Judgment 1. THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated the 9th August, 1991 passed by a learned Judge of this Court by which the learned Judge quashed an order striking off the name of the writ petitioner from the rolls of the Indian Oil corporation and directed the authorities concerned to allow the writ petitioner to resume his duties; forthwith and also to pay arrear emoluments as admissible to the writ petitioner as if the order striking out the petitioner's name from the rolls had not been passed. Being aggrieved by die said order the appellant Ms. Indian Oil Corporation Limited have preferred the present appeal. The writ petitioner/respondent was appointed as Equipment Operator Grade III in the Indian Oil Corporation at Haldia in 1973 and he had been working there since then. On and from 26th September, 1988 the petitioner remained absent from duties. Ultimately by a letter dated the 28th December. 1988 the Deputy General Manager (Production) of the Indian Oil Corporation informed the writ petitioner that since he did not resume his duties despite repeated directions the petitioner had lost his lien on the post of Equipment Operator, Grade - III and in terms of Clause 14 (b) of the Standing Orders his name had been struck off from the rolls of the Corporation and he ceased to be an employee with effect from 23rd December, 1988. The writ petitioner was also directed to deposit the outstanding advance due of Rs.24 249. 28 paisa within 15 days. On receipt of the aforesaid letter the petitioner on 14. 1. 89 made a representation to the Deputy General Manager (Production) stating that he had been suffering from Peptic Ulcer and his wife had sent two letters, and all medical certificates, and that he was still under treatment as a result of which he had not been able to resume his duties as directed and prayed that he should be allowed to resume his duties when his doctor would permit him to do so. The authorities, however, did not reply to the petitioner's said representation, nor did they withdraw or cancel the order whereby the petitioner's name had been struck off from the rolls. In course of time, the petitioner moved this writ petition in June 1990 which was allowed by the learned Trial Court as stated earlier. The authorities, however, did not reply to the petitioner's said representation, nor did they withdraw or cancel the order whereby the petitioner's name had been struck off from the rolls. In course of time, the petitioner moved this writ petition in June 1990 which was allowed by the learned Trial Court as stated earlier. Thereafter, the Indian Oil Corporation Limited preferred the present appeal. 2. ADMITTEDLY the writ petitioner was absent from duties on and from the 26th September. 1988. His case is that he sent a letter on 8. 10. 1988 to his office informing the authority about his illness. The receipt of any such letter is however denied by the appellant. On 14.10.1988 the wife of the writ petitioner sent a letter under registered post informing that her husband was seriously ill and confind to bed from 3. 10. 1988 and was under treatment. In that letter it was also mentioned that the petitioner would resume his duties after the doctor advised him fit. The said letter was received by the Senior Production Manager on 3rd November, 1988. By a letter dated the 7th November. 1988 the Production Manager wrote to the petitioner that he had been absenting from duties with effect from 26th September, 1988 without any permission or intimation and advised the petitioner to report for duties immediately, in any case by 15th November 1988 with a satisfactory explanation of his absence. It was also specifically mentioned in that letter that it would not be possible for the management to sanction leave to the petitioner beyond the aforesaid date, that is. 15. 11. 1988. It is the case of the petitioner that as he was seriously ill he could not report for duties and his wife sent all the Medical Certificates to the Production Manager about the illness of the petitioner and the said certificates were received by the Senior Production Manager on 21. 12. 1988. Receipt of any Medical Certificate is however denied by the appellant. By a letter dated the 1st December, 1988 addressed by the Production Manager to the petitioner the receipt of the letter of the petitioner's wife dated 14th October, 1988 was acknowledged and it was stated that the said letter was not supported by Medical Certificate and the writ petitioner was therefore, advised by a letter dated 7. 11. By a letter dated the 1st December, 1988 addressed by the Production Manager to the petitioner the receipt of the letter of the petitioner's wife dated 14th October, 1988 was acknowledged and it was stated that the said letter was not supported by Medical Certificate and the writ petitioner was therefore, advised by a letter dated 7. 11. 