M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this case has assailed the correctness of an order dated 7-7-1994 passed by the respondent 1-Deputy commissioner of Shimoga. A few facts require to be stated. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a resident of that town and claims to be in possession of a small plot of land which admittedly measures approximately 20 ft. x 40 ft. , on which, according to him, he has been residing and running a canteen since about the years 1965-1966. It is his case that pursuant to certain requests made by him, that the Municipal Council passed a resolution on 4-10-1990 being Subject No. 144 granting the property in question to the petitioner provided he pays the prevailing market rate. It is essential to record here that this decision was preceded by the petitioner filing a suit before the Civil Court whereby he had prayed that he should not be dispossessed from the premises. The petitioner failed in that effort as also in the subsequent proceedings right upto the High Court. In any event, as indicated earlier, on 4-10-1990 the resolution in question came to be passed. In the subsequent meeting of the Municipal council on 15-11-1990 the resolution dated 4-10-1990 whereby the land had been granted to the petitioner came to be revoked by another resolution. The petitioner challenged this decision before the respondent 1 and the respondent 3 who is also a councillor and who had objected to the resolution on certain grounds, also preferred an appeal to the Commissioner. There is some controversy with regard to the hearing of the two appeals which is not of much significance and the Commissioner, by the two impunged orders, allowed the appeal filed by respondent 3 and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. In sum and substance, the action of revocation of the resolution dated 4-10-1990 was upheld by the Commissioner. It is against these orders that the present writ petition has been directed. ( 3 ) MR. Patil, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that the reasoning of the learned commissioner is unsustainable in law. He places reliance on the provisions of Section 57 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, and he contends that a resolution passed by a Municipal Council cannot be either rescinded or set aside, except under the procedure prescribed by Section 57. He places reliance on the provisions of Section 57 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, and he contends that a resolution passed by a Municipal Council cannot be either rescinded or set aside, except under the procedure prescribed by Section 57. He submitted that admittedly the resolution for revocation of the earlier one which ought to have been formally placed on the agenda, taken up, discussed and passed by the House, was never even put on notice and therefore, in the absence of following these procedural requirements that the subsequent resolution dated 15-11-1990 is bad in law and ought to have been struck down. Mr. Patil's submission is that the procedure prescribed by Section 57 is mandatory and that the reasoning of the Commissioner that it was permissible to vary this resolution at the very next meeting is impermissible in law. ( 4 ) AS against this position, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Municipal Council and respondent 3 states that the submission of the petitioner is highly technical and that it ought not to be upheld. To start with, learned Counsel draws my attention to the provisions of Section 80, sub-section (5) which reads as follows :"80 (5 ). No act done or proceeding taken under this Act shall be questioned on the ground merely of any defect or irregularity not affecting the merits of the case". ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel submits that the submission canvassed by the petitioner's Counsel is nothing more than a hyper-technicality. He points out to the Court that the very body which passed the earlier resolution, namely, the Municipal council is invested with the inherent power to vary its earlier decision and if this is done without formally placing the proposed resolution on an agenda that it is a mere irregularity and not something that is sufficient to vitiate or void the subsequent decision. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel relies on the decision in Municipal Council, Raichur v Bohar amarchand Prasanna and Others , wherein the Supreme Court, while considering modification of a resolution passed by the raichur Municipal Council, upheld the argument that the provisions of Section 80 (5) were good enough to save the modification in that case. I have carefully gone through the ratio of that judgment and in my considered view, it is distinguishable having regard to the facts of the present case. I have carefully gone through the ratio of that judgment and in my considered view, it is distinguishable having regard to the facts of the present case. The technicality that was canvassed in that case was limited to the fact that the subsequent resolution was not passed by the House in an open meeting, that it was passed by circulation. The Supreme Court upheld the defence that the irregularity was so trivial that it would not affect the validity. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents also relies on another decision of the Punjab and haryana High Court in Jagdish Rai Chawla v State of Punjab and Others, wherein a resolution was called into question on the ground that the party who was a beneficiary of the same had not been heard before the resolution was revoked. That issue is not canvassed in the present case and this decision, therefore, would have hardly any application as far as the present proceeding is concerned. I need to however, add that the respondents' learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the fact that this was one of the grounds that was pleaded, but the same was not pressed in the- course of the arguments. ( 7 ) IN effect, the argument canvassed on behalf of the respondents and the one upheld by the respondent 1 proceeds on the footing that the resolution that was passed on 4-10-1990 did not assume legal significance or effect until it was duly recorded and confirmed by the House in its subsequent meeting on 15-11-1990. The learned Counsel points out to me that the proceedings of the House are officially minuted and that these minutes are required to be read and confirmed at the subsequent meeting. This is a requirement of Section 59. It is submitted, therefore, that a distinction is required to be made by this Court between a resolution that is revoked at the very next meeting before it is confirmed and situation where a resolution at the post confirmation stage is sought to be modified. The argument proceeds on the footing that the resolution has not assumed finality until it is confirmed. The argument proceeds on the footing that the resolution has not assumed finality until it is confirmed. In so far as no legal effect can be given to it nor can it virtually be executed unless and until it has attained an official garb which happens only at the point of time when the minutes are confirmed. To my mind, this argument cannot be upheld for the reason that it is true that Section 59 prescribes that the minutes of the previous meeting which included the resolution had to be confirmed. The term confirmation has got to be understood in the legal sense, namely, that it is a ratification of the recording of the proceedings of the earlier meeting and it is not to be confused with a situation whereby the business of the earlier meeting is to be re-discussed or reconsidered. This is the fundamental difference between the two insofar as the resolution assumes finality when it is passed by the House and it is only the clerical process of recording it which is verified at the stage when the minutes are confirmed. In this view of the matter, it would be clear that the revocation or modification of a resolution would not come within the jurisdiction of the House at the stage of confirmation of the minutes. For doing that, the procedure has been prescribed under Section 57 and that procedure is mandatory. There is good reason for this in so far as if the argument of the learned counsel were to be upheld, it would give rise to a dangerous proposition and an even more hazardous situation in so far as final decisions taken by the public body would require a second round of so called confirmation which is not within the scheme of law. ( 8 ) THERE is a certain element and requirement of finality as far as resolutions of a public body are concerned. I do agree with the respondents' Counsel when he points out that the power to vary or modify an earlier decision is invested with the Council, and this power can be exercised in appropriate cases. ( 8 ) THERE is a certain element and requirement of finality as far as resolutions of a public body are concerned. I do agree with the respondents' Counsel when he points out that the power to vary or modify an earlier decision is invested with the Council, and this power can be exercised in appropriate cases. There is, however, a requirement that adequate notice must be given and that the resolution proposing a revocation of an earlier resolution must be circulated and this requirement to my mind, is of equal importance because decisions once arrived at should not be loosely allowed to be varied or changed. In these circumstances, therefore, it is clear that the respondent 1 was in error in upholding the contention that the respondents were justified in revoking the resolution dated 4-10-1990 at the meeting held on 15-11-1990. ( 9 ) IN the light of-the aforesaid legal position, the two orders passed by the respondent 1 are liable to be set aside. The orders are accordingly quashed and set aside. As a necessary consequence, the resolution dated 4-10-1990 stands restored to its original position. The petition accordingly succeeds and the respondents are directed to give effect to the resolution dated 4-10-1990 within an outer limit of three months from today subject to the completion of the requisite formalities. --- *** --- .