SK. Taslim v. State of Bihar — 1994 DIGILAW 320 (PAT)

JUDGMENT Judgment delivered by B.L. Yadav. What is the scope of enquiry by the State Government or the Collector in an application under Section 45B of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fxation of Ceiling Area land Acquisition of Surplus land) Act. 1961, (for short the Act) and what does expression if it thinks fit under Section 45B of the Act, cannot and when can this court grant interim stay in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly when the interim stay is in respect of the land for which proceedings are pending at the initiative of the vendees under Section 45B of the Act are the short questions for determination in this writ petition filed by the vendees, the petitioners, seeking the relief for issuance of a writ of mandamus, directing respondent no.2 Collector. Purnia to dispose of the application of the petitioners under Section 45B of the Act. and to exclude the plots of land purchased by the petitioners by the sale deeds dated 23rd June, 1973 8th Sept. 1979 4th April, 19763 and 22nd of June 1973 from the operation of the ceiling proceedings and not to dispossess the petitioners from the plots in dispute till their application before the collector of the state Government under Section 45B of the Act is disposed of. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the proceedings under the said Act were initiated and Ashok Kumar Mandal, Kaushik Mandal and Gautam Mandal including their father and land holder filed objection under Section 10(2) of the said Act with the avernment that their plots including land in dispute need not declared surplus in as much as they did not hold in excess of the ceiling area, as indicated under Section 4 of the Act. The land holders led evidence to prove their case but ultimately it was held that the land holders had surplus land to the extent of 281 acres and odd as it is clear from the notification under section 15(1) of the Act published on 7.10.1993 (Vide Annexure-2 to the writ petition). As the proceedings under Section 10 of the Act were pending, the sale deeds in favour of the petitioner (Vide ann. 1) were executed as is obvious from the date of the sale deeds, prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 15 of the Act. 3. As the proceedings under Section 10 of the Act were pending, the sale deeds in favour of the petitioner (Vide ann. 1) were executed as is obvious from the date of the sale deeds, prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 15 of the Act. 3. The petitioner have now filed an application under Section 45B of the Act before the State Government or the Collector indicating that they are vendees under the different sale deeds and had no opportunity to contest the proceedings which were in progress under Section 10(2) of the Act. The prayer before the Collector is that the proceedings which had been concluded and in respect of which the notification under Section 15 of the Act had been issued be reopened and they be afforded an opportunity to contest the matter, as after the sale deeds in their favour they stepped in the shoes of the land holders. These proceedings are still pending and have not been decided one way of the other. During the pendency of those proceeding they have filed the present petition before this Court under Art, 226 of the constitution, seeking relief as indicated above in paragraph 1 of the writ petition to the effect that the collector be directed by a writ of mandamus to dispose of their application in respect of their claim under Sec. 45B of the Act. by re-opening the matter and the land purchased by them be declared to be exempted from ceiling proceeding and further by an ad interim mandamus respondents by directed not to dispossess them from the land purchased by them, during the pendency of the proceeding. 4. Mr. Arun Prasad Ambastha, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners had not been afforded any opportunity to contest the proceedings under Section 10(2) of the Act. 4. Mr. Arun Prasad Ambastha, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners had not been afforded any opportunity to contest the proceedings under Section 10(2) of the Act. Hence they be afforded an opportunity of hearing and the collector be directed to allow the application under Sec. 45B of the Act by re opening the matter proceedings which have been concluded in pursuance of the said notification under Section 15 of the Act dated 30.9.93 (Annexure-2) and during the pendency of their application before the Collector or the State Government under Sec. 45B an interim stay be granted by this Court in the present petition to the effect that the petitioners be not ejected from the land in question during the pendency of the application under section 45-B of the Act. 5. Reliance Was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners Ram Rup Singh Vs State of Bihar and others (1983 P.L.J.R. 82) Rajendra Mahto Vs. Hart Narayan Mahto (1989) P.L.J.R. 489) Sib Narain Roy Vs. State of Bihar and others (1994) (1) P.L.J.R 294 and a Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Praveen Shankar Singh and other Vs State