1988 to resume duties latest by the 15th November, 1988 but the petitioner failed to resume duties during; the extended period. The writ petitioner was again advised in the letter dated 1st December, 1988 to report for duties immediately with a satisfactory explanation of his absence. It was also mentioned in the said letter that in case the writ petitioner did not report by 7. 12. 1988 with a satisfactory explanation as aforesaid he would be deemed to have lost lien on his appointment in the Corporation. By another letter dated the 15th December, 1988 addressed by the Production Manager the writ petitioner was asked that he had failed to resume duties during the extended period and that he was once again advised to report for duties immediately with a satisfactory explanation of his absence and in case he did not report for duties by 22.12.1988 with a satisfactory explanation as aforesaid he would be deemed to have lost lien on his appointment in the Corporation. In the meantime, however the petitioner's wife addressed a letter dated 12th December, 1988 to the Production Manager acknowledging the receipt of a letter of the Production Manager a few days back. By the said letter dated the 12th December, 1988 the petitioner's wife informed that her husband had been suffering from Gastric Ulcer and he was admitted into a Nursing home in Calcutta and he would join service with illness certificate. In that letter it was specifically mentioned that this was the second information. Since however the petitioner did not join, the Deputy General Manager (Production) by a letter dated 28. 12. In that letter it was specifically mentioned that this was the second information. Since however the petitioner did not join, the Deputy General Manager (Production) by a letter dated 28. 12. 1988 wrote to the petitioner that the petitioner had failed to resume his duties even by the extended date and threfore he was deemed to have lost lien on the post of the Equipment operator Grade-III by his own action in terms of clause No. 14 (b) of the standing Orders and his name had accordingly been struck off from the roils of the Corporation as he had ceased to be an employee of the corporation with effect from 23\2\1988. For the sake of convenience and appreciation para -14 of the standing Orders is re-produced below :- "14. Overstay of leave or absence without leave - (a) If a workman overstays beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended, he shall lose his lien or, his post unless he (i) returns within ten days, of the expiry of the sanctioned leave, and (ii) explains the reasons for his overstay to the satisfaction off the General Manager or any other authorised by him in case the workman losses his Ben on his post, he shall be entitle to be kept on Bedli List. (b) If a workman absents himself without obtaining leave he will be considered to have abandoned his employment unless he (i) returns within twenty days from the commencement of such unauthorised absence and (ii) explains the reasons for his absence to the satisfaction of the General Manager or any other officer authorised by him. " 3. BY the impugned! letter dated 28. 12. 88 the writ petitioner was informed that he was deemed to have lost lien on the post by his own action in terms of clause no. 14 (b) of the Standing Orders and his name had accordingly been struck off from the rolls of the Corporation as he had ceased to be an employee of the organisation with effect from 23. 12. 88. It is therefore clear that by purported application of clause no. 3 4 (b) of the standing Orders the appellants struck off the name of the writ petitioner from the rolls of the Corporation on the ground that he had ceased to be an employee with effect from 23. 12. 88. 12. 88. It is therefore clear that by purported application of clause no. 3 4 (b) of the standing Orders the appellants struck off the name of the writ petitioner from the rolls of the Corporation on the ground that he had ceased to be an employee with effect from 23. 12. 88. New leaving aside, for the present moment, the question whether the said clause no. 14 (b) is otherwise attracted, and assuming for the present that the same is attracted here we will find that even prima facie there has been a mis-application of the said clause 14 (b. The said clause 14 (b) applied where a workmen absents himself without obtaining leave. Let us assume for the moment that the petitioner was absenting without "leave from 26. 9. 88. If that be so, then under clause 14 (b) the writ petitioner was required to be considered to have abandoned his employment on the expiry of a period of 20 days from the commencement of such unauthorised absence in the event of his failure to return to duties within the said period of 20 days and explain the reasons for such absence to the satisfaction of the concerned authority. A period of 20 days, commencing from 26. 9. 88, would have expired on 15. 10. 88. But, as we have seen, under the impugned letter dated 28. 12. 88 the writ petitioner was treated to have ceased to be an employee with effect from 23. 12. 88 and not from 15. 10. 88. It is therefore evident that the authorities concerned themselves did not consider that the writ petitioner was enjoying unauthorised absence from 26. 