JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J. 1. SUBJECT matter of impugnment in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the order dated 21-10-1993 passed by Superintendent of Police (Railways), Jhansi whereby the petitioners have been placed under suspension. The suspension order has its genesis in the institution of a criminal case in case crime No. 416 of 1993, under section 394/397 IPC pertaining to P.S, G R.P. Jhansi against the petitioners. 2. SRI Sudama Ji Shandilya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, vehemently urged that the suspension order is vitiated for the reason of the requirements of Rule 17 (1) (b) of U. P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks Rules, 1991 (in short the Rules) being observed in non-complaince, In that, urged the learned counsel, the appointing authority has not applied Its mind to the relevant factors governing the exercise of discretion vested in It under clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 of the said Rules. With a view to appreciating the contentions of the learned counsel Rule 17 of the Rules, in so far as it is relevant may be quoted below. "17 Suspension-(1) (a) A Police Officer against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding, may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the enquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority or by any other authority not below the rank of Superintended of police authorised by him in this behalf. (b) A police officer in respect of or against whom an investigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending, may at the discretion of the appointing authority under whom he is serving, be placed under suspension, until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is conected with his position as a police officer of is likely to embarass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude.- If the prosecution is instituted by a private person on complaint the appointing" authority may decide whether the circumstances of the case justify the suspension of the accused. (5) (a) Any suspension ordered or deemed to have been ordered or to have continued in force under this rule shall continue to remain in force until' it is modified or revoked by any authority specified in sub-rule (1)." 3. (5) (a) Any suspension ordered or deemed to have been ordered or to have continued in force under this rule shall continue to remain in force until' it is modified or revoked by any authority specified in sub-rule (1)." 3. A perusal of the impugned order (Annexure-1) would be eloquent of the fact that although the provision under which it has been passed, does not find mention, but the facts staged therein, leave no manner of doubt that it is referrable to clause (b) of sub rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Rules, inasmuch as it has not been passed on the grounds comprehended by clause (a) but on the ones comprehended by clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Rules. 4. IT is no doubt evident from the relevant rule quoted hereinbefore, that the power to place a police officer under suspension under clause (b) of sub rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Rules in discretionary but 'discretion' necessarily implies good faith and reasonableness in discharging public duties. IT cannot be gain-said that there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate. Further the discretionary power under rule 17 (1) (b) Uncoupled with a legal duty cast upon the appointing authority to place under suspension a police officer in respect of or against whom enquiry etc relating to a criminal charge connected with his position as a police officer or the one which is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties of involves moral turpitude is pending. This, of course, is coupled with the duty to apply its mind to the afore-stated relevant factors governing the exercise of discretion vested in it. It cannot be gainsaid that when a discretionary power is conferred upon an authority and the exercise of the discretion depends upon the existence of certain conditions, the exercise of the discretionary power would be vitiated if the conditions are non-existent. Under the rule in question, the condition precedent for the exercise of the power is comprehended in the expression if the charge is connected with his position as a police officer or is likely to embarass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude ; occurring in rule 17 (I) (b) of the Rules. Under the rule in question, the condition precedent for the exercise of the power is comprehended in the expression if the charge is connected with his position as a police officer or is likely to embarass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude ; occurring in rule 17 (I) (b) of the Rules. It is no doubt true that if the prosecution is instituted by a private person on compliant, the appointing authority may decide whether the circumstances of the case justify the suspension of the accused but here again the appointing authority would be guided by the nature and gravity of the charge and its bonafide. Wade on Administrative Law (4th Edn. p. 340) has aptly said- "........Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely that it to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended." 5. IN 'Breen V Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175 at 190, Lord Denning M. R. has observed as under : "The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this ; the statutory body must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith ; nevertheless the decision will be set aside." 6. THE following passage from the judgment of Lord Greene M. R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1-KB 223 at p. 229, would aptly explain the point- "It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does than mean ? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often used the word "unreasonable" in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used as a general description of the things that mast not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with the discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. It has frequently been used as a general description of the things that mast not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with the discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must excluded from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said to be acting "unreasonably". Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority." THE rule in question provides sufficient safeguards against a arbitrary exercise of discretion, in that the discretion to place a police officer under suspension under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 is circumscribed and conditioned by the expression "if the charge is connected with his position as police officer or is likely to embarass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude" occurring in rule 17 (1) (b) of the Rules. That apart, an arbitrary exercise of power under the said provision is always open to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The principles afore-stated are well settled and cannot be doubted. However, the question that arises for consideration in the instant case, is whether the impugned order of suspension has been passed arbitrarily as urged by the learned counsel. In my opinion, it is not. The fact that a case under section 394/397 IPC has been registered against the petitioner is not disputed. The offence undoubtedly Involves moral turpitude by its nature and is likely to embarass the petitioner in discharge of his duties as a police officer. 7. THE next question that arises for consideration is whether an order under rule 17 (1) (b) is required to be reasoned one. In my opinion, while placing a police officer under suspension under rule 17 (1) (b) of the Rules, all that the appointing authority is required to do is to set out as much minimal facts in the order of suspension as may be sufficient to disclose that the charge against the police officer is connected with his position as a police officer or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. 