N. D. V. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 24-9-1988 passed by the XIX Additional City civil Judge, Bangalore in O. S. No. 10381 of 1984. By the said judgment, the learned Additional City Civil Judge has dismissed the plaintiffs suit. ( 2 ) A few facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal, briefly stated, are as under: plaintiff filed a suit at O. S. No. 10381 of 1984 praying for a decree for permanent injunction on the allegation that he was in lawful possession of the suit property as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 100a. It is his case that he had also paid an amount of rs. 80,000/- by way of advance. According to him he spent considerable amount for the interior decoration of the shop premises and for advertisement and also installed machineries, besides the stock of cassettes and records worth about Rs. 50,000/ -. He has given the details in that behalf in para 5 of the plaint. According to plaintiff, he had great regard and respect for the defendant and did not insist upon the receipts for the payment made by him. Since according to him, defendant was thinking in terms of dispossessing him with an ulterior motive, he filed the suit praying for the reliefs referred to hereinabove. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT resisted the suit of the plaintiff. The case made out by the plaintiff that he has been inducted in the suit premises by the defendant as a tenant is denied by the defendant. He has also denied all other allegations made in the plaint incidental to the said allegations. According to defendant, he has been running a photographic shop selling photographic films etc. , under the name and style of "e. G. K. and sons" and apart from the photographic shop, defendant has also been running an ice-cream parlour under the name and style of "chit chat" and that he is also a dealer for HMT watches and is having a small show room displaying HMT watches in a portion of the said premises. According to him, he is also running a handicrafts Emporium in another portion of the same building. According to him, he is also running a handicrafts Emporium in another portion of the same building. It is the version of defendant that when he was so running these different business in the said complex, plaintiff who is stated to be a citizen of Singapore used to visit defendant's shop in connection with certain business transaction and plaintiff and defendant became acquainted in that connection. Defendant has averred that plaintiff represented to him that he was a citizen of singapore and that he visits Singapore very frequently and that he would be able to get imported cassettes and records and sell them, if some place is made available to him in the said complex for the said purpose. It is also the version of the defendant that plaintiff in that behalf promised to pay defendant a small commission on the basis of the sales made therein and that defendant believing the representation made by the plaintiff and taking into consideration the fact that plaintiff was still young, granted leave and licence only and permitted him to display cassettes and sell musical records. He has also given the details of the oral agreement between them in that behalf in para 4 of his written statement. It is the version of the defendant that there were several raids by customs authorities upon the shop running by plaintiff on the ground that he was selling contraband goods and immediately thereafter, defendant withdrew the leave and licence and asked plaintiff to cease from using the shop and since plaintiff has not ceased to use the schedule shop, defendant is thinking in terms of taking suitable legal action to restrain him from doing so. Defendant has also denied the various allegations and other allegations made in the plaint contrary to the stand taken by him. He prayed for the dismissal of the suit. ( 4 ) ON the basis of these pleadings, the lower court raised the following issues;" (1) Does plaintiff prove his possession of the suit premises as a tenant under the defendant as alleged? (2) Does defendant prove that plaintiff is only a licensee being in permissive possession with his leave and licence as contended? (3) Is plaintiff entitled to a permanent injunction as prayed for?" ( 5 ) BEFORE the lower court, plaintiff got himself examined as pw-1 and Ex. P. 1 to P. 18 were marked for the plaintiff. (2) Does defendant prove that plaintiff is only a licensee being in permissive possession with his leave and licence as contended? (3) Is plaintiff entitled to a permanent injunction as prayed for?" ( 5 ) BEFORE the lower court, plaintiff got himself examined as pw-1 and Ex. P. 1 to P. 18 were marked for the plaintiff. Defendant got himself examined as DW-1, Ex. D. 1 to D. 9 were marked for the defendant, ( 6 ) THE lower court on a consideration of the evidence on record and for the reasons reflected in its judgment, took the view that plaintiff has failed to prove his possession of the property as a tenant under defendant. The lower court also took the view that the defendant has also not established that plaintiff was inducted in the suit premises as a licensee. However, the lower court took the view that plaintiffs possession cannot be said to be a lawful possession or a juridical possession. The lower court has also taken the view that having regard to the fact that defendant has challenged the status of the plaintiff, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to have included a prayer for declaration also. On these grounds, the lower court has chosen to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. ( 7 ) I have heard Sri Tarakaram, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Sri Ramadas, learned counsel for the respondent. ( 8 ) IN the context of the submissions made at the bar by the learned counsel, the following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether the plaintiff was in lawful possession of the suit property on the date of the suit? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for permanent injunction? (3) What order? ( 9 ) POINT Nos. 1 and 2. Since these two points are inextricably mixed up with each other, they are taken up together for discussion. The fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property on the date of the suit is not in dispute. What is in dispute, however, is as to whether he was in lawful possession of the suit property on the date of the suit, the emphasis being on the term "lawful". The fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property on the date of the suit is not in dispute. What is in dispute, however, is as to whether he was in lawful possession of the suit property on the date of the suit, the emphasis being on the term "lawful". While plaintiff has taken the stand that he has been in possession of the suit property on the date of the suit as a lessee, the defendant has come out with a version that plaintiff was inducted into the suit property only as a licensee and his licence has since been revoked even before the suit was filed. It is the assertion of the defendant that plaintiff continues to be in possession of the suit property only as a trespasser. The court below has taken the view that plaintiff has failed to prove the lease set up by him. It has also taken the view that defendant has also failed to prove that plaintiff was inducted on the suit property only as a licensee. However, taking the view that plaintiff has failed to prove his juridical possession in respect of the suit property, the lower court has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. It is also necessary to mention here that the lower court has also taken the view that when defendant has specifically denied the legal right of the plaintiff, plaintiff ought to have sought for the relief of declaration also. ( 10 ) THE main thrust of the submission made by Sri Tarakaram, learned senior counsel for the appellant is that in a suit for injunction the crux of the question to be considered by the court is as to whether plaintiff has proved his possession on the date of the suit. It is pointed out by the learned senior counsel that the question of title is not germane in a suit for injunction. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the two decisions of this Court viz. , (i) the decision in Basavannagouda Fakira Goud patil by L. Rs. v State Government and Others, and (ii) the decision in Tarabai v Krishna Pandurang Power. The learned senior counsel argued that the finding of the court below that plaintiff was not a lessee is not warranted from the evidence on record. , (i) the decision in Basavannagouda Fakira Goud patil by L. Rs. v State Government and Others, and (ii) the decision in Tarabai v Krishna Pandurang Power. The learned senior counsel argued that the finding of the court below that plaintiff was not a lessee is not warranted from the evidence on record. Continuing his submissions, he contended that even otherwise on defendant's own showing plaintiff was a licensee and plaintiff can seek for the relief of injunction on the foundation of the plea set up by defendant by way of his defence. In this connection, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar v Mahabir prasad and Others. It is pointed out by the learned senior counsel that the possession of even a licensee, whose licence is revoked cannot be equated with the possession of a trespasser. The learned counsel tried to gain support for this proposition by way of analogy from the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Padma vithoba Chakkayya v Mohd. Multani and Another. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that though in the said case, the possession of a mortgagee was for consideration, the ratio laid down in the said case, would mutatis mutandis apply to the facts of this case also. Dilating on this aspect, the learned counsel argued that the remedy of the licensor against a licensee whose licence is revoked, is to sue for a mandatory injunction under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that the possession of a licensee who continues in possession after the licence is revoked, does not become adverse to the interests of the licensor and the same is the striking difference between the possession of a trespasser and the possession of a licensee whose licence is revoked. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the decisions rendered in the context of the possession of trespassers cannot be invoked in a situation where a licensee continues in possession even after the licence is revoked. The learned counsel also tried to gain support in this behalf from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sant Lal Jain v avtar Singh. Support is also sought from the decision in prabirendra Nath Nanday and Another v Narendra Nath Nanday. The learned counsel also tried to gain support in this behalf from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sant Lal Jain v avtar Singh. Support is also sought from the decision in prabirendra Nath Nanday and Another v Narendra Nath Nanday. The learned counsel argued that even otherwise plaintiffs possession is a settled possession and as such he cannot be evicted otherwise than in due course of law. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the supreme Court, viz. , Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by L. Rs. v Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao; Ram Rattan and Others v State of Uttar pradesh, and State of U. P. and Others v Maharaja Dharamander prasad Singh, etc. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that even assuming that the plaintiff has no right to continue in possession on the suit property, he cannot be forcibly dispossessed from the suit property. In this connection, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision in M/s. Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. v The Corporation of the City of Bangalore. Pressing into service the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel submitted that the lower court has erred in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. ( 11 ) ON the other hand, Sri Ramadas, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that plaintiff who has sought relief of permanent injunction on the allegation that he has been in possession as a lessee, has miserably failed to prove his status as a lessee and that therefore, he cannot seek the equitable remedy of injunction, merely on the basis of his possession. It is pointed out by the learned counsel Sri Ramadas that the circumstances of the case would clearly warrant a conclusion that he was a licensee and his licence has since been revoked and that therefore, the plaintiffs possession of the suit premises would be an unlawful possession, with the result, he cannot claim the relief of permanent injunction. Continuing his submission, the learned counsel pointed out that once when the licence is revoked it is the duty of the licensee to surrender his possession and a person who fails in his duty to surrender the possession to the licensor cannot request the court to help him to continue in possession. Continuing his submission, the learned counsel pointed out that once when the licence is revoked it is the duty of the licensee to surrender his possession and a person who fails in his duty to surrender the possession to the licensor cannot request the court to help him to continue in possession. In support of his submission that the possession of a licensee after the licence is revoked, is no better than that of a trespasser, the learned counsel has relied on the decision of the supreme Court in D. H. Maniar and Others v Waman Laxman kudav, particularly at page 2343. Reliance is also placed by the learned counsel on the decision in Siddamma Madiah and others v Geetha Dwarakanath, to contend that the licensee after the expiry of the licence would be a trespasser. The said decision is also pressed into service in support of the contention that a licence may be revoked either expressly or impliedly. Support is also sought by the learned counsel Sri Ramadas from the decision in Dominion of India v R. B. Sohan Lal, particularly at para 13 therein. It is held therein that even if licence is improperly revoked the remedy of a licensee is to claim compensation and not injunction. The learned counsel pointed out that the observation of the Supreme Court in Sant Lal Jain's case (supra), pressed into service by the other side has no application to the facts of this case in as much as all that is decided in the said case is that a lessee of a particular plot, who had granted a licence of a portion of the said plot can maintain a suit for possession after the revocation of licence. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that the ratio of the decision in Krishna Ram Mahale's case (supra), as also the decision in maharaja Dharamander Prasad Singh's case (supra), are clearly distinguishable having regard to the peculiar facts leading to the decision in the aforesaid two cases. The learned counsel pointed out that in Krishna Ram Mahale's case, there was a clear finding by the High Court that Krishna Ram Mahale was not just a licensee but was also a lessee. The learned counsel also pointed out that the circumstances of the said case, warranted an inference that the whole thing as stage managed by the respondent-owner. The learned counsel pointed out that in Krishna Ram Mahale's case, there was a clear finding by the High Court that Krishna Ram Mahale was not just a licensee but was also a lessee. The learned counsel also pointed out that the circumstances of the said case, warranted an inference that the whole thing as stage managed by the respondent-owner. Sri Ramadas has argued that it was in the context of the totality of the aforesaid circumstances that the supreme Court had ruled that a person in settled possession cannot be forcibly ejected. The learned counsel also pointed out that in Dharmander Prasad Singh's case (supra), the question for consideration was as to whether a lessor after the termination of lease or forfeiture of lease can take forcible possession of the leased property. Sri Ramadas, has pointed out that having regard to the various provisions of the Transfer of property Act including the provisions relating to holding over the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the said case cannot be stretched to the possession of a licensee who remains in possession after the licence is revoked. With reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Rattan's case (supra), the learned counsel argued that the said decision was rendered in the context of a criminal case and the said decision also has no application to the facts of the instant case. It is pointed out by the Sri Ramadas that the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Kallappa Setty v M. V. Lakshminarayana Rao, is directly on the point and is applicable to the facts of the case on all fours. It is further brought to my notice by the learned counsel that in a recent decision in Raghavendra Rao v Dodda Ramalingappa, this Court relying on the said decision has taken the view that a trespasser is not entitled to an order of temporary injunction as against a true owner. The attention of this Court is drawn specifically to the observations made in the said case by this court at paras 8 and 10 therein. Sri Ramadas has