9. 88. By their letter dated 15. 12. 88 which is Annexure to the affidavit-in-opposition the appellants advised the writ petitioner to report for duties with a satisfactory explanation immediately and at any rate by 22. 12. 88 failing which he would be deemed to have lost lien on Ms appointment. This was done inspite of the fact that earlier by the letters dated 7. 11. 88 and dated 1. 12. 88 the writ petitioner was asked to report far duties by 15. 11. 88 and 7. 12. 88 respectively with a satisfactory explanation for absence. The very fact that inspite of the commencement of the absence of the writ petitioner on 26. 9. 11. 88 and dated 1. 12. 88 the writ petitioner was asked to report far duties by 15. 11. 88 and 7. 12. 88 respectively with a satisfactory explanation for absence. The very fact that inspite of the commencement of the absence of the writ petitioner on 26. 9. 88 the appellants on three successive occasions directed the writ petitioner to report for duties by certain date stipulated on each occasion and the period for joining was extended from time to time lastly upto 23. 12. 88 shows that the appellants were not treating the absence of the writ petitioner upto 22. 3. 88 as unauthorised absence because the appellants themselves granted and extended, from time to time, the period within which the writ petitioner was required to report for duties. Since the writ petitioner was granted time lastly upto 22. 12. 88 to report for duties it cannot be said that his absence upto 29. 12. 88 was unauthorised absence. There is no doubt that the writ petitioner was asked to report for duties within a particular period with satisfactory explanation for such absence but obviously that was done with a view to considering as to what kind of. leave could be granted to the writ petitioner for the period of his absence, namely, whether sick leave, casual leave earned leave or extraordinary leave without pay. That leave was in the contemplation of the authorities concerned will be evident from a perusal of the letter of the Production manager dated 7. 11. 88 wherein the writ petitioner was advised to report for duties in any case by 15. 11. 88 with a satisfactory explanation for absence and he was at the same time cautioned that it would noter possible for the management to sanction leave beyond the said date, that is, 15. 11. 88. I repeat, leave was therefore in the contemplation of the concerned authority. In his next letter dated 1. 12. 88 the Production manager indeed noted that the writ petitioner had failed to resume his duties during the extended period and he was again advised to report for duties immediately and at any rate by 7. 12. 88 with satisfactory explanation failing which he would be deemed to have lost lien on his appointment. Therefore, the period for reporting feat duties was thus extended upto 7. 12. 8and. Then again, to letter dated 15. 12. 12. 88 with satisfactory explanation failing which he would be deemed to have lost lien on his appointment. Therefore, the period for reporting feat duties was thus extended upto 7. 12. 8and. Then again, to letter dated 15. 12. 88 the writ petitioner was told that he had failed to resume duties during the extended period) was once again advised to report latest by 22. 12. 88 with satisfactory explanation for absence failing which he would bye deemed to have lost his line on his appointment. Obviously, therefore leave was in contemplation of the concerned authorities and the period for reporting was extended from time to time. Obviously, the direction to render satisfactory explanation at the time of reporting for duties within the extended period was given, for determining the nature of leave that could be granted to the writ petitioner depending upon the explanation that might for offered by him. If, on joining by extended period, the writ petitioner would not, however, offer any satisfactory explanation for the initial period of absence or for the extended period thereby disentitling, him to any kind of leave for the relevant period, it would have been open to the appellants to take disciplinary proceeding against him under clause no. 20 of the standing Orders for overstaying, the leave originally granted or for absence without leave for more than eight days, whatever may it be, which is a misconduct in terms of clause no. 19 (20) of the Standing Orders, but in the facts and circumstances as, developed, there was no scope for the appellants to treat that the writ petitioner ceased to be an employee by reason of clause 14 (b) immediately after the expiry of the extended period on the ground of his faillure to join within the extended period. It needs no emphasis that clause 14 (b) can be invoked for termination of the service of an employee only after ensuring that the requirement of the clause have been satisfied. The said clause will apply either on its own; terms or not at all. Its application admits of mo, tailoring. If the appellants were treating the absence of the writ petitioner from 26. 9. 