JUDGMENT :- The State of Maharashtra, aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent for an offence punishable under Section 168, IPC vide order dated 20-7-1987 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 3rd Court, Esplande, Bombay, has come up in appeal before me. 2. The prosecution case in brief is that the respondent was working as a Probation Inspector of Divisional Office No. 8, National Insurance Company Limited, Sir P. M. Road, Bombay during the period 1978-1982. The respondent was bound not to engage in any trade or business without the permission of the aforesaid insurance company. According to the prosecution, he violated that condition and engaged himself in trade by running two agencies in the name of T. R. Solanki with National Insurance Company, Divi sional Office No. 4 and Life Insurance Corporation of India, branch No. 906, Bombay. While running the aforesaid two agencies he received the agent's commission from the aforesaid companies. While acting as the Commission agent he signed vouchers and whatever amounts he received from the National Insurance Company and the Life Insurance Corporation of India, he deposited the cheques in the account operated by him in the name of T. R. Solanki. 3. During the trial the respondent admitted the aforesaid facts. The contention of the prosecuting counsel in the trial court was that inasmuch as the respondent was employed by the National Insurance Company as an Inspector on probation on a monthly salary of Rs. 500/-. His act in running the aforesaid two agencies in the name of T. R. Solanki amounted to an offence punishable under Section 168 IPC. In support of its contention, in the trial court, the counsel for the prosecution, cited the decision of this court in the case of Mulshankar Maganlal, (1950) 52 Bom LR 648 : ( AIR 1951 Bom. 233 ) wherein this court has held that the word trade covers every kind of trade, business or occupation. The learned trial Magistrate did not accept this contention in view of the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1980 Cri LJ 919 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1167 ) (State of Gujarat v. Maheshkumar Dhirajlal). 233 ) wherein this court has held that the word trade covers every kind of trade, business or occupation. The learned trial Magistrate did not accept this contention in view of the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1980 Cri LJ 919 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1167 ) (State of Gujarat v. Maheshkumar Dhirajlal). In the aforesaid case Their Lordships observed that trade in its narrow sense means "exchange of goods, for goods or money with the object of making profit" and in its widest sense means "any business with a view to earn profit." The learned trial magistrate took the view that inasmuch as the respondent was only to receive commission and the profit was to go to insurance company, he had committed no offence under Section 168 IPC. Consequently he passed the impugned order. 4. Mr. Nalavade, learned Additional Public Prosecutor castigated the impugned order as a perverse one. His contention is that the word commission includes profits. I regret that I am not able to accede to this contention of Mr. Nalavade. The distinction between commission and the profit is crystal clear. Commission is an amount settled before hand which goes to the person who brings the business for the company. On the other hand, profits are whatever the company finally earns after deducting all the expenditure and it goes to the company. At any rate, I am examining the matter in appeal against acquittal. The Apex Court has repeatedly held that unless the view of acquittal is perverse or clearly unsustainable on an appraisal of the evidence or it results from an erroneous view of law, this court should not interfere. (See Para 3 of AIR 1971 SC 66 : (1971 Cri LJ 20) Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar and Para 10 of AIR 1987 SC 1083 : (1987 Cri LJ 974) Tota Singh v. State of Punjab). In my opinion, the view taken by the learned Magistrate was reasonable and calls for no interference. 5. In the result, I find this appeal to be devoid of merit and dismiss the same. The impugned order of acquittal of the respondent is confirmed. Appeal dismissed.