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Allahabad High Court · body

1994 DIGILAW 316 (ALL)

Suraj Prakash Bhatia v. State of U. P.

1994-04-07

A.P.MISRA, M.P.KENIA

body1994
JUDGMENT 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. Since the counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged, in view of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, the present petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. The petitioner seeks mandamus directing the respondents to pay salary and other benefits to the petitioner since 19th of May 1988, and give him charge on the post of medical officer. 3. The petitioner's case is that some vacancies for the post of medical officers in the health department were advertised through U. P. Public Service Commission. Allahabad, for which examination was conducted, in which the petitioner was selected and was declared, accordingly, when the result was published by the Public Service (Commission, which is Annexure-1 to the petition. On the 8th of April, 1988, a letter of appointment was issued to the petitioner appointing him in the district Nainital on the post of medical officer. On the 19th of May, 1988, the Chief Medical Officer, Nainital, directed the petitioner to join at the Primary Health Centre, Okhlkanda, in the same district (Annexure-2 to the writ petition). In pursuance of the said letter, petitioner reported on 19th of May, 1988, before the Medical Officer Incharge, Primary Health Centre, Okhalkanda, with a letter for joining, but in spite of the said letter being received, the petitioner was not given charge. Therefore, the petitioner made several representations for not appointing the petitioner in spite of letter having been issued earlier. It is significant that thereafter the Director (Administration), respondent no. 2, vide letter dated the 25th of July, 1990, directed the Chief Medical Officer, Nainital, to give charge to the petitioner latest by the 30th of July, 1990. On the 28th of Sept. 1990, the petitioner sent a reminder again to the Health Secretary, respondent no. 3, about charge not being given. Thereafter the petitioner was informed by the Chief Medical Officer that the matter has been referred to the Director General at Lucknow. It is not necessary to refer the subsequent various letters, which were sent by the petitioner for permitting the petitioner to join, but he was not permitted to do the same. It is for this reason the petitioner has filed the present petition when no relief is granted in spite of the selection to the said post for the aforesaid direction. 4. It is for this reason the petitioner has filed the present petition when no relief is granted in spite of the selection to the said post for the aforesaid direction. 4. It is averred that after filing of the counter affidavit the petitioner having come to know that an order has been passed by respondents on the 21st of March, 1991, the petitioner amended the petition by adding relief of quashing this order and adding grounds below, which was allowed by means of a separate order. The respondents have not annexed the order dated the 21st of March, 1991, along, with the counter affidavit, though it has been averred in the counter affidavit itself. We find this order has been annexed as annexure along with an affidavit filed by the petitioner while filing his application dated the 21st of December, 1993. The short controversy, which has been raised before this court is whether the respondents' action not appointing the petitioner, in spite of his being selected by Public Services Commission on the facts and circumstances of the case was justified or not. 5. After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the various affidavits we find two contradictory stands taken by the respondents. On the one hand, the stand is that the petitioner did not join and did not report for joining, hence he could not be absorbed on the post for which he was selected, but in the order dated 21-3-1991 as aforesaid, stand of the respondent is that since the second list has been Issued by the Public Service Commission and on its being issued, the first list automatically falls hence the petitioner could not be absorbed. From the narration of the facts and after considering the facts stated in the counter affidavit the stand of the respondents that the petitioner did not report does not stand to reason, as we find, repeatedly not only the petitioner reporting after passing of the order by the authority concerned yet he Could not be given charge for one reason or the other. In fact, when charge was not given to the petitioner, the petitioner approached the Director General (Health) in this regard. In paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit the stand taken is that even though the order issued by respondent no. In fact, when charge was not given to the petitioner, the petitioner approached the Director General (Health) in this regard. In paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit the stand taken is that even though the order issued by respondent no. 2, namely-Director Administration on 25th of July, 1990 for giving charge to the petitioner by the 30th of July, 1990, but since the petitioner did not contact the Chief Medical Officer, hence charge could not be given. It is significant that it has been stated in paragraph 8 of the rejoinder affidavit controverting the facts stated in paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit that the said letter dated 25th of July, 1990, copy of which was also sent to the petitioner, was only delivered on the 19th of August, 1990, hence the question of petitioner joining before that could not arise. On the other hand, there is nothing in the counter affidavit to show that after receipt of the letter, any communication was sent to the petitioner asking him to come and join on the said post. The stand of the petitioner, as also stated in paragraph 8 of the rejoinder affidavit, is that he also wrote a letter to the Chief Medical Officer on the 2nd of August, 1990, requesting him to arrange for taking charge but no communication was sent. On this small pretext not to permit the petitioner to take over charge for which he was appointed as far back as in the year 1988 is very unfortunate specifically where the petitioner is running from pillar to post requesting him to join. Thus the stand taken in the counter affidavit cannot be accepted. Even in the alternative defeating claim of petitioner that he did not come when petitioner did come to join on 7th August, 1990 that is to say seven days after the date mentioned in the aforesaid Director's letter for allowing the petitioner to join by 30th July, 1990. This date was outer date for respondent not the last date to the petitioner to join. It is very unfortunate that such stand is taken by the respondent to defeat the right of the petitioner who is duly selected. Next, this stand is in contradiction of the letter issued by the respondent no. 1 on 21st of March, 1991. This date was outer date for respondent not the last date to the petitioner to join. It is very unfortunate that such stand is taken by the respondent to defeat the right of the petitioner who is duly selected. Next, this stand is in contradiction of the letter issued by the respondent no. 1 on 21st of March, 1991. By this, right of the petitioner is defeated as he did not join and now second selection list is out. Thus the first list falls. This stand of the respondent is also unsustainable. As we have already held above, it is not that the petitioner did not join but it is the respondent who did not permit him to join As, on the facts, we have found the cancellation of his appointment on this ground is unsustainable, we also hold that the stand of the respondents that on the issue of the second selection list, the first list automatically falls would not be applicable to a case wherein an appointed person of the first selection was not permitted to join. Issuance of second list cannot defeat such class of cases. The first list would continue to be valid till the incumbents selected are not absorbed on the vacancies or posts for which selection was made. Delay in filling vacancies by the respondents cannot defeat a selected candidates right. Of course, after issuance of second selection list for vacancies or posts for which second selection was made the first list falls. If the vacancy did exist during that period and the respondents did not make any appointment or absorption on the said post even if the second list is published and if some person in the first list is still not absorbed the first list could not come to an end. This stand of the respondent is also unsustainable. 6. Accordingly, we quash the order dated the 21st of March, 1991, pissed by the Deputy Secretary cancelling the appointment of the petitioner and we direct the respondents to appoint the petitioner forthwith. As the petitioner was not permitted to join the services on the post on which he was selected in the year 1988, he incurred a heavy loss not only of the salary but future prospects, in view of this we award compensatory costs on respondent no. As the petitioner was not permitted to join the services on the post on which he was selected in the year 1988, he incurred a heavy loss not only of the salary but future prospects, in view of this we award compensatory costs on respondent no. 1 to the tune of rupees ten thousand, which may be paid within three months of filing a certified copy of this order by the petitioner before the said respondent. Accordingly, the petition is allowed with costs. Petition allowed.