JUDGMENT B.P. Singh, J. The petitioner herein has prayed for quashing of the order of the Special Judge, C.B.I., North Bihar, Patna, dated 19.1.1993, whereby the Special Judge rejected the application filed by the petitioner for his discharge. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the entire prosecution on the basis of the first information report (Annexure-1) lodged on 31.10.85 incriminating the petitioner in the commission of an offence under Section 5(1) (e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, registered as Special Case no. 79/85 __________________ R.C. Case No. 29/85. He has also prayed for quashing the charge-sheet dated 28.2.1987 (Annexure-3), and the order taking cognizance dated 7.7.1987 (Annexure-5). 2. The case of the petitioner is that a first information report was lodged by Sri D.S. Yadav, Inspector of Police, Special Police Establishment (C.B.I.). Patna on 31.10.85 alleging that the petitioner, who was working as Office Superintendent Grade II in the office of Divisional Railway Manager, North Eastern Railway, Sonepur, has amassed considerable wealth disproportionate to his known source of income. The petitioner has maintained a luxurious standard of living, and it was necessary to search for the incriminating evidence in the nature of liquid assets in his different Bank accounts, safe deposit lockers etc. There was reasonable ground to believe that he had concealed incriminating documents at the places mentioned in the report, and that he was likely to destroy the same unless immediate searches are conducted. On the basis of the aforesaid first information report the case was investigated by Sri R.D. Mishra, Inspector of Police, Special Police Establishment (CBI), Patna. Ultimately, a charge-sheet was submitted on 28-2-1987 and cognizance was taken by the Special Judge on 7th July, 1987. When the petitioner prayed for his discharge, the learned Special Judge by his order impugned dated 19.1.1993 rejected the same holding that a case was made out for framing of charges. 3. The first submission advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner was that even though at the stage of framing of charge, evidence need not be weighed meticulously, yet there must be evidence of disproportionate assets. 3. The first submission advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner was that even though at the stage of framing of charge, evidence need not be weighed meticulously, yet there must be evidence of disproportionate assets. In the instant case, the prosecution had added the assets belonging to the joint family to the assets of the petitioner to make out a case of the petitioner possessing assets disproportional to his known sources of income learned counsel submitted that in course of investigation as well the investigating officer recorded the statement of witnesses who supported the case that the joint family of the petitioner possessed assets which were wrongly included in the assets of the petitioner. He submitted that three members of the joint family of which the petitioner was the Karta had stated before the police that each one of them was an earning member and each and all of them added to the income of the joint family. The joint family had, therefore, acquired properties from their income. This was not taken note of by the investigating agency. With regard to the acquisition of a plot of land at Patna the petitioner had made only a small contribution, but the entire value of the land had been added while calculating the assets of the petitioner. The prosecution had also included property owned by others and had shown them as belonging to the petitioner held by him benami. It was, therefore, submitted that if the investigating officer had correctly assessed the value of the assets of the petitioner, many of the items of property would have been excluded and a true picture would have emerged which would have shown that the petitioner did not possess assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. 4. From the order of the learned Special Judge dated 19.1.1993 (Annexure-7) it appears that according to the prosecution the petitioner possessed disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 7,45,160/. The investigating officer has disclosed the details of the income of the petitioner during the period 26th June, 1958 to October, 1985, and when compared with the assets possessed by the accused at the time of the institution of the case, it appeared that he possessed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. 5. 7,45,160/. The investigating officer has disclosed the details of the income of the petitioner during the period 26th June, 1958 to October, 1985, and when compared with the assets possessed by the accused at the time of the institution of the case, it appeared that he possessed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. 5. It is difficult to accept the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner that the prosecution of the petitioners is vitiated on account of the fact that the investigating officer has not properly appreciated the material disclosed in the course of investigation, and that if he had excluded the properties, which, according to the petitioner, belonged to the joint family, he would have found that the petitioner did not possess assets disproportionate to his known sources at income. In my view, at the stage of framing of the charge such a meticulous examination of the evidence is neither possible nor desirable. I cannot ignore the note of caution given by the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. P.P. Sharma [1991 (2) BLJ 88 : 1991 (2) PLJR (SC) 11] that at the stage when the police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been forwarded to the Magistrate after completion of the investigation and the material collected by the investigating officer is under the gaze of the judicial scrutiny, the High Court will do well to discipline itself not to undertake quashing proceeding at that stage in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In the instant case as well the learned Magistrate has considered the records placed before him and was satisfied that the material disclosed a case