JUDGMENT Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. : On a plain reading of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution it appear" that a Writ can be issued against a Government Authority if its seat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or the cause of action has arisen wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The introduction of the situs theory and the part of cause of action in the main body of the Article cannot in any way be stated to be a restriction on to the user of jurisdiction. As regards the situs theory, no difficulty is experienced in the matter of interpretation by reason of the express language of the Article, viz., "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction." : in so far as the meaning to be attributed to the expression "cause of action", a long catena of judicial pronouncements set forth such a meaning to the effect that the expression means "the bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the court". 2. It is, however, worthwhile to note that the Supreme Court in its recent pronouncement in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Commission, (1994) 4 SCC 711 has had the occasion to examine the expression once again and in that context the Supreme Court observed as follows : "5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause notwithstanding anything in Article 32 - and provides that every High Court. shall have power 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, 'within those territories' directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court at Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arised within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the Writ petition. 6. It is well settled that the expression 'cause of action' means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entile him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour vs. Pratab Singh, ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98 : 15 IA 156, Lord Watson said: :-_ '. . . . . the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour'. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even On the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court." 3. This recapitulation has been necessitated by reason of specific submission of the appellant that the Trial Judge ought not to have entertained this writ application by reason of the fact that neither the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court nor the party-respondents are located within the territorial limits of this High Court and it is on this backdrop, it was contended, that the Situs Theory has been given a complete go by which is not permissible in terms of the provision of the Article 226 which in turn has conferred jurisdiction on to this High Court to issue appropriate writ or writs. 4. At this juncture, however, certain factual details ought to be noted. 5. In order to meet the growing demand of power in the capital region of Delhi, Delhi Electricity Supply undertaking (DESU), decided to erect a 400 KY. Double Circuit Line from Mandaula to Ballabgarh via Bawana and Bamnauli. By reason of such a decision the National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPC), being the consultant body of the Delhi Ring Main System, prepared bid documents and invited tenders for procuring spacer and spacer dampers. Be it recorded here, that not only the procurement was for Delhi Region but even the deliberations in regard thereto did take place at Delhi beyond the territorial limits of this court. Be it recorded here, that not only the procurement was for Delhi Region but even the deliberations in regard thereto did take place at Delhi beyond the territorial limits of this court. The entire set of documents which are lying in Delhi and even the tender notice and the tender forms were issued from Delhi. Needless to record here further that the tenders were to be submitted to Delhi Electricity Supply undertaking at Delhi. 6. As it appears from records only two parties did submit their tenders for the above work, viz., the writ petitioner and the appellant before this court. Without going into the merits, however, the factual score depict further that the NTPC duly recommended the award of the work in favour of the appellant. herein. As against such a decision, the writ petitioner moved this court under Article 226 of the Constitution and Shyamal Kumar Sen, J. on 14th October, 1993 passed an ad-interim order to the effect that the contract, pursuant to invitation to bid as advertised in the newspapers shall not be tinalised till 16th November, 1993. The writ petitioners were given liberty to apply for extension of the interim order on the returnable date. Subsequently, the interim order was extended from time to time and the matter was finally decided by the learned Judge on 3rd December, 1993 by a detail judgment. The operative portion of which reads as follows : "The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. The petitioner accordingly succeeds in this writ petition. Under those circumstances, there will be an order directing that the concerned Authorities should execute a formal contract with the petitioner within six weeks from date. In consideration of the Award of the said contract, (Collaboration Agreement as per proforma of) the Joint Deed of Undertaking forming part of the condition of the Tender should be executed by the petitioner and the Collaborator within four weeks thereafter. In default of furnishing the Joint Deed of Undertaking (Collaboration Agreement) within the period stipulated aforesaid, the contract to be so executed, will stand cancelled forthwith. Stay prayed for by Mrs. Bhattacharya is refused. All parties concerned are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of the judgment on the usual undertaking." 7. In default of furnishing the Joint Deed of Undertaking (Collaboration Agreement) within the period stipulated aforesaid, the contract to be so executed, will stand cancelled forthwith. Stay prayed for by Mrs. Bhattacharya is refused. All parties concerned are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of the judgment on the usual undertaking." 7. It is against this order the present appeal has been filed by the original respondent no.3 inter alia, contending that since no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court and since the authority is located outside the jurisdiction of this court, the assumption of jurisdiction by the learned Trial Judge was entirely erroneous. Be it recorded here, that the appeal was moved with a prayer for condonation of delay by reason of expiry of the period as allowed under the law. Be it further recorded that the appeal was moved upon notice to the writ petitioner and on 18th January, 1994 this court passed an order recording that by reason of sufficient grounds existing for condonation of delay, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. This court further ordered that there will not be any ad-interim order as such, excepting, however, that the steps taken in the matter shall abide by the result of the application and this court further directed filing of Affidavits in the matter. Upon completion of affidavits, however, when the stay application came up for final hearing Mr. Sarkar, appearing in support of the appeal, raised the issue of jurisdiction of this court and Mr. Chatterjee, appearing for the writ petitioner, however, prayed that the order for condonation of delay ought to be considered by this court since no ground whatsoever exists for condonation of such delay. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the explanations are totally unsatisfactory and as a matter of fact, Mr. Chatterjee contended that the incorrectness of the case made out by the appellant for condonation is written large on the face of the records. This court, however, on 9th February, 1994 directed that since an order has already been passed in regard to the condonation of delay in the fitness of things, a formal application for reconsideration ought to be filed before the court and the court shall deal with the same as and when such an application is filed. On the prayer of Mr. On the prayer of Mr. Sarkar, however, Delhi Electricity Supply undertaking was directed to maintain status quo on that date. 8. Be it recorded here further that in terms of the leave granted an application for recalling of the order for condonation of delay was filed before this court subsequently with a memorandum' of review. This court thereafter directed the parties to file respective affidavits so far as the review application is concerned and heard the matter along with the issue of jurisdiction. It is, therefore, only proper for this court to deal with the application for recalling of the order for condonation of delay as also to deal with the issue of jurisdiction. 9. On the factual backdrop as narrated above, we do not, however, see any reason to alter the decision in so far as the order as, passed for condonation of delay. The order was passed in the presence of the Advocates of the parties and there was no whisper of challenge and it is only when the issue of jurisdiction came up before the court that this move was initiated by way of application for review with a memorandum for review. There might be certain factual discrepancies but the discrepancies cannot as such, be treated to be of such an importance, so as to warrant a change in the decision as regards the condonation of delay is concerned. The fact remains however, that at the time of hearing the appellant petitioner was not present before the learned Judge and it is this absence which has been very strongly criticised by Mr. Chatterjee to the effect that the appellant was standing on the fence and by reason of rejection of contention of Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking before the court, the appellant moved this court. We are however, unable to record our concurrence with such a submission. Admittedly, there is affection of right so far as the appellant is concerned, therefore, in the event of there being any knowledge direct or otherwise the appellant would have to be given an opportunity before the Court without any hesitation whatsoever and as such some credence ought to be given to the statements of the petitioner as regards the condonation of delay. We do not see any reason in the factual matrix of the situation to alter our decision and in the premises the application for recalling of the order along with the memorandum of review against the order of condonation of delay fails and the same is dismissed. 10. Turning attention on to the other aspect of the matter viz. the issue of jurisdiction of this court, the principal contention of Mr. Chatterjee is that there was a conscious application of mind by the learned Trial Judge and it ought not to be easily interfered with. In any event, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that Situs Theory does not have any manner of application in the facts of the matter under consideration since the cause of action accrued at pre-amendment stage of the Constitution. Mr. Chatterjee relied on section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure as also sections 16, 17, 18 and 19 of Code and submitted that the issue of jurisdiction ought to be tried along with the main appeal since the statement in the petition ought to be taken as correct in order to succeed on a preliminary question as regards the issue of jurisdiction. It was contended that the publication was effected at Calcutta and the threat of conferment of benefit to the appellant was also administered at Calcutta by reason of the receipt of the letter from the Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking. In any event, it was contended that the order has already been implemented and it has now enured to the benefit of the respondent herein and as such, the court of Appeal ought not to give contra-finding as regards the issue of jurisdiction. 11. Turning attention on the last contention, we are unable to record our concurrence with the submission of Mr. Chatterjee more so, by reason of the specific order of the Appellate Court as noted above, as also the subsequent order dated 9th February, 1994. The other contention of Mr. Chatterjee with regard to conscious application of mind by the learned Trial Judge as regards the issue of jurisdiction also cannot be accepted by reason of the fact that the Appellate Court is within its rights, in our view, to consider the issue afresh otherwise the functioning of the Appellate Court would be rendered completely nugatory which situation, in our view, cannot be conceived. The appeal preferred against the order of the learned Trial Judge and obviously there would be conscious application of mind, be in regard to the issue of jurisdiction or on merits but that by itself would not preclude the Appellate Court to interfere or intervene at the earliest possible stage. 12. Turning attention on to the main thrust of challenge against the order of the learned Trial Judge on the basis of Situs Theory in our view, there is sufficient justification in the strong criticism of Mr. Sarkar in regard to the assumption of jurisdiction by this court in the factual backdrop as noted above. If we analyse the factual aspect in slightly more greater detail here at this juncture it is apparent that the NTPC has formulated a policy for Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking and tender notice was published in Delhi Formulation of Policy was at Delhi: The rejection of offer and acceptance of the offer did take place at Delhi itself. Merely because of the fact that some communication was received at Calcutta, in my view, will not confer jurisdiction on this court. This letter, in any event, was posted at Delhi and if an analogy is drawn as regards the formation of contract. Mr. Chatterjee's contention can not be accepted, that the same would give rise to a cause-of-action authorising him to initiate proceedings in this court. The observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwandas Goverdhandcm Kedia vs. M / s. Girdharlal Parshottamdcm & Co. & Ors. ( AIR 1966 SC 543 ) in this context, lends assistance to the view expressed above. 13. The main thrust of challenge in the writ petition is alleged arbitrary exercise of power in so far as Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking and NTPC are concerned - but that exercise of power also did take place at Delhi. Would this factual backdrop entitle a party to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court at Calcutta - In my view, the answer cannot but be in tl1e negative. 14. In the premises this appeal succeeds on the ground of jurisdiction. The order of the learned Trial Judge is set aside by reason of lack of jurisdiction to entertain, try and determine the writ petition in so far as this High Court is concerned. The writ petition is also dismissed on the self-same ground. 14. In the premises this appeal succeeds on the ground of jurisdiction. The order of the learned Trial Judge is set aside by reason of lack of jurisdiction to entertain, try and determine the writ petition in so far as this High Court is concerned. The writ petition is also dismissed on the self-same ground. Be it recorded here that we have not gone into the merits of the matter and this order of dismissal is passed only on the ground of jurisdiction. The writ petitioner however would be at liberty to present the petition before the appropriate forum if they are so advised. 15. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 16. Bijitendra Mohan Mitra, J. : I agree. Appeal allowed.