in the present case. The Division Bench of this Court as well as learned Single Judge had noticed the aforesaid decision of their lordships of the Hon"ble Supreme Court rendered in Surendra Kumar Gyani"s case (supra). (14). According to ratio of Surendra Kumar Gyani"s case (supra) by their lordships it is apparent that their lordship their lordships ruled that in that case the State Government did not even intend to give those employees appointment on the regular basis. While in the present case it is proved to the hilt that the Panchayat Samiti had made a request by its resolution to Commission to regularise the services of the contesting respondent which leads towards an irresistable conclusion that in the present case the intention of the appointing authority was to appoint the contesting respondent on regular basis. Secondly, in case of Surendra Kumar Gyani (supra) Insurance department sanctioned and created 180 posts temporarily on the footing that the appointment of daily rated clerks will come to an end on the availability of duly recruitted persons while in the present case post against which the contesting respondent was appointed was not temporarily created and sanctioned by the appointing authority with an understanding that in case of permanent appointment he will be removed but he was appointed against existing permanent vacancy with intention to make him permanent. In view of the aforesaid discussion we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of this court has rightly distinguished the aforesaid decision and an argument contrary to it raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is not acceptable. (15). It is undisputed before us that Panchayat Samiti had made a request for regularisation and extension of the services of the contesting respondent to the Commission which was neither approved nor refused by the Commission. As such the aforesaid conduct of the appointing authority will attract the promisory estoppel by conduct as ruled by their lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Motilal Padampath Sugar Mills Co.Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (3). Their lordships in the aforesaid judgment ruled that the principle of the promisory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. There is no reason or principal why promisory estoppel ahould also not be available as a cause of action if necessary to satisfy the equity. The aforesaid doctrine of the promisory estoppel has also been applicable against the government by their lordships of the Honble Supreme Court and their lordships negatived the defence of State on executive necessity. In the instant case the appellant is an instrumentality of State. Therefore, the aforesaid principle of promisory estoppel by conduct is also applicable to him. (16). In the instant case we are fully satisfied that the appellant intended to induce the contesting respondent to believe that he is being temporarily appointed against a substantive vacancy which was intended to be made permanent. He was allowed to continue in service even after expiry of the period of extension. The appointing authority made a request to the Commission for regularising and extending the services of the contesting respondent which further induced the present respondent to act upon it and he did act upon it by continuing in service even after expiry of the period of extension. The appointing authority made a request to the Commission for regularising and extending the services of the contesting respondent which further induced the present respondent to act upon it and he did act upon it by continuing in service even after expiry of the period of extension. The contesting respondent entered into the employment with the appellant on the faith of representation made by appointing authority that he would not be prejudiced and his employment would be regarded as a continuous employment. Now the appellant cannot be allowed to go back of his intended representation made to the contesting respondent upon which he had acted upon. (17). We have scrutinized Anx.3 to the writ petition which goes a long way to prove that the performance of the contesting respondent Shri Hari Ram as a Driver was superb in the departmet. He was found to be competent, laborious, sweet tongue and honest driver. It is further certified by the appointing authority that the contesting respondent was also a very good Jeep Mechanic and during his employment as a Jeep Driver, his performance was superb. Thus, the contesting respondent possessed all the requisite qualifications of a honest Jeep Driver yet he is being deprived of his source of livelihood on mere technicalities against the constitutional philosophy enshrined under Article 39- A and Article 41 which requires that the State is to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work. It would be share pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens but no person can be deprived of his source of livelihood already provided by the State or its instrumentality except according to just and fair procedure established by law. (18). In our considered opinion it is indeed unfair to use the contesting respondent, generate hope and feeling of security in him, attune him and his family to live within his earnings and then suddenly to throw him out of job without complying with the mandatory provisions contained under Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (19). The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had again generated a hope to the