of Bihar and Others 1987 P.L.J.R. 145) 6. Mr. Birendra Prasad Verma learned standing Counsel appearing for the respondents state has submitted that the proceedings under section 10(2) of the Act have been concluded after affording opportunity to the land holders, predecessors in interest of the petitioner vendees. The petitioners had obtained sale deeds during the pendency of the proceeding under the Act. the petitioners could contest the proceedings under the Act at the relevant points of time when they purchased the plots and obtained sale deed 23.6.79, 4.4.1973 and 22.6.1973, but they did not rather when the proceedings have been concluded after acqusition of the surplus land and relevant publication under Section 15 of the Act has they have made filed applications before the state Government or the collector under section 45B of the Act to re open the proceedings concluded after decision on merit against the land holders who contested the matter Neither any new evidence bas been discovered nor any mistake or error has been pointed in the proceedings against the land holders certified copies of the orders pissed in the proceedings against the land holders have also not been filed. The application of the petitioners under section 45B of the Act are just by way of fishing out and without showing any error or illegality in the earlier proceeding. The proceedings under Section 45B need not be re-opened as a matter of right, rather this power has to be exercised by the State Government or the Collector very sparingly and for adequate reasons and those powers could be exercised on the basis of the new materials discoverd by the petitioner-vendees. The Principal relief sought by the petitioners was to obtain an interim stay directing the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners from the plots purchased by them during the pending of the proceeding before the State Government or the Collector (respondent no.2) Interim stay in a writ jurisdiction particularly when the proceedings are pending before some her authority need not be granted as a matter of course. Jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution being discretionary, need not be exercised in favour of any person who seeks just interim relief in respect of the proceedings pending before some other authority or Tribunal, of No case to exercise jurisdiction under Art. 226 or the Constitution has been made out, directing the collectors to reopen the proceedings in pursuance of the application of the petitioners or to grant interim stay to them in respect of the plots purchased by the petitioners. In that view of the matter, the present petition is devoid of any merit and, therefore, it is fit to be dismissed. 7. Having scrutinised the submission of the learned counsel for the parties, the short question for our determination are as to on what ground the application of the petitioners under section 45-B of the Act can be allowed and the proceedings which have ultimately concluded against the land-holders, can be re-opened and what can be the meaning assigned to the expression as it thinks fit" employed by the legislature under section 45B of the Act and under what circumstances interim mandamus or stay could be granted by this Court in respect of the proceedings pending before some other authority. 8. Before answering the first question, the provisions of sec. 5(i)(iii) section 9(2) and section 45-B of the Act may be read conjointly and no part of the same is to be read in isolation. In other words no part of the sections can be obliterated or stretched. 8. Before answering the first question, the provisions of sec. 5(i)(iii) section 9(2) and section 45-B of the Act may be read conjointly and no part of the same is to be read in isolation. In other words no part of the sections can be obliterated or stretched. Other relevant provisions of the act and the rules have also to be considered. We are reminded of an old Lat in maxim "INGUSTUM EST NIS TOTA LEGE INSPECTADE UNA LIOUA EJUS PARTICULA PRO POSITA JUDICAR VEL RES PONDERE." WHICH connotes that it is unjust to refer one part of the statue without examining the whole of it. At the same time there is another maxim A verves LEGILNON EST RECE-DENDUM" which means that from the word of the statute there must be no departure. In N.M. Mulchandavis admirable treatise legal maxim Vs. Phreses there is a mention of 4837, a maxim UT RES VALEAT PPIT IUS OUAU PERF AT which means that the court would avoid that construction which would fail to relief the manifest purpose of the legislation of the presumption that the legislature would enact only for the purpose of brining about an effective result. (See film Exhibitors Guild Vs. State ( AIR 1987 A.P. 110 F.B.) In other words, so that the intention of the legislature may not be treated as vain or left to operate in the air. (See Hankey V. Cleberring 1942 2 K.D 326 and Hair frey Vs. Beant front 1946 K.N. 280). 