B. N. KIRPAL, C. J. ( 1 ) EVEN more than two decades after the question first arose, the Counsel are still debating on the question as to what is a state, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. That is the principal contention raised in this appeal filed by a Public Limited company, challenging the judgment of the learned single Judge, who had allowed a writ petition filed by five er six employees, whose services had been terminated. ( 2 ) RESPONDENTS Nos. 2 to 6 were working with the appellant, which, inter alia, carries on the business of manufacture and sale of fertilizar, and that the terms and conditions of recruitment and service were regulated by the Service Rules framed by the appellant. Rule 44 contained a provision, which enabled the Company to discharge or determine services of an employee after his confirmation. The said Rule, inter alia, provided that after confirmation, an employee in Grade I or grade II may be discharged from service of the Company "for sufficient reasons by the Competent Authority", after giving him three months notice in writing in that behalf, or salary in lieu of such notice. ( 3 ) THE Managing Director of the company passed an order dated 6th of may 1984, discharging the said respondents from service under the said rule 44. Reasons for the discharge were recorded by the Managing Director, but the same were not communicated to the said respondents. The order of discharge merely stated that their services were being terminated under said Rule 44. The appeal filed by the said respondents, within the Company itself, being unsuccessful, they filed a writ petition, being Special Civil Application No. 5039 of 1984, challenging the said order of discharge. ( 4 ) BEFORE the learned single Judge, it was, inter alia, contended on behalf of the respondents that it was not possible for the Company to terminate the service merely by giving three months pay and without holding any enquiry and without recording any reasons. ( 5 ) THE appellant herein had submitted that it was not a state and, therefore, a petition under Article 226 of the constitution was maintainable. It was also submitted that the services of the respondents had been terminated under rule 44 and such termination was justifiable on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. ( 5 ) THE appellant herein had submitted that it was not a state and, therefore, a petition under Article 226 of the constitution was maintainable. It was also submitted that the services of the respondents had been terminated under rule 44 and such termination was justifiable on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. ( 6 ) THAT petition was allowed by the learned single Judge, who came to the conclusion that the order of discharge, which was passed, was really by way, of punishment, and as the appellant was a state, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the said respondents were entitled to be reinstated as their services could not have been discharged without following the principles of natural justice. ( 7 ) IT has been submitted by the learned advocate General that the learned single judge fell in error in holding that the appellant was a state. For the reasons, to which we shall presently revert to. the contention is that the appellant is not a state, and even if it be assumed that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable, even then, the relationship between the appellant and the respondents being purely contractual in nature, the relief of retirement should not have been granted. It was, of course, submitted that the order of discharge which was passed was wholly justified. ( 8 ) DEALING with the question whether the appellant is a state, the learned single Judge referred to the of-quoted judgment on the point in issue, viz. , those of R. D. Shetty v. The International airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, air 1981 SC 487 , where the tests for determining whether a Corporation could be said an instrumentality or an agency of the Government had been culled out. The tests, which were summarised in Ajay hasias case, and which were referred to by the learned single Judge, are as follows:" (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government. The tests, which were summarised in Ajay hasias case, and which were referred to by the learned single Judge, are as follows:" (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor. . . whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or state protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive state control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) Specifically, if a department of government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of the inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of the Government. "the learned single Judge referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in som Prakash v. Union of India, AIR 1981 sc 212 , wherein it had been observed, after referring to the decision in international Airport Authoritys case, that the true test was a functional one. "the learned single Judge referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in som Prakash v. Union of India, AIR 1981 sc 212 , wherein it had been observed, after referring to the decision in international Airport Authoritys case, that the true test was a functional