placed reliance on another decision of this Court viz. , the decision in k. V. Narayan v Sharana Gowda and Another, wherein this court has held that a trespasser is not entitled for injunction against a true owner. Sri Ramadas has placed reliance on another decision of this Court viz. , the decision in k. V. Narayan v Sharana Gowda and Another, wherein this court has held that a trespasser is not entitled for injunction against a true owner. It is also contended by the learned counsel that the ratio of the decision in Krishna Ram Mahale's case (supra), is not in conformity with the tenor of the decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court rendered to earlier. In particular, the learned counsel contended that the said decision is not in conformity with the tenor of the decision of the Supreme court in D. H. Maniar's case (supra ). It is pointed out by the learned counsel that if there is a conflict between the two decisions of the Supreme Court, the one rendered by a larger bench will have to be relied on by courts of law. In this connection, the learned counsel invited the attention of this court to a decision of the Full Bench of this Court in govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi v West Patent Press Co. Ltd. and another. The attention of this Court is also invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Another v raghubir Singh (dead) by L. Rs. , etc. The learned counsel has emphasised that the relief of injunction being an equitable remedy, the conduct of a person claiming such a relief should not be tainted. As pointed out earlier, it is argued by the learned counsel that a person, who is liable in law, to surrender possession to the lawful owner, cannot ask the court to help him to continue in wrongful possession. ( 12 ) I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side. ( 13 ) IN the first place, it is necessary to see as to whether the relief prayed for by the plaintiff can be given on the case set up by him. Plaintiff has come out with the specific case that he has been in possession as a lessee and the rent agreed is Rs. 100/- per month. He has also come out with a specific contention that he has paid an advance of Rs. 80,000/- towards the petition premises. Plaintiff has come out with the specific case that he has been in possession as a lessee and the rent agreed is Rs. 100/- per month. He has also come out with a specific contention that he has paid an advance of Rs. 80,000/- towards the petition premises. The case made out by the plaintiff goes to show that he had also paid rent for the period upto April, 1984 and since defendant evaded to receive the rent for the months of May and june, 1984, the same was being sent by Money Order. Defendant has specifically denied the said allegations. Plaintiff apart from his ipse dixit has not produced any document to evidence the payment of either the advance said to have been paid to defendant or the rent said to have been received by the defendant upto the end of April, 1984. Under these circumstances, it becomes difficult to accept the version of the plaintiff. Further, his evidence also does not stand the test of probability. It is needless to say that whatever may be the acquaintance between the parties it would be natural to expect a receipt for having paid the advance amount of Rs. 80,000/-, having regard to the course of common conduct and human nature. In fact, Sri Tarakaram, learned senior counsel for the appellant has not been able to show as to how the finding of the court below in that behalf can be said to be unjustified. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary for me to dilate further on this aspect. However, as pointed out earlier, it is argued by sri Tarakaram, the learned senior counsel that it is permissible for the court to give a relief to the plaintiff on the plea set up by the defendant by way of defence, subject of course, to the condition that the relief can be legitimately founded on such a plea. The legal proposition canvassed by Sri Tarakaram is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Firm Srinivas ram Kumar's case (supra ). The legal proposition canvassed by Sri Tarakaram is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Firm Srinivas ram Kumar's case (supra ). The Supreme Court in the said case, among other things, has held in para 9 therein as under:"as regards the other point, however, we are of the opinion that the decision of the trial court was right and that the High Court took an undoubtedly rigid and technical view in reversing this part of the decree of the subordinate Judge. It is true that it was no part of the plaintiffs case as made in the plaint that the sum of Rs. 30,000/- was advanced by way of loan to the defendants second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be established by evidence. The fact that such a prayer would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is not really material. A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil P. C. to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The question, however, arises whether in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the court to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit. As an illustration of this principle, reference may be made to the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Mohan manucha v Manzoor Ahmed. This appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the plaintiff appellant to enforce a mortgage security. The plea of the defendant was that the mortgage was void. This plea was given effect to by both the lower court as well as by the Privy Council. But the privy Council held that it was open in such circumstances to the plaintiff to repudiate the transaction altogether and the claim a relief outside it in the form of