for framing of charge. I cannot say on the basis of the material placed before this Court that the view taken by the Special Judge is either preverse, unreasonable or unsupported by the material on record. In sum and substance the petitioner wants this Court to undertake a meticulous examination of the material on record, and even before the stage of evidence is reached, to consider the defence of the petitioner. As I understand it, the plea of the petitioner is that some of the properties included in the assets of the petitioner did not belong to him and belonged to the joint Hindu family of which he is the Karta. As I understand it, the plea of the petitioner is that some of the properties included in the assets of the petitioner did not belong to him and belonged to the joint Hindu family of which he is the Karta. This is the defence which the petitioner has pleaded before this Court, but unfortunately this is not the stage at which the defence of the petitioner can be considered. The appropriate stage would be at the stage of trial when the petitioner will have ample opportunity of proving his defence by producing cogent and reliable evidence. If the petitioner is able to convince the Court by producing such evidence that some of the assets really do not belong to the petitioner, the Court will exclude those assets, and then consider whether the charge against the petitioner is established. At the pre-trial stage it is not possible for the Court to consider the question of title and to make a detailed investigation into the manner in which various items of property were acquired. Not only does the law not permit such procedure, indeed it would be impossible for a court to take up this task at the pre-trial stage. The learned Special Judge has, therefore, rightly observed that these matters will have to be considered at the stage of trial, and at the stage of framing of charge the court must proceed on the basis of the materials collected in course of investigation which disclose prima facie that the petitioner possessed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. The first submission must, therefore, be rejected. 6. The second submission urged on behalf of counsel for the petitioner is that the first information report (Annexure-1) discloses that a first information report was lodged only seeking permission to search the places mentioned in the report for discovering incriminating evidence against the petitioner. There is nothing in the first information report to show that the Inspector was required to investigate the case at the behest of the Superintendent of Police. It is difficult to appreciate the argument, because the report makes an allegation of the petitioner possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. With a view to prove the allegation a prayer has been made for issuance of warrants for the search of the places mentioned in the report. It is difficult to appreciate the argument, because the report makes an allegation of the petitioner possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. With a view to prove the allegation a prayer has been made for issuance of warrants for the search of the places mentioned in the report. Obviously a detailed report could not be made by the Inspector before collecting the incriminating documents which were in the custody of the petitioner. Reference was made to Section 5 (A)(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and it was submitted that the section required that an offence referred to in clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section 5 of the Act shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. The question as to whether the Inspector of the Special Police Establishment was or was not authorised by the Superintendent of Police to investigate the offence is essentially a Question of fact. No such question was raised before the learned Special Judge nor do I find that at any stage this point has been taken in the instant application. This point was sought to be urged by counsel at the time of hearing of the application but it was pointed to him that a Question of fact not raised before the court below nor raised in the application before this Court cannot be permitted to be urged. In the absence of factual foundation it is not possible to examine the second submission urged on behalf of the petitioner. 7. The third submission urged before me was that the jurisdiction of the Delhi Special Police Establishment was not extended to the railway area. At least no notification had been produced to show that the jurisdiction of the Delhi Special Police Establishment had been extended to the railway areas. Counsel submitted that if the jurisdiction of the Delhi Special Police Establishment was not extended to railway areas, which means to all railway officers, the case could not be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, since the petitioner was at the relevant time a railway official. The argument proceeds on the assumption that railway area must be understood to include all railway officers. 8. The argument proceeds on the assumption that railway area must be understood to include all railway officers. 8. I notice from the order of the learned Special Judge that the submission in the form urged before me does not appear to have been urged before the learned Special Judge. It was argued before the learned Special Judge that the jurisdiction of the Delhi Special Police Establishment was not extended to the State of Bihar which submission was repelled by the learned Special Judge by reference to the notification produced before him by the prosecution. However, even if the submission urged before me is examined, it would be found that there is no merit in the submission. The submission proceeds on the erroneous assumption that the words "railway area" must mean all railway officials. Having regard to the nature of the offence of which the petitioner is charged, it cannot be said that the offences were committed entirely within the railway areas, so that only railway police could have investigated the case. The case against the petitioner is a case of corruption, and there is no factual foundation for the submission that all the offences were committed entirely within the railway areas. In the absence of any factual foundation for the submission, the same cannot be examined in an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It cannot be urged as a matter of law that even if a railway officer commits an act of misconduct outside the railway areas, the offence must be necessarily investigated by the railway police on the assumption that railway areas must include all officers serving the railways. I find no merit in the third submission as well. 9. The fourth submission seriously pressed before mo was that with the coming into force of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act 49 of 1988) the prosecution launched under the Act of 1947 could not continue, because there were inconsistencies between the earlier Act and the Act of 1988. It was submitted that the definition of the offence under Section 5(1)(e) of 1947 Act was different from the one under Section 13(1)(e) of 1988 Act. Similarly, under Section 5(2) of 1947 Act, the court for special reasons recorded in writing could impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year, but under 1988 Act no such discretion has been left to the court. Similarly, under Section 5(2) of 1947 Act, the court for special reasons recorded in writing could impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year, but under 1988 Act no such discretion has been left to the court. It was submitted that the penal sections were also inconsistent. It was further submitted that under Section 6 of the Act of 1947, if the sanction was not properly obtained the prosecution could be quashed. Under Section 19 of the Act of 1988 the provision has undergone a material change by inclusion of sub-sections (3) and (4) therein, with the result that unless failure of justice is proved to have been occasioned, the finding, sentence and order passed by the Special Judge cannot be reversed by the appellate court on the ground of absence, or any error, omission, or irregularity in obtaining the sanction, Similarly, the court's discretion in ordering the stay of proceeding in such matters has been considerably curtailed. He further drew my attention to tl1e provision of Section 5 of the Act of 1947 and compared it with the provision of Section 7 of 1988 Act and pointed out that they are quite different. In an application filed on behalf of the petitioner the petitioner has pointed the differences in several other provisions of the two Acts to show that material change has been brought about in the provisions by the Act of 1988. On this basis it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that having regard to the provision of Section 30 of the Act of 1988, the present prosecution cannot continue since the provisions of the Act of 1988 were inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of 1947. To examine this submission it is necessary to notice Section 30 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which reads as follows : "30. Repeal and saving. - (1) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), are hereby repealed. To examine this submission it is necessary to notice Section 30 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which reads as follows : "30. Repeal and saving. - (1) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the application of Sec. 6 of the General clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of this Act." Two things are obvious from a bare reading of the section. Firstly, the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is not excluded. Secondly, it provides that anything• done or any action taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed, shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of this Act. This does not mean that merely because the provisions of the Act of 1988 are in many respects different from the provisions of the Act of 1947, no prosecution launched under the old Act can be continued after the Act of 1988 came into force. That to my mind would be the effect if the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is to be accepted. Fortunately the submission is squarely answered by a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons vs. Director of Enforcement (1993 Criminal Law Journal 197). In that case the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, which also provided for the repeal of the earlier Act by the same name of the year 1947, and further provided that "anything done" . . . . . under the Act hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act". . . . . under the Act hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act". It would thus appear that the saving was expressed in the same terms in the aforesaid Act as it has been expressed in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Further, the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1987 has been made specifically applicable by Section 30 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Supreme Court also considered the effect of Section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. I am tempted to quote from the judgment of the Supreme Court which succinctly declared the law thus : “……………The contention of the respondent that the Repealed Act after the Act had come into force in 1973, the Repealed Act is a dead corpse and no life into it could be blown with the aid of Sec. 81 (2) of the Act or Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. We find no force in the contention. The effect of the repealed Act by operation of Clause (e) of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act read with sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 81 is that, though the Act obliterates the operation of Act 7 of 1947, despite its repeal, the penalty, liability, forfeiture or prosecution for acts done while the repealed Act was in force were kept alive, though no action thereunder was taken when the Repealed Act was in force. The rights acquired or accrued or the liabilities incurred or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred during its operation are kept alive. Investigations to be made or any remedy which may have been available before the repeal be enforced are also preserved. Such rights, liabilities, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, due to repeal "shall not lapse". The saving clause, thus, aimed to preserve the legal effect and consequences of things done though those effects and consequences projected to post repealed period. Investigations to be made or any remedy which may have been available before the repeal be enforced are also preserved. Such rights, liabilities, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, due to repeal "shall not lapse". The saving clause, thus, aimed to preserve the legal effect and consequences of things done though those effects and consequences projected to post repealed period. The things done adumbrated in Sec. 81 (2) or Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act or penalty or punishment incurred would envisage that the things already done or liabilities, penalty, punishment or forfeiture, incurred, though happened before the Act carne into force, Sec. 81 (2) of the Act empowers to effectuate the liabilities, penalties, etc. as if they have been in existence and amenable to be pursued under the Act or under the Repealed Act by operation of Sec. 6 of General Clauses Act. What is unaffected by the repeal of the Act 7 of 1977 is a right accrued etc. There is a distinction between a legal proceeding for enforcing a right acquired or accrued or liability, penalty, forfeiture, punishment incurred and the legal proceedings for acquisition of a right, the former is saved whereas the latter is not. In spite of repeal the right to investigation or to take legal proceedings remain unaffected and preserved as if the old Act continues to be operative. What remains to be done, after the Act came into force, is the quantification, if necessary after due investigation and legal proceedings and if proved to impose the penalty, forfeiture or punishment . . . . . Even in a case of bare repeal accompanied by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the provisions of the new Act will have to be looked into to find where and how far the new Act envisages a contrary intention affecting the operation of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. Unless such contrary intention is manifested, liabilities, penalties, forfeiture or punishment under the Repealed Act will continue to exist and remain in force by operation of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. 5. We have already seen that the Act did not evince any contrary intention. It merely reiterated the earlier law operating in the field. Unless such contrary intention is manifested, liabilities, penalties, forfeiture or punishment under the Repealed Act will continue to exist and remain in force by operation of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. 5. We have already seen that the Act did not evince any contrary intention. It merely reiterated the earlier law operating in the field. Therefore, Clause (d) of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act gets attracted to the acts done or the penalties incurred or forfeiture or punishment had already been committed before the repealed enactment, though no criminal proceedings have been actually initiated under repealed enactment before its repeal." 10. In tile instant case as well the position is the same. There is nothing in the Act evincing contrary intention or affecting the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. It, therefore, logically follows that liabilities, penalties, forfeiture or punishment under the Repealed Act will continue to exist and remain in force, and that action taken shall be deemed to have been done and taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of this Act. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under the new Act the minimum punishment that must be awarded is a sentence of one year but under the Act of 1947, for special reasons, to be recorded by the court, tile punishment could be even less. This to my mind does not advance the case of the petitioner any further. Having regard to the provision of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, the petitioner can be convicted of an offence for violation of a law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an offence. He cannot be subjected to a penalty greater than which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. Obviously, therefore the petitioner can be awarded punishment only under the Act of 1947 and not under the Act of 1988. A penal provision is always prospective and, therefore, the petitioner cannot complain that with the coming into force of the Act of 1988, he will be subjected to a harsher punishment. Obviously, therefore the petitioner can be awarded punishment only under the Act of 1947 and not under the Act of 1988. A penal provision is always prospective and, therefore, the petitioner cannot complain that with the coming into force of the Act of 1988, he will be subjected to a harsher punishment. From the fact that significant changes have been brought about in the Act of 1988, it cannot be inferred that even in respect of rights 8~quired or accrued or the liabilities incurred or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred during the operation of the repealed Acts are obliterated and shall lapse. What has to be seen is whether the new Act evinces any intention not to continue the proceeding in respect of anything done or any action taken or purposed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the repealed Acts. No provision has been brought to my notice which evinces such a contrary intention and, therefore, the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner must be rejected. 11. It was lastly urged that there has been considerable delay and that the petitioner will suffer great hardship if he has to face trial. No doubt, such delays must be avoided but there may be reasons for the delay. Having regard to the nature of the offence, it is not possible to quash the proceeding solely on the ground of delay. However, the trial court is directed to proceed with tile matter with utmost expedition. 12. Since I have found no merit in any of the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner, this application is rejected.