Judgment : ARUNACHALAM, J. ( 1 ) THESE three Habeas Corpus Petitions are disposed of together by a common order, since the detenus concerned are stated to be involved in the same ground crime and most of the arguments advanced are identical. In respect of two of the detenus, one additional ground was urged, which, we will refer to at the appropriate stage. ( 2 ) VARTHAMALAI, petitioner in H. C. P. No. 2363 of 1993 is a friend of detenu Balu Singh, who has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention dated 22. 11. 1993, passed by the first respondent in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (Central Act 46 of 1988) with a view to preventing the detenu from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs (opium ). ( 3 ) PETITIONER Vceramani in H. C. P. No. 2367 of 1993, is the brother-in-law of detenu Madesh, who has been similarly detained in pursuance of an order of detention passed by the same authority on the same day for the same purpose. ( 4 ) AMMANIAMMAL petitioner in H. C. P. No. 2368 of 1993 is the wife of detenu Kandan who has also been detained similarly as the other two detenus by an order passed on the same day by the same authority and for the same purpose. ( 5 ) THE grounds of detention show that on 13. 10. 1993. Jayaraman, Inspector of Police. Narcotic Intelligation Bureau, C. I. D. , Madras, had received reliable information about the prejudicial activities of the detenus and based on the same he proceeded to Dhadhegapatti and surrounded the house bearing door No. 1 E. B. , Singaramuniappankoil Street, at 3 A. M. on 14. 10. 1993. The raiding party reached the first floor entrance of detenu Kandans house. They noticed therein Kandan and Madesh in possession of one suit case each while detenu Balu Singh possessed a blue colour rexine bundle. After observing all legal formalities and informing the detenus of the need to search the house as well as their person search was conducted between 3. 00 a. m. and 4. 30 a. m. in the presence of witnesses. Detenu Kandan produced an ALFA suitcase in which 14. 850 kgs. of opium was found kept in 11 rexine stitched bags. After observing all legal formalities and informing the detenus of the need to search the house as well as their person search was conducted between 3. 00 a. m. and 4. 30 a. m. in the presence of witnesses. Detenu Kandan produced an ALFA suitcase in which 14. 850 kgs. of opium was found kept in 11 rexine stitched bags. Search of yellow colour suitcase produced by detenu Madesh contained similar quantity of opium kept in 11 blue coloured rexine stitched bags. Similarly the rexine bundle produced by detenu Balu Singh contained 11 rexine stitched bags with 14. 850 kgs. of opium. Two separate samples of opium each weighing about 33 grams. were drawn from each of the suitcases and the rexine bundle. The remaining quantity of opium was secured with N. I. B. seal. On further search made in the first floor the Sub-Inspector of Police noticed nine cloth jackets stated to be used for transporting opium from North India. They were seized. None of the detenus had a licence or permit, to keep the opium seized. After informing the detenus, about the grounds for their arrest they were arrested and taken to N. I. B. C. I. D. Office along with seized properties. A crime was duly registered. Statements of the detenus were recorded during investigation which revealed that they were actively indulging themselves in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs. Arrested detenus were produced before Judicial Magistrate No. IV. Salem, and remand obtained leading to lodging them in Central Prison. Salem Chemical analysis of the samples taken reveakd that they were opium. It is also the opinion of the Chemical Examiner that the jackets contained opium. After follow-up action impugned orders of detention were passed. ( 6 ) MR. P. V. Bakthavatchalam learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in atl these Habeas Corpus Petitions advanced common arguments which we will serialize and dispose them of then and there. As far as a single extra ground urged on behalf of two of the detenus we will mention it separately and consider its inherent merits. ( 7 ) THE first ground was that the first respondent, Secretary, Prohibition and Excise Department, Madras, was not specially empowered to pass these orders. We find that the following notification was published by the State Government in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, referring to G. O. Ms. ( 7 ) THE first ground was that the first respondent, Secretary, Prohibition and Excise Department, Madras, was not specially empowered to pass these orders. We find that the following notification was published by the State Government in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, referring to G. O. Ms. No. 887, Home, Prohibition and Excise (VIII) Department, dated 1. 8. 1989. The notification reads as follows: In exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. 