J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IN this group of 24 petitions identical facts and questions have arisen and therefore they are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is common in all the 24 members and his a society duly registered under the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short ). Respondents are the members of the petitioner-society. For the purpose of purchase of sugarcanes the petitioner society had entered into contract with the respondents. According to the case of the petitioner on account of rise in the market price of the sugar-cane the respondents did not sell their sugar cane products to the petitioner-society and instead they sold the same to other factories with a view to fetch higher price and thereby gain more profits. Thus the respondents are alleged to have committed breach of the contract. ( 3 ) THE petitioner society filed an Arbiration Suit against all the respondents before Board of Registrar Nominees under the provisions of the Act initially for specific performance of contract and later on changing relief to damages. The petitioner society claimed damages of Rs. 80/- per M. T. in all the 24 suits against the respondents. ( 4 ) DURING the course of the proceedings of the suits before the Chairman of Board of Registrars Nominees at Rajkot on 30/10/1980 in one Arbitration Suit No. 23 of 1980 on behalf of respondents in that suit being defendant a Pursis was filed. It was to be treated as common Pursis in remaining other 23 Arbitration Suits. ( 5 ) AS per the said Pursis it was stated that respondents-defendants in the suits have no objection to pay the damages at the rate of Rs. 10 per M. T. in each suit. It was also stated that in similar such cases the petitioners-plaintiffs had recovered damages accordingly in other suits. Therefore it was stated that the respondents have no objection to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 10/- per M. T. as it was done in past in other suits and they had given up for other disputes. Thus the respondents original defendants by filing the Pursis submitted before the court that the award may be passed against them for damages at the rate of Rs. 10/- per M. T. as it was done in past in other suits and they had given up for other disputes. Thus the respondents original defendants by filing the Pursis submitted before the court that the award may be passed against them for damages at the rate of Rs. 10/- per M. T. Below this Pursis the Managing Director of the petitioner-society made an endorsement that the Honble Court may pass appropriate order as it deemed fit on the same day. ( 6 ) THE Chairman of the Board of Registrar Nominees at Rajkot was pleased to pass the order on the same day. It is mentioned in the impugned order of the trial court that the court had read the contents of the Pursis and had considered the facts and circumstances of the each case and after hearing the advocates of bath the sides it was decided to award the damages at the rate of Rs. 10 per M. T. with costs. The impugned order by the Chairman of the Board of Registrar Nominees at Rajkot came to be passed on 30/10/1980. ( 7 ) BEING aggrieved by the order passed by the Chairman of the Board of Registrar Nominees at Rajkot on 30/10/1980 the petitioners original plaintiffs filed 24 appeals before the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal at Ahmedabad. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case and hearing advocates of the parties the Division Bench of the Tribunal confirmed the impugned order of the trial court and dismissed all the appeals. Therefore the original unsuccessful plaintiffs have now come up before this court by filing this 24 petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality and validity of the impugned order passed by the courts below. ( 8 ) BEFORE the merits of the petitions are examined it would be appropriate to mention about scope and ambit of the powers of this court in a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The jurisdictional sweep is very much circumscribed in a petition under Article 227. Reassessment and reappraisal of the evidence is not warranted in such petitions. The investigation of facts is also not permissible. This court cannot go into the findings of facts. The main anxiety of the court is to see as to whether there is any lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. Reassessment and reappraisal of the evidence is not warranted in such petitions. The investigation of facts is also not permissible. This court cannot go into the findings of facts. The main anxiety of the court is to see as to whether there is any lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. No doubt unless it is successfully pointed out that either there is illegality or perversity or misreading of evidence or non-application of mind this court under Article 227 would be at loath to interfere with the concurrent finding of facts. ( 9 ) THE merits are required to be examined in view of the aforesaid legal back-ground. First contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that there is no consent of the competent person for signing compromise Pursis. Firstly this submission is unsustainable as the courts below have concurrently and consistently held that the person namely Mr. P. D. Raval who had signed on behalf of the petitioners was competent to compromise for and on behalf of the petitioner-society. Such a finding cannot be disturbed in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Apart