JUDGMENT 1. This is a contempt petition under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The complaint is that there is a violation of the order dated 19-8-1992 passed by a Division Bench of his Court in writ petition No. 14364 of 1992 (Smt. Abha Rani Gupta v. State of U. P., and others by which the writ petition was finally disposed of with certain directions. The relevant part of that order is reproduced below :- "In the interest of justice we direct the opposite party no. 3 to dispose of the said representation (27-6-92) within one month from the date of filing a certified copy of this order along with a copy of the representation already filed before him. In case the Chief Development Officer rejects the representation, he will give a speaking order." 2. To appreciate the background and the circumstances in which the aforesaid directions came to be made, it is necessary to set out few facts. The applicant Smt. Abha Rani Gupta hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner 2) was appointed in December, 1978 at the post of Gram Vikas Adhikari. The appointment letter, it is stated, was issued by Zila Vikas Adhikari, Banda. Subsequently, it appears that the petitioner was transferred to District Allahabad in the year 1982 and in due course, she was posted as Gram Vikas Adhikari at Block Shankergarh, Allahabad, vide appointment letter dated 11-2-1992. The case of the petitioner is that she received another order No. 3965 dated 13-5-1992 by which she was directed to report in the office of opposite party no. 4 but she was not permitted to join there nor was she allowed to put her signature on the attendance register. It is alleged that the petitioner gave an application dated 18 -5-1992 in the office of opposite party no. 3 to the effect that she was not being permitted to make her signatures and directions be issued to opposite party no. 4 to strictly comply with the directions given in the letter dated 11-2 1992. A number of other communications are referred to in the Contempt Petition which are said to have been addressed to the opposite parties, by the petitioner. However, as the petitioner was not being paid her due salary, she made a representation dated 27-6-1992. 4 to strictly comply with the directions given in the letter dated 11-2 1992. A number of other communications are referred to in the Contempt Petition which are said to have been addressed to the opposite parties, by the petitioner. However, as the petitioner was not being paid her due salary, she made a representation dated 27-6-1992. It is in this background that this Court gave the directions for disposal of the representation filed by the petitioner by order dated 19-8-1992. Out of the four persons arrayed as opposite parties in this petition, by an order dated 23-1-1993 notice was issued against opposite party no.3, only, namely. Smt. Radhe Chauhan, Chief Development Officer, Allahabad. The charge against her is that despite production of a certified copy of the order dated 19-8-1992 the representation of the petitioner had not been decided and accordingly, she is guilty of having wilfully flouted the order passed by this Court for which she is liable to be punished. In the defence filed by opposite party no. 3 in the form of counter affidavit, the charge of violating the order of this Court has been denied. Various factual allegations set out in the Contempt petition pertaining to the posting of the petitioner at Shankergarh etc. have also been controverted and the assertions in the counter affidavit are at variance from those contained In the Contempt petition. According to the counter affidavit the petitioner was transferred from Shankergarh by order dated 22-5-1992 but she did not abide by that order. She was again transferred from Shankergarh to Manda but that order also remained uncomplied. The petitioner has not been attending her duties since after May, 1992 and, therefore, she was not entitled to any salary for the period subsequent to 21-5-1992. However, she had been paid her salary up to that date. 3. As the controversy in this petition is limited to the question whether the concerned opposite party had carried out the directions contained in the order dated 19-8 1992 or not, or otherwise whether she is liable to any action for contempt, it is not necessary to go into further details, allegations and counter allegations concerning the transfer and alleged absence of the petitioner from her duties. 4. 4. The defence taken in paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit is that the order of this Court dated 19- 8-1992 has since been complied with pending these proceedings and the representation of the petitioner dated 27-6-1992 stands decided by an order dated 2-2-1993 by this Chief Development Officer. Allahabad a copy of which has been filed as Annexure CA-7 to the counter affidavit. An explanation for the delay in carrying out the directions of this Court has also been furnished to which a reference shall be made hereinafter. We are not concerned in these proceedings with the merits of the decision taken in the order dated 2-2-1993 by which the representation was decided. Suffice it to say that by the said order the representation was rejected. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order of this Court has not been complied with in terms. The representation has been rejected without passing a speaking order and this is clear violation of the directions contained in the order dated 19-8-1992. Secondly, the representation had not been decided within the period of one month of production of a certified copy of the order of this Court. Consequently, the learned counsel contends, that the contemner cannot be exonerated from the charge of contempt asserted in this petition. 5. These submissions have been considered carefully but none of them has any merit. It is incorrect to contend that the order dated 2-2-1993 by which the representation was rejected, is not a speaking order. On the contrary, it sets out the entire case of the petitioner and the reason why she was not found entitled to the salary claimed by her. The first submission is, accordingly, rejected. 6. Coming to the second contention, it is true that the representation was not decided within the period stipulated in the order dated 19-8-1992 passed by this Court, but the delay is not without a cause and an acceptable explanation has been given. It is necessary to emphasize that all authorities civil and judicial and such other persons to whom directions are issued by the Court, are obliged to comply with the orders and they should exercise utmost vigilance in compliance of the Court's order. It is necessary to emphasize that all authorities civil and judicial and such other persons to whom directions are issued by the Court, are obliged to comply with the orders and they should exercise utmost vigilance in compliance of the Court's order. The fact that the compliance of the order is made after the issuance of the contempt notice may not by itself afford any defence or sufficient reason in absence of extenuating circumstances to absolve the contemner for his lapse of non-compliance of the order within the period specified by the Court. This Court has noticed in a number of cases a growing tendency, that public authorities in particular, who have been directed to do or not; to do a particular thing within a specified time, have been taking such orders lightly. In a half hearted fashion. Such an attitude must be depricated. The "Contempt of Court' means an act or omission calculated to interfere in due administration of public justice. Where a case of wilful disobedience is made out, this Court will not hesitate to punish the delinquent officer/authority and no lenience in the Court's attitude should be expected as a matter of course merely on the ground that the order has been complied with though belatedly. Because of the delay in implementing the orders of this Court, very often the public are put to great injury and hardship and they are compelled to resort to this Court and initiate proceedings by way of contempt. In M. L. Sachdev v. Union of India, 1991 (1) CrLJ 92, the Supreme Court pointed out that In enforcing the compliance of orders passed by the Court and in punishing for lapses in the matter of compliance by Invoking the power of contempt the Court seeks only to ensure that the majesty of the Court may not be lowered and the functional utility of the constitutional edifice may not be rendered ineffective, These observations were made where directions given in an order passed by the Supreme Court had not been carried out within the time stipulated in the order. The Supreme Court also observed : "This Court expects Union of India to exhibit utmost ideal conduct for others to emulate." Under section 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act 'Civil Contempt' is defined inter alia to mean a wilful disobedience. The Supreme Court also observed : "This Court expects Union of India to exhibit utmost ideal conduct for others to emulate." Under section 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act 'Civil Contempt' is defined inter alia to mean a wilful disobedience. Luckily, in the present case there is nothing on record which may go to show that the opposite party has deliberately and wilfully not carried out the directions within the time as directed in the order dated 19-8-1992. The circumstances narrated in the order deciding the representation and the averments contained in the counter affidavit go to show that the petitioner herself was to be blamed for the delay in disposal of her representation. The contemner in her anxiety to abide by the principles of natural justice, gave a notice to the petitioner on 7-10-1992 to furnish her reply before a decision was taken on her representation. The reply was furnished on 20-10-1992 which was found to be incomplete and, hence, a further notice was issued to the petitioner which she did not reply. The order dated 2-2-1993 narrates that the petitioner had come to the office for a different reason and when the second notice sent to her was read out to her at her instance, she refused to accept that notice, leaving no option to the opposite party except to decide the representation on whatever material was available on record. In these circumstances, the delay if any cannot be construed as deliberate one nor could it be held that there was any wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Count on the part of the opposite party no. 3. The petition is devoid of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. Notice issued to the opposite party no. 3 is hereby discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.