9. In American Jurisprudence (Vol. I pages 838 to 839) there is a statement that the main object of construction of laws is to as certain and carry out the intend of the legislature the courts have themselves no power to legislate and amend any omission of the acts directly and indirectly by construction (SEE Guiseppi Vs. Walling-324 U.S. 244 and Teders Vs. Sovannach 202 U.S. (SC) 263). The courts have no power to interpret that which has no effect of Interpretation. It is for the courts to ascertain the meaning of the provisions, neither to add nor substract, delete or distrart. See Barsky V. Viard if Regents-347 U.S. 442). 10. We would consider the provisions Section 5 (ii) indicate the consequences of a sale deed obtained without previous permission of the collector in writing. It is for the courts to ascertain the meaning of the provisions, neither to add nor substract, delete or distrart. See Barsky V. Viard if Regents-347 U.S. 442). 10. We would consider the provisions Section 5 (ii) indicate the consequences of a sale deed obtained without previous permission of the collector in writing. Admittedly, all the sale deeds obtained by the petitioners, have been obtained after ceiling Amendment Act, 1972 and without any previous permission of the collector in wilting the legal effect of such sale deeds have to be ascertained. If the petitioner vendees or the land holder would have applied for permission, the collector would have got an opportunity to apply his mind as to whether the transfer was made with malafide intention or it would defeat the purpose or the act. 11. Two provisos have been added to section 5(ii) of the act. The interpretation to be assigned to a proviso is well known The main function or a proviso is to carve out an exemption to the main enactment, and it might change to some extent the very concept of the intendment of enactment by providing certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable someties the scope of the provisions covered by a proviso is so imbeded in the act itself as to became an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire tenor of the substantive enactment itself. At the same time, a proviso cannot normally be so interpreated as to set at naught the main enactment. (See A. N. Lehgal Vs. Raja Ram Sheoram- AIR 1991 SC 1406 and S. Sundaram vs. V.R. Pattabhiram-AIR 1985 S.C. 588). 12. The first proviso to section 5 (ii) of the act has been added to modify or clarify that even if sale deed has been made with the previous permission in writing after enforcement of 1972 (ceiling) Amendment Act, it shall be deemed that the saledeed was made out of the ceiling are a admissible to the land holder. What is to be emphasised is that the expressions “shall be deemed to have been employed by the legislature. What is to be emphasised is that the expressions “shall be deemed to have been employed by the legislature. A deeming clause is used to introduce an artificial conception to an expression or a phrase when a thing is deemed to be some thing else, it is for all practical purposes to be treated as it is that thing, though in fact it is not (See Addl. Income tax Officer Vs. L. Alfred 1962 suppl. I SCR 143) whenever expression deemed to is employed a legal fiction is creted. Legal fication has been explained in East Fend Dwellings Col Ltd. vs. Finshury Borough council 1952 appeal cases 109 as follows :- If you are bidden to treat an imagiary state or affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. The statue says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it does not says that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corrolaries of that state of affairs.” 12. In Industrial supplies private ltd. Vs. Union of India. ( AIR 1980 SC 1858 ) it was observed: “It is now Axiomentic that when legal fiction is incorporated in a statute the court has to ascertoion for what purpose fiction is created. After ascertaining the purpose, full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and should be carried to its logical conclusion. The court has to assume all the facts and circumstances which are includental or inevitable corollaries to the given effect to the fiction.” The legal fiction employee by the legislature has to be interpreted in the light of its correct meaning and import. 13. What first proviso to section 5 indicates is that even if permission of the collector was obtained before making sale, nevertheless the sale shall be deemed to have been made form within the ceiling area admissible to the land holders. In other words, even if the sale deed could have been obtained by the vendees with permission of the collector in writing, never the less it would be deemed to have been made from within the ceiling area admissible to the land holders. In other words, even if the sale deed could have been obtained by the vendees with permission of the collector in writing, never the less it would be deemed to have been made from within the ceiling area admissible to the land holders. The vendees can put their claim from that area only. 14. The proviso added to section 9(2) makes it mainifest that the land holder, apart from retaining (while exercising the option) to the extent of ceiling limit, would be entitled to an additional 2 acres of homestated land in case conditions indicated are fulfilled. Our interpretation to section 5 (ii) and sec. 9(2) also finds support from the