restitution under section 65, Contract Act. Although no such alternative claim was made in the plaint, the Privy Council allowed it to be advanced and gave a decree on the ground that the respondent could not be prejudiced by such a claim at all and the matter ought not to be left to a separate suit. It may be noted that this relief was allowed to the appellant even though the appeal was heard ex parte in the absence of the respondent. "the defendant in his written statement has taken the specific plea that plaintiff was inducted into the suit property as a licensee and his license is revoked next before the suit. The lower court has taken the view that defendant has also failed to prove the licence set up by him. In my view, the approach adopted by the lower court in this behalf is not correct. In so far as this proceeding is concerned, there are only two versions on the question as regards the mode of induction of plaintiff into the suit property. Once when the status of plaintiff as a lessee is not established by acceptable evidence, the rival version that he was inducted as a licensee is rendered probable. In my view, if this aspect is examined from the crucible of probabilities, the version of defendant appears probable. Once when the status of plaintiff as a lessee is not established by acceptable evidence, the rival version that he was inducted as a licensee is rendered probable. In my view, if this aspect is examined from the crucible of probabilities, the version of defendant appears probable. In a civil case the court is required to be guided by preponderance of probabilities. Looked at from this perspective the version of the defendant as to the status of plaintiff in relation to suit property will have to be accepted. If that be so, the connected question to be considered is as to whether plaintiffs licence is revoked. It is well-settled that a licence may be revoked either expressly or impliedly. Defendant has stated in para 9 of his deposition that he has orally withdrawn the licence or permission granted by him to the plaintiff. This portion of his evidence coupled with the version of the plaintiff that the defendant was trying to make forcible entry into the suit premises would render probable the version of the defendant that the licence was terminated before the suit was filed. ( 14 ) IF that be so, the crux of the question is as to whether plaintiff who was a licensee and who has continued in possession after the licence was revoked, is entitled to the equitable remedy of injunction. As noticed earlier, the emphasis in the submission made by Sri Ramadas, learned counsel for the respondent is on the nature of possession. According to him, the possession of such a person, which is equated to the possession of a trespasser, cannot be protected by the court by way of injunction, which is an equitable relief. The contention of the other side, as noticed earlier, is that the remedy of defendant in such a situation is to seek mandatory injunction from the court as provided for under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, which would, in substance amount to the seeking of possession. ( 15 ) THE fact that the possession of a licensee after the licence is revoked, is as that of a trespasser is supported by the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in Siddamma madaiah's case (supra ). ( 15 ) THE fact that the possession of a licensee after the licence is revoked, is as that of a trespasser is supported by the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in Siddamma madaiah's case (supra ). However, Sri Tarakaram as mentioned earlier, has argued that the possession of a licensee even after the licence is terminated cannot be equated to that of a trespasser, because, his possession qua the licensor does not become adverse to the title of the licensor. The decision relied on by Sri Tarakaram in this behalf, as pointed out earlier, is the decision in Padma Vithoba Chakkayya's case (supra ). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, among other things, held that when a person gets into possession of properties as mortgagee, he cannot by any unilateral act or declaration of his, prescribe for a title by adverse possession, against the mortgagor, because in law his possession is that of the mortgagor. Sri Tarakaram, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that the said ratio would mutatis mutandis apply to the facts of the instant case also. Dilating on the same, the learned counsel contended that even after the licence is terminated the possession of the licensee cannot be adverse to the licensor. In my view, it is not necessary to go into too many details on this aspect. All that can be said is that the possession of a licensee is in its inception permissive and that therefore, his possession can never be deemed to be adverse until he does some overt act which shows that he claims adversely to the licensor and such overt act comes to the knowledge of the licensor. This view is reflected in Katiyar's 'easements and Licences' 10th edition at page 871, Note 14. I may point out here that the said view is nothing but a compendium of certain decisions reflected at the footnote to the said passage. It is therefore, clear that the proposition that the possession of a licensee cannot be adverse to the title of the licensor is circumscribed by certain limitations. However, it is necessary to remember that the only rights which the licensee has after the revocation of licence, are the rights enumerated in Section 63 of the Easements Act. It is therefore, clear that the proposition that the possession of a licensee cannot be adverse to the title of the licensor is circumscribed by certain limitations. However, it is necessary to remember that the only rights which the licensee has after the