JUDGMENT The Court: The writ petitioner No. 1 is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, and owns a jute mm at Sijberia, under Uluberia Police Station, in the district of Howrah. 2. The writ petitioner No.2 is a share-holder and Director of the said Company, and, at the material time, he was running the said mill on the basis of a scheme sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction in the month of February, 1991. 3. From the case made out in the writ petition it appears that on or about 15th September, 1987, the petitioner Company was declared a sick company within the meaning of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, hereinafter referred to as BIFR, initially appointed the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India and, thereafter, the Industrial Financial Corporation of India as Operating Agencies to formulate a scheme for revival of the petitioner Company. However, as no scheme was forthcoming, the petitioner No.2 submitted a scheme for reviving the Company which, as mentioned hereinbefore, was accepted and approved by the BIFR in February, 1991 and the petitioner No.2 was al10wed to take over the management of the Company in terms of the said scheme. 4. According to the petitioners, as a result of failure by the financial institutions in providing timely financial assistance, the Company had to face serious financial problems as it inherited huge liabilities from the past management. One of the biggest liabilities was the outstanding Provident Fund liabilities, part of which was liquidated, while a large amount still remains to be paid. 5. It is the petitioners' case that while sincere attempts were being made to revive the Company, on and from the month of October, 1993 a certain section of the workers began to take disruptive steps by taking recourse to various illegal activities in and around the mill premises of the petitioner Company and inspite of repeated requests and complaints made to the police authorities, no positive action was taken by them and there was no improvement in the situation. 6. According to the petitioners, on being emboldened by the inaction of the police, on and from 15th November, 1993, a certain section of the workers began to prevent the other workers from entering the Mill premises and discharging their duties. 6. According to the petitioners, on being emboldened by the inaction of the police, on and from 15th November, 1993, a certain section of the workers began to prevent the other workers from entering the Mill premises and discharging their duties. Thereafter, the said workers also began picketting in front of the Mill gates and prevented lorries from entering into the Mill premises to take out the finished products. 7. It is the further case of the petitioners that on and from 23rd November, 1993, a section of the workers at the Mill resorted to a strike, thereby completely paralysing all activities at the Mill. Since all efforts to lift the strike failed, the management of the petitioner Company declared temporary suspension of work on and from 26th November, 1993, and such closure is still continuing. 8. Consequent thereupon, the petitioner Company appears to have filed applications under Ss. 144(2) and 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Uluberia, Howrah, on 9th December, 1993. By his order of even date the learned magistrate observed that on 30th November, 1993, he had already directed the Officer-in-Charge, Uluberia Police Station, to make adequate police arrangements and to keep a close watch on the activities of antisocial elements and also to ensure that no one obstructed the free movement of the staff and officers of the petitioner Company. The learned magistrate also directed the said police authorities to take appropriate action on complaints lodged against incidents of threat, theft and criminal trespass. In view of the said directions, the learned magistrate did not consider it necessary to issue any further orders on the applications filed by the petitioner Company under Ss. 144(2) and 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed that the same be filed. 9. Since, according to the petitioners, the order of the learned magistrate did not adequately protect the interest of the petitioner Company, they moved a revisional application in this Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same is still pending disposal, although, certain interim directions were given therein to safeguard the interests of the petitioners. 10. Since, according to the petitioners, the order of the learned magistrate did not adequately protect the interest of the petitioner Company, they moved a revisional application in this Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same is still pending disposal, although, certain interim directions were given therein to safeguard the interests of the petitioners. 10. It is the case of the petitioners that despite the orders passed by the learned magistrate and this Court on the revisional application, the police authorities failed to discharge their statutory duties in compliance of the said orders, despite repeated complaints made to them. 11. Appearing in support of the writ petition, Mr. Anindya Mitra firstly submitted that the writ application was based on the inaction of the police authorities in curbing the lawlessness in and around the Mill premises, which had compelled the petitioners to declare closure of the Mill. Mr. Mitra urged that the writ application was not dependant upon the proceedings under s. 144(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the orders passed therein by the learned magistrate. 12. Referring to the prayers made in the writ petition, Mr. Mitra submitted that when the writ application was initially moved on 23rd December, 1993, a learned Judge of this Court had directed the matter to appear in the list on 6th January, 1994, and had passed interim orders, inter alia, directing the respondents to ensure that there was no breach of the peace in and around the Mill premises and to ensure free ingress and egrees of loyal staff, lawful visitors, raw materials, finished goods, vehicles to and from the Mill premises, Directions were also given to apprehend wrong-doers and potential wrong-doers and to remove all trespassers and anti-social elements from the Mill premises to enable the petitioners to run their business smoothly and without interference. 13. Mr. Mitra submitted that an appeal had been preferred by the added respondent and the Division Bench, sitting in vacation on 29th December, 1993 had modified certain portions of the interim order passed by the learned single Judge. Mr. Mitra submitted that the prayers made in the writ petition will now have to be considered in the light of the orders passed in the said appeal on 29th December, 1993, whereby the appeal itself was disposed of. 14. Mr. Mr. Mitra submitted that the prayers made in the writ petition will now have to be considered in the light of the orders passed in the said appeal on 29th December, 1993, whereby the appeal itself was disposed of. 14. Mr. Mitra then referred to the application filed on behalf of the added respondent, inter alia, for appointment of a Receiver to make an inventory and to take possession of the finished products and raw jute stock and to sell the same for liquidation of the legitimate and statutory dues of the workmen. Mr. Mitra submitted that no interim orders had been passed on the said application and by order dated 20th May, 1994, the application was directed to be heard along with the writ application. 15. Mr. Mitra submitted that since the writ application itself was being disposed of finally, the question of appointment of a Receiver on the respondent's application did not arise and was wholly misconceived. Mr. Mitra urged that the scope of the writ petition was confined to the inaction of the police authorities in maintaining law and order in and around the Mill premises and to ensure free egrees and ingress of the section of the workers who were willing to work and for the free movement of vehicles with raw materials and finished goods to and from the Mill premises, and could not be widened to include reliefs being prayed for on behalf of the respondents. 16. Mr. Mitra submitted that various offers had been extended to the section of the workers, who were bent upon disrupting the normal functioning of the Mill, to sit at the negotiating table to iron out the various differences and to recommence the operation of the Mill, but such overtures had been turned down, although, it would have been to the interest of all concerned to have the Mill re-opened. 17. Mr. Mitra submitted that in the aforesaid circumstances it would only be just and fair to grant the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition, keeping in mind the order passed by the Appeal Court on 29th December, 1993, while disposing of the appeal. 18. Opposing the writ application on behalf of Sheikh Nazibur Rahaman, who was added as a respondent in the writ proceedings by the Appeal Court, Mr. 18. Opposing the writ application on behalf of Sheikh Nazibur Rahaman, who was added as a respondent in the writ proceedings by the Appeal Court, Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta firstly submitted that inviting the writ Court to pass such orders as prayed for in the writ petition, would be defeating the very purpose of the express provisions contained in s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Sengupta submitted that while s. 144 of the above Code provided for an order circumscribed by a specific time-frame, an order passed by the writ Court would amount to an order in perpetuity. 19. Mr. Sengupta submitted that ample relief was provided for in a proceeding under s. 144 of the aforesaid Code, and no blanket order for all times to come ought to be passed by the Court, since such a procedure was not contemplated under the law. 20. Mr. Sengupta then submitted that the workers, who were employed by the Mill, could not be said to be trespassers, as they had every right to be in the Mill, not only as employees, but as persons having a stake in the Mill itself. 21. Mr. Sengupta submitted that the scheme under which the Company was being run at the relevant point of time, with the approval of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, provided for contribution by the workers of a sum of Rs. 11/- per day per head by way of a wage-cut for generating additional capital for rehabilitating the jute mill, and such deductions were commenced from the month of February, 1991. Mr. Sengupta contended that having contributed a very substantial sum towards the working capital of the petitioner Company, the workers had acquired a lien over the Mill and its properties, including all raw materials and finished products, lying in the Mill premises, and they had every right to protect their interests in respect thereof. 22. Mr. Sengupta submitted that, in any event, even if the workers in the Mill were considered to be trespassers within the Mill premises, they could be removed therefrom only in due process of law, which, according to Mr. Sengupta, meant a decree for eviction passed by a competent Civil Court. 23. Mr. Sengupta submitted that employer-employee relationships had undergone a great deal of change over the years, which was recognised upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Sengupta, meant a decree for eviction passed by a competent Civil Court. 23. Mr. Sengupta submitted that employer-employee relationships had undergone a great deal of change over the years, which was recognised upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In keeping with the growing concept of social justice, the Courts have even gone to the extent of suggesting that workmen should also have some say in the running of an establishment, since they contributed their labour to the capital provided by the management, to make the establishment function. 24. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Others, reported in AIR 1980 SC at Page 1896, Mr. Sengupta repeated that when a big employer makes a claim to socially irresponsible control over a large industrial concern and over the lives of tens and thousands of human beings whom it happens to employ, he is talking in a dying language. 25. In this regard, Mr. Sengupta also referred to another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Textile Workers' Union vs. P. R. Ramakrishnan and Others, reported in AIR 1983 SC at Page 75, wherein it had been held that workers of a company have the locus standi to appear and be heard in a Winding-up petition under s. 433 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956. 26. Mr. Sengupta then submitted that it was well-settled that he who seeks equity must also do equity and come to the Court of equitable relief with clean hands. 27. Mr. Sengupta urged that having failed to payoff the legitimate dues of the workers, and having failed to deposit the Provident Fund and other dues of the workmen, it was not open to the respondents to pray for orders to prevent the workmen from asserting their rights to claim their legitimate dues. 28. Mr. Sengupta then submitted that the writ petition was misconceived as no cause of action had been disclosed therein. Mr. Sengupta contended that except for mention of threats, no positive case had been made out in the writ petition that some injury had actually been caused which called for action on the part of the police authorities and on account of inaction of the police authorities in respect thereof a cause of action had arisen for the filing of this writ petition. 29. 29. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Sengupta referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Pandey and Another vs. Smt. Usha Rani Rajgaria, reported in AIR 1983 SC at Page 1225, wherein it was held that in a private dispute the writ Court was not the proper forum for deciding such dispute and it was for the parties to seek their relief either before the Civil Court or in a proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code, where ample remedy had been provided for. 30. Mr. Sengupta contended that the dispute between the petitioners and the workmen was essentially of a private nature, and the jurisdiction of the writ Court had been wrongly invoked by the petitioner Company when its remedy lay in proceedings either in the Civil Court or under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 31. Referring to the application filed on behalf of the added respondent for appointment of a Receiver, inter alia for the purpose of taking possession of the raw materials and finished goods lying in the factory premises, and to sell the same so that the outstanding dues of the workmen could be met, Mr. Sengupta contended that such a course of action was often adopted to safeguard the interest of the parties. Mr. Sengupta urged that merely because other formus were available for similar reliefs and the application had been filed on behalf of the added respondent, who did not have carriage of the proceedings, it could not be contended that such an application was not maintainable. Mr. Sengupta urged that even the Supreme Court had observed that technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way in granting relief to a deserving party. 32. In this regard, Mr. Sengupta referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sadhuram Bansal vs. Pulin Behari Sarkar and Others, reported in AIR 1984 SC at Page 1471, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether in a given situation the offer of the persons in possession of a particular property earmarked for sale by the Receiver, when such offers were the highest, could be considered along with other Builders. Their Lordships held that in the interest of social justice, the higher offer of the persons in possession should be accepted. Their Lordships held that in the interest of social justice, the higher offer of the persons in possession should be accepted. The Supreme Court also went on to observe that social justice must prevail over any technical rule. 33. Drawing an analogy from the above decision, Mr. Sengupta submitted that, although, the application for appointment of a Receiver had been filed on behalf of the added respondent, who did not have carriage of the proceedings, such technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice to the parties. 