JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J. 1. THE petitioner who has been a student of G. B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology, Pant Nagar, District Nainital has appro-Ached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution against the office order dated 29/30-6-1993 whereby the following punishment was awarded to him : "1. Temporary Dismissal for 3 Semester i.e. II Semester, 1992-93 and I and II Semesters 1993-94, ii. Campus declared out of bounds during the above period. iii. Conduct probation throughout his stay in the University after readmission. iv. Debarred i for further degree programme and job employment in the University. v. Readmission after completion of punishment period is subject to approval of Vice-Chancellor on the recommendation of Dean of College/ Discipline Committee." 2. DISCIPLINARY proceedings against the petitioner and certain other students arose out of complaints and counter complaints pertaining to several cases of 'Maar-Peet' and 'physical assault' which took place on 24-2-1993, 12-4-1993, 15-4-1993 and 28-4-1993. The incidents were investigated by the DISCIPLINARY Committee and the concerned students including the petitioner were heard in person and afforded opportunity to defend themselves. On the basis of the material available before the DISCIPLINARY Committee, the following acts of indiscipline and misconduct emerged against the petitioner :- "i. Involvement in maar-peet and firing incident in the market as well as Subhash Bhawan on 24-2-1993. ii. Physical assault on Sri Y. K. Sharma, Id. No. 16234 common room of Vis. Bhawan on 12-4-93. iii. Alleged involvement in clash with Sri Om Vir Singh, Id. No. 17410 and Sri. Rahul Verma Id. No. 16654 near Silver Jubilee Hostel on 15-4-93. iv. Active participation in group clash and man-handling on 28-4-1993 near University Library alleged to be having Desi Kattas." Upon consideration of the report submitted to it, the Disciplinary Committee the meeting of which was held on 20-8-1993, awarded to the petitioner the punishment as aforestated Aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 3. HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted in a just and fair manner and well in accordance with the principles of natural justice. I do not find any error in the decision, making process' and this Court, sitting in writ jurisdiction, cannot supplant the decision taken by the University authorities by its own. 4. I do not find any error in the decision, making process' and this Court, sitting in writ jurisdiction, cannot supplant the decision taken by the University authorities by its own. 4. IT was held in the case of Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All. E.R. 141 "The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court." (See also Harpal Singh Chauhan v. State of U. P., JT 1993 (4) SC 1), Lord Brightman observed in the above noted case of Evans : ".........Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made" and held that it would be an error to think".....that the court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself." 5. IN State of U. P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 , the Supreme Court has ruled as under : ".........Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be converted into appeal. Judicial review is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision making process." 6. IN U. P. Financial Corporation v. M/s. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd., JT 1993 (2) SC 226, the law regarding judicial review of an administrative decision or order has been propounded as under : "The obligation to act fairly on the part of administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the Rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial Authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 . Even so the extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. Even so the extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi judicial authorities, it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. IN the matter of administrative action, it is well-known, if more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities, they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred" (Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Counsel, 1977 AC 1014 at 1064). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases, only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the Court intervene." Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has not been able to invite ay attention to any error in the decision making process and, as already noticed, 1he disciplinary proceedings have been conducted in a just and fair manner and well in accordance with the principles of natural justice Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the petitioner has been illegally and arbitrarily discriminated in the matter of punishment in that, it is urged, a lesser punishment has been awarded to Sri Pradeep Kumar Tripathi against wham a similar and identical charge was made and who was described to have played main role along with the petitioner. 7. SRI Dinesh Kakkar learned counsel for the respondent, urged that the petitioner was involved in all the 4 incidents of 'maar-peet and 'physical assault' which took place on the dates stated hereinbefore whereas Pradeep Kumar Tripathi was involved only in 2 dates in the incidents. 8. 7. SRI Dinesh Kakkar learned counsel for the respondent, urged that the petitioner was involved in all the 4 incidents of 'maar-peet and 'physical assault' which took place on the dates stated hereinbefore whereas Pradeep Kumar Tripathi was involved only in 2 dates in the incidents. 8. HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that it was for the University authorities to determine as to what punishment should be awarded to a particular student involved in the various incidents of 'Maar-Peet' and Physical assault' amounting to misconduct and act of indiscipline It is not for the High Court to determine as to what punishment should have been awarded to a student found guilty of acts Of violence and indiscipline both inside and outside the University campus. In Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. v. Bagleshwar, AIR 1966 SC 875 , it has been ruled by the Supreme Court as under : "In dealing with petitions of this type, it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions like the Universities or appellant no. 1 set up Enquiry Committees to deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic Tribunals to decide all relevant questions in the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the matter of the adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available, but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so. Courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities under Article 226, the High Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision in question; its jurisdiction is limited and though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence at all. the High Court would be justified to quash that order. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities under Article 226, the High Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision in question; its jurisdiction is limited and though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence at all. the High Court would be justified to quash that order. But the conclusion that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not Justify the said conclusion. Enquiries held by Domestic, Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves and in holding such enquiries, the Tribunals must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice; but it would, we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all considerations which govern criminal trials in ordinary Courts of law. In the present case, no animus is suggested and no mala fides have been pleaded. The enquiry has been fair and the respondent has had an opportunity of making his defence. That being so, we think the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order passed against the respondent." 9. IN State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow, JT 1994 (I) 217, the Supreme Court, while examining the scope of interference by High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, on the question of punishment, has held as under : "On the question of punishment, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the punishment awarded is excessive and that lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice. It may be noticed that the imposition of appropriate punishment is within the discretion and judgment of the disciplinary authority. It may be open to the appellate authority to interfere with it but not to the High Court.........The power under Article 226 is one of judicial review." 10. It may be noticed that the imposition of appropriate punishment is within the discretion and judgment of the disciplinary authority. It may be open to the appellate authority to interfere with it but not to the High Court.........The power under Article 226 is one of judicial review." 10. IN view of the above authorities, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order but I have no manner of doubt that if the petitioner approaches the Vice- Chancellor and candidly offer unconditional apology and gives an undertaking for good conduct in future, the latter as guardian of the petitioner and as custodian of the Nation's future, which the student community certainly is, would confer his benediction upon the petitioner by appropriately modifying and reducing the punishment awarded to the petitioner with a view to affording him an opportunity to reform and mould himself and build up his career by changing the course of his activities from destruction to creativity; from violence to non-violence and, from hatred to love and compassion. Animalism being the past of man-kind, the propensity of violence in man-kind is nothing but a disease inherrited from animals. 1 am sure, if the petitioner approaches the Vice-Chancellor with open heart, the latter would, in his capacity as guardian of the petitioner, certainly reduce the punishment appropriately and give a chance to the petitioner to transgress and transcend his past, and I also hope and trust that the petitioner would be given the treatment in the matter of punishment-similar to the one the Vice-Chancellor may give to P. K. Tripathi pursuant to the order dated 21-3-1994 passed in writ petition No. 25366 of 1993 : Pradeep Kumar Tripathi v. Vice Chancellor and others having due regard to the provision of Regulations 45 (i) (d) and 45 (iv) (d) as approved by the Academic Council in its 156th and 158th meeting held on 13-6-1981 and 14-8-1981, the copy of which has been annexed as annexure-1 to the supplementary affidavit, and which, as stated at the bar, have been re-approved as Regulations 45 (vi) of the Regulations. The writ petition is disposed of with the above" observations and directions.