revocation of licence, are the rights enumerated in Section 63 of the Easements Act. Section 63 provides that where a licence is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property affected thereby, and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property. It is also clear that after the expiration of the 'reasonable time' next after the licence is revoked, the licensee will not have any right to remain in possession. It is not necessary for this Court to consider as to what are the rights and remedy of a licensee who has been evicted in a case where the licence is irrevocable or for that matter in a case where the licence is revoked even before the expiration of the period for which the licence is granted, because, those questions have not arisen for consideration in this case, I hasten to add here that the plaintiff has not based his claim on his possession as a licensee, but he has based his claim on the allegation that he has been a lessee. The aspect relating to licence has cropped up for consideration since an argument is advanced at the Bar that in the alternative, it is permissible for the plaintiff to claim the relief on the plea set up by the defendant by way of defence. Defendant, as pointed out earlier, has stated that plaintiff was a licensee and his licence has been revoked. When plaintiff seeks to claim the relief on the basis of the defence set up by the defendant, the Court cannot go beyond the defence set up for the purpose of seeing as to whether a relief in the alternative can be given to the plaintiff on the plea of the defendant. Be that as it may. ( 16 ) FROM what is stated hereinabove, it is clear that the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable time to leave the premises after the license is revoked. That would also mean that after the expiration of the 'reasonable time', he has no right to remain in possession. Be that as it may. ( 16 ) FROM what is stated hereinabove, it is clear that the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable time to leave the premises after the license is revoked. That would also mean that after the expiration of the 'reasonable time', he has no right to remain in possession. If that be so, the question for consideration is as to whether such a person is entitled to the equitable remedy of injunction. The submission made by the learned counsel Sri ramadas with reference to this aspect has already been briefly alluded to earlier. The decisions pressed into service by the learned counsel, Sri Ramadas also are referred to earlier. The two decisions, among others, of this Court which are mainly pressed into service by the learned counsel Sri Ramadas are the decision in Raghavendra Rao's case and the decision in K. V. Narayan's case (supra ). In Raghauendra Rao's case, (supra), it is held by this Court that a trespasser is not entitled to an order of temporary injunction as against a true owner and that a person having possessory title can maintain a suit for possession against another person who has no better title than himself. However, it is added in the said case that such possessory title cannot be available as against a true owner of the property. Then again, in para 10 therein, this court has held that the principle is that possession is good against all but the true owner. It is further pointed out in the said case that as the plaintiff therein has been found to be in unlawful possession of the disputed portion of the land which is of the ownership of defendant, the lower appellate court has rightly refused to grant the decree. Similarly, in Narayan's case, this Court, after a consideration of the various decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court as also of the other High Courts, has held that a trespasser in possession is not entitled to a temporary injunction as against a true owner. It is further observed that the principle underlying the conclusion is that the relief of injunction, being a relief in equity, the court cannot aid a person who himself is guilty of doing a wrongful thing. It is further observed that the principle underlying the conclusion is that the relief of injunction, being a relief in equity, the court cannot aid a person who himself is guilty of doing a wrongful thing. While taking the view which it has taken in the said case, this Court has referred to the various decisions of the Supreme Court viz. , the decision in M. Kallappa setty v M. V. Lakshminarayana Rao (supra), the decision in nayar Service Society Ltd. v K. C. Alexander. It has also considered the earlier decision of this Court in Mallayya v puttappa,. I may also point out here that in Raghavendra Rao's case (supra), also this Court reached the same conclusion after considering the decisions of the Supreme Court viz. , the decision in Nair Service Society's case (supra), and the decision in kallappa Setty's case (supra ). It has also relied on the earlier decision of this Court in Narayan's case (supra ). ( 17 ) IF the whole matter is approached from the aforesaid perspective, I should say that plaintiffs suit is liable to be dismissed, because, plaintiff, as pointed out earlier, after the expiration of the reasonable period next after his licence was revoked, has no right to continue in possession of the property in question. In other words, he will have to be deemed to be a person who is in unauthorised possession next after the aforesaid cut-off date. As such, it is possible to say that he is not entitled to the equitable remedy of injunction. However, in a matter like the one in hand, particularly in the context of the later decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the question to be asked is not merely as to whether a person in wrongful possession is entitled to the equitable remedy of injunction, but a relative question that is required to be answered is as to whether a person in settled possession though he has no authority to continue in possession, can be forcibly dispossessed. This question is required to be answered particularly in the context of the decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. , the decision in Ram rattan and Others v State of U. P. ; the decision in Krishna Ram mahale v Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao; and the decision in State of u. P. v Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh. Further a Division bench decision in Mis. , the decision in Ram rattan and Others v State of U. P. ; the decision in Krishna Ram mahale v Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao; and the decision in State of u. P. v Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh. Further a Division bench decision in Mis. Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. v The corporation of the City of Bangalore (supra), would also arise for consideration in the context of this question. In Ram Rattan's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 4 of the said decision, among other things, has held as under:"it is well-settled that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser, while the trespasser is in the act or process of trespassing, and has not accomplished his possession, but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies available under the law. "i may point out here that the said decision was rendered by the hon'ble Supreme Court in a criminal case while considering the question of exercise of private defence of property. However, the fact that such a decision is given in a criminal case will not make any difference to the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court. Similarly, in Krishna Ram Mahale's case (supra), the Hon'ble supreme Court has, in para 8 of its judgment, held as under:mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for defendant No. 3 the appellant herein, rightly did not go into the appreciation of the evidence either by the trial court or the High Court or the factual conclusions drawn by them. It was, however, strongly urged by him that the period of licence had expired long back and the plaintiff was not entitled to the renewal of licence. It was submitted by him that in view of the licence having come to an end, the plaintiff had no right to remain in charge of the business or the premises where it was conducted and all that the plaintiff could ask for was damages for unlawful dispossession even on the footing of facts as found by the High Court. We find ourselves totally unable to accept the submission of Mr. Tarkunde. We find ourselves totally unable to accept the submission of Mr. Tarkunde. It is a well-settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division bench of this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao jagadish Singh. This Court in that judgment cited with approval the well-known passage from the leading Privy council case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v Naresh narayan Roy, where it has been observed (p. 208 of SCR 1968 (2)) : (at p. 622 of AIR 1968): "in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court. " (emphasis supplied) similarly, the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v Dharmander prasad Singh (supra), has in para 15 of its judgment held as under: "sri Sorabjee submitted that great hardship and injustice would be occasioned to the respondents if the state Government on the self-assumed and self-assessed validity of its own action of cancellation of the lease, attempts at and succeeds in, a resumption of possession extrajudicially by physical force. Sri Sorabjee referred to the notice dated 19-11-1985 in which the Government, according to Sri Sorabjee, had left no one in doubt as to its intentions of resorting to an extrajudicial resumption of possession. Sri Sorabjee referred to paras 3, 10 and 4 of the order dated 19-11-1985. A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extrajudicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in higher or better position. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedegree'. In Bishandas and Others v State of Punjab and Others, this Court said at pp. 1574 and 1575 of AIR 1961: "we must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order. ""before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the state and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. " (emphasis supplied) therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extrajudicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law. "a Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra), particularly at para 10 has held as under:"the second aspect is this. It is part of the concept of "rule of Law" that no claim to a right to dispossess by the use of force without recourse to procedure in accordance with law is recognised or countenanced by courts. Such a right in the respondent cannot be recognised regardless of the question whether or not the appellant itself has any subsisting right to remain in possession. The protection that the court affords is not of the possession - which in the circumstances is litigious possession - but a protection against forcible dispossession. The basis of relief is a corollary of the principle that even with the best of title there can be no forcible dispossession. The protection that the court affords is not of the possession - which in the circumstances is litigious possession - but a protection against forcible dispossession. The basis of relief is a corollary of the principle that even with the best of title there can be no forcible dispossession. " (emphasis supplied) a careful perusal of the aforesaid decisions viz. , the decision in ram Rattan's case, the decision in Krishna Ram Mahale's case and the decision in M/s. Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. 's case would clearly go to show that the emphasis in the said decisions is on the rule of law. In other words, the said decisions would go to show that a person cannot secure his own justice. In a primitive society a person used to get criminal justice by private vengeance and civil justice by violent self-help. However, the modern states have adopted the system of 'administration of Justice' based on rule of law. That, in my view, is the sum total of the aforesaid four decisions. I may point out here that there is no conflict between these decisions and the decision of the Supreme court in Nair Service Society's or the decision in Kallappa Setty's case or for that matter the decisions in any other earlier cases. In the earlier cases, the Supreme Court has, in substance, held that the possession of a trespasser is good against everyone but the true owner. However, the question as to whether a person in settled possession can be forcibly dispossessed was not considered in those cases. Such a question has been considered in the later cases alluded to immediately hereinabove. Under these circumstances, I do not find any conflict in the various decisions of the Supreme Court cited at the Bar on either side. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary for this Court to go into the question as to which of the decisions of the Supreme Court will prevail. I have already alluded to the submission made by sri Ramadas, and the decisions pressed into service by him with reference to this aspect. Since, however, I do not find any conflict in the different decisions of the Supreme Court, it is wholly unnecessary to go into that aspect at all. I have already alluded to the submission made by sri Ramadas, and the decisions pressed into service by him with reference to this aspect. Since, however, I do not find any conflict in the different decisions of the Supreme Court, it is wholly unnecessary to go into that aspect at all. ( 18 ) IF that be so, the question to be considered at this juncture is as to whether plaintiffs possession in the facts and circumstances of this case can be said to be a settled possession. I have pointed out earlier, that according to defendant's own showing, plaintiff was inducted into the suit property by the defendant himself. Plaintiff has been carrying on his business there. According to defendant, there is an understanding between him and the plaintiff that plaintiff should also give a small commission to him presumably by way of consideration for the licence granted to him. In other words, till the dispute arose between the parties, that is to say, till about 1984, the possession of the plaintiff was peaceful. His possession was not precarious at that point of time. It is therefore clear that till the dispute arose between the plaintiff and the defendant, plaintiff had settled himself in the property in question and has been running his business. It is needless to say that such a possession is a settled possession. The matter would have been different had the possession of the plaintiff been interrupted from the beginning or objected from the beginning or it was without the knowledge of the defendant. Such, however, is not the situation. The plaintiff was planted into the suit property by the defendant himself. He allowed him to continue in possession till the dispute arose. Under these circumstances, I have no hesitation whatsoever in holding that plaintiffs possession is a settled possession though he has no right as at present to continue in possession. Even then in the context of the decisions referred to hereinabove, it is not permissible for the defendant to forcibly dispossess plaintiff though it is certainly open to him to take possession from him having recourse to law and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by it. It is one thing to say that the unauthorised possession of a person cannot be protected by injunction. It is one thing to say that the unauthorised possession of a person cannot be protected by injunction. It is, however, quite another thing to say that a person who is in settled possession cannot be forcibly dispossessed. ( 19 ) FROM what is stated hereinabove, it is clear that though the plaintiff is not entitled to the protection of his possession, he is entitled to be protected from forcible eviction. In that view of the matter, a restricted injunction is indeed required to be issued. If such an injunction is not issued, the same would mean that defendant can forcibly evict the plaintiff. It is significant to notice here that in Krishna Ram Mahale's case (supra), the hon'ble Supreme Court had even directed restoration of possession to the licensee who was forcibly evicted, after holding that even assuming that the licensee was unauthorisedly continuing in possession, he was not liable to be forcibly evicted. If that be so, it would follow as a matter of logical corollary to the same that a direction to the defendant will have to be given that he can take possession only in due course of law and he cannot take possession otherwise than in due course of law. Such a direction will obviously have to be indeed in the nature of injunction. That is the decree which will have to follow in this case. ( 20 ) IN the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree dated 24-9-1988 of the court below in O. S. No. 10381 of 1984 are hereby set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is partly decreed by restraining the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff-appellant of the suit schedule property except in accordance with law and the procedure prescribed by law. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. --- *** --- .