JUDGMENT - BHAIRAVIA V.H., J.:—This appeal is brought by the appellants-original plaintiffs against the judgment and decree passed by the Extra Assistant Judge, Thane in Civil Appeal No. 310 of 1975, confirming the judgment and Decree passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kalyan dated 29th June, 1975, by his judgment and order dated 28th October, 1980. 2. Short facts of the case are that, the appellants-plaintiffs had filed a suit for possession of the property bearing Survey No. 88, Hissa No. 2, admeasuring 131/4 gunthas, situated within the local limits of Kalyan Municipal Council. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the suit property being agricultural land was given to the defendant No. 1 for cultivation. It is further alleged that without the permission of the plaintiffs, defendant No.1 parted some portion of the suit property with defendant No. 2. Thus, the defendant No. 2 occupied the suit property as a trespasser. It is to be noted here that though the suit property was originally agricultural land, situated within the local limits of Kalyan Municipal Council, did not remain agricultural land but converted into N.A. and it reveals from the record that respondent No. 2 has built up the house on this land. 3. It is the case of the appellants-plaintiffs in this appeal before the trial Court that pending the suit, the respondent-defendant No. 1 and plaintiff entered into compromise and filed a compromise purshis before the trial Court which is on record as Exhibit 81. It is submitted that by this purshis, the defendant No. 1 has cancelled the alleged agreement of sale between the plaintiffs and the defendant i.e. Exhibit 100 and the earnest money which was paid to defendant No.1 by the plaintiffs, returned to the plaintiffs by defendant No. 1. Thus, compromised terms were recorded by the learned trial Judge and the endorsement to that effect is at Exhibit 81. Despite that, the Learned trial Judge proceeded with the suit, recorded the evidence and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs, by his judgment and order dated 29th August, 1975. Appeal against the said judgment and order being Civil Appeal No. 310 of 1975 in the Court of Extra Assistant Judge, Thane came to be dismissed by order dated 28th October, 1980. Hence, this appeal. 4. The learned Counsel for the appellants Mr. Appeal against the said judgment and order being Civil Appeal No. 310 of 1975 in the Court of Extra Assistant Judge, Thane came to be dismissed by order dated 28th October, 1980. Hence, this appeal. 4. The learned Counsel for the appellants Mr. Y.V. Divekar has stated that there was a bearing in important question of law before this Court that under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code, the Court recorded the compromised terms required to pass the judicial order on the basis of, compromised purshis and that is binding to the parties. It has been contended by Mr. Divekar that the learned trial Judge instead of drawing decree on the basis of compromise purshis Exhibit 81 proceeded with the suit and decided the suit on merits. According to him, this is an illegal order. The Appellate Court has also committed the same error in confirming the judgment and order of the Learned trial Judge. Mr. Divekar has emphatically argued this point and in support of his arguments, he relied upon the provision under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. Order XXIII, Rule 3 reads as under :— 3. Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by the parties), or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same the subject-matter of the suit) : Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Mr. Mr. Divekar relied on the endorsement of the trial Court at Exhibit 81 purported to be recorded the compromised terms and submitted that once the Court satisfies on verifying the terms produced into writing in the compromise purshis by asking the parties to compromise and the compromise terms are recorded by the learned Judge, Court is required to pass judicial order and to draw the decree accordingly. He emphasized on the words “shall pass the decree in accordance with their writ”. There is therefore, no any dispute as regards the statutory provision under the Civil Procedure Code and the meaning thereby. Mr. Divekar has cited some authorities in support of his arguments. He relied on the observations rendered in (Bai Chanchal and others v. Syed Jalaluddin and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1081 and submitted that though the compromise between the plaintiffs and defendant No.1, the Court ought to have drawn the decree against defendant No. 1 on the basis of purshis. In the said judgment, it has been observed : “The third point raised by learned Counsel was that, since there was one single suit based on the lease of 1895 for ejectment of persons in possession, there could be only one single decree in that suit and the Court was incompetent to pass two