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1994 DIGILAW 333 (KER)

F. S. Chhajerh v. Kerala Financial Corporation

1994-09-01

M.M.PAREED PILLAY, V.V.KAMAT

body1994
Judgment :- PAREED PILLAY J. In C. A. No. 123 of 1994 in C. P. No. 5 of 1993 the learned single judge held that under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, the first respondent (Kerala Financial Corporation) has the right to sell the industrial concern, its machinery and equipment in one lot and the landed property with the building separately. The appellant who has taken a loan from the first respondent and defaulted payment sets forth the contention that the industrial concern as such alone can be sold and it cannot be sold piecemeal. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the first respondent has the authority to sell the machinery and equipment as one lot and the landed property with the building separately. The learned single judge, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, held that fairness and equity demand the sale of the assets of the appellant-company in liquidation at the earliest and any delay in the sale on technical grounds would only result in loss to all concerned. The learned judge further held that the attempt of the appellant is to deliberately delay the proceedings. Advertisements were published on earlier occasions for the sale of the industrial concern as a whole as directed by the court at that time. As that became not feasible, the learned single judge granted permission for the sale of the machinery and the property with the building separately. Wide publicity of the sale has been ordered by the learned judge. The contention of the appellant is that under section 2(c) of the Act "industrial concern" has been defined and in view of the definition the unit can only be sold as such and not on piecemeal basis as ordered by the learned single judge. There is no merit in the above contention as section 29 of the Act does not place any embargo on the power of the financial corporation while exercising its power under the section. Section 29 enables the financial corporation to proceed against the defaulting creditor to realise the dues to it. The section also enables the financial corporation to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern when default in repayment of the loan advanced has occurred or when the concern fails to comply with the terms of the agreement with the financial corporation. The section also enables the financial corporation to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern when default in repayment of the loan advanced has occurred or when the concern fails to comply with the terms of the agreement with the financial corporation. In such a situation, this section gives ample power to the financial corporation not only to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern but also the right to transfer by way of lease or sale to realise the amount due from the industrial concern. The transferee under section 29(1) gets all rights in the property as if the transfer had been made by the owner of the property. Sub-section (2) makes the position clear. Sub-section (5) states that in a case where the financial corporation has invoked the power under sub-section (1) it becomes the owner of the concern and it can sue or be sued in the name of the concern. Thus, from a reading of section 29 the indubitable position is that the financial corporation which has invoked this section can be deemed to be the owner of the concern and the transferee gets full rights in the property transferred. There is nothing in section 29 to hold that the financial corporation has its limitations in leasing or selling the property in a situation warranted under this section. Once action is taken under section 29, it is perfectly open to the financial corporation to sell the machinery and equipment if deemed necessary and in the circumstances of the case. In a situation where the financial corporation finds that bidders are not available to purchase the industrial concern as a unit and that the sale of machinery and equipment in one lot and sale of the landed property separately would subserve its interest, viz., realisation of the amount due to it, nothing prevents it from doing so. The contention of the appellant that the learned single judge went wrong in allowing the first respondent to sell the machinery and equipment as one lot and the landed property with the building separately is not tenable. The contention of the appellant that the learned single judge went wrong in allowing the first respondent to sell the machinery and equipment as one lot and the landed property with the building separately is not tenable. Learned counsel for the appellant cited Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U. P. Financial Corporation, and contended that instead of selling the property the learned single judge ought to have taken necessary steps to see that the industrial concern is continued as such without being fragmented and sold. In that decision, the Supreme Court only stated that wherever possible an industrial unit should not be permitted to perish but should be tried to be revived and that the financial corporation should avoid arbitrariness in dealing with the matter. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the said ruling has no application. The learned single judge has found that any delay in the sale of the unit on technical grounds would result in loss to all concerned. It is the common case that the machinery of the industrial unit would get further rusted and it may not be useful for the purpose of production of any other units. Taking that into consideration the learned single judge held that the sale of the machinery and equipment as one lot would be beneficial to the parties concerned. Another contention of the appellant is that section 529A of the Companies Act overrides the provisions contained under section 46B of the State Financial Corporations Act and so the first respondent cannot be allowed to exercise its power under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act. Learned counsel relied on Kerala Financial Corporation v. Official Liquidator for the above submission. John Mathew J. held in the above decision that under section 529A of the Companies Act workmen's dues are made an overriding preferential payment pari passu with the debts due to secured creditors and the non obstante clause in the said section has to prevail over section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act. John Mathew J. held in the above decision that under section 529A of the Companies Act workmen's dues are made an overriding preferential payment pari passu with the debts due to secured creditors and the non obstante clause in the said section has to prevail over section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act. The said ruling has no application to the facts of the case in hand as in the present case it is seen that the permission was granted by the learned single judge in C. A. No. 136 of 1993 to the first respondent (Kerala Financial Corporation) being a secured creditor of the appellant-company to sell the industrial concern invoking the provisions of section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act. That being the position, it is futile to contend that in view of section 529A of the Companies Act, section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act cannot be invoked. There is no merit in the appeal. M. F. A. is dismissed.