from that the petitioner society has passed a resolution in its executive committee being Resolution No. 5 on 24 authorising President and Managing Director to conduct handle and compromise the litigation for and on behalf of the society. It is contended that Mr. P. D. Raval was not the Managing Director and therefore he was incompetent to compromise the case before the trial court. This submission is also without any substance. It is an admitted fact that he was incharge of the office of the Managing Director of the petitioner society at the relevant time. He was looking after the management and affairs of the petitioner society. Both the courts below have held that he was incharge of the management and the office of the Managing Director and therefore he was competent. Therefore in view of the Resolution No. 5 of the petitioner-society concurrrently authorising President and Managing Director it cannot be contended that incharge Managing Director Mr. Raval was incompetent to compromise the cases before the trial court. It is an admitted fact that no action is taken against him so far. Therefore finding of facts recorded by the courts below is justified and requires no interference. Raval was incompetent to compromise the cases before the trial court. It is an admitted fact that no action is taken against him so far. Therefore finding of facts recorded by the courts below is justified and requires no interference. ( 10 ) THIRD contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the trial court has not applied its mind and has not considered the principles of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as Code for short ). It is also submitted that advocates have not signed the compromise. This submission is reiterated for being rejected. It was also contended before both the courts and it is rightly rejected. It is very clear from the impugned orders passed by the trial court that the trial court considered following three things before passing impugned award. (1) Contents of the consent Pursis. (2) Facts and circumstances emerging from the pleadings of the parties. (3) And hearing arguments of the advocates of both the parties. Not only that it is also mentioned in the impugned order and the award that the court had inquired by pointing out certain question to learned advocates of the parties as to whether any one of them intended to lead evidence. As neither side was ready to lead evidence the court had to proceed with the matter for passing appropriate order in the light of the aforesaid three circumstances. Accordingly the trial court has passed the impugned order. ( 11 ) THE provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code are important and they are required to be examined. As neither side was ready to lead evidence the court had to proceed with the matter for passing appropriate order in the light of the aforesaid three circumstances. Accordingly the trial court has passed the impugned order. ( 11 ) THE provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code are important and they are required to be examined. Order 23 Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code reads as under:- Order 23 Rule 3 :-WHERE it is proved to the satisfiction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit the Court shall order such agreement compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit whether or not the subject matter of the agreement compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit :provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at the Court shall decide the question but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question unless the Court for reasons to be recorded thinks fit to grant such adjournment. EXPLANATION-AN agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act 1872 (9 of 1872) shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. ( 12 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the principles underlying Order 23 Rule 3 would undoubtedly apply. It can very well be seen from the aforesaid provision - (I) that the Court has to satisfy itself about the lawful agreement or compromise in respect of subject matter. (ii) that the compromise is signed by the parties; and (iii)that the Court has to satisfy that an agreement or compromise is in respect of whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit. All the material ingredients are satisfied on plaint perusal of the impugned order and the award passed by the trial court. (ii) that the compromise is signed by the parties; and (iii)that the Court has to satisfy that an agreement or compromise is in respect of whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit. All the material ingredients are satisfied on plaint perusal of the impugned order and the award passed by the trial court. Therefore the last submission that the court has failed to satisfy itself about material ingredients of the agreement or compromise in respect of subject matter of the suit must also fail. ( 13 ) HAVING regard to the facts narrated hereinbefore and in light of the relevant principles of the Act as well as Civil Procedure Code this court has no hesitation in finding that the entire group of 24 petitions is without any substance and is required to be dismissed. Accordingly all the petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs. Interim relief shall stand vacated. Rule discharged. Office is directed to place certified copy of the common judgment in each of the petitions at the earliest. Petition Dismissed. .