88 as unauthorised absence thereby attracting clause 14 (b) they would have treated that the writ petitioner had abandoned his employment and ceased to be in their employment on the expiry of 20 days from 26. Its application admits of mo, tailoring. If the appellants were treating the absence of the writ petitioner from 26. 9. 88 as unauthorised absence thereby attracting clause 14 (b) they would have treated that the writ petitioner had abandoned his employment and ceased to be in their employment on the expiry of 20 days from 26. 9. 88, but they did not do so. On the contrary, they extended the period upto 22. 12. 88. Therefore if the writ petitioner did not report for duties within the time extended upto 22. 12. 88 his unauthorised absence really would have started on 23. 12. 88 and in that ease clause 14 (b) could not have been applied to bring about abandonment or cessation of employment prior to the expiry of a period of 20. days from 23. 12. 88 as envisaged in the said clause 14 (b) itself. Consequently the impugned letter issued on 28. 12. 88 that is, before the expiry of a period of 20 days from 23. 12. 88, informing the writ petitioner that he had lost lien on the post by reason of his failure to join by 22. 12. 88 and had ceased to be an employee of the appellants with effect from 23. 12. 88 is clearly inconsistent with the provisions of clause 14 (b) and is therefore not sustainable in law. If the appellants would have treated the absence of the writ petitioner as unauthorised absence from the very inception, namely, from 26. 9. 88, in that case the writ petitioner would have been considered to have abandoned his employment and thus ceased to be in service on the expiry of a period of 20 days from 26. 9. 88, namely, with effect from 16. 10. 88 but since the appellants extended time in succession and ultimately treated that the writ petitioner had ceased to be in the employment on the expiry of the extended period, namely, with effect from 23. 12. 88 it is evident that the appellants did not consider that he absence of the writ petitioner from the inception was unauthorised absence. Again since the writ petitioner was allowed extension of time to report for duties by 22. 12. 88 the appellants should have waited for a period of 20 days from 23. 12. 88 before invoking clause 14 (b) which however they did not do. Again since the writ petitioner was allowed extension of time to report for duties by 22. 12. 88 the appellants should have waited for a period of 20 days from 23. 12. 88 before invoking clause 14 (b) which however they did not do. In any view of the matter the action taken by the appellants against die writ petitioner by treating that he ceased to be in the employment of the appellants with effect from 23. 12. 88 does not fit in with the terms of clause 14 (b) and therefore cannot be treated as an action sustainable in law under clause 14 (b. 4. AS we have seen, the writ petitioner was absenting from 26. 9. 88. It is however his case that he informed the authorities concerned by a letter dated 8. 10. 88 which is however denied by the appellants and indeed there is also no evidence except the ipse dixit of the writ petitioner that any such letter was written by him on 8. 10. 88. The writ petitioner's wife however wrote a letter to the Senior Production Manager informing that the writ petitioner was seriously ill and was confined to bed under treatment. In that letter it was also stated that the writ petitioner would resume his duties on being fit as per doctor's advice. This letter was received at the appellants' end on 3. 11. 88 but curiously enough the Production Manager in his letter dated 7.11.88 addressed to the writ petitioner inter alia stated that the writ petitioner had been absenting from duty with effect from 26. 9. 88 without any permission or intimation. Obviously, that was not a correct statement because by that rime the letter of the writ petitioner's wife dated 14. 10. 88 had. already reached the Production Manager on 3. 11. 88 whereby the Production Manager was informed about the writ petitioner's illness. Again in his letter dated 1. 12. 88 addressed to the writ petitioner, the Production Manager wrote that the writ petitioner had been absenting from 26. 9. 88 without any permission or intimation. However in the said letter the Production Manager acknowledged that the letter dated 14. 10. 88 written by the writ petitioner's wife was received by them on 3. 11. 12. 88 addressed to the writ petitioner, the Production Manager wrote that the writ petitioner had been absenting from 26. 9. 88 without any permission or intimation. However in the said letter the Production Manager acknowledged that the letter dated 14. 10. 88 written by the writ petitioner's wife was received by them on 3. 11. 88 and it was indicated in that letter that the writ petitioner was seriously ill but that was not supported by any medical certificate. How is it that inspite of the receipt of the letter of the writ petitioner's wife informing about the illness of the writ petitioner the Production Manager wrote in his letter dated 7. 11. 88 as well as in his letter dated 1. 12. 88 that the writ petitioner was absenting front 26. 9. 88 without any intimation. As a matter of fact intimation was given and on the basis Of such intimation the authorities concerned granted time to the writ petitioner to report for duties. It also appears that after receiving the letter of the Production manager dated 1.12.88 the writ petitioner's wife again wrote to the production Manager on 12. 12. 88 about the illness and treatment of her husband and also wrote that the writ petitioner would join service with fitness certificate. It is true that in none of these letters written by the writ petitioner's wife any specific period was mentioned as to how long the writ petitioner would remain absent on the ground of illness nor was there any formal prayer for leave, but the fact remains that the authorities concerned were informed about the illness of the writ petitioner and also about the fact that he would join, obviously, after recovery, as per doctor's advice with fitness certificate. It also appears (that authorities concerned received the said letter of the writ petitioner's wife on 21. 12. 88, that is. before the expiry of the extended period granted by the authorities concerned to the writ petitioner lastly to join by 22. 12. 88. Unfortunately, the concerned authorities, it seems, did not bestow any consideration on the said letter of the writ petitioner's wife dated 12. 12. 8 (8 which was received by them on 21. 12. 88 and even did not mention the same in their impugned letter dated 28. 12. 88. 12. 88. Unfortunately, the concerned authorities, it seems, did not bestow any consideration on the said letter of the writ petitioner's wife dated 12. 12. 8 (8 which was received by them on 21. 12. 88 and even did not mention the same in their impugned letter dated 28. 12. 88. There is however some factual controversy as to whether any medical certificates were sent to the appellant along with the letter of the writ petitioner's wife dated 12. 12. 88. It is; the case of the writ petitioner that such certificates were sent along with the said letter but this is denied by the appellants and indeed the said letter dated 12. 12. 88 does not indicate that any medical certificate accompanied the same. We however need not enter into such factual aspect of the matter as we have already found that the impugned action as communicated under the letter dated 28. 12. 88 that the writ petitioner had ceased to be in the employment of the appellants with effect from 23. 12. 88 under clause 14 (b) of the certified standing Orders is not tenable in law in view of the fact that such action is not consistent with the provisions of the said clause. The impugned action is also not sustained by clause 14 (a) of the Standing Orders because under the said clause also less of lien on the post cannot be enforced before the expiry of a period of 10 days after the expiry of the extended period. Even under clause 14 (a) therefore the appellants could not have treated that the petitioner had lost lien on the post immediately after the expiry of the period on 22. 12. 88 as lastly extended by the appellants. Considered from any angle of view the impugned action of the appellants is thus not found to be technically or procedurally sustainable in law as the action on the assumption that the petitioner had ceased to be in the employment with effect from a particular date, namely, 23. 12. 88 is not consistent with any of the provisions of clause 14 (a) and clause 14 (b) of the Standing Orders. An action under clause 14 is indeed a very drastic one entailing the consequence of a termination of service of an employee. 12. 88 is not consistent with any of the provisions of clause 14 (a) and clause 14 (b) of the Standing Orders. An action under clause 14 is indeed a very drastic one entailing the consequence of a termination of service of an employee. In such a situation it is only fit and proper, nay, rather compulsively incumbent upon the authorities concerned to see that the procedural aspect of the matter receives adequate care so that the protection and safeguard meant for the employee is not unduly curtailed or superseded to his detriment. In the present case by issuing the impugned letter dated 28. 12. 88 informing that the petitioner ceased to be in employment with effect from 23. 12. 88 by reason of his not reporting for duties within the extended period that expired on 22. 12. 88, the appellants have curtailed and superseded the opportunity of the writ petitioner to report for duties within 20 days from the expiry of the extended period as envisaged in Clause 14 (b. If the history of personal liberty is the history of procedural safeguard, in service jurisprudence also it can be stated that the minimal security in respect of the continuance of service of an employee has to be jealously guarded by requiring reasonably strict compliance not only of the principles of natural justice but also of the procedural safeguards that may be provided by statutory provisions such as the Certified Standing Orders here, in the matter of putting an end to the service of an employee. This is more so, in view of the fact that the courts are now recognising livelihood as a concomitant incidence of life, any arbitrary deprivation of which is forbidden by the letter and spirit of Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution. This is more so, in view of the fact that the courts are now recognising livelihood as a concomitant incidence of life, any arbitrary deprivation of which is forbidden by the letter and spirit of Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, this can not be a good cause on the part of the appellants that since the writ petitioner did not actually recover from illness even within the period as mentioned in Clause 14 after the expiry of the extended period, he cannot complain that the action under Clause 14 was premature in point of time, and that even if the writ petitioner would have been granted the full statutory period for joining duties after the expiry of the extended period as envisaged in Clause 14, the same would have been of no practical avail to him as he would not have been able to join even within such time. Such a consideration is not tenable at any rate in a case like this where the petitioner's wife informed the authorities that the writ petitioner had been suffering from illness and he would join with fitness certificate after recovery as per medical advice. In this connection, it is also to be mentioned that under Clause 19 (20) of the Standing Orders absence without leave for more than eight consecutive days constitutes misconduct for which an employee is liable to penalty as mentioned in Clause 20 in accordance with the procedure prescribed thereunder. Even pending any enquiry in relation to misconduct an employee can be placed under-suspension. Therefore for absence without leave for more than eight days an employee can be placed under suspension and proceeded against by drawing up disciplinary proceeding. Unauthorised absence on the part of an employee may expose him to the risk of summary termination of service under clause 14 or to disciplinary proceeding under clause 20 of the Standing Orders. Therefore for absence without leave for more than eight days an employee can be placed under suspension and proceeded against by drawing up disciplinary proceeding. Unauthorised absence on the part of an employee may expose him to the risk of summary termination of service under clause 14 or to disciplinary proceeding under clause 20 of the Standing Orders. It is also no doubt true that the concerned authorities in appropriate cases will have the option to take action against an employee enjoying unauthorised absence either by invoking termination of service under clause 14 if the requirements of that clause are satisfied or under clause 20 by starting a disciplinary proceeding and even by placing the employee under suspension pending enquiry and it is the option of the concerned authorities to choose as to which one of the courses they would adopt against an absentee employee, but their choice of action under any of the clauses does not give the many right to ignore the requirements of the clause which they may choose to apply in a particular case. The court certainty has got nothing to say if the concerned authorities in a particular case choose to take recourse to clause 14 (a) or 14 (b) as may be applicable instead of clause 20 but then the Court in such case where the action entails termination of service will anxiously examine whether the vital procedural requirements have been complied with. In the present case, as we have found, the action purportedly taken under Clause 14 (b) of the standing Orders is not consistent with the vital and basic requirements of the said clause. Such action therefore cannot be sustained and we find no reason to differ from the view of the learned trial judge that the impugned action purportingly taken under Clause 141 (b) is not sustainable. 5. IT has next been argued on behalf of the appellants that there was unreasonable delay in filing the writ petition. The writ petition was filed on 11.6.90 that is about one year and a half after the impugned letter dated 28.12.88 was issued to the petitioner. In fact after receiving the said letter the petitioner also wrote a letter to the concerned authorities on 14. 1. 89. The writ petition was filed on 11.6.90 that is about one year and a half after the impugned letter dated 28.12.88 was issued to the petitioner. In fact after receiving the said letter the petitioner also wrote a letter to the concerned authorities on 14. 1. 