one. In arriving at the conclusion that the appellant was a state, the learned single judge rested his decision on the following reasons:-A. That the name of the Company was "gujarat State Fertilizers", which indicated that it was a State Government company;b. Land acquisition proceedings were initiated by the State Government for the purpose of acquiring land and that the company was promoted by the State government;c. Government Financial Institutions and Nationalised Banks were holding major part of the share capital of the company;d. The State of Gujarat was entitled to nominate and appoint one-third Directors in the Board of Directors of the Company and that one such Director was to be the chairman, and the Managing Director as also to be appointed from amongst the said three nominated Directors;e. The equity shareholders, other than the Government of Gujarat and government-owned Corporations, were small in number that there was hardly any scope for their getting elected as Directos on their own and, therefore, most of the other Directors were also those who were, in effect, appointed by the Government;f. The Company discharges government functions to implement the directive Principles of State Policy, when it amended and inserted Clause 13a and clause 13b in its Memorandum so as to undertake, carry ouj and sponsor rural development programmes;g. The State Government had a right to direct audit of the Comtroller and auditor General of India or its Nominee, and the Company had willingly agreed to place its annual reports before the State legislature every year for discussion, if necessary;h. The Company had obtained exemption under the Monopolies and restrictive Trade Practice Act, because it contended that it was controlled by the government;i. The Company had obtained land from the Gujarat Refinery and the municipal Corporation for water scheme; andj. The prices of fertilizers were controlled by the State Government. ( 9 ) NUMEROUS cases have been cited by counsel from both the sides with regard to the question as to whether the appellant is a state or not. The prices of fertilizers were controlled by the State Government. ( 9 ) NUMEROUS cases have been cited by counsel from both the sides with regard to the question as to whether the appellant is a state or not. On a careful analysis of these cases, it will be evident that in such one of them, the Court has sought to apply the aforesaid six tests, which had been laid down by the supreme Court in the International airport Authoritys case, as had been culled out by it in Ajay Hasias case. We do not, therefore, propose to deal with these cases at great length except to, briefly, indicate what was observed therein. ( 10 ) IN Tekraj Vasandi alia, K. L. Basandhi v. Union of India and Others, air 1988 SC 469 , the Supreme Court was examining whether the Institute of constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, which was registered under the Societies registration Act, could be regarded as an agency or instrumentality of the State so as to come within the purview of "other authorities" in Article 12. The Court examined all the decisions on the point, starting from the case of Rajasthan State electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lai, air 1967 Sc 1857 , and came to the conclusion that the said Institute was not a state or "other Authority", but took note of the fact that the Memorandum of association of the Institute permitted acceptance of gifts, donations, and subscriptions and it received annual contribution from the Government, which was quito substantial, but it also received money from other sources. The said conclusion was arrived at notwithstanding the fact that the Institute was initially accommodated in the parliament House and out of the 19 founder Members, high dignitaries of the country were there. The Speaker of the lok Sabha was its first President, three ministers, a former Chief. Justice and a former Attorney General were its Vice- presidents, two other Ministers and three members of Lok Sabha were amongst the other members. Nevertheless, the supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Objects of the Institute were not governmental business and was outside the purview of Article 12 of the constitution. ( 11 ) IT. Considerable reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in chander Mohan Khanna v. The National council of Educational Research and training and Others, AIR 1992 SC 76 . ( 11 ) IT. Considerable reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in chander Mohan Khanna v. The National council of Educational Research and training and Others, AIR 1992 SC 76 . The National Council of Educational research and Training ("ncert") was a registered Society, having been-set up to assist and advice (sic.) the Ministry of education. The Government had a power to review its work and issue directions to it. The Council of the Society was to consist mainly of various Government officials, whose period of appointment was fixed by the Government. The Rules also provide that if there were any difference of opinion amongst the members, then the view of the majority would prevail subject to a veto, which could be exercised by the Government of india within a month of the decision. Its funds were to consist of grants from the government, contribution from other source, income from assets of the Council and receipts from other sources. The supreme Court reviewed the entire case law on the point and observed as follows:". . . ARTICLE 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the government within the sweep of the expression state. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must hot be lost sight of that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as state under Article 12. The State control, however vast and pervasive, is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is also not conclusive. The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and polices of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is "state". If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as "state" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. . . . If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as "state" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. . . . " ( 12 ) THE Kerala High Court in K. M. Thomas v. Cochin Refineries Ltd. and others, AIR 1982 Kerala 248, came to the conclusion that M/s. Cochin refineries Limited was not an instrumentality of the State. That was a company, in which 53% of the shares were held by the Central Government, 15% by the Government of Kerala, Life insurance Corporation of India and general Insurance Company and 26% shares were held by Philips Petroleum company of United States of America. Besides this, there were 2000 shareholders, including Corporate bodies. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, that the Company was not a state, the high Court held as follows:". . . The Government of India has only a bare majority and not the entirety of the share capital of the Company, i. e. Cochin refineries Ltd. A substantial part of the share capital belongs to a foreign company. There is no material to show exclusive or unusual financial assistance has been given by the Government. The board of Directors has practically full control over the management of the affairs of the Company. The fact that five out of nine Directors are Government nominees is not sufficient to say government has exclusive or unusual control over management, etc. This conclusion is valid even taking into consideration certain reservations regarding. approval of Central government. For the matter the foreign company has power of veto in regard to capital expenditure in excess of specified limits. Presence of nominees of a foreign company in the Board is a significant circumstance. It cannot be said that there is deep and pervasive state control. Of course Company may enjoy monopoly status since it is dealing with precious commodities like petroleum and petroleum products and the like and such an activity is of public importance, viewed in the light of importance of the commodities in the life of the Nation. There is no material to show that any activity of the Government has been handed over to the Company. Existence of any element of authority or command has not been established. There is no material to show that any activity of the Government has been handed over to the Company. Existence of any element of authority or command has not been established. The totality of the circumstances mentioned above is not sufficient to show that "voice is that of the Government or hands are of the government" or that the Company is "an agent or surrogate of State, in fact owned by the State, in truth controlled by State and in effect an incarnation of State". It is no more than a Government under the company law and not a limb of government. In this view, I uphold the contention of first respondent-Company that it is not an instrumentality of State within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution. . . . "the aforesaid judgment of the Kerala high Court was approved by the Delhi high Court in the case of P. B. Ghayalod v. Mis. Maruth Udyog Ltd. and Others, air 1992 Delhi 145, where, again, the question arose whether the said Joint venture Company was a state or not. The Government of India held 60% of the shares. While Suzuki Motor Company of Japan held 40% of the shares in Maruti udyog Limited. The Delhi High Court held that Foreign Companies collaborating with Public Corporations could not be subjected to the rigour of article 14 and, in any case, M/s. Maruti udyog Limited was not a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution. This judgment of the Delhi high Court was challenged in the supreme Court by the filing of a Special leave Petition, being Special Leave petition No. 17844 of 1991, but the said petition was dismissed on 6th of december 1991. ( 13 ) THIS Court also in Special Civil application No. 5939 of 1987, Vijaysinh s. Waghela v. Gujarat Alkalies and chemicals Ltd. and Another, decided by the Division Bench on 16-7-1988, came to the conclusion that M/s. Gujarat alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. , in which the government had share, was not a state. A single Judge of this Court in another case, being Special Civil Application No. 1664 of 1991, decided on 13th of december 1991, came to a similar conclusion with regard to M/s. Gujarat insecticides Limited. A single Judge of this Court in another case, being Special Civil Application No. 1664 of 1991, decided on 13th of december 1991, came to a similar conclusion with regard to M/s. Gujarat insecticides Limited. Yet another company, in respect of which a similar conclusion was arrived at was Nagarjuna fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. A single judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s. Nav Bharat corporation, Bombay v. Nagarjuna fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. , 1990 (2) alt 615, came to the conclusion that the said Company was not a state. In that case also, the Government held 17. 