S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ). Rule. Mr. S. M. Shah appears and waives service of rule on behalf of respondents. This group of civil revision applications is directed against common judgment and oder passed by Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad below application Exh. 300 tendered under Order 6 Rule 17 of C. P. Code. By the impugned order dated 6-4-1994 the trial court has allowed the application and has permitted the plaintiff in HRP suit to amend the plaint within a week from the date of the order and to supply copy of the amended plaint to the defendants. It is such common order granting amendment of the plaint which is subject-matter of challenge in this group of Civil Revision Applications. ( 2 ) ). It appears that the respondent plaintiffmadangopal Rajaram Shukla has instituted HRP Suit No. 3387/81 against the petitioner-tenant and other suits being HRP Suit Nos. 3388 to 3407 of 1981 and HRP Suit No. 3420/81 and HRP Suit No. 280/81 against various other tenants to recover possession of respective suit premises from each tenant inter alia on the ground that each tenant was in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months and has failed to pay arrears of rent despite service of demand notice under Section 12 of Bombay Rent Act and that therefore each tenant was liable to be evicted. It appears that all such suits were consolidated as respondent landlord was common and the common ground of non-payment of arrears of rent was alleged against each tenant for his eviction. It appears that the trial Court framed common issues at Exh. 13 and permitted the parties to read oral as well as documentary evidence. After the evidence was recorded the trial Court after hearing oral submissions of the learned Advocates for parties proceeded to deliver the judgment and on 29th December 1993 the trial court for the first time fixed standard rent of the premises in possession of each defendant at Rs. 20. 00 p. m. exclusive of taxes and with respect to premises in possession of Ramiqubal Pitambar Thakur the defendant of HRP Suit No. 3399/81 he fixed standard rent at Rs. 20. 00 p. m. exclusive of taxes and with respect to premises in possession of Ramiqubal Pitambar Thakur the defendant of HRP Suit No. 3399/81 he fixed standard rent at Rs. 60 p. m. Thereafter in para 17 of the judgment the trial Court held that as standard rent of suit premises in each case was determined for the first time by the court the defendant-tenant in each case was required to be granted reasonable time to pay deficit of arrears of rent and mesne profits in the court. Accordingly he held that each defendant was required to be granted reasonable time to pay up arrears of rent and thereafter he held that further question as to whether each defendant tenant was entitled to protection under Section 12 (3) (b) of Bombay Rent Act was required to be decided. Accordingly he directed each defendant-tenant to deposit arrears of rent commencing from 1-10-1977 on or before 21st January 1994 and he observed that the defendants were required to deposit said rent to avail protection under Section 12 (3) (b) of Bombay Rent Act. So stating he reserved his finding on the issue as to whether the defendant in each case was entitled to protection of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act. It further appears that thereafter the defendant in each case deposited arrears of rent as directed by the trial Court on or before 21st January 1994 and pursis to that effect was filed on 21st January 1994 in the trial Court by the defendant-tenant in each case. That pursis is to be found at Exh. 294. ( 3 ) ). It is at this stage that the respondent-plaintiff moved the trial court by way of application at Exh. 300 for amendment of plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. Code inter alia contending that though in reply to the notice of demand each tenant has accepted the plaintiff as landlord of the suit premises in the written statement filed in each suit a contention is raised that the plaintiff-landlord was not entitled to recover rent and that he has no right title or interest over the suit premises. It is further averred that because of such averment contained in the written statement the defendant-tenant in each suit denied the title of the plaintiff landlord over the suit property and has thereby incurred liability of eviction on the ground of disclaimer of title of landlord and that said ground is required to be incorporated in the plaint for eviction. He further averred that the trial court has simply passed interim judgment and order and therefore the matter cannot be said to have been finally decided and since pure question of law has arisen on admitted facts the plaintiff-landlord should be permitted to agitate such question in the very suit by duly amending the plaint and by framing necessary issue on such pleading. The second amendment which the plaintiff-landlord sought in the said plaint was to the effect that each defendant-tenant has acquired suitable residential accommodation after coming into force of the Bombay Rent Act and that therefore each defendant-tenant has incurred the liability of eviction under Section 13 (1) (L) of Bombay Rent Act. By the proposed amendment therefore the plaintiff-landlord wanted to introduce paras 3a and 3b in the plaint in each suit. ( 4 ) ). Such application for amendment of plaint in each suit was fixed for hearing and the defendant-tenants have filed their common reply at Exh. 307 inter alia contending that such application for amendment was mala fide and was belatedly filed having realised that the