Judgment BABOO LAL JAIN, J. 1. This is am application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure made by the M/s. Shalimar Paints Limited, the defendant in Title Suit No. 44 of 1986 Ashoka Deb and Anr. v. Shalimar Paints Limited ). The said suit was instituted by the plaintiffs, decree holder on or about 24th March, 1986, inter-alia for eviction of the petitioner. The writ or summons was served upon the petitioner and the petitioner appeared in the suit through advocate and prayed for time to file its written statement. Such time was granted to the petitioner on several occasions. The petitioner also made an application before the Trial Court under section 17 (2)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The petitioner, however did not file any written statement. On 14th July, 1987, the time to file me written statement was again extended at the prayer of the petitioner till 27th November, 1987. On 27th November, 1987 the petitioner did not appear nor prayed for any further extention of time to file its written statement and the suit was fixed for exparte hearing as no written statement was filed with in the extended time. The suit was adjourned for exparte hearing from time to time on 17th February, 1988, 11th May, 1988, 29th July, 1988. Ultimately, on 3rd October, 1988 being last adjourned date, the suit was taken up for exparte hearing and the evidence was taken. On the said date, the suit was adjourned for orders on 4th October, 1988 and an exparte decree was passed on 4th October, 1988. It appears that no steps were taken on behalf of the petitioner from 27th November, 1987, until the said exparte decree was passed. 2. THEREAFTER, on 13th February, 1989 the petitioner filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said application was marked as Misc. Case No. 8 or 1989. On the same date, that is 13th February, 1989 the petitioner filed an application under Section 151 of the code of Civil Procedure for stay of operation of the exparte decree. On 29th March, 1989 the petitioner filed an application is Title Execution Case no. 4 of 1989 for stay of execution was rejected by the Assistant District judge, First Court, Alipore. On 17th April, 1989 the said application for stay filed in Misc. On 29th March, 1989 the petitioner filed an application is Title Execution Case no. 4 of 1989 for stay of execution was rejected by the Assistant District judge, First Court, Alipore. On 17th April, 1989 the said application for stay filed in Misc. Case No. 8 of 1989 was rejected by the First Assistant district Judge. The said application in Misc. Case No. 8 of 1989 was disposed of by an order No. 23 dated 17th April, 1989.Thereafter on 26th June, 1989 the petitioner made an application before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the aforesaid Order No. 23 dated 17th April, 1989. The Division bench of this Court directed the matter to appear as a contested application two weeks hence and ad-interim stay of all further proceedings was ordered in the meantime. The said application is not before us. 3. ON 16th June, 1989 the petitioner filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, before the First Assistant District Judge for condonation of delay in making the aforesaid pending application under order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being Misc. Case No. 8 of 1989. On 22nd June, 1991 and 29th June. 1991 the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was heard by the First Assistant District Judge, Alipore. On 20th July, 1991 the petitioner's said application for condonation of delay was rejected by the order No. 44 dated 20th July, 1991. 4. THEREAFTER on 9th November, 1991 the present application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed in this Court. On 28th November, 1991, the Division Bench of this Court gave directions for service of the copies of the application on the opposite parties and also granted an interim order staying further proceedings in the execution case as prayed for with liberty to pray for extension thereof upon filing of the affidavit of service as directed. On 31st January, 1992 the opposite parties appeared and directions were given for hearing of the application as a contested application. It was ordered that the interim order will continue until further orders. On 31st January, 1992 the opposite parties appeared and directions were given for hearing of the application as a contested application. It was ordered that the interim order will continue until further orders. The said Order No. 44 dated 20th July, 1991 which is the subject matter of this revision application precedes on the basis that the petitioner delayed in filing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application under Order 9, Rule 13 was filed on 13th February, 1989, that is, about 4 months and 9 days after the exparte decree was passed. The time allowed under law for such application being 30 days, there was a. delay of about three months and nine days. Whether, the said application under Order 9, Rule 13 which was marked as Misc. Case No. 8 of 1989, is to be allowed or not is a matter to be considered at the time of the final hearing of the said application under Order 9, Rule 13 on its merits. 5. THE only point which was material for consideration while considering the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is whether the delay in filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13, which was, in fact, filed on or about 13th February, 1989, should be condoned or not. Ordinarily, the application for condonation of delay should also have been filed on the 13th February, 1989 since the application under Order 9, rule 13 was filed on the said date, that is, 13th February, 1989. 6. THE Court below observed that the petitioner under Section 5 of the limitation Act was filed six months after the petitioner acquired knowledge of the exparte order dated 12th January, 1989. Before the Court below, the petitioner tried to explain by a long story of consultation of legal exparte at every stage and the petitioner tried to shift the responsibility upon his legal adviser at different stage which was not accepted by the court below. It was on record that several adjournments were obtained before filing of written statement. Under such circumstances, the Court below held that failure to take steps to file written statement and allow the suit to be heard exparte could not be construed as a wrong advise given by his lawyer. Further, it was observed that the petitioner himself acquired the knowledge of the exparte order dated 12th January, 1989. Under such circumstances, the Court below held that failure to take steps to file written statement and allow the suit to be heard exparte could not be construed as a wrong advise given by his lawyer. Further, it was observed that the petitioner himself acquired the knowledge of the exparte order dated 12th January, 1989. He could not attribute his fault to his legal exparte for delayed filing of a petition under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court on an identical matter, in the case of Salil Dutta v. T. M. and M. C. Private ltd. , reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185 , observed that the advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal, i. e. the party who engaged him. Though in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an exparte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq case must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. The suit in the present case was an ongoing suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private Limited Company with its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. But one thing is clear- they had chosen not to cooperate with the court. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. But one thing is clear- they had chosen not to cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask any indulgence, putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a thing which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted. In that case, the suit for ejectment was filed against the company and on identical ground was advanced in that case which had been advanced in this also. The Supreme Court observed that the defendant-company was not a rustic ignorant villager but a Private limited Company with us Head Office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies, and it was clear that the said company has chosen not to co-operate with the court and under such circumstances, the company had no right to ask for any indulgence, putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally, unaware of the nature of significance of the proceedings is a thing which could not be accepted and ought not have been accepted. Relying the said/decision of the Supreme Court we are of the view that the court below was right in not exercising discretion in favour of the petitioner by condoning such a long delay in the facts and circumstances of the case. Further, it is also well settled principle that when discretion has been exercised by the court below on proper consideration of all relevant materials, the High Court would be very slow in interfering which such discretionary exercise of power and unless the clear case of illegality and/or total failure of exercise of powers have been made out, the court could not interfere. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the Learned Trial Judge. There is absolutely no ground for interfering by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this case and accordingly the petition is rejected. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the Learned Trial Judge. There is absolutely no ground for interfering by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this case and accordingly the petition is rejected. Let this order be communicated to the Court below as the Court of the opposite parties.