JUDGMENT (ORAL) A.A. Halbe, J. - The petitioner - original party No.2 Abdul Gaffar has challenged the validity of the order under Section 145 (1) Criminal Procedure Code issued against him in Case No. MAG/145/3/94 dated 12.3.1994 by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Quepem basically on the ground that the learned Magistrate has not mentioned the grounds separately, which pursuaded him and which satisfied him to pass the impugned order. The main contention is that although the notice reads: "Whereas I am satisfied on the under mentioned grounds from police report that a dispute is likely to cause breach of peace.. .. ... " those grounds are not at all set out in the said order, and if that be so, this is a case of want of application of mind on the part of the Sub Divisional Magistrate and in that light of the matter, the order should be quashed. According to him, the provisions of section 145 Cr. P.C. rather make it mandatory on the part of the Sub Divisional Magistrate to set out the grounds and if they are not so incorporated, the Magistrate should be prevented from exercising the drastic powers under the said provision. 2. For that purpose, he has relied on 1980 Criminal Law Journal 1151 in the case of Sardari Lal and others v. The State of Punjab wherein the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has laid down that : "The Magistrate must record the grounds of his being satisfied. The order must reflect subjective satisfaction. The Magistrate merely adopting suggestions in the police report would render the order invalid." He has also relied on in the case of Fakirchand v. Bhanaram1 wherein also practically the same ratio has been reiterated: "The provision as to stating the ground of the Magistrate being satisfied as to there being an apprehension of a breach of the peace is mandatory despite the fact that section 145 is adapted to cases of urgency. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast grounds.". In the case of Peria Mannadha Goundar v. Marappa Goundar2, the Madras High Court has also supported the view in following words : "The preliminary order should state clearly the reasons and grounds on which the satisfaction is based and that the Magistrate had applied his mind in passing the preliminary order." In the case of Indira and others v. Dr. Vasantha3, the Madras High Court has also laid down similar observations and they are as follows: "The very jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under this section arises out of his satisfaction of a dispute likely to cause breach of peace either on the report of a police officer or upon other information, which information must be reflected in the order which he should make in writing stating the grounds of his satisfaction. This order which is the sine-qua-non of the proceedings initiated under section 145 Cr. P.C. must require the parties to file the written statement. " The tenor of this observation is that the parties must know the grounds which led the Magistrate to issue the order under section 145 Cr. P.C. Taking support of this ratio, the learned advocate for the petitioner-party No.2 has claimed that the grounds have not been mentioned although it is suggested that the police report has been perused but that does not lead us to believe as to what was the ground which satisfied the learned Magistrate. When he took upon him to mention those grounds separately, he did not do so and that should pursuade this Court to quash this order. 3. This has been vehemently resisted by the learned advocate for the respondent No.2 original party No.2 to the order and the learned advocate for the respondent No.2 has contended that all these arguments shall have to be rejected in view of the clear ratio laid down by this Court in the case of V.K. Rao v. Chandappa4. It is a Division Bench Judgment called for in the reference made to that Court. He has also drawn my attention to the view taken by the Supreme Court which appears on page 226 and according to him, in view of the ratio of this Court, which in turn is supported by the view of the Supreme Court, there is no reason whatsoever to quash the said order. 4. Now in order to resolve this controversy, few facts shall have to be set out. It seems that some dispute has cropped up between party No.1 and No.2 in respect of mining rights of Oiteiro Divodgall. 4. Now in order to resolve this controversy, few facts shall have to be set out. It seems that some dispute has cropped up between party No.1 and No.2 in respect of mining rights of Oiteiro Divodgall. The complaint was filed to the Police Sub Inspector, Sanguem and the facts appear to be that party No.2 - Abdul Gaffar has been putting obstructions in the administration of mining of M/s. Timblo Minerals Pvt. Ltd. There were about two complaints made against Abdul Gaffar. The allegation is that despite the ostensible rights of the company, to administer the mine, Abdul Gaffar with the help of anti-social elements has been preventing the workers of the company from carrying out mining operations. This report is based on several statements of Shrinivas Chari, Martoba Sarwottam Manerkar, Khushali Gaunkar and others. The consistent allegation is that on 11.3.1994 Abdul Gaffar and others, who can well be called as Gundas, tried to physically assault the workers of the said company and thus prevented them from carrying out the mining operation. The report thus clearly gives a ground for the rival claims set out over the said mine. The learned P.P. has tendered the file and it seems that there has been some partnership between Timblo Minerals Pvt. Ltd. and Noor Mohammad Abdul Karim, who is undisputedly father of Abdul Gaffar to operate the above mine. The learned advocate for party No.1 has contended that in pursuance of this partnership deed, the company has right to operate the mine along with party No.2 but by no stretch of imagination party No.2 can prevent party No.1 from operating the said mine. 5. 'The police' report spells out all these aspects and according to the report, the party No. 2 Abdul Gaffar obstructed party No. 1 from operating the mine. The police Sub Inspector, therefore, felt that since both the parties have claims, this is clear 'case which was likely to create breach of peace. He, therefore, filed a report and called for the action under section 145 Cr. P.C. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, as indicated, passed the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. in the words set out here before, and as stated, the word "under mentioned grounds" used by the Sub Divisional Magistrate does not find any support in the subsequent part of the order. No grounds are mentioned. P.C. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, as indicated, passed the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. in the words set out here before, and as stated, the word "under mentioned grounds" used by the Sub Divisional Magistrate does not find any support in the subsequent part of the order. No grounds are mentioned. In this regard, it will have to be stated that although the words "under mentioned grounds" have been stated, there is an observation that those grounds were based from the police report. In I.L.R. 1978 Bombay 205 (supra) it is laid down that although it is advisable for the Magistrate to record the grounds separately, there would be nothing wrong if the Magistrate relies for his satisfaction on the police report. The necessary observations are set out as below: "If the Magistrate has perused the application and satisfied himself that there is a dispute regarding land etc. likely to cause breach of peace, then it is not mandatory for him to set the grounds and the non-stating of the grounds will not vitiate the final order as the stating of grounds in the preliminary order is a matter of procedure." The purport of this observation read along with the previous observations would show that if the Magistrate has perused the police report and felt satisfied then that order can not be faulted with. Merely because the word "undermentioned" has been stated in the order, it can not be said that the Magistrate did not have any materials for his satisfaction. The substance of the order is that the Magistrate was satisfied on the police report and the use of word "undermentioned", to my mind, becomes rather redundant. The main thrust of the order is that the police report was perused and the necessary order was passed. The argument on behalf of party No.2 in this behalf cannot be of any avail. The rulings cited by the learned advocate for party No.2 shall have to be ignored in view of the ratio laid down by this Court. Apart, even the Supreme Court has virtually laid down the same ratio when the Supreme Court observed that there should be something in the order to indicate that the Magistrate had grounds to pass the order. This would, therefore, exclude the requirements of setting out the grounds separately in the said order. Apart, even the Supreme Court has virtually laid down the same ratio when the Supreme Court observed that there should be something in the order to indicate that the Magistrate had grounds to pass the order. This would, therefore, exclude the requirements of setting out the grounds separately in the said order. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in this application. 6. However, the learned advocate for party No.2 has contended that Civil Suit No. 51/94 has been filed by his party in regard to the same subject matter and that the proceedings under Sec. 145 Cr. P.C. should normally emerge in the result of that suit. Even on that count, the proceedings should not survive. No interim orders have been passed in that suit. In that behalf, the learned advocate for party No.1 has laid stress on the observations of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Bisan Pusha Gond v. Mayaram5 wherein the Court observed that mere institution of a civil suit in the Civil Court would not by itself be sufficient to justify dropping of proceedings under section 145 if there is a danger of a breach of the peace which can best be averted by summary proceedings under that section. 7. There is also tendered on record in the case of Sarbhansingh v. Hussain Khan6, wherein also the same view have been inunciated. Since the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. can not be faulted with, the question of entertaining this application would not arise. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. At this stage, the learned advocate for party No.2 seeks stay of this order for four weeks. It is being opposed by the learned advocate for party No.1. Looking to the ratio cited above, there is no ground to stay. Hence rejected. Application dismissed. 1. A.I.R 1957 Punjab 303. 2. A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 411. 3. 1991 Cr. L.J. 1798. 4. 1978 I.L.R. 205 5. A.I.R. 1953 Nagpur 356. 6. 1986 (1) Bom. Cases Reporter 459.