plaintiff-landlord was not likely to succeed in the suit for recovery of possession. It was submitted that such amendment would totally change the nature of suit and the same was barred by law of limitation. It was further submitted that despite categorical pleadings and evidence led before the trial court at no point of time ground of disclaimer of title of landlord was pressed into service and therefore it ought to have been treated as abandoned and such ground may not be permitted to be agitated by way of amendment of plaint. It was further submitted that despite categorical pleadings and evidence led before the trial court at no point of time ground of disclaimer of title of landlord was pressed into service and therefore it ought to have been treated as abandoned and such ground may not be permitted to be agitated by way of amendment of plaint. It was submitted that it was too late a stage to grant amendment of plaint when the court has already declared interim judgment and when directions issued by the trial court are already complied with by the tenants the final judgment or conclusion of the proceedings is now fail accompli known to the plaintiff-landlord and in proceedings of this nature this type of amendment should not be permitted. It was further submitted that granting of amendment of this nature would amount to permitting a party to dig up a stale hopelessly belated and impliedly abandoned claim and further lead to de novo trial. ( 5 ) ). It appears that despite such objections filed by the defendant-tenant the learned trial Judge granted application for amendment by the impugned judgment which has given rise to the present group of CRAs. ( 6 ) ). Mr. N. D. Nanavaty Learned Advocate for petitioners-tenants in each case has very vehemently submitted before this Court that invocation of provision of Order 6 Rule 17 at this stage when the trial court has delivered interim judgment and when final judgment is fail accompli in view of the fact that all tenants have deposited full arrears of rent as directed by the court the plaintiff-landlord should not be permitted such amendment introducing totally new ground of eviction. It would amount to permitting the party to agitate a. totally new case which was never agitated in the course of trial. He further submitted that when the written statement filed as back as 1982 by each tenant the contention was taken that the landlord was not entitled to recover land and was not entitled to institute suit for possession the defence of the defendant in each case was specifically made known to the plaintiff-landlord. He further submitted that when the written statement filed as back as 1982 by each tenant the contention was taken that the landlord was not entitled to recover land and was not entitled to institute suit for possession the defence of the defendant in each case was specifically made known to the plaintiff-landlord. The plaintiff-landlord waited for a period of over 12 years and did not amend the plaint and did not lay foundation for seeking eviction on the ground of disclaimer of title and therefore also the application for amendment ought to have been rejected as it would cause great prejudice to the defendant-tenant in each case. Lastly he submitted that though ordinarily all the amendments are to be allowed at any stage which are necessary for the purpose of effectively and finally adjudicating upon the dispute which may arise between the parties deliberate omission to sue on a known ground available to the plaintiff-landlord should be viewed seriously so as not to permit the landlord to seek eviction of a tenant on such abandoned ground. It could be said that he has waived such ground though available to him in law submits Mr. Nanavaty. ( 7 ) ). Mr. S. M. Shah learned-Advocate for plaintiff-landlord on the other hand strenuously urged before this Court that the trial Court has exercised jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application under Order 6 Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code and it has by exercising judicial discretion consistent with the principles of law propounded by the Apex Court has exercised its judicial discretion and has exercised Jurisdiction vested in it by law more so when ordinarily all amendments in pleadings are required to be allowed which are necessary for the purpose of effectively and finally adjudicating upon the issues which may arise between the parties this Court should not interject itself in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C. P. Code ( 8 ) ). In the case of L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. M/s Jardine Skinner and Co. reported in AIR 1957 SC 357 the Apex Court has taken a view that if the amendment is one which is required in the interest of justice the court has discretion and jurisdiction to allow such amendment. In the case of L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. M/s Jardine Skinner and Co. reported in AIR 1957 SC 357 the Apex Court has taken a view that if the amendment is one which is required in the interest of justice the court has discretion and jurisdiction to allow such amendment. It is no doubt true that the courts would as a rule decline to allow amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be Ordered. That factor however does not affect the power of the court to order amendment if that is required in the interest of justice ( 9 ) ). In the very volume immediately after the aforesaid decision in the case of H. Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil reported in AIR 1957 SC 363 once again the Apex Court propounded principles which must govern the amendments of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code Observations of the Supreme Court in the said case are consistantly (sic.) followed till date by all the courts and even by the Apex Court in subsequent decisions which need to be quoted at this stage: All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) not working injustice to other side (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct but the amendment would cause him injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation the amendment must be refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendent an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side or can it not ? ( 10 ) ). The ultimate test therefore still remains the same can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side or can it not ? ( 10 ) ). From the aforesaid quotation it becomes clear that ordinarily amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy twin requirements i. e. (i) not working injustice to other side and (ii) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The ultimate test which the court is required to apply is to ask the question namely Can the amendment be allowed without injustice to other side or can it not ? ( 11 ) ). Applying the aforesaid test in subsequent decision the Apex Court as well as this Court has taken the view that any amendment which would change the nature of the cause action or which in substance amounts to making out totally new cause of action should not be permitted to be made. However if the cause remains same and the proposed amendment simply introduces new or additional ground of relief ordinarily such amendment is required to be allowed. It is also by now well established that the amendment of pleading can be granted at any stage provided it does not cause injustice to other party ot (sic.) it does not prejudice the defence of other side. The Apex Court and this Court has permitted amendment of pleadings even at the stage of second appeal in this Court of appeal in the Apex Court in cases where the amendment otherwise falls squarely within Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. At the same time amendment at a stage when it would be barred by limitation is generally not encouraged as it deprives the other party of plea of limitation available in law though in exceptional cases the Apex Court has even permitted such amendment. ( 12 ) ). With the aforesaid general statement of law on the question of amendment of pleadings I may now refer to the authorities cited by the parties. ( 13 ) ). Mr. N. D. Nanavaty learned Advocate appearing for petitioner-tenant in this Court has invited attention of this Court to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gaurishankar v. Hindustan Trust Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1972 SC 2091 whether in the Apex Court was dealing with the proceedings under Delhi Rent Act. ( 13 ) ). Mr. N. D. Nanavaty learned Advocate appearing for petitioner-tenant in this Court has invited attention of this Court to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gaurishankar v. Hindustan Trust Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1972 SC 2091 whether in the Apex Court was dealing with the proceedings under Delhi Rent Act. The plea of absence of valid notice terminating the contractual tenancy was not taken in the original written statement. The written statement was sought to be amended after 8 years and it appears that such amendment was allowed at the appeal stage. The Apex Court in this context found that as the suit premises fell to the share of appellant-Gaurishankar in 1958 by virtue of compromise decree he asked the respondent tenant to pay rent to him. The court also noticed that there was exchange of correspondence between appellant-Gaurishankar and the respondent-Company. It was also noticed by the court that the Managing Director of the respondent-Company was the son-in-law of Krishanlal who was the Chairman of the respondent-Company. He was also a close relative of appellant. Despite this the appellant Gaurishankar was driven to one proceedings after the other and in each occasion his title was denied. Ultimately he filed suit for eviction in 1959 which dragged on for several years. The tenant waited for years before seeking such amendment. The lower court allowed the amendment. The Apex Court in this connection observed that no such amendment should have been allowed on account of gross delay and laches on the part of respondent in raising such plea. The Apex Court held that in such matters it must be remembered that if a technical plea of the nature sought to be raised had been raised at an earlier stage the appellant could have withdrawn the petition for eviction with liberty to file another petition after serving the requisite notice. By not raising that plea for nearly 8 years a great deal of prejudice was caused to the appellant. It was in this connection the Apex Court frowned upon the order allowing amendment as it found that such amendment would cause a great deal of prejudice to the other party. ( 14 ) ). This decision may support the proposition that. unduly belated so amendment of pleadings if it causes prejudice to the other side should not be granted. It was in this connection the Apex Court frowned upon the order allowing amendment as it found that such amendment would cause a great deal of prejudice to the other party. ( 14 ) ). This decision may support the proposition that. unduly belated so amendment of pleadings if it causes prejudice to the other side should not be granted. However if no obvious prejudice to the other side is pointed out and the amendment merely seeks to introduce additional ground or addition of some facts and circumstances which may justify granting of a relief the court may allow such amendment. Such amendment cannot be said to change the nature of suit or nature of cause of action ( 15 ) ). Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vineetkumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera reported in AIR 1985 SC 817 . The question before the Supreme Court was that the pleading with respect to which the relief was sought was not then ten years old on the date of suit. However during the pendency of suit the pleading became ten years old and once it was ten years old the new Rent Act namely U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act would apply Admittedly pleading was not ten years old on the date of the suit but during the pendency of litigation it completed ten years. Question was whether the new Rent Act will be a attracted or the proceedings would be governed by the old Act. In this context the Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Pasupati venkateswarlum v. Motor and General Traders reported in AIR 1975 SC 1409 and following observations are quoted by the Supreme Court: it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of he judicial process. If a fact arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief of the manner of moulding it if brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. If a fact arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief of the manner of moulding it if brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure where no specific provision or fairplay is not violated with a view to promote substantial justice-subject of course to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to trial Court. If the litigation pends the power exists absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice Rulings on this points are legion even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities the court can and in many cases must take cautions cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. ( 16 ) ). From the aforesaid quotation it becomes clear that if facts or circumstances arising after the lis has come to the court has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it if brought diligently to the notice of the court it cannot blink at it or cannot be blind to the events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. After quoting the aforesaid observations the Supreme Court observed that normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action but it is well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute addition of new cause of action or raise a new case but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record the amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation ( 17 ) ). It is thus clear that if the amendment is one which does not alter or change the cause of action of the nature of the suit and it simply amounts to addition of new grounds of eviction which ale not otherwise as prejudicial to the defence of the defendants they are to be all owed. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has gone to the extent of observing that such amendments would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation. ( 18 ) ). Mr. S. M. Shah learned Advocate for respondent-plaintiff invited the attention of this Court to the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Champaben v. Gopinath Gandhar reported in 21 GLR 709. In the said case in the proceedings between the landlord and the tenant under Bombay Rent Act it was contended before the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction by the landlord that the trial Court was not justified in rejecting the amendment application of the landlord when he wanted to introduce by way of amendment certain events which had happened during the pendency of suit in the trial Court when he wanted to plead additional ground for obtaining relief of possession. By such amendment the landlord wanted to urge fresh ground of sub-tenancy as during the pendency of proceedings the tenant has sublet the premises to defendant Nos. 2 3 and 4 who were sought to be joined as parties. Such amendment was disallowed. It was in this context that S. B. Majmudar (as His Lordship then was) found that the lower court was not justified in rejecting the application for amendment. The Court found that in fact the trial Court permitted the parties to lead evidence on such ground of subletting. Once the trial court permitted the parties to lead evidence regarding subletting based on subsequent event a reasonable impression was created in the mind of the party that whatever be the state of pleadings the court is going to decide the question. Had the trial Court not permitted such evidence the plaintiff could have certainly applied for amendment in trial court. It was only at the time of writing judgment that the trial court observed that the record was unnecessary burdened by producing evidence by plaintiff on the question of subletting. Under such circumstances. Had the trial Court not permitted such evidence the plaintiff could have certainly applied for amendment in trial court. It was only at the time of writing judgment that the trial court observed that the record was unnecessary burdened by producing evidence by plaintiff on the question of subletting. Under such circumstances. if the amendment application was moved before the appellate court it was held that delay in moving amendment application cannot be said to be fatal. The court took the view that the amendments need be ranted