78% of the equity capital and assistance was also given to the Company by financial corporations. Out of a Board of 15 directors, 3 were nominated by the government. But, this was not enough to make it a state, even though in 1978, the Government of Andhra Pradesh had held majority shares in the said Company. ( 14 ) SHRI S. K. Zaveri sought to rely upon the decision in the case of M. C. Mehta v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1086 , but in that case, the supreme Court did not come to the conclusion that M/s. Shriram Foods and fertiliser Industries was a state. ( 15 ) IN Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna jayanti Mahostav Smarak Trust and others v. V. R. Rudani and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1607 , the Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus could issue to any person or authority performing public duty. It was, therefore, submitted by the learned Counsel that even if the appellant is not a state, it should nevertheless be regarded as an authority. It is difficult to agree with this submission, because the Supreme court in that very decision observed that, to be a public authority, the person must perform public duty. Manufacture of fertilizer, in the instant case, is not a public duty, but is purely a manufacturing activity. It is a commercial undertaking, which is being run by the appellant, and it manufactures and sells fertilisers, just as other private and public sector companies, who are in the same line. Manufacture of fertilizer, in the instant case, is not a public duty, but is purely a manufacturing activity. It is a commercial undertaking, which is being run by the appellant, and it manufactures and sells fertilisers, just as other private and public sector companies, who are in the same line. ( 16 ) REFERENCE was also made to the decision in the case of Central Inland water Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, AIR 1986 SC 1571 , as well as 1988 (3) SLR 388, and /. 5. Saini v. National Institute of Health and Family welfare and Others, AIR 1993 LAB. I. C. 1475. Each one of these cases was decided, applying the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in international Airport Authoritys case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). These decisions can be of no assistance as we shall presently see when we examire the facts here in relation to the tests laid down in international Airport Authoritys case. ( 17 ) THE first test laid down in international Airport Authoritys case was with regard to the share capital of the corporation. The respondents have filed an affidavit in this Court which shows that on 16th May 1985, when the impugned order against him was passed, the Governor of Gujarat held 49. 2% of shares, IDBI, LIC and other financial institutions held 29. 17%, Nationalised banks held 0. 87% shares, Indian and foreign Companies held 2. 51%. shares and individual and other non-residents and Co-operative Banks and societies held 18. 44 % shares. As on 4th of July, 1992, the shareholding of the Governor of Gujarat has come down to 0. 23%, while the Gujarat State Investments linited holds 41. 70% and Gujarat industrial Investment Corporation holds 0. 10%, the total of these being 42. 03%. Financial Institutions hold 38. 68%, the banks hold 0. 27%, Indian and Foreign companies hold 1. 62% and individuals and others hold 19. 22%. In terms of numbers, we are informed that there are, approximately, 39000 individual shareholders of this Company. Furthermore, the shares of this Company are "listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange, and are regularly quoted and frequent transactions in shares takes place. It is not possible to accept as correct the reasoning of the learned single Judge that major portion of the shareholding is controlled by the Government. Furthermore, the shares of this Company are "listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange, and are regularly quoted and frequent transactions in shares takes place. It is not possible to accept as correct the reasoning of the learned single Judge that major portion of the shareholding is controlled by the Government. In arriving at this conclusion, the learned single Judge has assumed that the shares hold by the financial institutions have also to be regarded as the shareholding of the government. The learned Advocate. General is right in drawing our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of LIC v. Escorts Ltd. , AIR 1986 sc 1370 . It was contended in that case that LIC and other such Corporations were state or Government Undertakings, to whom the provisions of article 14 applied. The Attorney General had, in that case, submitted that actions of the State or an instrumentality of the state, which do not properly belong to the field of public law, but belong to the field of private law are not liable to be subjected to judicial review. While finding considerable