recent division bench of this court in sib Narain Roy Vs. State of Bihar 1994 (I) PLJR 294 where in the Honble S.B. Sinha, J. at page 30 has held as follows :- “By reason of the said first proviso, the lands transferred shall be deemed to have been made within the ceiling area admissible to the land holder. The intent and purport of the said proviso is therefore, clear that although the lamb have been transfered by the land holder, the same would be deemed to have been made within the ceiling area admissible to the land holder and thus the land holder cannot claim that such transfer be excluded from the puriview of the ceiling area, the intention of the legislature stands further clarified from sub section 2 of sec 9 of the said act, in terms whereof the lands so transferred by the land holder. It is therefore, clear that three legal fications have been created, one in terms of the first proviso appened to clause (ii) of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 5, the second in terms of the second proviso there and the third terms of sub sec 2 of sec. 9. It is now well known that a legal fiction created by reason of the provisions of the statute, has to be given full effect” 15. In the present case the petitioners obtained sale deeds after the ceiling Amendment Act. 1972 but without written permission of the collector. In that event a legal fiction his been created that it shall be deemed that it bad been made from within the ceiling are admissible to the vendor. In the present case the petitioners obtained sale deeds after the ceiling Amendment Act. 1972 but without written permission of the collector. In that event a legal fiction his been created that it shall be deemed that it bad been made from within the ceiling are admissible to the vendor. These is another possible inference from such transaction that the vendor can also not claim that such transfers be excluded from the ceiling limit. Second proviso makes it manifest that in case a sale deed has been made beyond the ceiling limit, it means that it was made to defeat the provisions of the act. Neither the vendor nor the vendees can take benefit of such sales. 16. Sec. 9(2) of the act enacts a consequence of the transfer made either with or without the permission of the collector. There is another legal fiction enacted u/s 9(2) while exercising option to retain certain plots, to the extent of ceiling area applicable to a land holder it shall be deemed that the land transferred either with or without permission of collector has been selected to be retained. In case sec 5(ii) and sec. 9(2) are red together it becomes crystal clear that the claim of the vendees in respect of the land either with of without permission is only against the land retained by the land holder within the ceiling limit. There is no doubt that the land covered by all the transfers in dispute are within the ceiling limit. 17. As the legal fiction has been created by the legislature in its collective wisdom while enacting sec. 5(ii) and two proviso and also sec. 9(2) while interpreting these provisions and similar other provisions, a court in our humble opinion would be justified to ascertain for what purpose the fiction has been created and after ascertaining this, the court is to assume all those facts and circumstances which appears to be incidental or Inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. (See East End Dellings Co. Ltd. V. Finshury Borough council 1951 2 AHER 587 and in Coal Economising Gas Co. 1875 CLD 182). 18. The scops of section 45-B of the Act has been the subject matter of a number of decisions of this court, including the Full Bench (Consisting of the Hou'ble Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalla, C.J. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.P. Jha and the Hon'ble Mr. 1875 CLD 182). 18. The scops of section 45-B of the Act has been the subject matter of a number of decisions of this court, including the Full Bench (Consisting of the Hou'ble Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalla, C.J. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.P. Jha and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice L.M. Sharma, as his Lordships then was) in Pravesh Shankar Singh Vs. State of Bihar (1978 PLJR 154) F.B. it was observed (at page 156 in paragraph 10) that the proceeding under section 45B of the Act cannot be reopened for merely making a fishing enquiry to test the correctness of the earlier order, there must be fresh material relevant to the question which, it considered along with the existing material on the record would lead to a different conclusion. In the instant case no mistake or error has been pointed out in the earlier proceeding against the vendor land holder and therin no factual foundation to that effect. It was also not stated by the petitioners as to what was the fresh material relevant to question which was discovered by the present petitioners subsequent to the earlier proceeding. 