89. There is no doubt that there has been a considerable delay in filing the writ petition but then the delay has been explained by stating that the writ petitioner was lying ill and undergoing treatment and medical certificate and prescriptions etc. have been also annexed to the writ petition and it is the writ petitioner's case that even at the time of filing the writ petition he was lying ill. In view of the illness of the petitioner, in my view, the delay stands explained in the facts and circumstances of this case. The judgment of the learned trial Court does not indicate that the plea of delay was canvassed at the time of hearing before the learned trial judge. The plea was, however, in the writ petition no doubt. However, the plea of delay not having been pressed before the learned trial judge and taking somewhat a liberal view in the facts and circumstances of the case we held that the writ petitioner has explained the delay on the ground of his illness and accordingly, at this stage we are not inclined to throw out the writ petition on ground of delay. The other plea taken on behalf of the appellants is the plea of alternative remedy available to the writ petitioner. It is submitted on behalf, of the appellants that the writ petitioner should have availed of his remedy, if any under the Industrial Disputes Act, but without taking recourse to such remedy the writ petitioner has directly approached the High Court under Article 226 which is not tenable. This argument was also made before the learned trial judge at the time of hearing and the learned trial judge in this connection considered the derisions in Premier. Automobiles v. K. S. Wadke AIR 1975 SC 2238 . Ramesh Chandra Sood v. State of West. Bengal AIR 1972 Cal 455 , Hariba v. K. S. R. T. C. 1983 (11 LLJ 76 and Dinesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1985 Lab. Automobiles v. K. S. Wadke AIR 1975 SC 2238 . Ramesh Chandra Sood v. State of West. Bengal AIR 1972 Cal 455 , Hariba v. K. S. R. T. C. 1983 (11 LLJ 76 and Dinesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1985 Lab. IC 287 and came to the conclusion that the Writ Court can interfere in cases where peculiar or exceptional grounds are established even if there is an alternative remedy. The learned judge as also of the view that the facts of this case are such as calls for interference and is one of these peculiar cases contemplated by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Dinesh Prasad (supra. In Premier Automobiles v. K. S. Wadke (supra) the question of jurisdiction was considered by the Supreme Court in connection with the maintainability of suit filed in the Civil Court. There also one of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court is that if the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or a liability under the central common law and under the Industrial Disputes Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative leaving it to the election of the suiter concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy (vide para 23, ibid. Since the right of a petitioner against illegal termination of service is a right under the general law it cannot be said that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Is ousted where the termination of service has been affected in violation of statutory provisions, namely, the Standing Orders here, simply because an alternative remedy exists. The law is established that the alternative remedy does not bar the Jurisdiction, but the Court will be slow m exercising' such jurisdiction where alternative remedy is available unless there are some special or exceptional circumstances warranting interference by the Writ Court. Here having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case the learned trial judge has thought it fit to exercise his discretion in the matter of exercising the writ jurisdiction and indeed5 we cannot say that the discretion was exercised by the learned trial judge in an unreasonable or perverse way. Here having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case the learned trial judge has thought it fit to exercise his discretion in the matter of exercising the writ jurisdiction and indeed5 we cannot say that the discretion was exercised by the learned trial judge in an unreasonable or perverse way. By reason of the action of the appellants the petitioner's employment stood terminated and we have seen that the action resorted to by the appellants for treating that the writ petitioner had ceased to be in the employment of the appellants with effect from a particular date is inconsistent with and is net sustained by the provisions which were purportingly applied by the appellants to this case. It is also to be noticed that in paragraph 21 rat the writ petition it has been specifically stated that there is no other alternative remedy and the remedy sought there will be sufficient and in consonance with justice. As against that the appellants in paragraph 25 of their affidavit-in-opposition. while dealing with the paragraphs 21 and 22 of the writ petition, simply say that the writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Nowhere in the affidavit-in-opposition the appellants took any plea that the writ petition was not maintainable because of the existence of an alternative remedy. The plea of alternative remedy, it seems, was taken for the first time at the hearing before the learned trial judge. The fact that