force in this contention, the Supreme Court did not discuss in great detail, but it did observe that it did bot construe Article 14 as a charter for judicial review of State actions and to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for said actions. Dealing with the question of the State venturing into the Corporation world, it was observed as follows:". . . For example, if the action of the state is political or sovereign in character, the Court will keep away from it. The court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the action of the State is related to contractual obligation or obligations arising out of the Court, the court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the Court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the state is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State Ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. There is no reason why the state as a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the Company, like any other shareholder. . . . ?in view of the aforesaid, it must follow that the financial institutions, in a case like the present, have to be regarded as ordinary shareholders and not as a state. They exercise their rights, like other members of the Company, and are at liberty to sell or buy more shares. In fact, the listing of the shares at the Stock exchange shows that even the Gujarat state Investiments Limited, or, for that matter, the Governor of Gujarat, is at liberty to sell and buy more shares. There is no provision in the Articles of association of the Company, which makes it obligatory on the Government of gujarat to give any grant, or subsistence or other funds to the Company. Therefore, the test relating to the share capital mentioned in Airport Authoritys case is not satisfied here. ( 18 ) THE second test with regard to the financial assistance. As we have already observerd, except for certain percentage of shares being purchased by the governor of Gujarat and the Gujarat industrial Corporation, there is no other financial assistance from the State to the company. The second test of Airport authoritys case is also not satisfied. ( 19 ) THE third test was as to whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status. Manufacture of fertilizer is not the monopoly of either of this Company, or slate, for that matter. The second test of Airport authoritys case is also not satisfied. ( 19 ) THE third test was as to whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status. Manufacture of fertilizer is not the monopoly of either of this Company, or slate, for that matter. Fertilizer in India is being manufactured by private sector as well as by public sector undertakings. The State has no monopoly in respect thereof. Therefore, the third test is also not satisfied. ( 20 ) AS far as the fourth test regarding deep and pervasive State control is concerned, the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that two-thirds of the board of directors of the company were appointed by the Governor of Gujarat. We are unable to agree with this third of the Board of Directors is to be appointed by the Government of Gujarat and that the Chairman and Managing director are to be out of those 3. But, the other Directors are either those who are elected for a fixed term and retired by rotation or are the nominees of the government Corporations. It may be that because the Government of Gujarat and the Gujarat Investment Corporation are the single largest shareholders, their presence at the time of voting would be required for electing independent persons as Directors, in the event of a poll taking place. But that does not mean that the directors so appointed are all nominees of the Government. The Articles of association of the Company do not postulate as such. If the Gujarat State investments Limited were to sell off its shares, then it will have no part to play in the election of any Director to the Board. The Board of Directors, at the material, time, consisted of the following persons:1. Shri Jaykrishna Harivallabhdas, chairman (Nominated by the government of Gujarat), Industralist. 2. Shri Arvind N. Mafatlal, Industrialist. 3. Shri H. M. Patel, L. C. S. (retired ). 4. Shri Arvind N. Lalbhai, Industrialist. 5. Shri R. B. Amin, Industrialist. 6. Shri T. K. Patel, Member of parliament and Chairman, Gujarat State co-operative Marketing Society Limited. 7. Shri Rohit C. Mehta, Industrialist. 8. Shri F. N. Rana, IAS (retired ). 9. Shri L. R. Dalai, ICS, Chief secretary to the Government of Gujarat (Nominated by the Government of gujarat ). 10. Shri M. D. Rajpal, LAS, Additional chief Secretary to the Government of gujarat. 11. Dr. 7. Shri Rohit C. Mehta, Industrialist. 8. Shri F. N. Rana, IAS (retired ). 9. Shri L. R. Dalai, ICS, Chief secretary to the Government of Gujarat (Nominated by the Government of gujarat ). 10. Shri M. D. Rajpal, LAS, Additional chief Secretary to the Government of gujarat. 11. Dr. S. K. Subramanian, (Nominated by the Industrial Development bank of India ). 12. Shri F. J. Heredia, LAS, Managing director, (Nominated by the Government of Gujarat ). It will be seen that only the persons at serial Nos. 1, 9, 10 and 12 were the nominees of the Government of Gujarat, but the Director at serial No. 11 was nominated by the Industrial Development bank of India, while all the other directors were very eminent. person in their own rights. Even the person nominated by the Government of Gujarat and its Chairman was an industrialist of repute. The Board so constituted consisted of eminent independent persons and it is difficult for us to hold that there was a duep and pervasive State control, specially when the Aticles of Association of the Company do not provide for any directions to be issued to it. . ( 21 ) THE last test laid down in international Airport Authoritys case was whether the Corporation was a department of the Government, which wastransferred. In this connection, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the appellant has been promoted by the Government of Gujarat and it sought to rely upon the decision, which has been taken by the Government of Gujarat, even before the Company was registered, which clearly indicated the governments desire to establish such an undertaking. It cannot be disputed that this Company has ben promoted by the state of Gujarat. But that by itself is not decisive of the question as to whether the appellant is a state or an authority, within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution. ( 22 ) IT was submitted by Shri Zaveri that the appellant-Company wrote to the m. R. T. P. and got exemption on the ground that it was a Government corporation. The fact that such a letter was written and exemption obtained is not denied. But, merely because the appellant has got an undue favour or an advantage, cannot mean that, in law, it is a state. The fact that such a letter was written and exemption obtained is not denied. But, merely because the appellant has got an undue favour or an advantage, cannot mean that, in law, it is a state. If on the facts and circumstances of this case that is the only conclusion which must follow. None of the tests, as laid down in Ajay Hasias case are fulfilled here. The appellant is not a public Company, within the meaning of that expression under Section 617 of the Companies Act. It is no doubt true that its accounts have to be audited by the Auditors nominated by the government. But, that is because of the provisions of Section 619b of the companies Act. The said section provides that if not less than 51% of the paid up capital of the Company is held by the central Gqvernment or the State government, and any Corporations, then the provision of Section 619 would apply, which, inter alia, provides for the appointment of an Auditor by the Central government. The said section merely safeguards the interests of the government or the Government corporation "as a shareholder, but would not make such a Company as a public company. ( 23 ) THE mere use of the words gujarat State would also not indicate that it is a public company. Had the appellant been a public company, the provisions of Section 617 of the companies Act would have been selected because, the State of Gujarat was one of the Promotors. But no public duty is being performed by this Company and it is like any other Joint Venture undertaking. ( 24 ) SIMILARLY, because land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, or it had obtained land for a water scheme, is also not indicative of the fact that the appellant is a state. The appellant has, possibly, got preferential treatment from the State Government, but that by itself would not mean that the company is a state. ( 25 ) IT was then submitted that even if the appellant is not a state, under article 226 of the Constitution, a writ, order or direction can issue to any authority or person. But, then the said authority or person should be discharging public function. In any case, it was argued, the provisions of Article 21 of the constitution were attracted, because right to live means right to livelihood. But, then the said authority or person should be discharging public function. In any case, it was argued, the provisions of Article 21 of the constitution were attracted, because right to live means right to livelihood. In support of this contention, Mr. Zavcri sought to rely on the decision of the supreme Court in The Board of Trustee v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Others, AIR 1983 SC 109 . At page 114, it was observed as follows:". . . The expression life does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life. The expression life has a much wider meaning, where therefore the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely to adversely affect reputation or livelihood of a person, some of the finer graces of human civilisation which make life worth living would be jeopardised and the same can be put in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair procedures. . . . "our attention was also drawn to the observations of the Supreme Court in D. K. Yadav v. M/s. J. M. A. Industries. , JT 1993 (3) S. C. 617, wherein, at page 625, it was observed. :". . . It is thus well settled law that right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the constitution would include right to livelihood. . . . "these observations of the supreme Court were made when it was referring to the decision of the Supreme court in the case of D. T. C. v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. , (1991) suppl. 1 SCC 600, which, obviously, was a state. On the other hand, in M. C. Mehtas case, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed at page 1095 as follows:". . . Taking the above exposition as our guideline, we must now proceed to examine whether a private corporation such as Shriram comes within the ambit of Article 12 so as to be amenable to the discipline of Article 21. . . . " (Emphasis added) again at page 1100, it was observed as follows:". . . since we are not deciding the question as to whether Shriram is- an authority within the meaning of Article 12 so as to be subjected to the discipline of the fundamental right under Article 21, we do not think. . . . . . . " (Emphasis added) again at page 1100, it was observed as follows:". . . since we are not deciding the question as to whether Shriram is- an authority within the meaning of Article 12 so as to be subjected to the discipline of the fundamental right under Article 21, we do not think. . . . "it is clear from the observations of the constitution Bench in M. C. Mehtas case that Article 21 is available only against a state or an authority, and not against a private party or a citizen. ( 26 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion, the conclusion which follows is that the appellant is not a state, or an authority, under Article 12" and that the provisions of Article 21 are also not attracted. ( 27 ) SHRI Zaveri sought to submit that, in any event, the aforesaid Rule 44 was opposed to public policy and because of section 23 of the Contract Act, this Court should hold that the same is void and, therefore, the action taken by the appellant was unwarranted. In an effort to show that the said clause was void, the learned Counsel relied upon the aforesaid supreme Court decision in the case of central Inland Waters case, as well as delhi Transport Corporations case. In both those cases, there was a clause, which permitted the employer to terminate the services of the employee, without assigning any reason and by giving three months notice in writing. It was held by the Supreme Court that such a clause would be opposed to public policy and would attract the provisions of section 23 of the Contract Act, specially when the employee is in a week position and is unable to bargain with the i prosperous employer. Such a clause was held to be a nullity, because it gave a power to the employer to terminate the services of an employee without assigning any reason whatsoever. It is not necessary for this Court to decide whether Rule 44, in the present case, is void or not, because no relief can be granted to the respondents in a writ petition even if the said rule is to be struck down. It is not necessary for this Court to decide whether Rule 44, in the present case, is void or not, because no relief can be granted to the respondents in a writ petition even if the said rule is to be struck down. We may, however, note that there is a difference in language between rule 44 and the rule with which the supreme Court was concerned in Central inland Waters case, and the D. T. C. case. Whereas, in those cases, no reasons were necessary or- the power to be exercised, Rule 44, on the other hand, does mention that the power can be exercised "for sufficient resons". 2-2-1994: whether for this reason, the Rule is distinguishable or not, we do not intend to decide, because the parties have arrived at an agreement between them, the terms of which have been filed in court today, and are as follows: "the concerned officer will be paid compensation equivalent to 3. 33 years salary (salary means salary contained in last pay slip details of which are given herebelow) on basis of last pay and allowances drawn by officers as full and final settlement in respect of all 5 officers. The so-called Association of officers Civil Suit No. M. C, A. 359/84 pending before Civil Judge, Baroda, shall stand withdrawn in terms of settlement and shall give immediate possession of the said premises. The Special Civil application 6647/85 shall stand withdrawn. ( 28 ) THE amount of compensation as agreed shall be payable within one month from the date of judgment. 1. B. D. Patel Rs. 9081. 50 per month. 2. A. R. ,naik Rs. 11087. 50 per month3. J. N. Desai Rs. 8639. 50 per month4. A. M. Mehta Rs. 9053. 50 per month5. M. D. Desai Rs. 8015. 50 per monthplus professional allowances, fixed medical reimbursement allowance, reimbursement Sufary and Suit length as per eligibility and Silver memento if eligible. They shall be eligible for retirement benefits like Gratuity/pension/ppst retirement Medical benefits scheme as per their eligibility in this behalf. The Association of Officers shall not litigate any further in this matter. " therefore, while allowing the appeal, the same is disposed of in terms of the aforesaid terms of Agreement between the parties. There will be no order as to costs. ( 29 ) THE payment to be made to the respondents in terms of this order. The Association of Officers shall not litigate any further in this matter. " therefore, while allowing the appeal, the same is disposed of in terms of the aforesaid terms of Agreement between the parties. There will be no order as to costs. ( 29 ) THE payment to be made to the respondents in terms of this order. They would be entitled to relief under Section 89 of the Income-Tax Act and the terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of O. P. Bhandari v. Indian tourism Development Corporation, 61 company Cases 291, would be applicable. Appeal disposed of. .