34. Mr. Sengupta also referred to a Bench decision on this Court in International Airports Authority of India and Another vs. United ITDC Employees' Association and Others, reported in 1994 (1) CHN at Page 164, wherein it was observed that under the expanding horizon of modern Labour and Industrial Law, it is no longer possible to ignore the workers as they are now being treated to be as much, If not more, a part of the industrial concern as the owners thereof. 35. Mr. Sengupta urged that having regard to the provisions of Article 43A of the Constitution, the workers now do have a say in the matter of management of the industrial concern, and the same cannot be ignored. Hence, the application for appointment of a Receiver for the mill in question was quite maintainable and appropriate relief could be given to the workers thereupon. 36. Mr. Sengupta lastly submitted that s. 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, did not create an absolute bar to the appointment of a Receiver, while a scheme for reviving the Company was pending consideration before the BIFR, nor could the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution be circumscribed by an inferior authority exercising powers under a statute, 37. Mr. Sengupta urged that while considering the question of appointing a Receiver, as prayed for by the added respondent, the Court would not only have to keep in mind the principles embodied in Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also the provisions of Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution in the backdrop of the facts of this case. 38. 38. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India and Others, commonly referred to as the Bhopal Gas Leak case, reported in 1990(1) SCC at Page 613, Mr. Sengupta referred to an observation made in paragraph 124 of the judgment to the effect that to do a great right it is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong. 39. Mr. Sengupta concluded his submissions by submitting that praying for a Receiver was nothing unusual, inasmuch as, even while disposing of matters finally, the writ Courts often make orders which are conditional and dependant on circumstances. Mr. Sengupta submitted that in order to maintain peace, it would be necessary to remove the cause and/ or irritant for any unrest in and around the Mill premises, and it could be done by appointing a Receiver to payoff the outstanding dues of the workers and to ensure that the workers in the Mill were regularly paid their dues and were not subjected to further harassment financially or other wise. 40. Mr. Tapan Chandra Dutta, who appeared for the State with the learned Advocate General, adopted the submissions of Mr. Sengupta and submitted that it was in the interest of all concerned to ensure that the Mill was re-opened and work was recommended at the earliest opportunity. 41. Replying to the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, Mr. Mitra submitted that proceedings under s. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 226 of the Constitution were not mutually destructive and could be proceeded with simultaneously. While in the revisional proceeding the propriety of the order of the learned magistrate was in question, in the writ application, the inaction of the police and other local authorities formed the basis of the grievance of the writ petitioners. 42. Mr. Mitra contended that there was nothing unusual about the prayers made in the writ petition, and the same were perfectly justifiable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 43. On the point of doing equity in order to ask for equitable relief, Mr. Mitra pointed out that except for the broken month of November, 1993, when a closure had to be declared, the workers had been paid their salaries and other dues upto date. Mr. 43. On the point of doing equity in order to ask for equitable relief, Mr. Mitra pointed out that except for the broken month of November, 1993, when a closure had to be declared, the workers had been paid their salaries and other dues upto date. Mr. Mitra submitted that the petitioners were ready and willing to pay the outstanding dues for the broken month of November, 1993, if the Mill was allowed to re-open and work was resumed therein. Mr. Mitra submitted that the primary objective of all the parties should be to ensure the re-opening of the Mill, without prejudicing the parties to any great extent. 44. Mr. Mitra then contended that an order passed by the writ Court in a situation like the present one, cannot be said to be an order in perpetuity and such orders were made to fit the situation then existing and in the facts of the case. 45. Mr. Mitra relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ganga Cold Storage Company Ltd. and Others vs. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in 1979(2) CLJ at Page 55, in support of his contention that even after the lapse of the statutory period under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a writ petition against police inaction would be maintainable. 46. Of course, Mr. Sengupta submitted that the aforesaid decision was distinguishable from the facts of this case, in that, in the said decision, the opposite parties therein had no stake in the assets of the Company, as in the present case. 47. Mr. Mitra concluded his reply by submitting that sufficient materials were before the Court for appropriate directions to be given to the police and other local authorities to discharge their statutory duties and to ensure peace in and around the Mill premises, so that the Mill could run smoothly and without obstruction, for the benefit of all concerned. 