JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner, who is a member of R.A.S., has filed this writ petition with a prayer to quash the FIR No. 41/92 dated 3.4.1992 registered by the Director General, Rajasthan State Investigation Bureau under the instructions of the State Government. He has also prayed that the respondents should be restrained from taking further proceedings in pursuance of the FIR. 2. Petitioner entered in Government service on appointment to R.A.S. in the year 1962 after selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission.In the year 1987 he remained posted as Competent Authority under the Urban Land '(Cdlmg and Regulation) Act, 1976. During the period of his working as Competent Authority under the Act of 1976, he passed an order dated 18.8.1987 in respect of properties of Shri Avani Kumar Mukharjee and his family, out of which some portion had been transferred to Jagjeevan Grah Nirman Sahakari Sa'miti in the year 1985 and 1986. The petitioner granted exemptions from the operation of 1976 Act to the lands which were transferred to the Cooperative Society. Against the order passed by the petitioner, an appeal has been filed under Section 33 of 1976 Act by one of the aggrieved parlies. A reply to this appeal has been submitted by the Department and it has supported the order passed by the petitioner. 3. On some complaints made by one Shri Prithvi Singh to Hon'ble the Lok Ayukl, Rajasthan, alleging serious irregularities and corruption by the petitioner, a ease was registered by the Hon'ble the Lok Ayukt under Section 10 of the Lok Ayukt and Up-Lok Ayukt Act, 1973 and an enquiry was made by him with notice to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply. At the time of personal hearing he filed written representation. Hon'ble the Lok Ayukt submitted a report to the Government for initiating action against the petitioner by way of departmental enquiry as well as by way of prosecution. 4. On the basis of report of Hon'ble Lok Ayukt, the Government in Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms issued a memo dated 6.3.1992 for holding an enquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Raj. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958. Against the charge sheet the petitioner filed writ petition No. 2335/92 P.D. Paliwal v. State & Anr . That writ petition has been admitted by the High Court on 17.3.1992. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958. Against the charge sheet the petitioner filed writ petition No. 2335/92 P.D. Paliwal v. State & Anr . That writ petition has been admitted by the High Court on 17.3.1992. An interim order staying further proceedings in relation to the charge sheet dated 6.3.1992 has also been passed and the same has been confirmed on 13.4.1992. 5. At the same time action was initiated by the Government for registration of a criminal ease against the petitioner. For this purpose the Assistant Secretary, Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms made a report to the Director General, Rajasthan State Investigation Bureau and a FIR No. 41/92 was registered on 3.4.1992 for offence under Section 5(l)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Allegation levelled against the petitioner is that while acting as Additional Director-cum-Competent Officer (I), Urban Development & Housing Department, Jaipur in the year 1987, the petitioner had passed order dated 18.8.1987 in favour of land holders which resulted in a loss of rupees one crore to the government. Order passed by the petitioner has been described to be wholly contrary to law and arbitrary. 6. It is the FIR which has been made subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. Petitioner has pleaded that action of the Government in getting the FIR registered against him, suffers from malice in fact as well as in law. According to the petitioner, FIR was got registered with a view to frustrate the promotion of petitioner in I.A.S. In the first place departmental enquiry was initiated under Rule 16 of 1958 Rules but when the Government found that the enquiry cannot proceed on account of the stay order passed by the High Court, the FIR was got registered with an oblique motive. Petitioner's case is that the provisions of Sections 5(1) (d) and 5(2) of 1947 Act no longer exist in view of Section 30 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Further case of the petitioner is that he does not fall within the ambit of the expression public servant's as defined under Section 21 IPC. This the petitioner says because according to him he was acting like a Judge while passing an order under the provisions of 1976 Act. Further case of the petitioner is that he does not fall within the ambit of the expression public servant's as defined under Section 21 IPC. This the petitioner says because according to him he was acting like a Judge while passing an order under the provisions of 1976 Act. Yet another plea raised by the petitioner is that while passing order dated 18.8.1987 he may have committed some error of law but that cannot give rise to an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Another submission of the petitioner is that the order dated 18.8.1987 was passed by him in accordance with the provisions of law and there is no justification for the Government to initiate prosecution of the petitioner particularly when appeal as well as review of the order dated 18.8.1987 arc still pending. 7. In reply the respondents have come forward with a case that the order dated 18.8.1987 was passed by the petitioner in total disregard of the provisions of law. This he did with an ulterior motive and with criminal intention. According to the respondents the charge sheet was issued to the petitioner after taking into consideration the report of Hon'ble Lok Ayukt and that a case was registered against the petitioner in the light of the said report. 8. Shri N.L. Pareek, learned Additional Advocate, has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that this court cannot, -while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, interfere with the process of law initiated at the instance of Government in a case involving corruption by a public servant. Shri Pareek argued that substantial evidence is available against the petitioner to prima facie establish the allegation levelled against the petitioner and, therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, the High Court must not intervene. Shri Pareek invited court's attention to the decisions of Superme Court in State of Bihar v. P.R Sharma, 1992 Suppl.(l) SCC 222 , and State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl.(l) 335 . Shri Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that although the court may not readily interfere with the FIR, in a case where no offence is disclosed in the FIR, the court cannot shut its eye and allow a party to face harassment in the form of prosecution. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl.(l) 335 . Shri Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that although the court may not readily interfere with the FIR, in a case where no offence is disclosed in the FIR, the court cannot shut its eye and allow a party to face harassment in the form of prosecution. Shri Kuhad further argued that in this case, FIR has been registered under a dead law and that even on merits, no offence whatsoever is disclosed with reference to Section 5(l)9d)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 9. In order to appreciate rival submissions, it will be proper to make reference to Sections 5(l)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 10. A look at the aforesaid provision shows that proceedings under Section 5(l)(d) can be initiated if a public servant has by corrupt or illegal means obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. It is, therefore, clear that before a person can be proceeded against under Section 5(1) (d), there must be an allegation that a person has by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, done something which has resulted in pecuniary advantage to himself or to some other person or has obtained valuable thing for himself or for any other person. If one can possibly discern these factors from the FIR lodged against the petitioner, there will be little justification for the court to interfere with FIR. However, if the court comes to the conclusion that even prima facie the FIR does not disclose the ingredient of offence under Section 5(l)(d), there will be little justification for quashing of the FIR. 11. Even in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have referred to the cases where the High Court will be justified in quashing the FIR. 11. Even in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have referred to the cases where the High Court will be justified in quashing the FIR. Their Lordships observed : "The following categories of cases can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court cither to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised : (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report of the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulteriour motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." In State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1983) 1 SCC 9 , Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 395 and Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court had declared that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. 12. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principle, the FIR registered against the petitioner deserves a close scrutiny. A look at the FIR (Annexure-11), registered against the petitioner, shows that the report begins with the allegation that the petitioner had passed order dated 18.8.1987 with the object of causing favour of Jagjeevan Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti. He had violated the provisions of law by granting exemption to the land belonging to Mukharjee family. It is then alleged that in reality Jagjeevan Grih Nirman Samiti was a society of the members of the family of Alok Kumar Mukharjee and without making any investigation into the legality of the Samiti, the petitioner made an order for granting exemption to the society. It is then alleged that in reality Jagjeevan Grih Nirman Samiti was a society of the members of the family of Alok Kumar Mukharjee and without making any investigation into the legality of the Samiti, the petitioner made an order for granting exemption to the society. Other allegations levelled against the petitioner related to violation of the provisions of law and omission to look into the relevant facts.Extracts of the various paragraphs of the First Information Report are quoted below: " fdUrq Jh ikyhoky us vius mDr fu.kZ; esa mDr lfefr dh oS/kkfudrk ,oa vfLrRo ds ckjs esa fdlh izdkj dk ;qfDrlaxr foospu ugha dj mDr lfefr dks lgh ekudj muds i{k esa Hkwfe dks vYlj ds izko/kkuksa ls eqDr dj fu;eksa ds fo:) dk;Zokgh dj jkT; ljdkj dks djhc 1 djksM+ #i;s dk vkfFkZd uqdlku igqWapk;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa mDr Jh ikyhoky }kjk ;g fy[kuk fd tuojh 1976 esa 21415 oxZ ehVj Hkwfe eqdthZ ifjokj }kjk tfj;s bdjkjukek csph x;h Fkh dkuwu dh [kqyh vogsyuk dj ,oa rF;ksa dh vuns[kh dh x;h gSA bl laca/k esa dksbZ iq[rk izek.k fjdkMZ ij ugha yk;s x;s Fks ftuls dkuwr lEer rjhds ls ;g fl) gksrk gks fd Hkwfe dk cspku vYlj vf/kfu;e ykxw gksus ls iwoZ gh lfefr dks dj fn;k Fkk vkSj dCtk Hkh laHkyk fn;k FkkA ikuh vkSj fctyh dk dusD'ku [kkyh tehu ij ysus esa fu;eksa esa dksbZ jksd ugha gS vkSj dsoy blh vk/kkj ij edkuksa ds fufeZr eku ysuk fu;ekuqlkj ugha gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa lHkh edkukr iwoZ esa cu pqds FksA ;g eku ysuk dkuwu ds fo:) gS bl izdkj mDr 17406 oxZ ehVj Hkwfe dks vYlj ds izko/kkuksa ls eqDr j[kdj Jh ikyhoky us jkT; ljdkj dks Hkkjh vkfFkZd uqdlku igqWapk;k gSA bl izdkj Jh ikyhoky us mDr vkns'k dk xyr gokyk nsdj bl Hkwfe dks vYlj ds izko/kkuksa ls eqDr j[kdj xyr dk;Zokgh dh gSA blds vykok mDr Jh ikyhoky us vius fu.kZ; esa of.kZr LVkEi isij ij fd;s x;s 17 vujftLVMZ cspku ds bdjkjukeksa dks Lohdkj ughsa fd;k] fdUrq eqdthZ ifjokj ,oa txthou x`g fuekZ.k lfefr ds ekeys esa o vU; ekeys esa LVkEi isij ij fd;s x;s vujftLVMZ bdjkjukes dks Lohdkj dj fy;k x;k gks tks fd iw.kZr;k HksnHkkoiw.kZ ,oa voS/kkfud o dkuwu ds fo#) gSA Jh ih0Mh0 ikyhoky ds fo#) vijkf/kd ykijokgh ds fy;s ih-lh- ,DV dh lacaf/kr /kkjkvksa lifBr Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh lEcfU/kr /kkjkvksa ds vUrxZr vijk/k ntZ dj vUos"k.k fd;k tkosA " 13. The aforesaid extracts of the First Information Report show that the allegation levelled against the petitioner is of serious irregularities allegedly committed by him in the passing of the order granting exemption from the operation of the Act of 1976. There is no allegation against the petitioner of having secured any pecuniary advantage for himself or anybody else. In the absence of such allegation against the petitioner it is clear that no offence is per se made out against him under Sections 5(l)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. May be that the order passed by the petitioner as a competent Authority acting under the Act of 1976 is contrary to law or is against the record, but merely on that ground the petitioner cannot be proceeded against for offences under Section 5(l)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Government is free to set passed by the petitioner by exercising its jurisdiction of review am order passed by the petitioner is still under consideration of the Give as in the month of February 1994 the learned Additional Government Advocate made a statement that the review proceedings arc still under consideration of the Government. Even the appeal filed by one of the aggrieved parties has not been decided so far. Whatever may be the fate of the review or the appeal, I am of the considered view that the First Information Report lodged against the petitioner docs not prima facie disclose commission of offence under Section 5(l)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act of 1947. 14. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, I do not consider it necessary to decide points which have been raised on behalf of the petitioner. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The First Information Report No. 41/92 registered by the Rajasthan State Investigation Bureau, Jaipur is quashed and the respondent Government is restrained from proceeding further in the matter. *******