such a plea was not taken by the appellants at the earliest opportunity before the learned trial judge even at the time of affirming the affidavit-in-opposition is rather surprising. In my view, when the appellants did not take such plea in their affidavit-in-opposition and when in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned trial judge has in exercise of his discretion, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, chosen not to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of existence of alternative remedy and when we also in appeal find that the impugned action on the part of the appellants entailing termination of service of the petitioner is not sustainable in law, it will be now a miscarriage of justice if after the passage of all these years we relegate the petitioner at this stage to seek his alternative remedy elsewhere. Accordingly, we hold that the writ petitioner's case does not deserve to (be defeated on ground of alternative remedy. 6. THE learned trial judge quashed the impugned letter dated 28. 12. 88 and also directed the concerned respondents to allow the writ petitioner to resume duties forthwith and also to pay all such arrear emoluments as are admissible to the writ petitioner as if the order striking out the petitioner's name from the rolls had not been passed. While there is no reason to interfere with the order of the learned trial judge quashing the impugned letter dated 28. 12. 88, there is however need for reconsideration of the direction for payment of arrear emoluments as if the petitioner's name had not been struck off from the rolls. The writ petitioner has annexed some medical certificate and prescriptions etc. with the writ petitioner from which it would prima facie appear that die petitioner had been suffering from illness like peptic ulcer/duodenal ulcer etc. and was advised rest with various kinds of treatment The writ petitioner also annexed various prescriptions and certificates to the affidavit affirmed by him on 26th September, 1991 in connection with, the stay application in this appeal. The prescriptions annexed thereto also include prescription dated 28. 6. 90 whereas the writ petition itself was filed on 11. 6. 90. No medical certificate of fitness has been filed or produced nor has it been submitted as to whether the petitioner has become medically fit to report for duties. The fact that even at the stage of appeal it is not the case of the writ petitioner that he has become medically fit to report for duties nor has any submission been made to that effect renders it unwarranted to direct payment of arrear emoluments to the petitioner on reinstatement, particularly when it is crystal clear that at the time of filing the writ petition one and half year after the termination service and even thereafter he was not medically fit to resume duties. Since the petitioner was prima facie ill all through, it is only fit and proper that he should now he given an opportunity, after quashing the impugned letter, to report for duties with medical certificate of fitness, but without any direction for payment of arrear emoluments except to the extent indicated below. Since the petitioner was prima facie ill all through, it is only fit and proper that he should now he given an opportunity, after quashing the impugned letter, to report for duties with medical certificate of fitness, but without any direction for payment of arrear emoluments except to the extent indicated below. The writ petitioner will be permitted to report for duties with a medical certificate of fitness within two weeks from this date and in the event the petitioner reports for duties within two weeks with a current-medical certificate of fitness, the appellants shall allow him to join. In that event the appellants shall allow earned leave and sick leave for the maximum period admissible to the petitioner from 26. 9. 88 as if he was; entitled to the same and shall pay him such emoluments as may be admissible to him for such period. So far as the subsequent period is concerned the appellants shall treat the petitioner, as a special case, to be on extra-ordinary leave without pay till the petitioner joins pursuant to this order. In view of the order in this appeal there will however be no question of taking any disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioner for his absence. Considering that a very long time has already elapsed since the commencement of absence of the petitioner on ground of illness we direct that in the event the writ petitioner fails to report for duties with a current medical certificate of fitness within two weeks as directed above he shall be deemed to have ceased to be in employment of the appellants with effect from the expiry of the aforesaid period of two weeks from this date, subject however to the various kinds of leave for the past period as directed earlier. The impugned order of the learned trial judge stands modified accordingly and the appeal also stands disposed of thus. No cost is however ordered. Appeal allowed in part.