48. While considering the application filed on behalf of the added respondent for appointment of a Receiver at the ad-interim stage, I had indicated that it was doubtful as to whether the reliefs prayed for could at all be given in the context of the case made out in the writ petition. 49. 48. While considering the application filed on behalf of the added respondent for appointment of a Receiver at the ad-interim stage, I had indicated that it was doubtful as to whether the reliefs prayed for could at all be given in the context of the case made out in the writ petition. 49. Having heard the parties at considerable length during the final hearing of the writ petition, I see no reason to take a different view from that which I had taken earlier. 50. The scope of the writ petition is confined to the alleged inaction of the police and local authorities in maintaining law and order in and around the Mill premises, despite the repeated complaints of the writ petitioners with regard to the obstacles created to the smooth running of the Mill by a section of the workers. 51. I fail to see how the scope of the writ petition can be widened at the instance of the respondents and that too by a prayer for appointment of a Receiver for the purpose of taking charge of the finished products and the raw materials within the Mill premises and to sell off the same in order to liquidate the dues of the workmen, which would have a totally opposite effect to the prayers made in the writ petition. If the writ petition succeeds, it will lead to an incongruous situation if the prayer for appointment of a Receiver is also allowed simultaneously. 52. On the other hand, if the writ petition is dismissed, then also no separate order can be passed on the respondent's application, as the respondent cannot get a mandate on the writ application filed by someone else who has the carriage of proceedings. 53. Furthermore, as I had already observed in my order of 20th May, 1994, if the workmen have been denied their legitimate dues their relief would lie before the special forums set up by the State Government under different enactments to deal with and decide such claims and it would be improper for the writ Court, while considering a case of police inaction, to decide such claims or to appoint a Receiver to decide such claims. and that, too, on the respondent's application. 54. The decisions of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. and that, too, on the respondent's application. 54. The decisions of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Sengupta in reference to Article 43A of the Constitution, which forms part of the Directive Principles of State Policy, are no doubt an expression of the Court's concern to ensure interaction between the workers and the management by the workers' participation in the management process of an industrial establishment, but the principles involved will have to be applied to fit the facts in a given situation, in the absence of any direct legislation covering the field envisaged in Article 43A of the Constitution. 55. Mr. Sengupta's submissions regarding s. 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, are attractive, but are not of much help to the added respondent in the instant case in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 56. I am unable to convince myself that the subject matter of this writ application gives rise to a situation where the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. (supra) or National Textile Workers' Union (supra), as relied upon by Mr. Sengupta, can be imported. I am not, therefore, inclined to allow the application for appointment of Receiver and other consequential relief's filed by the added respondent and the same is, accordingly, rejected. 57. Coming to the merits of the writ application itself, I am also unable to accept Mr. Sengupta's submissions that the petitioners' remedy was and/or is confined only to a proceeding under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It does not require any elucidation that the provisions of s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code are to be invoked when there is an urgent apprehension of a serious breach of the peace. The legislature in its wisdom has, therefore, limited the life of an order under s. 144 of the said Code for a period of two months. On the other hand, it is the continuous duty of the police authorities to maintain law and order and to prevent any serious breach of the peace. It is well settled that a writ in the nature of Mandamus may be issued to compel performance of statutory duties. 58. Contrary to Mr. On the other hand, it is the continuous duty of the police authorities to maintain law and order and to prevent any serious breach of the peace. It is well settled that a writ in the nature of Mandamus may be issued to compel performance of statutory duties. 58. Contrary to Mr. Sengupta's submissions that the writ application was based only upon-threats, definite materials have been provided which called for the intervention of the police authorities for the benefit of all concerned, including the workers, for maintaining an atmosphere which could have been conducive for negotiation between the parties, instead of ending in closure of the Mill. Timely action may have prevented such an eventuality and may have reduced the hardships suffered by the workers. 