provided they do not cause any prejudice to other side. ( 19 ) ). From the aforesaid statement of law an the question of amendment of leadings in my opinion it cannot be aid that the trial court committed any error in exercising its jurisdiction in ranting amendment application. It cannot be said that each defendant-tenant has denied title of the landlord in their written statement and in fact the cross-examination of witnesses was also directed towards the question of disclaimer of title. In fact arguments were also advanced before the trial court but the trial court felt that in absence of any pleading the suit cannot be decreed on the ground of disclaimer of title. There was pleading which amounted to denying the title of plaintiff-landlord. Evidence was also led. Only omission was that there was no specific pleading in the plaint. Such a pleading if permitted to be introduced even at such an advanced stage of trial it cannot be said that it would cause prejudice to the defence of the defendants especially when the defendants-tenants have already denied the title of the landlord. They may at the most submit their explanation or reason as to why and under what circumstances they have denied the title. They can also submit that their written statement does not amount to disclaiming title. They may also lead evidence on such issue. However such amendment would not. in anyway prejudice the defence. In my opinion the trial court was therefore justified in granting amendment so as to introduce such additional ground for seeking eviction. ( 20 ) ). They can also submit that their written statement does not amount to disclaiming title. They may also lead evidence on such issue. However such amendment would not. in anyway prejudice the defence. In my opinion the trial court was therefore justified in granting amendment so as to introduce such additional ground for seeking eviction. ( 20 ) ). Turning now to the question of second fact which is sought to be added by proposed amendment it is the case of the plaintiff-landlord that each tenant has subsequently acquired suitable residential accommodation Acquisition of suitable residential accommodation by the tenant after commencement of Bombay Rent Act is a ground for eviction under Section 13 (1) (L) of Bombay Rent Act. Once such ground is available to the landlord even after institution of suit since the ground has come into existence after the institution of the suit the landlord can be permitted to amend the plaint and can agitate such additional ground. The relief being that of eviction from the premises leased the proposed amendment simply introduces additional ground for relief and it would not amount to changing the nature of suit. In my opinion therefore even second part of the amendment was rightly allowed by the trial Court. . ( 21 ) ). It is submitted by Mr. N. D. Nanavaty learned Advocate for petitioner-tenant that the trial court not permitted them to file any additional written statement to the amended plaint and that once application stands granted fresh evidence shall have to be led after framing necessary issues. He submitted that though in substance it would amount to trying out fresh suit on fresh cause of action the trial court would pressurise the tenants to proceed further with the suits as the suits are of the year 1981. He submitted that such haste would prejudice the defence of the tenants. To the aforesaid extent it shall have to be stated that the trial Court ought to have permitted the petitioner-tenant to file written statement to the amended plaint. To that extent the judgment and order of the trial court deserves to be interferred (sic.) with. He submitted that such haste would prejudice the defence of the tenants. To the aforesaid extent it shall have to be stated that the trial Court ought to have permitted the petitioner-tenant to file written statement to the amended plaint. To that extent the judgment and order of the trial court deserves to be interferred (sic.) with. It is directed that the petitioner-tenant in each suit shall now be permitted to file additional written statement to the amended plaint by March 31 1995 The trial court shall thereafter frame additional issues and thereafter provide sufficient opportunity to the parties to lead evidence on such new issues and shall not insist for immediate disposal of the suits. It shall have to be kept in mind that the petitioners-tenants are hutment dwellers who shall have to be provided sufficient time to collect and lead evidence oral as well as documentary. The trial court is accordingly directed to grant sufficient opportunity to the petitioners-tenants as well as landlord to lead necessary evidence which they want to lead on additional issues which may now arise after amendment of the plaint. ( 22 ) ). Since amendment is sought at a belated stage and when the suits were practically decided and when interim judgment was also delivered it was submitted before this court that the plaintiff-landlord shall be subjected to payment of costs to the petitioner-tenant in each case but unfortunately the trial court has not imposed any such condition. In the facts and circumstances of the case in my opinion for such belated amendment after 12 years some condition of costs ought to have been imposed. The respondent-landlord is directed to pay costs of Rs. 250. 00 in each case to the petitioner-tenant. ( 23 ) ). Subject to aforesaid modification in the order passed by the trial court all the CRAs are dismissed. Rule in each CRA is discharged. The costs as directed to be paid by the plaintiff-landlord to the defendant-tenant in each case of Rs. 250. 00. .