8. 8. IT is no doubt true that even in a matter of pure judgment as distinguished from the one which can be established objectively by accepted legal standards, the courts can enquire whether those facts on which the judgment could reasonably be made to exist and have been taken into consideration ; whether the judgment has been made upon proper self direction as to those facts and, whether judgment has not been made upon other facts which ought not to have been taken into account. But as observed by Lord Denning M. R. in (1976) 3 WLR 651 "much depends on the matter about which the Secretary of State has to be satisfied. If he is to be satisfied on a matter of opinion that is one thing. But if he has to be satisfied that some one has been guilty of some discreditable or unworthy or unreasonable conduct, that is another"-(See Wade on Administrative Law, 4th Edn p. 380-81). The appointing authority while exercising the power of suspension under rule 17 of the Rules does not decide any lis nor does it act as a Tribunal and the nature of its function too is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. If it has acted in good faith and on relevant consideration and has not allowed itself to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous consideration, an order of suspension would not be vitiated simply because it is not reasoned one All that is to be seen is whether the conditions indicated in the rules are fulfilled and the authority has acted in good faith unactuated by any malice. 9. IN the instant case, this finds mention in the impugned order of suspension that a case under section 394/397 IPC has been registered against the petitioner. It is not and cannot be disputed that such charge involves moral turpitude and is likely to embarass the petitioner in discharge of his duties as a police officer. IN my opinion, it was not necessary for the appointing authority to say, expressly in the order, that the charge involves moral turpitude or that it is likely to embarass the petitioner in discharged of the duties. The order impugned in the writ petition, in my opinion, stands the litmus test of reasonable exercise of discretion and cannot be frowned upon as arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. The order impugned in the writ petition, in my opinion, stands the litmus test of reasonable exercise of discretion and cannot be frowned upon as arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. This court, while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution should not ordinarily INterfere with the orders of suspension "unless they are passed malafide and without there being even prima facie evidence on record connecting an employee with the misconduct in question" (See U. P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan, JT 1993 (2) SC 550). 10. WHILE exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution against an administrative order of discretionary nature, this court must also bear in mind the following observations made by prof. Wade- "The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority, which parliament appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds. it acts ultra vires. The court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly merely according its own opinion. It must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the courts function to look further into its merits." In U. P. Financial Corporation v. M/s, Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd., JT 1993 SC 226, it has been held- "...........Doctrine of fairness, evolved in administrative law was not supposed to convert the writ courts into appellate authorities over administra- tive authorities." And further that- "...........Only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair that no reasonable person would have taken that action can the court intervene." 11. THE learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decision in Brijesh Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., (1994) UP LB EC 348, wherein a learned Judge of this Court, while construing the provisions of rule 49-A of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, has observed as under- "............the appointing authority while passing order of suspension against the employee has to apply its mind as to whether order of suspension will be justified in the facts and circumstances of the case until the termination of all proceedings relating to the criminal charge. Whether the charge is connected with his position in service or it is likely to embarass him in discharging of his duties or the charge is such which involves moral turpitdue............. 12. THE principle as afore stated is not to be questioned and what has been observed above by the learned Judge is in fact also the requirements of rule 17 (1) (b) of the Rules involved in the present case, but in my opinion, if the facts stated in the order of suspension disclose a charge involving moral turpitude in respect of which an investigation, enquiry or trial is pending, an order under the rule cannot be said to be one suffering from the vice of arbitrariness/arbitrary exercise of discretion. THE appointing authority, in my opinion, is not required to record reasons, apart from disclosing the facts that an investigation, enquiry or trial regarding the criminal charge is pending against the concerned police officer and that such charge is connected with his position as a police officer or is likely to embarass him in discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. As noticed hereinbefore, the order impugned in the petition does disclose the fact that a case under section 394/397 IPC has been Instituted against the petitioner and the fact that such a charge involves moral turpitude, is not and cannot be disputed It would be, in fact, against public policy to allow a police officer charged with criminal offence under section 394/397 IPC to discharge his duties as such police officer until he is clearned of or is likely to be cleared off the charge in view of the material collected during investigation, enquiry or trial. THE decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner therefore, is not of any avail. THE decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner therefore, is not of any avail. THE order impugned in the petition neither suffers from the vice of malafide nor it can be said to have been passed without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the petitioner with the misconduct in question. It is not shown to be arbitrary or whimsical THE function of the appointing authority under rule 17 (1) not being judicial, quasi judicial or adjudicatory, it was not necessary to record reasons (See National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. K. K. Raman, AIR 1992 SC 1806 I am, therefore, not inclined to invoke extra-ordinary and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It may however be observed that the petitioners may at appropriate stage of investigation, enquiry or trial of the criminal offence, move an application for revocation of the suspension order under sub-rule (5) (a) of Rule 17 of the Rules which provides that any suspension ordered or deemed to have been ordered or to have been continued in force under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by any authority specified in sub rule (1) of the Rules, If any such application is moved by the petitioner, the appointing authority shall then be duty bound to record reasons whether it rejects or allows the application because at that stage it is required to decide issue raised in the application. 13. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed subject to above observations. Petition dismissed.