59. Mr. Sengupta's submissions that the police authorities were really being called upon to take sides in a private dispute between the management and the workers, also appear to be without substance. An establishment employing a large number of workers cannot be equated with or compared to a landlord and tenant relationship, as was sought to be urged by Mr. Sengupta, and apprehensions of a serious breach of the peace would always be present in an industrial establishment where there are conflicts and/or conflicting interests existing between the workers and the management. 60. The decision cited by Mr. Sengupta in the case of Mohan Pandey (supra) is not really applicable in this case, since the dispute involved herein cannot be called a private dispute, having regard to the dimension of the law and order problems created because of various circumstances. 61. The point for consideration in this context is Mr. Sengupta's submissions regarding the alleged acquisition by the workers of a lien on the raw materials and finished goods lying in the Mill premises, on account of their contribution to the working capital of the petitioner Company by way of a wage-cut of Rs. 11/-per day per workman. 62. I have gone through the relevant portions of the scheme sanctioned by the BIFR, but have found nothing therein to show that the workers would acquire a lien over the raw materials and finished goods lying in the Mill premises, on account of their contribution to the working capital of the Company in the form of a wage-cut of Rs. 11/- per day per workman. 11/- per day per workman. On the other hand, the relevant portion of the scheme provides that the workmen shall agree to deposit, on interest-free basis, an amount of Rs. 15/- (later reduced to Rs. 11/-) per person per day, for a period of 5 years from January, 1991, to December, 1995, and the same would be repayable after the rehabilitation period in such suitable instalments, as may be agreed to by the management of the Company and the representatives of the labour unions, on the basis of mutual consultation six months period to the rehabilitation period, It was, however, further provided that workmen who retired during the period of rehabilitation would be eligible for refund of the interest-free deposit within a period not exceeding 45 days from the date of retirement. 63. It cannot, therefore, be said that the workers had acquired a lien on the raw materials and the finished goods lying in the Mill premises, since they had agreed to a wage-cut of Rs. 11/- per day per person, but, on the other hand, the workers would be entitled to reimbursement of the amounts so deducted from their wages, in terms of the scheme or if the rehabilitation scheme fails and such failure is recorded, as such, by the BIFR, from appropriate forum. 64. In that view of the matter, I see no reason for altering the view taken by me earlier that if the workmen have been deprived of their legitimate dues under different heads, they have their remedy in respect thereof before the special forum set up the State Government to deal with and decide such claims. 65. In the above circumstances, the writ petition succeeds to the extent indicated hereinbelow. 66. The respondents Nos. 3 to 7 shall, in the discharge of their statutory duties, ensure that there is no breach of the peace in and around the Mill premises and that all such employees, officers and staff, as are willing to resume their duties in the Mill, if and when the closure is lifted, are able to peacefully enter and leave the Mill premises without any obstruction. The said respondents will also ensure that for the purpose of operating the Mill, there is no obstacle or hindrance to the entry of raw materials in the Mill premises and the removal of finished goods therefrom, subject, of course, to such other orders that may be passed by the special forums which are competent to go into and decide the claims of the employees. 67. If the closure is lifted and work in the Mill is resumed, the petitioners shall pay to the workers their salaries and other emoluments for the broken month of November, 1993, within a week from the date of re-opening of the Mill. If any other dues are payable to the workmen, the petitioners shall take expeditious steps to payoff the same, in accordance with law and the rehabilitation scheme, to ensure a peaceful and healthy atmosphere for running of the Mill. 68. This order will not fetter the hands of the concerned respondents in taking steps before any other appropriate forum in this regard, and, if any such application is made, the concerned authority is directed to proceed with the disposal of such application expeditiously. 69. If it becomes necessary, the said respondents Nos. 3 to 7 shall at the cost of the petitioners place a police picket in front of the gate of the Mill premises to prevent any serious breach of the peace in and around the Mill premises, and to ensure free egress and ingress of men and materials to and from the Mill premises, subject to the conditions mentioned hereinabove. The writ application is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. 70. Having regard to the fact that the Mill in question is under closure, there will be stay of operation of this judgment and order for a fortnight from date, as prayed for on behalf of the added respondents, but this stay will not prevent the petitioners and the respondents from taking any step to re-open the Mill. 71. All parties will act on a xeroxed signed copy of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking. Application allowed.