Judgment N. L. TIBREWAL, J. ( 1 ) NON-PETITIONER No. 1 Dhiraj Kulshreshta is author of an article title Adalat Katghare Meint which was published in Maya, a monthly magazine published by non-petitioner No. 5 Non-petitioner No. 2 Shri Alok Mitra is Chief Editor of the magazine, Shri Babulal sharma is Joint Editor of the magazine and Shri Triloki Nath Srivastava is Deputy Editor, Printer and Publisher of the magazine (Delhi ). This magazine claims itself to be having largest sale, as is evident from the claim made on page 1 of the magazines 31st May, 1992 edition of Maya magazine was published and circulated, this Court on 27. 5. 1992 took notice of the article and prima facie came to the conclusion that the said article scandalises or tends to scandalise this Court and lower or tends to lower the authority of this court. On the basis of the above conclusion the Court suo motu took cognizance of contempt against the author of the article, the Chief Editor, the Joint Editor, and Dy. Editor (Delhi), Printer and Publisher of Maya. In its order dated 27/5/1992 the Court extracted some portions of the article but at the same time recorded that the extracted portion of the publication and the entire article goes to show that a clear and calculated attempt has been made to scandalise or lower the authority of this Court. In response to the notice issue by the Court, Shri Prem Krishna Sharma, Advocate, and other Advocates appeared on behalf of the non-petitioners. On an application filed by non-petitioner No. 5 for grant of exemption from personal appearance on the ground of his poor health, the Court granted him exemption from personal apperance. Similar exemptions were granted to non-petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4 on 14/9/1992. Non-petitioner No. 5 filed written submissions written he stated that he has got all respect for the judiciary of India including this Honble High Court and that be cannot even think of bringing the High Court into contempt or scandalise the judiciary. He stated that even if there is a slight unintemational effect of the article amounting to Contempt of Court, he tenders unconditional apology. He stated that even if there is a slight unintemational effect of the article amounting to Contempt of Court, he tenders unconditional apology. He also stated that even though he is official printer and published of the Magazine but owing to his old age and indifferent health, he is not personally going through each and every article before it is published. At the same time the non-petitioner has adopted the contentions raised by Shri Dhiraj Kulshreshta in his reply. Non-petitioner No. 4 has submitted a statement indicating that he is Sub-Editor under the Delhi Bureau of the Magazine and he has no connection with the publication of articles in the Magazine at Allahabad. He is in no way connected with the article published in the Magazine was sent by the Rajasthan Bureau. He, therefore, prayed that notice issued against him may be discharged. Reply filed by non-petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are more or less on the same lines on which non-petitioner No. 5 has filed his reply. Non petitioner No. 2 has made an additional statement that being the Chief Editor of the Magazine he is legally and normally responsible for the article published in the Magazine and, therefore, he cannot shift his liability on any of the other non-petitioners. He states that he accepts his ultimate libaility and he undertakes to abide by all orders to be passed by this Court. Non-petitioner No. 1 has filed a detailed reply. In the beginning has used the same expression which has been used by non-petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 5 and has stated that even if there is slight uninternational effect of the article which constitutes Contempt of Court, he tenders his un-conditional apology. He has, however, proceeded to make detailed submissions regarding the law of contempt by making reference to the decision the Supreme Court in P N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar and Others and In Re : S. Mulgaokar; A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 727. He has then stated that Rajasthan High Court Bar Association had started agitation and had levelled certain charges about functioning of the Court and headlines under the title of the article makes a mention of this fact in the beginning he has made reference to letter written by the Bar Association. He has then stated that Rajasthan High Court Bar Association had started agitation and had levelled certain charges about functioning of the Court and headlines under the title of the article makes a mention of this fact in the beginning he has made reference to letter written by the Bar Association. He has also stated that as a conscientious journalist, it was his duty to investigate the matter and the causes which led to the situations in which lawyers were bycotting the Courts and the litigating party was suffering. He has stated that to restore the faith in a system, no escapism or sidelining the issue will do and that the system will have to be cleaned. For that purpose carpet will have to be rolled, the dirt will have to be faced and the. bull will have to be caught by the horns if corruption is to be weeded out. He has stated that whatever has been mentioned in the article is not the authorts finding or his own produce but they are the allegations made by the Bar