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1994 DIGILAW 297 (KER)

OUSEPH ESTHAPANOSE v. STATE OF KERALA.

1994-07-29

SUJATA V.MANOHAR, T.L.VISWANATHA IYER

body1994
JUDGMENT T. L. VISWANATHA IYER, J. - These tax revision cases arise out of the assessments made on the petitioner under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, for the years 1979-80, 198-81 and 1981-82. The appeals filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were rejected as time-barred. Since the Appellate Tribunal did not find reason to interfere with the common appellate order, these tax revision cases have been filed. 2. We heard counsel for the petitioner and Sri T. Karunakaran Nambiar, Special Government Pleader (Taxes), for the Revenue. 3. The assessments impugned have been made on the turnover of a brick manufacturing unit alleged to have been run by the petitioner. The petitioner's case was that his son Pappachan had been running such a unit at Edanad, Sreemoolanagaram, for which the Panchayat authorities had issued licence, and that Pappachan had been paying tax on the sales effected by him. Reference is made to annexure B series of receipts produced along with T.R.C. No. 5 of 1994. Petitioner refers to annexure F certificate issued by the Executive Officer of the Sreemoolanagaram Panchayat to support his plea that he had not run any such brick manufacturing unit during the relevant years. In fact the petitioner had in his letter written to the assessing authority on December 28, 1981 on receipt of the pre-assessment notice categorically asserted that he was only an agriculturist not doing any business and that the brick manufacturing unit was run by his son Pappachan, who was also remitting the tax due. 4. The assessing authority however completed the assessments as, according to him, enquiries revealed that the petitioner had carried on the brick manufacturing unit. 5. The first appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were admittedly time-barred. But the petitioner attempted to explain the delay. He is an illiterate individual. He was suffering from rheumatic complaints. He filed the appeals when revenue recovery proceedings were taken for realisation of the tax assessed. 6. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner issued notice to the representative of the petitioner to show cause why the appeals should not be rejected as time-barred. The representative did not choose to appear with the result the appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay. 7. 6. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner issued notice to the representative of the petitioner to show cause why the appeals should not be rejected as time-barred. The representative did not choose to appear with the result the appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay. 7. It is true that there has been laches on the part of the petitioner's representative to appear and present the petitioner's case, but having regard to the facts of the case as set forth above, we are of the view that the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner ought to be disposed of on merits instead of being scuttled on the ground of delay. The petitioner appears to be an illiterate person, claiming to be a mere agriculturist. He had clearly stated that the business was not his, but his son's, who was paying the tax therefor. Though the appeals were belated, the default of the representative appears to have contributed to the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We are of the opinion that the interests of justice require a decision of the first appeals on the merits, after condoning the delay in filing them. The tax revision cases are accordingly allowed and the impugned common order of the Appellate Tribunal is set aside. The Tribunal shall dispose of the appeals afresh, remitting the cases back to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for decision on the merits, treating the appeals before him as filed in time after condoning the delay. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.