separate decrees on 8th July, 1946 and 28th January, 1949. Counsel, in this connection, relied on the provisions of Rules 1 and 12 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure which relate to the pronouncement of judgment and the Court passing a decree in a suit. These Rules have really no relevance. On the other hand, Rule 3 of Order XXIII, Civil Procedure Code clearly envisages a decree being passed in respect of part of the subject-matter of the suit on a compromise, and Rule 6 of Order XII, Civil Procedure Code, permits the passing of a judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other questions. Thus, it is clear that, in the same suit, there can be more than one decree passed at different stages. In the present case, the first decree of 8th July, 1946 was based on a compromise between the plaintiffs and some of the defendants, while the second decree dated 28th January, 1949 decided the rights of the remaining defendants. Thus, it is clear that, in the same suit, there can be more than one decree passed at different stages. In the present case, the first decree of 8th July, 1946 was based on a compromise between the plaintiffs and some of the defendants, while the second decree dated 28th January, 1949 decided the rights of the remaining defendants. The two decrees were separate and independent and neither of them could be treated as a nullity.” Further, Mr. Divekar relied on the judgment rendered in (Maria Coleta Isabel Da Conceicao Rodrigues Cota and others v. Claudia Jose Circumcisse Rodrigues Cota and another)2, reported in 1991(3) Bom.C.R. 698 . In para 6, of the said judgment, it is held : “It was urged on behalf of the respondents that any objection, which is to be raised to the compromise, should be raised when the compromise is presented to the Court, before a decree is passed, and the objections should not be allowed to be raised after the decree, because there has to be some limitation of the time on the raising of such objections. Neither the text of Rule 3 of Order 23, nor the proviso, nor the explanation, put such a limitation, but obviously if any objection is to be raised, ordinarily it should be raised before the compromise is recorded, after complying substantially with the provisions of Rule 3. The requirement of the proviso is that the Court shall decide the question if it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that there was an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the object being that the Court should be satisfied that there has been a lawful adjustment of compromise.” 5. Though Mr. Divekar relied on this judgment in support of his arguments, virtually, it is contrary to the submission of Mr. Divekar. The view taken by the courts below in rejecting his objection against the proceedings of the suit is correct. 6. Though Mr. Divekar relied on this judgment in support of his arguments, virtually, it is contrary to the submission of Mr. Divekar. The view taken by the courts below in rejecting his objection against the proceedings of the suit is correct. 6. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the submission of the learned Counsel as regards the applicability of Order 23, Rule 3 is not sustainable for the simple reason that all the parties to the suit were not parties to that compromise as per the judgment rendered in (Harshadbhai Shah and another v. Rani Kamla Raje and others)3, reported in 1988 Mh.L.J 874 : Civil Procedure Code, Order 23, Rule 3.— Compromise unless signed by all parties cannot be acted upon. In view of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, a compromise petition must be signed by all the parties. A compromise petition cannot be acted upon unless and until it is signed by all the parties. 7. Admittedly, there are two defendants and the compromise purshis Exhibit 81 was signed only by the plaintiffs and defendant No.1. Further, the defendant No. 1 who is the signatory in the compromise purshis Exhibit 81, before the decree is passed, entered in the witness box and stated before the Court that the thumb impression on the compromise purshis was obtained by the plaintiffs by making misrepresentation without explaining the contents of the purshis and she was not made known about the true contents of that purshis and thus, the plaintiffs have committed fraud against her. 8. Not only that, the appellants-plaintiffs, did not object to this at the time of recording the evidence, but preferred to cross-examine her and allowed the suit to proceed. The conduct of the appellants-plaintiffs pending the suit is also not consistent with his grievance that once the compromise is recorded, judicial order must follow but if we look to the proceedings in the suit, the plaintiffs have allowed the suit to be proceeded further without objecting to the proceedings. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel Mr. Divekar is unsustainable on this count. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel Mr. Divekar is unsustainable on this count. In the case of (Ramchandra Mathuralal v. Kalusingh Nathraj)3, reported in A.I.R. 1961 M. P. 245, it has been held by the Court : “Civil Procedure Code, 1908, O. 23, R. 3—Compromise during pendency of suit—Plaintiff continuing to prosecute suit even after compromise—Plaintiff must be deemed to have repudiated it by his conduct and is not entitled at later stage to invoke it in his own favour. Once a compromise is arrived at during the pendency of a suit, the plaintiff should not proceed with the suit. He should ask the Court to record the compromise and satisfy it that the agreement is genuine. If he, however, changes his mind and the other party also acquiesces, the compromise is washed out, and the suit should proceed on merits. But he cannot later on, when his hopes do not materialise, come back to the compromise. His conduct amounts to a repudiation of the compromise. It is no less a repudiation because it is tacit and disentitles him at later stage to ask that the compromise should be recorded.” 9. In this appeal, the learned Counsel wants that a decree in terms of compromise purshis must be passed against respondent-defendant No.1 and the right of defendant No. 2 who has not signed the compromise purshis may be kept open for separate adjudication in the trial Court. I cannot accept this submission of the learned Counsel for two reasons. The compromise purshis Exhibit 81, no doubt is on record with the endorsement of the learned Judge but the respondent-defendant No. 1 has subsequently by her oral deposition before the trial Court stated that she was not made to understand the contents of the purshis and obtain her thumb mark under misrepresentation that the suit land will remain with her. Thus, she has declined to accept the compromise terms before the decree was passed. Further, the appellant-plaintiff has cross-examined defendant No.1 on this point shows that the compromise purshis Exhibit 81 was not acted upon. In view of this clear finding and evidence on record, the appellant-plaintiff is not entitled for reliefs under Order 23, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code. Further, the appellant-plaintiff has cross-examined defendant No.1 on this point shows that the compromise purshis Exhibit 81 was not acted upon. In view of this clear finding and evidence on record, the appellant-plaintiff is not entitled for reliefs under Order 23, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code. Mere endorsement of the learned Judge on compromise purshis would not amount to “recorded the compromise purshis” within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 3 and would not follow the judicial order on that basis. However I am of the opinion that once the compromise purshis is filed in proceeding and the Court satisfied with the terms enumerated in the purshis by the personal verification in the presence of the parties-signatories, should not allow to misuse the process of the Court by turning hostile to it after some time for one or the other reasons; but in the instant case, the compromise was not perfect because the defendant No. 2 who was the interested and affected party, had not signed it and in view of the aforesaid judgment and ruling, no decree could be passed on the basis of such incomplete compromise. Therefore, the arguments and submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellants are unsustainable and therefore, rejected. 10. Having regard to the merits of the case, there is concurrent finding of the facts by both the Courts below. As regards the agreement of sale Exhibit 100, both the Courts below have held that there was a valid agreement of sale between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 and therefore, defendant No. 1 who inducted defendant No. 2 into the suit property cannot be held to be the trespasser. The main objection of the appellants-plaintiffs is against defendant No. 2 and the Issue No.1 was framed in that regard also. There is a clear finding of both the courts below that the appellants-plaintiffs have failed to give sufficient description of the portion alleged to have been occupied by defendant No. 2 as a trespasser. He is required to prove that under the provision of Order 6, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code and therefore, it is held by both the courts that defendant No. 1 was in possession of the suit property under the agreement of sale and the said agreement of sale Exhibit 100 held to be valid agreement. He is required to prove that under the provision of Order 6, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code and therefore, it is held by both the courts that defendant No. 1 was in possession of the suit property under the agreement of sale and the said agreement of sale Exhibit 100 held to be valid agreement. The subsequent induction of defendant No. 2 could not be held as trespasser. In the result, appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----