19. In Nagendra Nath Choubey Vs. State of Bihar 1989 P.L.J.R. 487) this court has held in paragraph 4 that the illegalities must have been shown in the earlier proceedings which have been concluded much earlier and in case no such illegality was shown in the earlier proceedings, the collector or the State Government would hit be justified to re-open the proceedings in an application under section 45-B of the Act. In Harish Chandra Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others (1984 P.L.J.R. 988) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was held by this court at page 991) that before an application under section 45-B of the Act could be allowed, some illegality to the earlier proceedings must be shown and proved. In S.K. Ibrahim Vs. Bibi Zulekha and others (1993)(I) P.L.J.R. 285 this court held (at page 258) that the power given by the legislature under section 45-B of the Act for re-opening the proceedings which have been concluded earlier is to be exercised sparingly and for adequate reasons. In S.K. Ibrahim Vs. Bibi Zulekha and others (1993)(I) P.L.J.R. 285 this court held (at page 258) that the power given by the legislature under section 45-B of the Act for re-opening the proceedings which have been concluded earlier is to be exercised sparingly and for adequate reasons. At the same time such power should be exercised only on the basis of the new material discovered after conclusion of the earlier proceedings, 1989 P.L.J.R., 487 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners was on different facts and it was held in that case that the power of review creature of the statute and unless the said power was provided any order could not be reviewed in the garb or such power of review, whereas Ram Roop Singh Vs. State of Bihar (1983) P.L.J.R. 422) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners was also based on different facts, Inasmuch as in the case the question was about the scope of a writ or mandamus, or as to when a writ of mandamus can be issued, against the Housing Board under the charges and whether leave could be granted to the petitioner. 20. In our considered opinion therefore, the power under Section 45B of the Act could be exercised not as a matter of right and as a matter of course, but only when some illegality was pointed out in the earlier proceeding concluded. In the present case in none of the paragraphs of the present petition any illegality in the earlier proceedings has been pointed out. In order to re-open the proceedings concluded, some fresh evidence must be collected and it must also be shown No such evidence was available when the earlier proceedings were in progress and in case new material was considered along with material already (sic) in the earlier proceedings (sic) the inference and result would be entireely different. It must be sparingly noted that in respect (sic) after satisfying these conditions, interference on an application under section 45B can be made and the earlier proceedings could be reopend. 21. Now, reverting to the next question about the meaning to be assigned to the expression if it thinks fit used under section 45B suffice it to say that this expression does not mean that the State Government or the collector has been given very wide power to re-open the Proceedings. 21. Now, reverting to the next question about the meaning to be assigned to the expression if it thinks fit used under section 45B suffice it to say that this expression does not mean that the State Government or the collector has been given very wide power to re-open the Proceedings. As Section 45B has to be read along with section 5 (ii) and 9(2) of the Act, keeping in view the effect of legal fiction created by the legislature and the necessity for creating legal fiction demeing. The legal fiction under Section 5(ii) and Section 9(2) was created to obviate that the claim or the vendees in respect of sale obtained after the ceiling Amendment Act, 1972 was confined to the ceiling area admissible to the land holder. The area covered by the sale deed, obtained either or without prior permission of the collector in writing would be deemed to be the area in respect of which the land holder has expressed his option to retain it. The another corollary is that the vendees if aggrieved can claim their rights in the of plots in respect of which the land holder has expressed his option or would be deemed to have expressed his option and to no other and to no other area or land (see Sec 9(2) of the Act) The state Govt. or the Collector would not exercise power on an application made just with a view to male a fishing or raving enquiry. The expression it thinks fit ordinarily means in the discretion or the court. The word "discretion" is derived from the word discretion which means science of understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between right and wrong. It would not be inapt to refer to Latin Maxim DIS-CRETTA EST DISCERNERE PER LEGEM QUIDSIT JUSTUM" which means discretion is to know through law which is just and proper, the discretion to be exercised by the state government or the collector is to be exercised not on whims but to ascertain law was to whether in view of the provisions under section 5(ii) and section 9(2) of the Act. adumbtreat above would it be advisable to exercise the discretion to re open the proceedings on an application made just with a view to make a fishing or roving enquiry. 