1988 (Central Act 46 of 1988) the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby specially empowers the Secretary to Government in charge of Home, Prohibition and Excise Department for the purposes of the Said section. (By order of the Governor) R. Nagarajan. Commissioner and Secretary to Government. T First respondent who has passed these impugned orders is the Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department. We find no substance in the first ground. ( 8 ) THE second ground was that; as. envisaged under Section 3 (2) of the Act, the State Government had not forwarded to the Central Government a report in respect of these orders of detention, made by an officer empowered by it. We find from the original papers placed before us, that the report to be despatched to the Central Government was made ready and. authorised on 1. 12. 1993 and also directed to be forwarded, within the ten days period prescribed. However, the despatch was done only on 6. 12. 1993. It will be our only to scrutinise if there had been substantial compliance of the provision under Section 3 (2) of the Act. The object and purpose behind this provision is to make the Central Government aware of the orders of detention passed under this Act either by the empowered officers or the State Governments, so that it shall not be kept in the dark, further the power of revocation is vested in it. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in Sk. Salim v. State of West Bengal, the stranglehold of stark literalness has therefore to be avoided in order to give a rational meaning and content to the language used in the statute. Of course, the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the word forthwitht used in Section 3 (3) of MISA. Salim v. State of West Bengal, the stranglehold of stark literalness has therefore to be avoided in order to give a rational meaning and content to the language used in the statute. Of course, the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the word forthwitht used in Section 3 (3) of MISA. In that case decided by the Supreme Court, the order had to be approved within 12 or 22 days, as the case may be, and keeping that object in view, the word forthwith was sought to be interpreted. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforestated case, will certainly stand attracted, while interpreting a similar provision under Section 3 (2) of this Act. The mandate under Section 3 (2) of the Act will permit, a test, to find out whether the act was done, with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay and further any prejudice had been caused to the petitioners, by the late making of the report. In our view, if the report stands made without avoidable or unreasonable delay, provisions of the section shall have to be held to have been complied with. We are unable to agree with petitioners counsel on the second ground. ( 9 ) THE next ground urged was, that intimation had not been served on the close relations of these detenus about the fact of these preventive orders and jail in which these detenus stood imprisoned. We find from the papers placed before us, by learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that, a communication dated 27. 11. 1993, was forwarded by the detaining authority by Registered Post Acknowledgement Due, to the wife of the detenu Balu Singh, to her address in Madhya Pradesh State. Ammani Ammal, wife of detenu Kandan and Madhu, wife of Madesh, refused to receive intimations dated 24. 11. 1993 informing them of the twin facts of these preventive orders and the jail in which the detenus stood confined. Further, we find, that all these detenus had been in a position to get ready representations against these impugned detention orders, even on 10. 12. 1993 to be forwarded a little later. The purpose for which intimation prescription was directed in A. K. Roy v. Union of India, and explained in Vasanbarthits case3, certainly stands fulfilled. Further, we find, that all these detenus had been in a position to get ready representations against these impugned detention orders, even on 10. 12. 1993 to be forwarded a little later. The purpose for which intimation prescription was directed in A. K. Roy v. Union of India, and explained in Vasanbarthits case3, certainly stands fulfilled. ( 10 ) THE next ground was, that as far as detenu Balu Singh is concerned, copy of the documents supplied to him in Hindi, the only language known to him, translation of the English material into that language, is rather bad. As far as other two detenus are concerned, they are aware of Tamil language and hence no such complication can arise. Mr. P. V. Bakthavatchalam has placed before us, variations he has been able to note, with the help of a translator, between English grounds and the grounds served in Hindi. The first variation was, that at line 11 of page 1, in English grounds, time has been mentioned as 3. 00 p. m. , which has not been so stated in the Hindi grounds. Secondly, in the Hindi grounds, search period is stated to be between 3. 00 and 4. 00 p. m. while in the English grounds, the said period is stated to be between 3. 00 and 4. 30 p. m. We find that this deficiency is there. But, that cannot ensure in favour of the detenu, for he has been made aware, that soon after reaching the venue of crime, after following due formalities, search stood commenced. The slight difference in the total time taken for search, cannot even remotely be held, as a fact situation, which could have caused prejudice to the case of the detenu. ( 11 ) THE next difference, that was pointed out was, that in the Hindi grounds, mention has, been made, that two sample packets of opium were taken along with 14. 850 kgs. of opium, but English grounds would indicate, that two sample packets were taken from the whole quantity of opium seized. We cannot overlook, that literal translation from one language to another, is well nigh impossible. All that is required in law, is that the substance of the information sought to be conveyed, must be made available to the detenu, in the language known to him. We cannot overlook, that literal translation from one language to another, is well nigh impossible. All that is required in law, is that the substance of the information sought to be conveyed, must be made available to the detenu, in the language known to him. Number of documents have been supplied to the detenu, which indicate, that samples taken out of the whole quantity of opium possessed by him was forwarded to the Laboratory for analysis and that was found to be opium. Infinitesimal and minor errors, which do not affect the core of the communication of these orders and grounds of detention, cannot be taken undue advantage of by the petitioners. ( 12 ) THE next difference pointed out was that Section 8 (c) of the Act mentioned in the English ground, does not find a place in the Hindi version. We are unable to agree, for soon after mentioning P. S. Crime No. 55 of 1993, Section 8 (c) read with 18 of NDPS Act, has been stated. Of course, this numerical 118t1 may look at the first blush as 5, but taken in the context where it stands placed, there cannot be any ambiguity that it must relate to numerical 8 ( 13 ) A similar infirmity about lack of mention of 5. 30 hours in Hindi grounds relating to reaching NIB CID office, was brought to our notice. However, the translator of this Court stated that this time has been mentioned in the Hindi grounds. Even if it is taken, that 5. 30 p. m. has been omitted to be mentioned in the grounds of detention, it is possible to visualise, a continuous course of action taken by police officials from the visit of the scene, of seizure, arrest of the detenus and bringing them to the police office, for interrogation. There is no scope, whatever, for any prejudice on this score. ( 14 ) IT was then pointed out, that in the Hindi grounds (at page 6), it has been mentioned that he can give a vakalat in request form, whereas in English ground, he has been told that he can be represented by a friend, who is not an Advocate. ( 14 ) IT was then pointed out, that in the Hindi grounds (at page 6), it has been mentioned that he can give a vakalat in request form, whereas in English ground, he has been told that he can be represented by a friend, who is not an Advocate. While expatiating the meaning of the words as used in the Hindi grounds, the translator told us, that vakalat used in the Hindi grounds was not with reference to an Advocate, but with reference to a friend who can take up his cause. All that we have stated earlier, that a literal translation cannot be expected, will certainly take care of this infirmity also. ( 15 ) SOME other minor variations were also brought to our notice, but, taking note of the substance of the Hindi grounds and the substancy of the English grounds, we are satisfied that the detenu had been communicated effectively, the purport of grounds, without any ambiguity, whatever, and hence it cannot be argued, that the detenu had been prejudiced in any way, from making an effective representation. We reject this ground, without hesitation. ( 16 ) THE next ground was, that the detaining authority has stated in the grounds of detention, that there was likelihood of the detenu coming out on bail by filing an application before Court, for bails are granted after some time. This statement, according to petitioners counsel, has been made without taking note of the stringent provisions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which makes obtaining of bail, not an easy formality. We have carefully assessed this contention. It is not as though bail is not ordered when offences are committed under NDPS Act, though a procedure of issue of notice to the Public Prosecutor and hearing him on certain aspects, form an integral part of Section 37. All that the detaining authority is expected to be aware is about the fact of remand of the detenu concerned and the imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail by preferring bail applications in Court, which may then lead to commission of future prejudicial activities. All that the detaining authority is expected to be aware is about the fact of remand of the detenu concerned and the imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail by preferring bail applications in Court, which may then lead to commission of future prejudicial activities. While dealing with a similar contention under PITNDPS Act, Supreme Court, in Birendra Kumar Rai Virendra Kumar Rai v. Union of India stated as follows: It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that there was no possibility of the petitioner being released on bail and as such there was no ground or justification for the detaining authority to hold that there was a compelling necessity for the detention of the petitioner. We find no force in this contention. The detaining authority was aware that a bail application had already been filed by the petitioner and the same was to come up for hearing on 7. 