Council, the Bar Association and eminent lawyers. He has also referred to the fact that a press conference was called by the Rajasthan High Court Bar Association copies of certain correspondence have been made available to the members of journalist fratenity and that the article is only truthful reproduction of what was said in the press conference and what has been written in the documents supplied to him. He has reproduced the name of S/shri Surresh Pareek, President, Rajasthan High Court Bar Association, S. R. Surena, Virendra Dangi, Vimal Choudhary, B. L. Sharma and others. He has went on to plead that article does not in any manner obstruct or interfere with the Courts of justice or due administration of law but actually strengthens the hands of High Court to take firm steps in wedding out the bad and unworthy in the system for which the High Court has itself taken steps by removing or compulsorily retiring a number of judicial offices in process. ( 2 ) THE other petition has been filed by Shri M. M. Ranjan, Advocate. Shri Ranjan has stated that being a Member of the Bar in Rajasthan since 1977, he is deeply interested in the welfare and high reputation of the judiciary. ( 2 ) THE other petition has been filed by Shri M. M. Ranjan, Advocate. Shri Ranjan has stated that being a Member of the Bar in Rajasthan since 1977, he is deeply interested in the welfare and high reputation of the judiciary. He has stated that the article published in Maya Magazine in its 31st May, 1992 issue, scandalises and lowers down the authority of the Court. The article attributes improper motives to the Honble Judges of the Court and cannot be termed as fair and bonafide criticism. Instead of it amounts to gross Contempt of Court. ( 3 ) NON-PETITIONER No. 1 has filed a reply to the application filed by Shri M. M. Ranjan, Advocate. He has questioned the locus standi of Shri M. M. Ranjan of filing this application by stating that Shri Ranjan has also participated in the programmes organised by the Bar Association, like, bycotting of the Courts. It has also been stated by the non-petitioner that the contempt petition filed by Shri Ranjan is not maintainable in the eye of law. ( 4 ) IN support of the motion 9f contempt, learned Advocate, General and the Additional Advocate General with their usual tenacity argued that the article written by non-petitioner No. 1 and which has been published in the Maya Magazine has been worded printed and published with a deliberate intentional and calculated design to scandalise the High Court as well as the entire judiciary of Rajasthan. The article as a whole brings the entire judiciary in disrepute by lowering down its dignity and authority and it clearly tends to weaken the confidence of people in the dispensation of justice in the judiciary of Rajasthan. Learned Advocate General argued that there is a malicious attack on Honble the Chief Justice and a number of Judges of the Court inasmuch as false imputations and charges have been levelled against them and disparasing remarks have been made against them. Those who read articles will certainly see the judiciary in poor light and this would definitely interfere with the administration of justice. Shri B. P. Agarwal submitted that what the Court is required to see is the effect of the publication. Mensrea or motive in the publication of article is wholly irrelevant. Those who read articles will certainly see the judiciary in poor light and this would definitely interfere with the administration of justice. Shri B. P. Agarwal submitted that what the Court is required to see is the effect of the publication. Mensrea or motive in the publication of article is wholly irrelevant. He submitted that even though the Courts have recognised the right of the press and the Public to criticise the judgments but this right cannot be used to scandalize the Court or to disrepute that entire system. Shri Agarwal submitted that even though the members of the Bar, who have made unwarranted utterance against the Judges of the Court have not been impeladed as a party, the non-petitioners cannot claim immunity from punishment for having committed contempt of Court. Shri P. K. Sharma and other learned Counsel for the non-petitioners, vehementally argued that peoplets right to know is an important constitutional right and the press has a duty to report happening of various events in the administration including the High Court Claim punishment for having committed contempt of Court. Shri P. K. Sharma and other learned Counsel for the non-petitioners, vehementally argued that peoples right to know is an important constitutional right and the press has a duty to report happening of various events in the administration including the High Coon. Claiming the shelter of Article 19 (1) (a), Shri Sharma. and other learned Counsel argued that the article is merely a report of the events which had happened in the Rajasthan High Coon and the petitioner had never intended to bring the authority to law into disrepute. Shri Sharma submitted that the motive of the writer is an important factor which has to be borne in mind while considering whether a person is guilty of Contempt of Court and the Court cannot under-rate the duty of a reporter. Even if an erroneous reporting is made by a person, he cannot be punished under the law of contempt. Learned Counsel argued that even if the report is reckless or unrefines, it cannot be said that the author of the report has intended to bring the entire Court into disrepute. Even if an erroneous reporting is made by a person, he cannot be punished under the law of contempt. Learned Counsel argued that even if the report is reckless or unrefines, it cannot be said that the author of the report has intended to bring the entire Court into disrepute. Shri Sharma made elaborate reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in P. N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar and others (supra) and other decisions in support of his submission that the article in question is not intended to shock the confidence of the public rather it is intended to inform the public of the facts. Shri Sharma further submitted that the non- petitioner have tendered unqualified apology and, therefore, there is no ground for penalising them, Apology submitted by the non-petitioners is bonafide and they have done so at the threshold. By submitting the detailed reply what the non-petitioners have done is to explain the circumstances in which the article was written and was got published in the press. ( 5 ) WE have given our thoughtful consideration to the entire matter. The abstract of the article unmistakably shows that the article not only criticises the system but brings the entire working of the judiciary in Rajasthan to disrepute in the eyes of public. The statements made in the. article are clearly intended to lower the authority of Court in the eyes of public. This publication cannot under any circumstances be described as a part of the duty of press to report the happenings in. the Rajasthan High Court. The language used in the article cannot be construed as an expression of opinion of the individual over the working of the system. Rather it clearly and designedly brings the entire system of administration of justice to ridicule. We do not at all wish to say that criticism of the judgments is not permissible but if a cricism of the judgment or a Court or a Presiding Officer, tends to scandalise the Court or the System of dispensation of justice or lowers its authority or brings the authority of the Court in disrepute, certainly the act of the person who make such writing as well as the act of person who is responsible for printing or publication of such writing is liable to be held guilty of Contempt of Court. The petitioner is not a regular reporter of the magazine. He has described himself to be a free-lance journalist. Article written by him docs not simply makes a reproduction of what others have said but he definitely made an attempt to castigate the entire judicial system in Rajasthan. He has unmistakably cast a doubt on the integrity of the judges of the High Court of Rajasthan and particularly those sitting in the Jaipur Bench. The Court is not much concerned with the mere motive of the non-petitioner in writing the article or printing or publishing thereof but the effect which this article has caused on the whole system in Rajasthan. ( 6 ) IN Mohd. Yamin v. Om Prakash Bansal a Division Bench of this Court was concerned with a similar publication made in newspaper Prasant Jyoti. Reference was made to the opinions expresses by several members of the Bar but at the same time the author of the article has expressed his own opinion over the matter. An objection was raised by the non-petitioner before the High Court that the matter published in the article does not relate with any proceeding pending in any Court and in any case the matter published is considered to be false and defamatory. Any proceeding for contempt can be taken but the remedy lies for taking proceeding for defamation by the persons who are alleged to have been defamed. It was further pleaded that the allegations made by the news items are the contents of the representation given by 25 Advocates of Jaipur in 1977 to the President of India, the copies of which were also given to other dignitaries and if at all the contempts has been committed, the same stood committed on 5. 11. 1977 by the Advocates of Jaipur. It was pleaded that Advocates who made the representation are necessary parties and unless they are made parties, the Court cannot proceed with the matter. While rejecting this objection, the Court ruled that mere a vailability of an alternative forum of proceedings by way of action for defamation does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court. to initiate contempt proceedings. The Court also rejected the plea that merely because the Advocates to whom the statements were attributed, were not parties to the contempt proceedings could not proceed. to initiate contempt proceedings. The Court also rejected the plea that merely because the Advocates to whom the statements were attributed, were not parties to the contempt proceedings could not proceed. It held that even if Advocates had not been made parties, no immunity can be claimed by the petitioner in respect of the publication made by him. In Pennekemp v. Florida, Frank Furter, J. observed If men including Judges and journalists were angeles there would be no problems of Contempt of Court. Angelic Judges would be undisturbed by extraneous influences and angelic journalists would not seek to influence them. The power to punish for contempt as a means of safeguarding Judges in deciding on behalf of the community as impartially as is given to the lot of men to decide is not a privilege accorded to Judges. The power to punish for Contempt of Courts is a safeguard not for Judges as persons but for the function which they exercise. It is a condition of that function indispensable for a free society that in a particular controversy pending before a Court and awaiting judgment, human beings however strong should not be torn from their mornings of impartiality by the under tow of extraneous influences. In Brahma Prakash v. State of U. P. , their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated the parameters of proceedings for Contempt of Court had observed: that there are two primary considerations which should weight with the Court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by scandalising the Court itself. In the first place the reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duty, would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the fight of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in Courts can be created. In the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, case should be taken to distinguish between what is liable on a Judge and what amounts really to Contempt of Court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the Judge is concerned does not necessary make it a contempt. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the Judge is concerned does not necessary make it a contempt. Thus, in our opinion it can be laid down as a rule of law that action alone can be taken by proceeding in libel and no action can be taken for Contempt of Court even though the action scandalise the action of a Judge in his official or judicial capacity. . . ; In E. M. Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanna Nambiar, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: The law of contempts stems from the right of the Courts to punish by imprisonment or fines persons guilty of words or acts which either obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. The Court further held Where, therefore. a person charged the judiciary as an instrument of oppression and the Judges as guided and dominated by class hatred, class interests and class prejudice, instinctively favourings the rich against the poor, it is clearly in attack upon Judges calculated to raise a sense of disrespect and distrust of all judicial decisions. It weakens the authority of law and law Courts and the person is person is guilty of Contempt of Court. That the persons did not intend any such result cannot serve as a justification. In Rama Dayal Markarha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court pointed out the settled distinction between the reasonable criticism of a judgment and the criticism of a Judge and observed: Fair and reasonable criticism of a judgment which is a public document or which is a public act of Judge concerned with, administration of justice would not constitute contempt. In fact, such fair and reasonable criticism must be encouraged because after all no one, much less Judges, can claim infallibility. A fair and reasonable comment would even be helpful to the Judge concerned because he will be able to see his own shortcomings, limitations or imperfection in his work. The society large is interested in the administration of public justice. Such a criticism may fairly assert that the judgment is incorrect or an error has been committed both with regard to law or established facts. It is one thing to say that a judgment on facts as disclosed is not in consonance with evidence or the law has not been correctly applied. Such a criticism may fairly assert that the judgment is incorrect or an error has been committed both with regard to law or established facts. It is one thing to say that a judgment on facts as disclosed is not in consonance with evidence or the law has not been correctly applied. Ordinarily, the judgment itself will be the subject matter of criticism and not the Judge. But when it is said that the Judge had a pre-disposition to convict or deliberately took a turns in discussion of evidence because he had already resolved to convict the accused, or he has a ways-ward bend of mind, is attributing motives, lack of dispassionate and objective approach and analysis and pre-judging of the issues which would bring administration of justice into ridicule if not infamy. When there is danger or grave mischief being done in the mailer of administration of justice, the animadversion cannot be ignored and viewed with placid equanimity. If the criticism is likely to interfere with due administration of justice or undermine the confidence which the public rightly repose in the Courts. of law as Courts of justice, the criticism would cease to be fair arid reasonable criticism as contemplated by Section 5 but would scandalise Courts and substantially interfere with administration of justice. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others, these Supreme Court once again indicated the scope of the jurisdiction of High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 129 and 215 of the Contempt of Courts Act and held: (1) The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the authority of Court. The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commits for Contempt of Court, not to protect the dignity of the Court against insults or injury, but, to protect and vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice is not prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. The power to punish for contempt is thus for the protection of publics justice, whose interest requires that decency and decorum is preserved ill Courts of Justice. Those who have a discharged duty in a Court of Justice are protected by the law, and shielded in the discharge of their duties. Any deliberate interference with the discharge of such duties either in Court or outside the Court by attacking the Presiding Officers of the Court, would amount to criminal contempt and the Courts must take serious cognizance of such conduct. In Pritam Pat. v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, the Supreme Court once again dwelt upon the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India and observed: Where an Advocate practicing in a High Courts after having failed to wrench a decision in his favour in his own case which he prosecuted as party in person has escalatingly scandalized against the sitting Judges of that High Court which are scurilous, highly offensive, vicious, intimidatory, fallacious and beyond condonable limit the same amounts to a flagrant on laugh on the independence of the judiciary, destructive of the orderly administration of justice and a challenge to the supremacy of the Rule of Law. Even a cursory reading of the remarks made against the learned Judge of the High Court unambigously showed that the potentially prejudicial utterances and the outrageous allegations rumbustiously and invectively made by the contemnor with malicious design of attempting to impairs the administration of justice have struck a blow on the judiciary and also seriously sullied the image, dignity and high esteem which the office of the Judge of the High Court carries with it and thus impeded the course of justice by fouling its source and steam. The maxim "salus populi suprema lex", that is the welfares of the people is the supreme lawt adequately enunciates the idea of law. This can be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully, judicially without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted, and this cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained. The maxim "salus populi suprema lex", that is the welfares of the people is the supreme lawt adequately enunciates the idea of law. This can be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully, judicially without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted, and this cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained. The judgment of Supreme Court P. N. Dua v. P. Shiv Shanker and Others (supra) son which much emphasis has been laid by Shri Prem Krishna Sharma, learned Counsel for the non-petitioners, arose out of a case in which the then Law Minister of India was charged with the allegation of having castigated the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court felt that the speech of Minister was to be read in a proper perspective and it was done so, the said speeches did not bring the administration of justice. The observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the judgment are:this, of course, if true is a criticism of the laws. The Supreme Court as it is bound to do has implemented the laws and in implementing the laws, it is a tribute to the Supreme Court that it has not discriminated between persons and persons. Criminals are entitled to be judged in accordance with law. If antisocial elements and criminals have benefited by decisions of the Supreme Court, the fault rests with the Jaws and loopholes in the legislation. The Courts are not deterred by such criticisms. Bearing in mind the trend in the law of contempts as noticed before, as well as some of the decision noticed by Krishna Iyer, J. in S. Mulgaokars case (A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 727) (supra) the speech of the Minister read in its proper perspective, did not bring the administration of justice. In some portions of the speech the languages used could have been avoided by the Minister having the backgrounds, of being a former Judges of High Court. The Minister perhaps could have achieved, his purpose by making his language mild but his facts deadly. With these observations, it must be held that there was no imminent danger of interference with the administration of justice, nor of bringing administration into disrepute. In that view it must be held that the Minister was not guilty of Contempt of this court. With these observations, it must be held that there was no imminent danger of interference with the administration of justice, nor of bringing administration into disrepute. In that view it must be held that the Minister was not guilty of Contempt of this court. In Vincent Panikulangara v. V. R. Krishna Iyer, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that criticism or comment upon the Courts, Judges or the judicial system coming from a person, whose bona fides in the cause of judiciary is not open to doubt, cannot be termed as mala fide or dishonest. In S. Mulgaokars (supra), also a somewhat similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court. In Hargovind Dayal v. G. N. Verma, the Supreme Court held that a contumacious conduct be equated with a criminal contempt. ( 7 ) THESE decisions clearly lay down the principle that while bare criticism of a judgment delivered by a Judge, cannot be treated as contempt but a writing, or publication, which tends to lower the authority of law and brings the system of administration of justice into disrepute, certainly amounts to Contempt of Court. In each case where the con tempts proceedings are initiated, the Court has to consider the totality of the circumstances in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether cc empts been made out or not. Even though we recognise the importance of the role required to be played by the press in a democracy and greater latitude is to be givens to the press in its reporting about the proceedings of the Court and even its criticism of the judgments, the press has to act as a responsible medium and it cannot be given unbridled discretion to criticise the Judges in person in their working. It cannot be accepted that the press has got a right to make unfounded allegations against the Judges in the garb of printing the view of Advocate or public. ( 8 ) IF in the light of above principles the impugned articles is once again closely scrutinished, we are fully convicted that by writing the article T1adalat Katghare Meint Dhiraj Kulshreshta (nonpetitioner) has clearly brought the entire system of administration of justice il) Rajasthan into disrepute. ( 8 ) IF in the light of above principles the impugned articles is once again closely scrutinished, we are fully convicted that by writing the article T1adalat Katghare Meint Dhiraj Kulshreshta (nonpetitioner) has clearly brought the entire system of administration of justice il) Rajasthan into disrepute. It was not merely an attempt to inform the public about the alleged abnormal situation who was going on and it is not a case of erroneous reporting, but a clear attempts to malign the entire judiciary of Rajasthan. Whatever may have been the intention of the non petitioner, there can be no manner of doubt that reading of the whole article written by the non petitioners leaves an indelible imprint on the mind of public that judgments in the High Court are rendered otherwise than on merit and that they are far from being fair. Thus, we hold non petitioner Dhiraj Kulshreshta guilty of Contempt of Court. ( 9 ) OF the other non-petitioner, non-petitioner No. 4, as stated that he is Sub-Editor of the Delhi Bureau of the magazine and, therefore, no finding can possibly be recorded against him. Non- petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 5 are the Chief Editor, Joint Editor and Publisher of the Maya magazine. They have not disputed that they have been responsible for the printing and publication of the article written by non-petitioner No. 1 and since non pethioner No. 1 has been found guilty of Contempt of Court, these non-petitioners are also held guilty of Contempts of Court. ( 10 ) COMING to the question of punishment we may first refer to the argument of Shri Prem Krishna Sharma, learned Counsel for the non-petitioners; with reference to non-petitioner No. 5, that he is an old person of 85 years of age. Looking to his old age we refrain from imposing any penalty on him excepts administering a warranting to him to be careful in the matters of publications made in the magazine. ( 11 ) REGARD to others non-petitioners, we find that although they have filed their unconditional apology for the article in question, in our considered opinion the apology tendered by them is not bonafide. The apology tendered by the non petitioners is neither free nor it is an act of contrition. There is no indication in the replies filed by these non-petitioner free nor it is an act of contrition. The apology tendered by the non petitioners is neither free nor it is an act of contrition. There is no indication in the replies filed by these non-petitioner free nor it is an act of contrition. There is no indication in the replies filed by these non-petitioners that they have genuinely felt sorry for writing and for publication of the article. In Om Prakash Kumawat v. N. K. Bairwal, a Division Bench of this Court has considered the nature of unconditional apology and the circumstances in which it should be accepted. Taking into consideration the observations made in that judgment and also the fact that the apology tendered by the non-petitioners cannot be considered as a free and frank admission of guilt and cannot be treated as an act of contrition, we reject their unqualified apology. ( 12 ) NOW comes the questions of punishment. Ordinarily the Court has to be magnanimous in such matter but the Court has also a duty to see that the administration of justice does not suffer and the people do not get any impression that justice is done on considerations which are not fair or are extraneous. It is high time that the faith of people in the systems of administration of justice is established because that is sine qua non for the survival of the democracy. Since non-petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 have been found guilty of Contempt of Court, we deem it proper to impose a sentence of one monthts imprisonment on non-petitioner No. 1, who is author of the article, and a fine of Rs. 1,000. 00. If he fails to pay the fine, he shall undergo additional simple imprisonment of seven days. Non-petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are punished with fine of Rs. 1500. 00 each. In case of failure of the non-petitioners Nos. 1 and 3 to pay the fine, they shall undergo simple imprisonments of 15 days. ( 13 ) IN view of the decision given by us in petition No. 2212/92, we do not consider its necessary to make an adjudication on the objections which have been raised by Shri Sharma, learned Counsel for the Hon-petitioners, to the maintainability of contempt petition filed by Shri M. M. Ranjan. Contempts Petition allowed.