22. adumbtreat above would it be advisable to exercise the discretion to re open the proceedings on an application made just with a view to make a fishing or roving enquiry. 22. In our opinion, therefore the expression’ if it thinks fit does not confer unbridled power on the State Government or the collector to act without sufficient cause. The jurisdiction under Section 45B of the Act has to be exercised for re opening in the proceedings concluded keeping in view the limitations imposed upon the authority. Such jurisdiction cannot be exercised as a matter of right and or as a matter of course. 23. That last question for our determination on the facts and in the circumstances of the case is as to whether this court will be justified in granting interim stay prayed for by the petitioners of the present writ petition, during the pendency of their applications under section 45B of the said Act. There is no doubt that this court can grant interim relief in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution but consideration for granting or refusing to grant interim relief would be different where the proceedings are still pending before the state Govt. or the Collector under Section 45B of the Act, and in such one us (B.L. Yadav) had occasion to decide a case in Zila Sahkari Bank Limited Vs. State of U.P. & others (1988) (57) Indian Factories & Labour Reports 428) and it was observed at page 432 in paragraph 13 as follows :- “It is by now well settled that the purposes of passing interim stay in the writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution ought to be to revive a workable formulas or arrangement to the extent called for by situation so that the unemployed workman’s agony is bot extended. This is of course a delicate balance which is to be maintained after considering pros and cons of the matter so that the larger public interest is not jeopardised and the socialist, democratic republic goal under the preamble of the Constitution and goal of bringing about social revaluation and establishment of welfare state is not kept in oblivition. Further the object of social and economic justice must be kept in mind. Further the object of social and economic justice must be kept in mind. In that case it was further held that it was delicate balance which was to be maintained after considering the pros and cons in the matter so that larger interest may not be jeopardised. 24. In the case of State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal Rungta (A.I.R.) 1952 S.C. 12) a constitution Bench (consisting or the Hon’ble) Kanta C.J. Patanjali Shastri, B.K. Mukherjee S. R. Das and Chandrashekhara Aiyar, JJ) had an occasion to declare the law on the subject about grant of interim relief/stay when the civil suit was to be filed and the proceedings in the suit were to commence, but by the time no proceeding could be initiated by the plaintiff, the petitioner was granted interim stay by the High Court by filing a civil suit and nothing was decided by the High Court relating to the rights of the parties or the legal right of the Petitioner, except the interim relief that was granted. In that connection it was held at page 14 in paragraph 6 as follows : “... The question which we have to determine is whether direction in the nattre of interim relief only could be granted under Article 226, when the Court expressly stated. That under Article 226, when the Court expressly stated. That it refrained from determining the rights or the parties on which a writ or direction of a like nature could be issued. In our opion, Article 226 cannot be used for and final relief on the application as the High Court has purported to do. The directions have been given here only to circumvent the provisions or S 80 Civil P.C. and in our opinion that is not within the scope or Art. 226. In our opion, Article 226 cannot be used for and final relief on the application as the High Court has purported to do. The directions have been given here only to circumvent the provisions or S 80 Civil P.C. and in our opinion that is not within the scope or Art. 226. An interim relief can be granted only of aid in and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit of proceeding, If the Court was of opinion that there was no other convenient of adequate remedy open to the petitioner, It might have proceeded to investigate the case on its merits and come to a decision as to whether the petitioners suceeded in establishing that there was an infringement of any of their legal rights which entitled them to writ of mandamus or any other directions of a like nature, and pending such determination it might have made a suitable interim order for maintaining the statue quoante. But when the Court declined to decide on the rights of the parties and expressly held that they should be investigated more properly in a civil suit, it could not for the purpose of facilitating the institution of such suit, issue direction in the nature of temporary injunctions, under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, the language of Art. 226 does not permit such an action. On that short ground the judgment of the Orissa High Court under appeal cannot be upheld.” 