PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) BBULA alias Ajit Pal (hereinafter referred to as 'detenu') has filed this application under Article, 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 seeking issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, quashing order of detention dated 6-3-1994 passed by the District Magistrate, Cuttack, in exercise of powers conferred by Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'act' ). The order of detention was passed with a view to preventing the detenu from acting any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and directing him to be interned in the Circle Jail, Choudwar, in pursuance of the said mittimus. ( 2 ) GROUNDS necessitating detention as de tailed in the grounds of detention are as follows. On 2-3-1994 at about 4. 45 p. m. the detenu along with one of his associates entered into the City Hospital, Cuttack. He assaulted Sri Bipinbehari Mohapatra, Stenographer to the Chief District Medical Officer, Cuttack and snatched away his wrist watch and cash. He moved inside the City Hospital shouting at the Chief District Medical Officer and other employees of the Hospital and threatened to take away their lives. To terrorise the employees, he assaulted two of them, namely, Sri Bijaya Chandra Das and Sri Durlava Singh. By his violent activities, the general public and employees present there were panic-stricken and had no courage to resist him. Out of fear, mem bers of public, patients who had come for treat ment and employees of the Hospital ran helter and skelter and attending doctors fled away from duties apprehending his deadly attack on them. An essential service like medical service could not be made available to the patients for a period. As the employees deserted their seats out of fear, Government work was hampered and normal functioning of a Government office was paralysed. The City Hospital, though a public place, was left isolated for a period due to his anti- social activities. His violent activities created panic and insecurity in the minds of Government employees and general public, affecting public order and tranquillity in the locality. He left the Hospital with a threatening for serious consequences if any one reports the incident to the police. Members of staff of the Hospital were so terrified that they did not venture to come to the police station on that day. He left the Hospital with a threatening for serious consequences if any one reports the incident to the police. Members of staff of the Hospital were so terrified that they did not venture to come to the police station on that day. It was reported to the police on the next day. Besides, there are reports of many anti-social activities in the past which prove habitual indulgence in such activities, caus ing grave sense of insecurity and fear in the minds of peace loving people. Ten incidents between the period from 23-6-1990 to 26-11- 1993 were listed, relating to such allegations. ( 3 ) THE order of detention has been primarily attacked on two grounds by the petitioner. (I) Allegations if any do not relate to any public order situation, and even if accepted at their face value constitute law and order situa tion, for which stringent action like preventive detention is impermissible; and (ii) There was inordinate delay in disposal of petitioner's representation by the Central Government. To highlight this aspect, it is submitted that the report of the State Government reached the Union Home Ministry on 27-4-1994. The said Ministry sought for certain vital informa tion on 28-4-1994 from the State Government, by sending a wireless message. On 4-5-1994 necessary information was conveyed by the State Government. The representation was placed before the Union Home Minister on 10-5-1994 and the same was rejected on 17-5-1994 by the Union Home Minister. According to the petitioner, de lay between (a) 4-5-1994 to 10-5-1994 and (b) 10-5-1994 to 17-5-1994 has not been explained. In the counter affidavit filed by the Central Government, it has been stated that on receipt of the fax message from the State Government on 4 -5-1994, the representation was placed before the Deputy Secretary, Home Ministry to consider and put up the same before the Special Secretary of Home Ministry with his comments. On 6-5 -1994 the Special Secretary considered the matter and after processing, put it before the Home Minister on 10-5-1994. In between 7th and 8/05/1994 were holidays, being Saturday and Sunday respectively. The Home Minister took up the matter for consideration on 10-5-1994 and disposed it of on 17-5-1994. It is pointed out that 14th and 15/05/1994 were also holidays being second Saturday and Sunday respectively. In between 7th and 8/05/1994 were holidays, being Saturday and Sunday respectively. The Home Minister took up the matter for consideration on 10-5-1994 and disposed it of on 17-5-1994. It is pointed out that 14th and 15/05/1994 were also holidays being second Saturday and Sunday respectively. According to the Central Government, there was absolutely no laches in dealing with the petitioner's representation and it was dealt with utmost despatch. ( 4 ) SO far as the plea that the alleged incidents were by their nature law and order situations and not public order situations, it is submitted by the State and Central Governments that the anti social activities created a fear psychosis in the minds of peace loving citizens, and they were prevented from carrying on their normal avoca tions, and the acts jeopardized public peace and tranquillity. By indulgence in such violent anti social activities, even tempo of life of community at large had been adversely affected. ( 5 ) A preventive detention is not punitive but precautionary measure. The object is not to pun ish a man for having done something, but to prevent and intercept him before he does it again. No offence is proved, nor any charge is formu lated, and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive justice re quires an action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. At the same time, a person's greatest of human freedoms, i. e. , personal liberty is deprived, and therefore, the laws of preventive detention are strictly construed, and a meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is mandatory. Compulsions of the primordial need to maintain order in society, without which enjoyment of all rights including the right of personal liberty, would lose all their meaning, are the true justifications for the laws of preventive detention. The deprivation of personal liberty of individuals becomes imperative to protect the society from denigrating. Laws that provide for preventive detention posit that an individual's conduct preju dicial to the maintenance of public order can provide grounds for a satisfaction that similar propensities on the part of the person concerned are likely and there is a possible future manifestation. The deprivation of personal liberty of individuals becomes imperative to protect the society from denigrating. Laws that provide for preventive detention posit that an individual's conduct preju dicial to the maintenance of public order can provide grounds for a satisfaction that similar propensities on the part of the person concerned are likely and there is a possible future manifestation. This jurisdiction has been described as a jurisdiction of suspicion, and the compulsions to preserve the values of freedom, of a democratic society and of social order sometimes merit the curtailment of the individual liberty. No law is an end itself and the curtailment of liberty for reasons of maintenance of public safety and tranquillity has to be administered under strict constitutional restrictions. No carte blanche is given to any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter in such matters. "to lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to the, written law" said Thomas Jefferson" would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty and all those who are enjoying with us, thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the needs. No law is an end itself and the curtailment of liberty for reasons of State's secu rity and national economic discipline as a neces sary evil has to be administered under strict constitutional restrictions. " No carte blanche is given to any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter in such matters. A constitutional protec tion is given to every detenu which mandates the grant of liberty to the detenu to make a represen tation against the detention, as imperated in Ar ticle 22 (5) of the Constitution. It also imperates the authority to whom the representation is ad dressed to deal with the same with utmost expedition. The representation is to be consid ered in its right perspective keeping in view"the fact that the detention of the detenu is based on subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned, and infringement of the constitutional right con ferred under Article 22 (5) invalidates the deten tion order. Personal liberty protected under Ar ticle 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the im pugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by law. Personal liberty protected under Ar ticle 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the im pugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by law. The stringency and concern of the judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Pelham Dale's case, 1881 (6) QBD 376 :"then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is a general rule, which has always been acted upon by the courts of England, that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he must take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails to follow every step in process with extreme regularity the court will not allow the imprisonment to continue. "a constitutional protection is given to every detenu which mandates the grant of liberty to the detenu to make a representation against the de tention, as imperated in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The grant of opportunity for repre sentation must be an effective one. Whenever there is executive invasion on personal liberty, the Court has to weigh in golden scales whether the personal liberty is to be placed at a high pedestal regardless of the social cost involved in the release of possible renegade. The question whether there is sufficient material to justify the detention is not open to judicial scru tiny. Sufficient of material is inconsequential in a case of preventive detention. It is not for the Court to pronounce on possible inferences from evidence for or against the detenu. It is for the detaining authority to satisfy himself about these matters and about the need to order the preventive detention and its duration. In considering the legality of an order of detention, the High Court does not and cannot function as a Court of appeal. If there is any material to justify passing of the detention order, the necessity for it is a matter of subjective assessment and satisfaction by the detaining authority with which no Court would be ordinarily justified in interfering, unless it is shown that there has been any infraction of the precautions afforded under Article 22 (5 ). If there is any material to justify passing of the detention order, the necessity for it is a matter of subjective assessment and satisfaction by the detaining authority with which no Court would be ordinarily justified in interfering, unless it is shown that there has been any infraction of the precautions afforded under Article 22 (5 ). Merely because the matter falls within the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority does not mean it could be irrational to the point of unreality. Subjective satisfaction is actual satisfaction, nevertheless. The objective standards which Courts apply may not be applied, the subject being more sensitive; but a sham satisfaction is no satisfaction and will fall in Court when chal lenged. If the material factors are slurred over, the formula of subjective satisfaction cannot salvage the deprivatory order. Statutory immunol ogy hardly moves such invalidity and the juris prudence of detention without trial is not the vanishing point of judicial review. An order of detention is made on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The court cannot con sider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the subjective satisfaction is based provided they have a rational probative value and not extraneous to the purport of detention. The Court cannot review the grounds and substitute its own opinion for the detention by applying the objective tests or determine the necessity of de tention for a specified purpose. However, grounds of detention are not wholly immune from judi cial review. Though veil of subjective satisfac tion cannot be lifted by the courts with the object of finding out its objective sufficiency, it could always be seen by Courts whether such satisfac tion was honest and not a colourable exercise of power. ( 6 ) 'public order' is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity prevailing among the members of political soci ety as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have instituted. The words 'public order' and 'public tranquillity' overlap to a certain extent but there are matters which disturb public tranquillity without being a disturbance of public order. Public order requires absence of disturbance of a state of serenity in society, but it goes further. It means, what the French designate ordere publique defined as an absence of insurrection, riot turbu lence, or crimes of violence. Public order requires absence of disturbance of a state of serenity in society, but it goes further. It means, what the French designate ordere publique defined as an absence of insurrection, riot turbu lence, or crimes of violence. By the expression 'maintenance of public order' what is intended is the prevention of grave public disorder. It is not the same as 'maintenance of law and order'. The latter means prevention of disorders of compara tively lesser gravity and of local significance. Expounding the phrase 'maintenance of public order', the apex Court has observed that one has to imagine three concentric circles : Law and order represent the largest circle within which is the next circle represents public order and the smallest circle represents the security of the State. All cases of disturbances of public tranquillity fall in the largest circle, but some of them are outside 'public order' for the purpose of the phrase 'maintenance of public order'. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere distur bance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Act, but disturbances which will affect public order can justify detention under that head. A line of demarcation must be drawn between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. It is the degree of distur bance and its effect upon the life of the commu nity in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. The question whether a person has only committed breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. There is no magical formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. Therefore, no strait-jacket formula can be laid down and it could depend upon the act and its impact. There is no magical formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. Therefore, no strait-jacket formula can be laid down and it could depend upon the act and its impact. The conduct of a person may be reprehensible, but it does not add up to the situation where by the community at large may be disturbed. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different context and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is in its impact on society, it may be very different. Qualitatively, the acts may not be very different. A state of peace or orderly tranquillity which prevails as a result of the observance or enforcement of internal laws and regulations by the Government is a feature common to the concepts of law and order and public order. The nature of the act, the circumstances of its commission, the impact on people around and such like factors constitute the pathology of public disorder. One cannot isolate the act from its public setting or analyse its molecules as in a laboratory. What has to be seen is its total effect on the flow of orderly life. It may be a question of the degree or quality of the activity, of the sensitivity of the situation and the psychic response of the involved people. To dissect further is to defeat the purpose of social defence which is the paramount purpose of preventive detention. Judged in the aforesaid premises, there can be no shadow of a doubt that the acts complained of come within the realm of public order and the plea that at the most they relate to law and order situation has absolutely no substance. ( 7 ) THE residual question is whether there was inordinate delay in dealing with the representa tion of the detenu. ( 7 ) THE residual question is whether there was inordinate delay in dealing with the representa tion of the detenu. The constitutional right of a detenu to file a representation to the Government carries with it impliedly a right that it must be disposed of as quickly as possible and any unexplained delay in that behalf would amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee contained in clause (5) of Article 22. It is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases within which the representation of the detenu has to be disposed of with reasonable expedition. It must necessarily depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. Since a representation should be considered with reasonable expedition, it is imperative on the part of every authority, whether in merely transmitting or dealing with it, to discharge the obligation with a reasonable prompt ness and diligence without giving any room for complaint of remissness, indifference or avoid able delay, because delay caused by slackness on the part of any authority will ultimately result in delay in disposal of the representation which in turn may invalidate the order of detention as having infringed mandate of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The question of any period taken in dealing with the representation of the detenu has to be decided in the particular facts and circum stances of each case and it cannot be determined on the basis of any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases. A leeway has to be given in considering such representation by the Gov ernment and no inference of delay leading to the violation of constitutional mandate enshrined in clause (5) of Article 22 can be drawn unless the, authorities dealing with the representation has adopted an attitude of leisureliness, supine indifference, slackness, unduly protracted procrasti nation or callous attitude in considering such representation. The time imperative for consid eration of the representation can never be abso lute or obsessive. Explanation offered relating to period taken for disposal of the representation is not unreasonable. It is clear that representation was dealt with utmost despatch. ( 8 ) BOTH the points raised by the petitioner having failed, there is no scope for interference in this writ application, which is accordingly dis missed. ( 9 ) V. A. MOHTA, C. J. :- I agree. Petition dismissed.