contesting respondent and his family members by giving an undertaking before the learned Single Judge on 3.12.1980. (19). The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had again generated a hope to the contesting respondent and his family members by giving an undertaking before the learned Single Judge on 3.12.1980. The said undertaking is reproduced below : "However, Mr. Bishnoi undertakes that in case the writ petition is allowed, the petitioner would be paid his salary from the date of his removal to the date of decision of the writ petition within two weeks." (20). Now after such a long time of more than 14 years if the contesting respondent is thrown out of employment, he and his family members will have no source of livelihood and there is a likelihood that the contesting respondent and his family members may indulge in anti-social activities which would be antithesis to our social order. In our old scripture it is aptly said "foHkwcf{kr% fde~ u djksfr ikie~" i.e. a person who is hungry is capable of doing any sin. This court cannot afford to encourage a man and his family members to indulge in anti-social activities by throwing him out of employment after such a long interval of more than 14 years. (21). The learned counsel invited our attention to the provisions contained under Sec.23(l), (4) and (6) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishads Rules, 1959 which are reproduced below : — "23(1)- In case no selection has been made or no person selected by the Commission is available at any time, for filling a vacancy, appointment may be made by the Appointing Authority temporarily for a period of not exceeding a six months, provided the filling up of the vacancy is required emergently and a certificate to the effect that no selected candidate is available has been obtained from the Committee. 23(4)- The period of such temporary appointment may, however, be extended beyond six months, only with the previous concurrence of the Committee. 23(6)- The temporary appointment made under this Rule shall terminate as soon as a candidate selected by the Commission or Committee, as the case may be, is made available. 23(4)- The period of such temporary appointment may, however, be extended beyond six months, only with the previous concurrence of the Committee. 23(6)- The temporary appointment made under this Rule shall terminate as soon as a candidate selected by the Commission or Committee, as the case may be, is made available. Candidates so made available and placed at the disposal of Panchayat Samiti/Zila Parishad shall be appointed by the appointing authority forthwith, on the vacancies against which temporary appointments have been made, and on their reporting for duty, persons holding temporary appointments shall be deemed to have vacated their office and shall not be entitled to any salary thereafter." (22). We do not propose to alter the material of the aforesaid service rules of which it is woven on the anvil of right to life which includes right to livelihood conferred by Article 21 which require to be fair, just and reasonable. However, according to us where there is a choice we propose to choose the meaning which accords with reason and justice. Therefore, according to us the aforesaid rule 23(1), (4) and (6) is to be interpreted consistantly with the spirit and philosophy of the Constitution which is permissible to do without doing violence to the said rule. Thus it follows that the employees who are serving on the establishment for long spells and have the requisite qualifications for the job, should not be thrown out but their services should be regularised as far as possible. It is true, the appointment made under these rules are intended to be invoked to serve emergent situation which could not brook delay. Such appointments are intended to be stop gap temporary arrangement to serve the stated purpose and not long ferm once. These rules were not intended to fill large number of posts in the service by back door entry but only those which could not be kept vacant till the regular appointments were made in accordance with the rules but once the appointments continued for long the services have to be regularised if the incumbent possessed the requisite qualifications. In the instant case the contesting respondent had worked on the establishment of the appointing authority for more than two years and he also possessed requisite qualification of a Jeep Driver. (23). In the instant case the contesting respondent had worked on the establishment of the appointing authority for more than two years and he also possessed requisite qualification of a Jeep Driver. (23). Our aforementioned view is fortified by a recent decision of Honble Supreme Court given in the case of Jacob M. Puthuparambil Vs. Keral Water Authority (4). . (24). In view of the aforementioned discussion, the instant special appeal is dismissed with cost and the judgment given by the learned Single Judge is hereby affirmed subject to this modification that the appellant will be paid his salary from the date of his removal uptil date within two weeks from the date of the judgement of this court without resorting the cumbersome proceedings by approaching the Labour Court under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In view of the undertaking given by the counsel of appellant on 3.12.1980 before the learned Single Judge to the effect that the contesting respondent would be paid his salary from his date of removal to the date of decision of the writ petition within two weeks.