A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a society registered under the Societies registration Act, 1860, and it is also registered under the Bombay Public Trusts act, 1950. According to the petitioner it runs Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital at Anand. The petitioner prays that the respondent authorities be directed to finalise the land acquisition proceedings in connection with the acquisition of the land for the hospital of the petitioner-Society which was initiated pursuant to notification dated 10/06/1982 issued under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act"), It is also prayed that the respondent authorities be directed to issue notification under Sec. 6 of the Act pursuant to the notification under Sec. 4 dated 10/06/1982. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is registered as Society under the appropriate provisions of the Act some time in the year 1971. Earlier in the year 1971 the petitioner applied to the Government for acquiring land for the petitioner-Society. The government issued notification under Sec. 4 of the Act on 24/07/1977. However, for a period of three years no actions were taken pursuant to the notification. Therefore, the notification lapsed. Thereafter by notification dated 10/06/1982 issued under Sec. 4 of the Act the Government declared its intention to acquire the following lands of village Anand, district Kheda. Survey No. Approximatearea s. No. 2299 Sq. m. T. P. Scheme No. 2 3100-68-75 f. P. No. 673 s. No. 2299 1329-46-25 t. P. Scheme No. 2 f. P. No. 682 s. No. 1456/2 359-60-00 t. P. Scheme No. 2 f. P. No. 682/1 after publication of the aforesaid notification, it appears that interested parties submitted their objections. The Government considered the objections and took decision not to issue declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. This decision is reflected in letter dated 30/11/1983 written by the Government to the Collector, Kheda. The letter is produced at Annexure h to the petition. As disclosed in the letter, after careful consideration the Government had decided not to make declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. Therefore, the Collector, kheda, was asked to cancel the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, before the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act was cancelled, the petitioner approached this Court on February 16, 1984 and prayed the reliefs as stated hereinabove. This Court admitted the petition on 4/07/1984. Therefore, the Collector, kheda, was asked to cancel the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, before the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act was cancelled, the petitioner approached this Court on February 16, 1984 and prayed the reliefs as stated hereinabove. This Court admitted the petition on 4/07/1984. However, before this date, on 2/03/1984 this Court had passed the following order "ad-interim relief against cancellation of Sec 4 notification. " it is an admitted position that this ad-interim relief has continued to be in operation till today. ( 4 ) IT appears that respondents No. 5 and 8 who are the owners of the land in question applied for being joined as party respondents. On behalf of them affidavit-in-reply is filed by one of them on 3/07/1984. As disclosed in the affidavit-in-reply they were tenants of the land in question. They became owners of the land on account of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1947. They purchased the land as provided under Sec, 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands Act, 1947. It is inter alia contended on their behalf that the petitioner-Society is in substance and reality not a public trust. It is a one-man show. It is in fact not a public institution, but a family institution run by one Dr. V. H. Dave. Respondents have mentioned the names of the trustees in para 4 of the affidavit indicating the interrelations of the trustees. It is also contended that there was no need whatsoever for Homoeopathic college and hospital inasmuch as one such Homoeopathic College and hospital was already functioning at Anand itself. It is also contended that if the land is to be acquired for the purposes of a society like the petitioner- society, provisions of Secs. 6 to 37 of the Act cannot be put into force unless the previous consent of the appropriate Government is obtained as provided under Sec. 39 of the Act. It is also contended that the relevant provisions of the Rules regarding Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 have not been complied with. ( 5 ) THE petitioner has filed affidavit-in-rejoinder and has contested the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, for deciding this petition it is not necessary to go into the rival contentions raised by the parties. ( 5 ) THE petitioner has filed affidavit-in-rejoinder and has contested the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, for deciding this petition it is not necessary to go into the rival contentions raised by the parties. Learned Counsel appearing for the State Government of Gujarat and Secretary, Revenue Department, gandhinagar, has contended that in view of the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Act, proceedings initiated by Sec. 4 notification dated 10/06/1982 has lapsed. He has relied upon proviso to Sec. 6 which inter alia provides that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by notification under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 4 shall be made after expiry of three years from the date of publication of the notification. In the instant case the period of three years has expired on 10/06/1985. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the aforesaid provision of Sec. 6 would not be applicable in view of the Explanation to Sec. 6 (1) of the Act. In his submission in computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Sec. 4 (1) is stayed by order of the Court is required to be excluded. It is submitted that in the instant case, this court by order dated 2/03/1984 has stayed the acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the entire period from 2/03/1984 onwards till today has to be excluded from calculating the period of three years as provided in the first proviso to Sec. 6 (1) of the Act. ( 7 ) THE contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that this court did not stay any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of notification under Sec. 4 of the Act. In other words, this court did not stay acquisition proceedings. This Court on the contrary directed the Government not to cancel Sec. 4 notification. To put it differently, the Government was restrained from proceeding backward. There was no restriction placed by the Court on the Government in proceeding further with the acquisition. Learned Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 5 to 8 has also supported the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the Government. To put it differently, the Government was restrained from proceeding backward. There was no restriction placed by the Court on the Government in proceeding further with the acquisition. Learned Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 5 to 8 has also supported the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the Government. ( 8 ) THE order passed by this Court on 2/03/1984 cannot be construed to mean that any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Sec. 4 was stayed by this Court. As stated above, this Court did not restrain the Government from proceeding further with the acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the contention that there was order of the Court restraining the Government from taking further action pursuant to Sec. 4 notification has no merits. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nandoliya v. State of gujarat, reported in AIR 1991 SC 2153 [1992 (2) GLR 1591 (SC)]. It was a case which arose out of the judgment and decision rendered by this court which is reported in [1992 (2)] XXXIII (2) GLR 1581. In that case, after the notification under Sec. 6 of the Act dated 12/05/1988 was issued, it was challenged by the land owners by filing Special Civil application in the High Court. On the prayer for interim relief for stay of the operation and implementation of the said notification, the High Court granted only limited interim relief on 9/08/1988, restraining the government from taking possession of the lands of the petitioners. The interim relief continued to be operative. In response to the notice under Sec. 9 (1) of the Act the land owners appeared before the Land Acquisition officer concerned and raised objection that as two years had elapsed after publication of the notice making declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act, and no award had been made within the said period, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the said land had lapsed. This contention was rejected by the land Acquisition Officer. This decision was challenged by the petitioners before the High Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 7685 of 1990. This contention was rejected by the land Acquisition Officer. This decision was challenged by the petitioners before the High Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 7685 of 1990. The High Court rejected the petition, holding that provisions of Sec. 11- a of the Act provides that the entire period during which any action or proceeding to be taken pursuant to the declaration under Sec. 6 is stayed by an order of the competent Court is required to be excluded. The matter was carried before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has confirmed the decision of the High Court. ( 10 ) THE question before the High Court was whether the Explanation to Sec. 11-A was confined to the stage of making of the award pursuant to Sec. 6 notification or it covered in its sweep the entire period during which any action or proceedings should be taken in pursuance to the declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. The High Court took the view that it covered the entire period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance to the declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. The supreme Court has confirmed the view of this High Court. The Supreme court has held that it is not confined to stay of the making of the award pursuant to Sec. 6 of the notification. Thus, it is found that the aforesaid decision is of no help to the petitioner. The question before this High court and before the Honble Supreme Court was not the same as it has been raised and required to be considered in this petition. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the earlier part of para 8 of the reported decision. The Honble Supreme Court has stated that the Explanation to Sec. 11-A of the Act is in the widest possible terms; that there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Sec. 11 of the said Act. By referring to this observation it is submitted that when this Court directed the Government not to cancel the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act, this would also amount to staying "any action or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the Act". By referring to this observation it is submitted that when this Court directed the Government not to cancel the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act, this would also amount to staying "any action or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the Act". ( 12 ) THE submission cannot be accepted. The observations made in para 8 of the decision by the Honble Supreme Court are in the context of the facts and circumstances of that case. The Honble Supreme Court has not laid down the law that the order by which the Government may be restrained from cancelling Sec. 4 notification be construed as order of stay restraining the government from taking any action or proceeding pursuant to Sec. 4 notification. As observed hereinabove, this Court never restrained the Government from taking any action or further proceeding pursuant to Sec. 4 notification. This Court restrained the Government from cancelling Sec. 4 notification. This Court did not restrain the Government from completing the acquisition proceedings. There was no stay or injunction order passed by this Court restraining the Government from taking any action or further steps in the direction of completion of acquisition proceedings. ( 13 ) IN this connection it would be appropriate to refer to the following observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in para 8 of the reported decision". . . it appears to us that the Explanation is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Sec. 6, is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the land-holder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the land-holder who seeks" the benefit must not have obtained any order from a Court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under Sec. 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those land-holders who do not obtain any order from a Court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in taking a similar view in the impugned order. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in taking a similar view in the impugned order. "thus, as stated by the Honble Supreme Court, the object of the provision is to confer benefit on the land-holder. If the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, it would frustrate the very object of the provision. In the instant case, the land owners had not obtained any stay from any competent Court. Moreover, there was no stay obtained by anyone else restraining the Government from taking any action or proceeding further pursuant to Sec. 4 notification. Therefore, if the argument is accepted, it would lead to absurdity and would frustrate the very object of conferring benefit upon the land owners. Such an interpretion cannot be accepted. ( 14 ) IN above view of the matter, the proceeding initiated by the Government pursuant to Sec. 4 notification dated 10/06/1982 has lapsed on expiry of the period of three years as provided in the first proviso to Sec. 6 (1) of the act. In this view of the matter, the prayer made in the petition cannot be granted. ( 15 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the petition is rejected. Rule discharged. Ad-interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. .