12. 1990 and in these circumstances the detaining authority was justified in recording the satisfaction of compelling necessity of issuing the detention order as it could not have been predicated with certainty that the petitioner would not be released on bail. During the course of the arguments of this case before us it was pointed out by the Learned Additional Solicitor General that the bail has been granted in favour of the petitioners and this proves the correctness and legitimacy of the satisfaction of the detaining authority in this regard. There was voluminous documentary evidence placed on record before the detaining authority for passing the order of detention and it cannot be said that there was non-application of mind in passing the impugned order of detention. The voluminous record available with the detaining authority showed that the petitioner was engaged in illicit traffic in the purchase, sale, possession and abetting the export of Narcotic Drugs in the city of Varanasi which is an area highly vulnerable to such illicit traffic. There was enough material for the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the petitioner and his family was engaged in the clandestine business of preparing and selling Heroin for export from India. The compelling necessity, in the view of the detaining authority, as is evident from the grounds is that even in such cases, bails are granted after some time. We are unabable to fault the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. The compelling necessity, in the view of the detaining authority, as is evident from the grounds is that even in such cases, bails are granted after some time. We are unabable to fault the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. ( 17 ) THE next ground was, that based on a solitary instance, impugned order should not have been made by the detaining authority. This ground, we are unable to agree. In Subbash v. District Magistrate, Lucknow, Supreme Court stated that a solitary act of omission or commission, can be taken into consideration for being subjectively satisfied, by the detaining authority to pass an order of detention, if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act was such that it will disturb public tranquillity by creating terror or panic in the society or a considerable number of people in specific locality, where the act was stated to have been committed. In that case, Supreme Court was considering an order of detention passed under the National Security Act on the basis of criminal act, emanating from business rivalry between the detenu and the complainant. In a very recent case, Supreme Court, in M. Mohamed Sui than v. Joint Secretary to Govt. of India, observed as follows: It is urged that a single incident could not afford the basis for arriving at the satisfaction that the petitioner might repeat such acts in the future and it was necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from doing so. We are unable to agree with this contention. An order for preventive detention is founded on a reasonable prognosis of the future be, haviour of a person based on his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may consist of one single act or of a series of acts. It must be of such nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned would be likely to repeat such acts as to warrant his detention (Devu Marto v. State of West Bengal, 1974 (4) S. C. C. 135 = 1974 S. C. C. (Crl) 274 ). The question which, therefore, needs to be considered is whether from the past conduct of the petitioner as set out in the grounds of detention it could reasonably be inferred that the petitioner would be likely to repeat such acts in future. The question which, therefore, needs to be considered is whether from the past conduct of the petitioner as set out in the grounds of detention it could reasonably be inferred that the petitioner would be likely to repeat such acts in future. T In Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, Supreme Court reiterated its view in the following manner: TTThe next submission is that there were no antecedents arid that this being the solitary incident the detention is unwarranted. It is again a question of satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of the material placed before it. Even a solitary incident which has been detected may speak volumes about the potentialities of the detenu and merely on the ground that there were no antecedents the detention order cannot be quashed. The authorities cannot and may not in every case salvage the antecedents but as noted above even a solitary incident may manifest the potentialities of a detenu in the activities of smuggling. We have antecedents of these detenus, from their confessions, which give an insight, to their activities in drug trafficking. This ground cannot ensure in favour of the detenus. ( 18 ) THE next ground was, that samples were seized on 14. 10. 1993 from the detenus, but they were belatedly produced before Court, only on 18. 10. 1993, on which date, they were forwarded to the Laboratory, for analysis. It was brought to our notice, by learned Additional Public Prosecution; that these samples were produced even/on 14. 10. 1993 before Judicial Magistrate No. IV, Salem, and since this crime had to be prosecuted before a Special Court, the properties were taken to that Court on 18. 10. 1993. In between, we find that 16. 10. 1993 and 17. 10. 1993 were holidays, being Saturday and Sunday. We hold that the detenus, cannot have any grievance on this aspect. Further, strictly speaking, this question twill not fall within the arena of habeas corpus, cough it may be available for the petitioners before the trial Court, in the event of a prosecution being launched, on this ground crime. 10. 1993 were holidays, being Saturday and Sunday. We hold that the detenus, cannot have any grievance on this aspect. Further, strictly speaking, this question twill not fall within the arena of habeas corpus, cough it may be available for the petitioners before the trial Court, in the event of a prosecution being launched, on this ground crime. ( 19 ) THE next ground urged was, that though samples, one each, taken from the detenus concerned were forwarded to the Laboratory, no specific identification marks had been given to those samples, and therefore there was a link missing and this had been omitted to be taken note of by the detaining authority. Here again, we do not agree, for out of six samples seized, one each taken from each of the detenus, were forwarded to the Laboratory and all the three of them were found to contain opium. In the event of one or other of the samples not having contained opium, then probably we could have found some substance in this ground. We negate this contention. ( 20 ) IT was then argued, that it was not known, how in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority has stated that 33 grams was taken as sample. Apparently, it is only an approximate estimate. When the sample was taken in the presence of the detenu, after observing all formalities, and such sample was forwarded to the Laboratory, this question cannot arise, while challenging the impugned order of detention, unless there, is material to doubt the whole process, or the availability of that quantity stated to have been sampled. This ground has to be stated, only to be rejected. ( 21 ) THE next ground urged was, that there had been delay in disposal of representations forwarded by the detenus to the Central Government. As far as the State Government is concerned, this ground has not been urged, because with promptitude, representations of the detenus, had been, disposed of. Mr. K. Asokan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent has placed before us the following details. Representations of these detenus are dated 10. 12. 1993. Representation of Balu Singh, posted on 15. 12. 1993, was received by PITNDPS Cell, Central Government, on 29. 12. 1993. On the same day, parawar remarks were called for from the Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu. Representations of these detenus are dated 10. 12. 1993. Representation of Balu Singh, posted on 15. 12. 1993, was received by PITNDPS Cell, Central Government, on 29. 12. 1993. On the same day, parawar remarks were called for from the Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu. The State Government received the communication on 10. 1. 1994. The State Government forwarded its comments on 12. 1. 1994, which were received by PITNDPS Cell on 19. 1. 1994. We find that during this period, there was a postal strike for a few days and substantial time has been lost in postal transit. It will be better to have a look at the holidays that had intervened. 11th, 12th, 18th, 19th, 25th and 26th December, 1993 were holidays. Again, January, 1, 2, 8, 9 and 13 to 16 were holidays. Representation of this detenu stood rejected on 24. 1. 1994. In between 22nd and 23rd January, 1994 were holidays. We are able to find, that there was continuous processing of this representation and at no point of time any lethargy or laxity has been exhibited. Probably, it will be better if communications between Delhi and Madras are forwarded by speed post. But, we are able to visualise delays in postal transit, more so, when there was a postal strike for a few days. We are unable to hold that the Central Government could be faulted on the peculiar facts of this case. As far as the other two detenus are concerned, PITNDPS Cell received their representation on 20. 12. 1993. A letter calling for parawar remarks from the State Government was issued on 23. 12. 1993. Parawar remarks were forwarded by the State Government on 3. 1. 1994, to be received at Delhi on 10. 1. 1994. These representations were rejected on 21. 1. 1994 after due consideration. Holidays mentioned earlier, which had intervened, will equally apply to these representations. We also find these representations, though dated 10. 12. 1993 had been forwarded by Registered Post only on 15. 12. 1993. For all practical purposes, we can take it that the representations were effective only from 15. 12. 1003. We are unable to hold in favour of these detenus also; as far as the manner and the time factor in consideration of their representations are concerned. Delay in postal transit, had been the subject-matter of consideration in a few cases. 1993. For all practical purposes, we can take it that the representations were effective only from 15. 12. 1003. We are unable to hold in favour of these detenus also; as far as the manner and the time factor in consideration of their representations are concerned. Delay in postal transit, had been the subject-matter of consideration in a few cases. We need have to refer to only one of them. In M. L. Jose v. Union of India, it was stated as follows: comments from the sponsoring authority who was admittedly at Cochin in Kerala State which is far away from Delhi, and, some postal delay might have occurred in transmitting the representation from Delhi to Cochin and thereafter the comments from Cochin to Delhi. On the face of the facts of the present case, in our considered opinion, it cannot be said that there was unreasonable delay in consideration and disposal of the representation. Delay is a question of fact and as has been observed by the Supreme Court recently, some leeway may have to be given for administrative delays and in that process, we cannot ignore the possible delays in postal transit. The duty of the Court is to scrutinise, if representations had been disposed of without exhibition of lethargy, slackness or indifference. As stated earlier, on this ground, the detenus cannot succeed. ( 22 ) AS far as the detenu in HCP No. 2363 of 1993 (Balu Singh) is concerned, it was contended that the affidavit of the sponsoring authority was in English and a copy of the same was not supplied in the language known to the detenu. It has often been held by Courts that affidavit of sponsoring authority is only a forwarding note and it need not have to be supplied in every case unless specific material, not otherwise available, stands culled out from the said affidavit. Such a contingency does not arise in this case. It was also contended that certain English words find a place in the grounds of detention, which have not been translated into Hindi and supplied to the detenu, in spite of a requisition made by Balu Singh, through his representation. We have perused the Hindi grounds of detention. The reference to English letters are made only while mentioning NIB CID, S. I. of Police, Crime Number, P. S. (Police Station) and P. C. (Police Constable ). We have perused the Hindi grounds of detention. The reference to English letters are made only while mentioning NIB CID, S. I. of Police, Crime Number, P. S. (Police Station) and P. C. (Police Constable ). Wherever other words are used, they have been translated literally in Hindi. We are unable to visualise any prejudice to this detenu, because of those portions being in English, for in their context, they are easily understandable and those are normal words used even otherwise, whatever be the language. ( 23 ) IT was then argued, that the representations of the detenus had not been placed before the Advisory Board. We find that the Advisory Board met on 21. 1. 1994 and the representations of the detenus stood forwarded to it, even on 20. 12. 1993. As far as detenu Madesh is concerned, it was submitted that English words in Form No. 95 were not translated. This document is in Tamil. There is an endorsement made by the Magistrate on 14. 10. 1993 directing production before the Special Court with weight receipt, and thereafter it was resubmitted. That the property had been produced before the concerned Magistrate, soon after the crime, the detenu was aware of. That would suffice and even with regard to supply of translated copies, the question of prejudice will certainly playa part. We hold that the detenu had not been prejudiced due to non-translation of this portion of Form No. 95 which only relates to return and reproduction of the property before the Special Court. ( 24 ) AS far as detenus Balu Singh and Madesh are concerned, we are unable to find any ground to hold in their favour. H. C. P. Nos. 2363 and 2367 of 1993 shall stand dismissed. ( 25 ) HOWEVER, the case of Kandan, detenu in H. C. P. No. 2368 of 1993 stenos on an altogether different footing. The order of detention and the grounds of detention show, that they had been served, on a person, whose thumb impression had been obtained at 12. 30 noon on 24. 11. 1993. These two documents do not bear any endorsement, as to the person whose thumb impression stood obtained, in those documents. A specific ground was urged by Mr. P. V. Bakthavatsalam, that when the search was conducted, search list was served on this detenu, under his signature. 30 noon on 24. 11. 1993. These two documents do not bear any endorsement, as to the person whose thumb impression stood obtained, in those documents. A specific ground was urged by Mr. P. V. Bakthavatsalam, that when the search was conducted, search list was served on this detenu, under his signature. This detenu is capable of affixing his signature and if that be so, it was rather odd, that his thumb impressions had been obtained in the order of detention and the grounds of detention. It may be, that the detenu had possibly thought of affixing his thumb impression to provide one more ground for challenging his detention, but that cannot weigh with us in this case, without any material and more so when this detenu through his representation had asked the State Government as to the author of those thumb impressions found not only in the order and grounds of detention but also in the paperbook supplied to him. This part of the query made by the detenu, did not evoke any reply from the authorities concerned, though it is a very vital matter. As a matter of fact, on a scrutiny of the detention file, we find that as early as 25. 2. 1994, the Law Department has made a note as follows: The petitioner has contended at TA on page 6 of the affidavit that the detenus alleged signature is obtained in the house search list, but thumb impressions are found in all the documents furnished to him in jail even without an explanation or name of the person who affixed the said thumb impressions. It is seen at para 7 (A) of the draft counter affidavit wherein it is stated that the detenu had not disputed his thumb impression. Hence, the portion at A on page 6 is contrary to particulars furnished at 7 (A) of the draft counter affidavit. TI In spite of such a Note by Law Department, the State Government did not deem it necessary to file a counter-affidavit in this Habeas Corpus Petition alone, which was heard on 16. 3. 1994. As a matter of fact, a specific ground has been taken in this Habeas Corpus Petition about this serious infirmity and hence non-filing of a counter-affidavit on or before 16. 3. 1994, though this HCP was taken on file on 23. 12. 1993, was certainly a serious matter. 3. 1994. As a matter of fact, a specific ground has been taken in this Habeas Corpus Petition about this serious infirmity and hence non-filing of a counter-affidavit on or before 16. 3. 1994, though this HCP was taken on file on 23. 12. 1993, was certainly a serious matter. Not only the authorities were put on notice through the representation, but as well through petitioners affidavit filed in this Habeas Corpus Petition, about this serious infirmity, of very vital nature. The authorities concerned did not deem it fit either to offer an explanation or to put their stand in the counter. Unfortunately, for the State, at the last minute, it was thought fit to hurriedly get ready counter-affidavits and put them before this Court on the next hearing day, when orders were expected to be pronounced. As per as the counter-affidavit of the Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department, is concerned, it is the usual affidavit of denial and hence it does not advance the case of the Government. All that is surprising, is that an intended salvaging supporting affidavit has been filed by Selvaraj, Additional Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras, who was at the relevant time Jailor at Central Prison, Salem. In this affidavit sworn to on 17th March, 1994, after hearing in this batch of Habeas Corpus Petitions had almost reached its termination, on 16th March, 1994, Selvaraj has stated: TI detenu Kandan, son of Kavery Boyan was admitted on 24. 11. 1993 as per the proceedings No. 47335/pande/xv/93-1 dated 22. 11. 1993 by the Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department, Madras 9. The grounds of detention, detention order, affidavit and documents relied upon by the detaining authority were served by me on 24. 11. 1993 on the detenu Tr. Kandan and after service the said detenu has affixed his left thumb impression in my presence. He has further stated, that the left thumb impressions found in all the documents in the booklet supplied to the detenu are that of Kandan only and not any other person. Therefore, he has pleaded for dismissal of the petition of Kandan, as devoid of merits. In this affidavit, Selvaraj has not stated, as to why an endorsement was not made, abutting the thumb impressions that they belonged to detenu Kandan. This is the elementary precaution that one can expect, when service is made of a document. Therefore, he has pleaded for dismissal of the petition of Kandan, as devoid of merits. In this affidavit, Selvaraj has not stated, as to why an endorsement was not made, abutting the thumb impressions that they belonged to detenu Kandan. This is the elementary precaution that one can expect, when service is made of a document. An explanation ought to have been furnished, which is conspicuous by its absence. Be it as it may. The more shocking feature is, that the affidavit of Selvaraj, has been demonstrated to be false, by Mr. P. V. Baktha vatsalam, by reference to the documents available before us. We find, that the detention order and the grounds, stood served on the person whose thumb impression is found on these documents, at Central Prison. Salem, at 12. 30 noon on 24. 11. 1993, service having been effected by Jailor who is none other than Selvaraj, who has sworn to an affidavit before us. While so, we find that the documents book was served, to the person whose thumb impression is found therein, only at 4. 30 p. m. on 25. 11. 1993 and such service was effected by the Superintendent, Central Prison, Salem, a totally different individual other than Selvaraj. If the documents of service show, that the paper book stood supplied, to that person whose thumb impression is found only at 4. 30 p. m. on 25. 11. 1993, it is rather amazing, as to how a sworn statement could have been made by Selvaraj in his affidavit before us that he had served this documents book also relied upon by the detaining authority, even on 24. 11. 1003. Thus service effected on the person, whomsoever it might be, inside Central Prison, Salem, on 24. 11. 1993 and 25. 11. 1993, is open to serious doubt. As a matter of fact, we are impelled to doubt, the manner of service effected, in prisons throughout the State. In one of the prior Habeas Corpus Petitions, we came across an Additional Superintendent of Prisons, deputing a co-prisoner to serve documents on the detenu, and affirming as though they were so served in his presence. Further, in that case, we found that the co-prisoner had forged the signature of the detenu. That was an incident which had occurred in Central Prison, Madras. Further, in that case, we found that the co-prisoner had forged the signature of the detenu. That was an incident which had occurred in Central Prison, Madras. It appears another Officer belonging to the same calibre from Central Prison, Salem, has now been imported to Central Prison, Madras. We are unable to conceive as to how stark falsehood, could be stated in the affidavit, by an officer, in the rank of Additional Superintendent, Central Prison. A claim was made, that any mistake had been committed. We are unable to understand as to how before swearing to an affidavit, this officer did not choose to verify the documents and then affix his signature. Statements on oath made before Courts cannot be taken to be empty formalities, for, on those affidavits, most often decisions are based. We doubt the service of documents on this detenu, though it is quite probable, that he might have been the recipient, but on imagined surmises, we cannot base our conclusions. Either Selvaraj had uttered falsehood or the Jail Superintendent has made a false record of service, or it may be that both of them had committed grave irregularities inside the prison. If the, affidavit of Selvaraj is true, service of paperbook, on 25. 11. 1993, by the Additional Jail Superintendent, on the thumb impression is should be false. On the contrary if service on 25. 11. 1993 is true, the affidavit of Selvaraj must be false. Looked at from either angle, service episode not only shocks our conscience, but also appears to be dubious, more so when the recipient has not been identified in the service record itself. We are unable to attach any sanctity to this alleged communication to detenu Kandan. This is a matter which, requires an immediate and detailed enquiry, not only to prevent instances of this nature in future, but also to preserve the sanctity of service sought to be effected in prisons, more so in cases, where detenus are kept incarcerated, without trial. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor shall inform the State Government about this serious infirmity, so that action shall stand initiated without any delay on the officers concerned. Since, on a prior occasion, when an enquiry was directed by us, documents were stated to be missing, or not available, we have appended to the Court record, the paperbook produced before us by Mr. Since, on a prior occasion, when an enquiry was directed by us, documents were stated to be missing, or not available, we have appended to the Court record, the paperbook produced before us by Mr. P. V. Bakthavatsalam, so that, in the event of an enquiry, it could be made readily available to the investigating agency. Such agency can always take with the permission of this Court, the order of detention and grounds of detention, which were also served on the person whose thumb impressions are found therein, by another officer who was not responsible for the service of the paperbook. Due to this serious infirmity, we are constrained to held, that communication, of the order of detention, grounds of detention and the paperbook, to this particular detenu, is open to serious doubt. On this sole ground, he is bound to succeed. ( 26 ) IMPUGNED order of detention passed against detenu Kandim alone shall stand set aside. Kandan is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless his detention is otherwise required. RC. P. No. 2368 of 1993 alone is allowed. ( 27 ) THE net result is, H. C. P. Nos. 2363 and 2367 of 1993 are dismissed, while H. C. P. No. 2368 of 1993 is allowed. Ordered accordingly. H. C. P. Nos. 2363and 2367of 1993 dismissed. HCP No. 2368 of, 1993 allowed.