25. In view of the aforesaid direction laid down by their Lordships constituting a - constitution Bench the only possible inference is that, in case, a proceeding before some other Court or the authority and the rights of the parties, particularly that of the petitioners have not been finally edjudicated upon or in any case the legal rights of the petitioners have not been prima facie established and no finding to that effect has been recorded, in that event the Court exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would not be justified in granting interim relief, pending disposal of the case before the appropriate authority i.e. the State government or the Collector. In the present case under Section 45-B of the Act the proceedings are still pending, and the application of the petitioners have not been decided by the State Government or the Collector. In that event, this court would not be justified to grant an, interim relief to the petitioners to the effect that they should not be dispossessed during the pendency of their applications under section 45-B of the Act. The object to grant discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly granting temporary injunction cannot be extended to such an extent that only interim relief can be granted and the rights of the parties need not be decided, rather they are to be decided by other authority either in a civil suit or in some other appropriate proceeding. In the instant case the rights of the parties, particularly the petitioners vendees were yet to be determined by the State Government or the grant any interim relief to the petitioners. 26. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, it is not a fit case to grant any interim relief to the petitioners. 27. We may also point out that we are conscious about our ourself imposed instruction on jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This discretionary power is not to be exercised as a matter of right and as a matter of course. It is to be exercised only when there was some error apparent on the face of the records, and at the same time some injustice was done to the petitioners and the same was proved. Even if there is some error apparent on the face of the record, never the less if substantial justice has been done between the parties, this court would be justified in refraining from exercise of Jurisdiction under Article 226. In the present case, in our opinion, no injustice has been done to the petitioners. They have obtained sale deeds after the Ceiling Amendment Act, 1972 during the pendency of the ceiling proceedings without any previous permission of the Collector in writing. In that event the claim was confined and would be deemed to be confined only to the extent of the Ceiling limit applicable to the land holders and in any event it shall be deemed that the land holders have expressed their choice to retain the plots sold by them. In that event the claim was confined and would be deemed to be confined only to the extent of the Ceiling limit applicable to the land holders and in any event it shall be deemed that the land holders have expressed their choice to retain the plots sold by them. In case the petitioners have any grievance, they could make the same against the land holders on the vendors, Under these circumstance in our opinion, this is not a fit case where we can exercise our discretion in favour of the petitioners. There are catena of decisions of this Court in such matter. We need no multiply the same, except by making reference to the case of S.K. Ibrahim Vs. Bibi Zulekha & others (1993 (I) PLJR 255, Supra) at page 259 in paragraph 38, Pramod Kr. Vs. State (1988 PLJR 923; and Sukhu Mahto Vs. State of Bihar (1992 (2) P.L.J.R. 134) 28. Our answers to the question posed are that the scope of enquiry under section 45B of the Act is very limited. Jurisdiction can be exercised not on any application with a view to make fishing enquiry or roving enquiry. This can only be exercised when an illegality has been pointed out in the earlier proceedings. This power is to be exercised sparingly only when some new material has been discovered subsequent to the disposal of the proceedings by the ceiling authority, and only if it can be shown by the petitioners that in case the new discovered material was considered alongwith the material available to with the ceiling authority, the inference would be different and positively in favour of the petitioners vendees, and on proof of similar other circumstance. The expression “if it thinks fit” need not be construced elaborately, rather it has to be considered alongwith the limitation pointed out above in our judgment. This court would not be justified in granting interim relief where the matter in respect of the rights of the parties has not been decided as yet, as the applications of the petitioners are pending under Section 45 B of the Act. 29. The up shot of the discussions made hereinbefore and applying Aristatelium and Baconian reasonings, this writ petition fails and it is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed