Judgment : One, Rajendran preferred a private complaint against the present petitioner and one Kumaran, Editor of Tamil Daily “Dinakaran” Salem, under Sec. 200 Crl.P.C. on 30.5.1990 in the Court to Judicial Magistrate No. V, Salem alleging that he is the President of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Association, Regional President of Ambedkar Peoples’ Movement and General Secretary of VEMP Co-operative Workers’ Union. A news item was published in the issue of “Dinakaran” dated 13. 1990 under the caption in the name of present petitioner. The substance of the news item is that complainant Rajendran was caught red-handed when he was smuggling a rice bag and subsequently he was handed over to the police. Because of this false news item his name, fame and reputation have been lowered. The notice issued by him to both the accused did not evoke any reply. They neither expressed regret nor cared to explain their stand. 2. Learned Magistrate forwarded the complaint to Station House Officer, Yercaud for investigation and report under Sec. 156(3), Crl.P.C. on or before 16. 1990. On receipt of the same the Sub-Inspector registered it as Crime No. 326 of 1990 of his station under Sec.500(1), I.P.C., investigated and filed a charge-sheet on 2. 1992 against both the accused. The charge against A-1 under Sec. 501, I.P.C. is that helping the Editor of Tamil Daily ‘Dinakaran’ published and printed defamatory matter on 13. 1990and thus caused annoyance to complainant Rajendran. The charge against A-2 under Sec.501, I.P.C. read with Sec.109, I.P.C. is that he induced A-1 and abetted the offence. It was taken on file as C.C.No. 51 of 1992 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 5, Salem. 3. The second accused Jaganathan has now come forward with this application under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C. to quash the proceedings in C.C.No. 51 of 1992. Learned counsel for the quash petitioner has first submitted that the substance of the complaint, even if true, can constitute an offence only under Sec. 500, I.P.C. and not under Sec. 501, I.P.C. as indicated in the charge-sheet. It is true that Sec.501, I.P.C. relates to printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory. Learned counsel for the quash petitioner has first submitted that the substance of the complaint, even if true, can constitute an offence only under Sec. 500, I.P.C. and not under Sec. 501, I.P.C. as indicated in the charge-sheet. It is true that Sec.501, I.P.C. relates to printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory. Under Sec.499, I.P.C. whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person is said to defame that person. Evidently, the allegation in the present complaint can come only under Sec. 499, I.P.C. which is punishable under Sec. 500, I.P.C. However, filing a charge-sheet under a wrong section is no ground to quash the proceedings. The mere wrong label of a section under which a complaint is purported to have been filed is not material and a complaint, if it discloses an offence under any law, can surely, be proceeded with even though a wrong section or provision of law has been quoted as its label. 4. The main grievance of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the offence under Sec. 500, I.P.C. is a non-cognizable one. Under Sec. 156(3), Crl.P.C. a Magistrate may order investigation by the Police only in respect of a cognizable case. So the order dated 16. 1990 of learned Judicial Magistrate forwarding the complaint to Station House Officer, Yercaud for investigation and report is evidently wrong. Further, Sub-Inspector of Police who has investigated the offence has straightaway filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner under Sec. 501, I.P.C. and this has been taken on file by the Court as C.C.No. 51 of 1992. Sec.199(1), Crl.P.C. provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code which covers Secs. 499 to 502 except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. In other words, Sec.199 specifically prohibits the taking of cognizance of any complaint under Sec.500, I.P.C. filed by persons other than the aggrieved. From the very wordings of the section it is clear that the provisions is mandatory and the court is not competent to take cognizance of any complaint which is not filed by an aggrieved person. In other words, Sec.199 specifically prohibits the taking of cognizance of any complaint under Sec.500, I.P.C. filed by persons other than the aggrieved. From the very wordings of the section it is clear that the provisions is mandatory and the court is not competent to take cognizance of any complaint which is not filed by an aggrieved person. By no stretch of imagination it could be held that the Sub-Inspector of Police is an aggrieved person in this case. Besides, the report of the Police Officer is not a complaint within the terms of Sec. 199, Crl.P.C. In Bhana v. Emperor, (1911) 12 Crl.L.J. 50, conviction under Sec. 498 I.P.C. for enticing away a married woman was set aside for the reason that there was no complaint by the husband or guardian of an offence punishable under that section, as provided in Sec.199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The procedure adopted by learned Sessions Judge on the report of the Police Officer was held erroneous by the Punjab Chief Court. In Narasimhan v. Chokkappa, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 40 , the Apex Court has held that if a Magistrate were to take cognizance of the offence of defamation on a complaint filed by one who is not an aggrieved person the trial and conviction of the accused would be void and illegal. So the charge-sheet in the present case has necessarily to be quashed. 5. However, as rightly pointed out by learned Public Prosecutor, there is no reason to quash the complaint pending before the Magistrate. The trial Court is directed to proceed under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If it deems fit to take cognizance of the offence, the period of limitation prescribed in Chapter XXXVI will not be a bar since the pendency of the proceedings from 30.5.1990 is one account of the erroneous procedure adopted by the court below. The petition is ordered accordingly.