JUDGMENT : A.B. Srivastava, J. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 16-1-1992 of the XIIIth Addl. District Judge Kanpur Nagar in appeal u/s 22 of Act 13 of 1972 whereby he allowed the application of the landlords, Respondent Nos. 1 to 5, for release of accommodation u/s 21(1)(a) of Act 13 of 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The application u/s 21(1)(a) for release was filed by the Respondent landlords on the ground that they purchased house No. 119/73 Jawahar Nagar by sale deed date 20-3-1986 for their personal use and occupation for residence. Prior to it they resided in house No. 87/6E Hiraganj, Kanpur, as tenant. The Petitioner is a tenant of a portion consisting of one room and Chhajja on the ground floor with combined latrine and bath. The family of the landlords consist of sixteen persons named in the petition, whereas they are in occupation of two rooms along with kitchen etc. on the second floor, and one room on the ground floor The family consists of four married couple and some others of marriageable age, besides widowed mother and school going children. The accommodation aforesaid thus is to tally inadequate to their requirements. The family of the tenant consists of six persons including four minor children. The Respondents have a bonafide requirement of the portion in tenancy of the Petitioner, for their personal occupation. 3. The release application was contested by the Petitioner tenant inter alia on the ground that, no notice as required under first proviso to Section 21 of the Act has been served. The landlords have got three rooms on the ground floor, one on the first floor, and another room and Verandah on the second floor. They have also converted one Verandah into room. One room occupied by another tenant Deshraj Singh has also been vacated by him. The Respondents have also allowed three rooms in this house to be occupied by their near relation Jagdish Prasad as licencee. Accordingly landlord's need for additional accommodation is neither bonafide nor genuine. 4. In the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority affidavits in support of their respective contentions were filed by both the sides. A Commissioner was also appointed to make local inspection who submitted his report dated 16-7-1990. 5. Accordingly landlord's need for additional accommodation is neither bonafide nor genuine. 4. In the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority affidavits in support of their respective contentions were filed by both the sides. A Commissioner was also appointed to make local inspection who submitted his report dated 16-7-1990. 5. The Prescribed Authority by its order dated 6-9-1991 rejected the application for release on the ground that notice under the proviso Ist to Section 21 is not proved to have been served. In appeal however, the learned appellate authority reversing the said finding held that notice was served by refusal, the landlords and their family members bonafide require the accommodation in question for their occupation, and greater hardship will be caused to them If the release is refused to than to the Petitioner tenant if the same is allowed. He accordingly allowed the prayer for release. 6. Since affidavits have been exchanged between the parties, the petition is being disposed of finally according to the rules of court. Learned Counsel for both the sides have been heard and the material on record perused. 7. Taking up the first the question of service of notice under the first proviso to Section 21 of the Act, it would be found that according to the Respondent landlords they sent required notice by registered post which was received back from the post office with endorsement of refusal. The receipt regarding despatch of the registered cover containing notice, as well as the cover received back from the post office, was filed on the record of the Prescribed Authority. Postal endorsement on the registered cover was to the effect that, despite repeated Information neither addressee was met nor anyone there, disclosed where he could be met, it appeared that the addressee was avoiding to receive the registered cover. It is on the basis of this endorsement that the learned appellate authority held that the notice was presumed to be served by refusal. The contention on behalf of the Petitioner that in view of the contents of the endorsement made by the postmen, refusal of the notice could not be inferred does not appear correct. It is not the case of the Petitioner that he was not residing, or was even temporarily absent from his address of the premises in question, during the period the notice was taken by the postman for service, and attempted to be served. It is not the case of the Petitioner that he was not residing, or was even temporarily absent from his address of the premises in question, during the period the notice was taken by the postman for service, and attempted to be served. In Madan and Co. v. Wazir Chand AIR 1989 SC 63) the Supreme Court while interpretation a provision relating to service of notice in Section 11 of the J. & K. House and Shops Rent Control Act interpreted that the word 'served' is to be read as sent by post correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word 'receipt' as tender of the letter by the postman at the address mentioned in the letter. 8. On behalf of the Petitioner reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Ram Nakshatra Mishra v. Girdhar Das Kashya 1979 (U.P.) RCC 5 in support of his contention that the presumption of service is a reputable one. However, as stated above in this case besides bald denial there is no material to support the said plea, 9. Recently in Keshav v. IVth Addl. District Judge Budaun 1994 (1) ARC 80 this Court relying on the law laid down on the subject by the Supreme Court has held that mere denial of receipt of notice sent by registered post at correct address is not enough for rebuttal of presumption of its duo service. 10. In view of the above legal and factual position, there is no substance in the contention that the learned appellate court was not justified in raising the presumption that notice to have been served by refusal. 11. The next contention advanced by Shri S.M. Dayal on behalf of the Petitioner is that the appellate court instead of deciding the question of bonafide requirement and comparative hardship should have remanded the case to the prescribed authority for the purpose. The contention again is not sustainable in view of the fact the appellate authority in an appeal u/s 22 of the Act has all powers of the Prescribed Authority, of appraisal of evidence to come to its conclusion, on questions of fact or law, more-so when the entire evidence was available on the record. 12. The contention again is not sustainable in view of the fact the appellate authority in an appeal u/s 22 of the Act has all powers of the Prescribed Authority, of appraisal of evidence to come to its conclusion, on questions of fact or law, more-so when the entire evidence was available on the record. 12. Now taking up the question of bonafide requirement of the landlords it would be seen that the learned appellate court has found on the basis material on record that total number of rooms, including the portion which has since been vacated by the licence Jagdish Prasad, in the occupation of the family of the landlords consisting of sixteen persons, is six. The fact is also confirmed by the Commissioner's report giving details of the accommodation in the building in question. It has also been found that the family of the landlords consisted of five married couple besides a good number of children under education. For a family of this size, consisting of grown up and growing children, including married couple, obviously a six rooms accommodation cannot be said to be adequate* and their requirement of the portion in the tenancy of the Petitioner is obviously pressing and genuine. No exception can be taken to the findings recorded by the learned appellate court in this regard also. 13. On the question of comparative hardship also it would be found that the same was duly considered by the learned appellate court which has also taken into consideration the fact that the Petitioner-tenant has at no stage made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation. As already said the above accommodation in the possession of the landlord and the family being quite insufficient for their and other family member's requirements, the refusal of release will cause greater hardship to them, than to the tenant if release is allowed. 14. For all above reasons, the impugned judgment and order of the learned Additional District Judge in allowing the application for release does not suffer from any error of law, or factual infirmity. This writ petition has no merits. 15. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The interim order is withdrawn. However, the Petitioner is allowed two moths time to vacate. There shall be no order as to costs.