JUDGMENT D. P, Sood, J.—In this regular second appeal defendant No. 7 is the appellant. The sole substantial question of law urged before this Court is: "Whether respondents 7 to 10 (legal representatives of late Shri Lai Singh), who are not parties to the suit, had a right to prefer an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court before the District Judge?” 2. In order to appreciate the controversy in question narration of material facts is absolutely essential: "S/Shri Kuram Dutt and Sangat Ram, sons of Shri Kewal Ram, one of the mortgagees out of four brothers, namely, Kewal Ram, Tulsi Ram, Kalu and Karam Singh, purchased one-half share of the suit land with specific numbers to the extent of 9 bighas 15 biswas from one Shri Man Singh. Initially, land belonging to one Smt. Brikmu. She had gifted her entire land including the suit land vide gift deed dated 30-10-1967 in favour of said Man Singh subject to a condition that the donee (Man Singh) would continue to maintain her by paying cash amount of Rs. 35 per month. That gift was revoked by a subsequent decree passed in favour of Smt. Brikmu and against Shri Man Singh aforesaid to the extent of one-half share in the entire property earlier gifted to donee referred to above. There had been no partition in between the predecessor«in-interest of the parties. Thus, Smt. Brikmu and Shri Man Singh continued to have one-half share in the joint Khata." 3. Thereafter Man Singh aforesaid sold land to the extent of 5-6-0 bighas vide registered sale deed dated 17-11-1976 in favour of Karam Singh, defendant, now appellant before this Court. The plaintiffs, now respondents 1 and 2, namely, S/Shri Karam Dutt and Sangat Ram filed the instant suit in the court of learned Senior Sub-Judge, Kullu for declaration that second sale effected through registered sale deed dated 17-11-1976 by Shri Man Singh, now being represented through his legal representatives, being in excess to his share, is void. Defendant Karam Singh, now appellant, only contested the suit before the trial Court. The trial Court decreed the suit holding the plaintiffs to be the owners of the land measuring 9-15-0 bighas contained in specific khasra numbers detailed in the head note of the plaint, out of one-half share of late Shri Man Singh. Defendant Karam Singh, now appellant, only contested the suit before the trial Court. The trial Court decreed the suit holding the plaintiffs to be the owners of the land measuring 9-15-0 bighas contained in specific khasra numbers detailed in the head note of the plaint, out of one-half share of late Shri Man Singh. It further held that the plaintiffs having no right, title and interest in the other one-half share earlier owned by Smt. Brikmu, had no locus standi to file the suit and Bis suit for declaration without possession on this part of the suit land was held not maintainable. Hence, to this extent the suit was dismissed. 4. Respondents 7 to 10 (Legal representatives of late Shri Lai Singh), who were not parties to the main suit in the trial Court, feeling aggrieved with the judgment and decree" of the trial Court filed the appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, who vide his order dated 5th August, 1985 held that said respondents (appellants before the first appellate court) had locus standi to institute the appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It further held that defendant No. 5, Karam Singh (now appellant), could acquire the ownership and possessory rights of Shri Man Singh to the remaining land measuring 0-8-0 bighas and not to the land measuring 5-6-0 bighas as shown in the second sale deed dated 17th November, 1976. On account of the outcome of this appeal, defendant Karam Singh had filed the instant appeal. 5. At the very outset, it may be noted that the respondents (now - appellants) had admitted before the first appellate court that there was no partition effected between late Smt. Brikmu and Shri Man Singh (since deceased) and both remained in joint khata. Consequent thereto, they obtained a consent decree by way of modification of the decree passed by the trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree. 6. As regards the locus standi of respondents 7 to 10 to file the first appeal, suffice it to state that an appeal being a continuation of the suit, a person may be added as a party to it, even at the stage of the appeal, provided his addition is necessary "in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit". The questions involved in the suit mean and include only those questions that are involved in the suit between the parties to it, who are already on the record and cannot include those questions that may subsequently arise between them and the person who seeks to be implead-ed as a party to the suit. I am supported in taking this view by the cases, namely, Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 AP 195 ; Moti Ram Roshan Lal v. District Committee, Dhanbad, AIR 1962 Patna 357 ; Vaithilinga v. Tadasiva, AIR 1926 Mad 836 and Haridatt Sharma v. M/s. Jaikishan Shamlal & Sons and others, AIR 1983 J & K 29. The court is not precluded under Order I Rule-10 of the Code of Civil Procedure from striking out the name of any party improperly joined or addition of any person, who ought to have been joined for the purpose of passing an effective and executable decree for the perpose of resolving all the questions involved in the suit. 7. In the instant case, even as per the pleadings of the plaintiffs, late Shri Man Singh was not competent to effect the sale of property in excess to his share to defendant No. 5, Karam Singh, now appellant in this second appeal. Both had been impleaded as defendants. Though in the initial stage, the plaintiffs sought a decree for declaration that the suit land contained in specific khasra numbers detailed in the plaint are in their exclusive ownership and possession, yet subsequently during the pendency of the appeal by consent decree after making an admission that no partition of the land originally belonging to Smt. Brikmu had been effected, the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court was got modified. In other words, affected party was Karam Singh, now appellant in this appeal. No relief by the plaintiffs had been claimed against Lai Singh, now being represented by his legal representatives. The cause of action has not been changed nor the nature of the suit in any way has been effected thereby. In other words, affected party was Karam Singh, now appellant in this appeal. No relief by the plaintiffs had been claimed against Lai Singh, now being represented by his legal representatives. The cause of action has not been changed nor the nature of the suit in any way has been effected thereby. Even otherwise, under Rule 33 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate court had the power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order-as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are, passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees. 8. In the instant case, the trial Court has categorically decided as to what was the remaining share of late Shri Man Singh after the sale of suit land to the plaintiffs and thereafter the first appellate court has considered as to what rights Karam Singh, now appellant could get under the sale deed, in that view of the matter coupled with the fact that no relief had been sought against respondents 7 to 10 i. e. legal representatives of late Lai Singh, they were proper parties and the first appellate court did not commit any legal error in having allowed them to join and file the appeal. 9. As regards application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by defendant Karam Singh, now appellant, suffice it to state that dismissal or allowing it would not have in any way affected the relief claimed by the plaintiffs or defence raised by this defendant inasmuch as the question as to the rights of Man Singh in the remaining property and his right to sell the same, were involved for final determination of the courts below. Thus, this point cannot now be allowed to be raised, particularly when late Lai Singh now being represented through respondents 7 to 10 was merely a properly party in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 10. Before parting with this appeal, it may be clarified that both the courts below have failed to advert to the pleadings of the plaintiffs and modify the decree in terms thereof. Plaintiffs themselves claimed to be one of the four joint mortgagees. Further according to their own pleadings, plaintiffs had purchased the suit land subject to the rights, of other three mortgagees, his mortgage rights being lesser rights than to that of ownership, having merged into the bigger rights. Thus, purchase of the land by the plaintiffs was subject to the rights of other three mortgagees which remained unaffected. In that view of the matter, the courts below could have passed a decree subject to the rights of other three co-mortgagees, namely, S/Shri Tulsi Ram, Kalu and Karam Singh. Karam Singh is defendant No. 5 in the original suit and now appellant before this Court. Thus, the first appellate court should have modified the decree that plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land in the joint khata of all the co-sharers, however, subject to the rights of the aforesaid mortgagees. It is an error apparent on the face of the record and this Court is not precluded from correcting the decree to that extent under its inherent powers in order to finally adjudicate upon and settle all the questions in controversy arising in between the parties to the instant lis. Thus, to this extent the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court stands modified. 11. The appeal stands disposed of in terms of the above, with no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -