JUDGMENT : K.G. Balakrishnan, J. The petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act having its registered office at Madras with an office at Willingdon Island. In the year 1985, one R. Sobhana filed an application before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Quilon, alleging mat her husband, Babu Raj, met with an accident while employed by the petitioner in the work of loading and unloading of "CARE feed" at the Regional Poultry Farm on December 2, 1983. First respondent herein was also impleaded as a party. Although notice was served on the respondents in the case it was not contested and finally the second respondent, Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, passed an award for realising an amount of Rs. 23,100 with interest thereon and directed the first respondent, the Regional Poultry Officer, to pay the amount to the claimant and further directed the petitioner herein to indemnify the Regional Poultry Officer u/s 12(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 2. The Director of Animal Husbandry paid the amount on November 29, 1988. An appeal was filed by the Regional Poultry Officer, Thiruvananthapuram, as M.F.A. 959 of 1988 before this court against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The petitioner also was impleaded as a party. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal. The amount deposited by the Regional Poultry Officer was released to the claimant on December 13, 1989. Thereafter, nothing was heard in the matter. The petitioner has now received Exhibit P-2 notice under the Revenue Recovery Act for payment of Rs. 23,100 with six per cent interest from January 24, 1984. The petitioner challenges the revenue recovery proceedings. 3. I heard the petitioner's counsel. According to the petitioner, issuance of Exhibits P-2 and P-3 notices are illegal and arbitrary, and the petitioner is not liable to pay any amount as the claim is barred by limitation. The petitioner alleges that the amount ordered to be deposited in W.C.C. No. 19 of 1985 was deposited before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation on November 29, 1988, and the amount was released to the claimants on December 13, 1989, and, therefore, the revenue recovery proceedings taken after a period of three years are illegal and if at all the petitioner is liable to pay any amount, the claim is barred by limitation. It is pointed out that a time-barred debt cannot be allowed to be recovered under the Revenue Recovery Act. It is pointed out that a time-barred debt cannot be allowed to be recovered under the Revenue Recovery Act. Reliance is placed on two decisions of this Court in John v. District Collector (1989) 2 KLT 831 , and Nami v. State of Kerala (1987) 2 KLT 921 , wherein it is held (at page 923): "In the absence of a provision creating a substantive right to recover time-barred debts, the Act providing for summary recovery does not avail once the period prescribed for recovery under the Limitation Act has expired." The dictum laid down in the above two decisions is that the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act provide only for an easy mode of recovery of amount and it does not intend to recover time-barred debt. In other words, when the debt is time-barred, the same cannot be recovered by invoking the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. 4. One important aspect to be noticed in the above two decisions is that, in those cases, the debt was time-barred. But in the instant case, the claim against the petitioner is not time-barred for two reasons. Firstly, the amount was paid to the claimant by the first respondent, the Regional Poultry Officer, and the petitioner herein was directed to indemnify the first respondent. By virtue of Section 12(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the petitioner is bound to indemnify the first respondent. The first respondent is a Government Officer and the amount is claimed as if it is an amount due to the Government. If it is an amount due to the Government, u/s 112 of the Limitation Act, a suit could be filed against the petitioner herein within a period of 30 years. Therefore, the amount payable by the petitioner is not barred by time. 5. For yet another reason, the claim is not barred by the limitation. u/s 136 of the Limitation Act for execution of any decree other than granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil court, the period of limitation is 12 years. An appeal filed against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation was dismissed on July 11, 1989. Even though it is not a decree passed by the Civil Court, applying the general principles of the Limitation Act the period of limitation for execution of an order passed under special enactment is taken to be 12 years. An appeal filed against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation was dismissed on July 11, 1989. Even though it is not a decree passed by the Civil Court, applying the general principles of the Limitation Act the period of limitation for execution of an order passed under special enactment is taken to be 12 years. A payment order passed under the Companies Act was held to be enforceable within the period prescribed under Article 136 (People's Industrial Bank v. Mahesh Charan AIR 1926 Oudh 289). In Varghese v. Muthukulam Service Cooperative Society (1980) KLT 400, it was held that the period of limitation for an applicant to get delivery of property sold under an award passed and executed by a Co-operative Registrar is governed by Article 136. 6. Here, the recovery of the amount is being effected as part of the execution proceedings of the order passed by the Commissioner for Work-men's Compensation, So, in any view of the matter, the claim against the petitioner is not barred by limitation. The authorities were justified in issuing notices to the petitioner under the Revenue Recovery Act. The original petition is without any merit and it is dismissed.