Judgment : This revision is directed against the order in I. A.No.599 of 1993 in O.S.No.576 of 1991 in the Court of District Munsif of Valliyur. The parties to the suit are the sons and daughters of one Chithiraputhira Thevar and Sivanupillaiammal, The sons filed that action against the sisters for declaration and injunction in respect of an extent of 45. 0 hectares in S.F.No.537 of Valliyur village stating that it is their ancestral property and after the death of their father, their mother and sisters have executed a relinquishment deed in their favour in respect of this property on 25. 1971 and the plaintiffs alone are exclusively in enjoyment of this land. It appears that O.S.No.749 of 1990 between the same parties in respect of some other property is also pending trial. And defendants have instituted O.S.No.309 of 1991 in that Court seeking partition in respect of the present suit property and other items. The revision petitioner/ second defendant came forward with I.A.No.599 of 1993 under Sec.10, C.P.C. praying for stay of the trial of present O.S.No.576 of 1991 till the disposal of O.S.No.309 of 1991. The revision petitioner has sworn in the affidavit in support of the application that the decision in O.S.No.309of 1991 would bind both the parties in the other two suits and proceedings with the trial of all the suits would give room for rendering of conflicting decisions. The respondents/ plaintiffs opposed that application stating that an earlier application filed by the present revision petitioner under Sec.10, C.P.C. praying for the very same relief has already been dismissed as not pressed and, that dismissal order is a bar to the maintainability of the present application. Besides, the subject matter of the suit and issues in controversy in the three suits are different and all the parties in O.S.No.309 of 1991 are not on record in the present action. 2. The trial court in the impugned order dated 20.4.1993 has extracted the averments in the plaint and counter and after formulating the point for determination, again repeated the respective contentions of both sides and dismissed the application holding that the contentions of the respondents are acceptable. It has not gone into the merits and demerits of the respective claims and given reasons for its conclusions. It is practically a non-speaking order. 3. It has not gone into the merits and demerits of the respective claims and given reasons for its conclusions. It is practically a non-speaking order. 3. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that in view of the laconic order passed by the court below, the matter has to be remitted with a direction to give a finding considering the respective contentions of both sides. He further argued that this Court cannot substitute its own reasoning for the order of the lower court and a specific finding on the compliance of the ingredients of Sec.10, C.P.C. is necessary. However, I am unable to accept this submission of the revision petitioner. Merely because the court below has not written a proper order, the matter cannot be sent back simply for the purpose of writing the order as per the requirements of O.20, Rule 5, C.P.C. 4. The revision petitioner is unable to convince the court as to how this petition is maintainable in view of the fact that an earlier application I.ANo.149 of 1993 filed by him seeking the same relief has been dismissed as not pressed. He has placed reliance on Lachiram v. Tarachand, 71 M.L.J. 490, where it has been held that there is difference between the dismissal of suits and dismissal of execution applications. In the case of dismissal of execution petitions for default or on the ground that they are not pressed, the only point that is decided is that that application is dismissed and there is no bar in the way of a fresh application being made, if necessary the very next clay with the same prayer. That is settled law, and unless it can be said that there was a decision or adjudication which either directly decided the question on which the parties are at issue or which must be deemed to have impliedly decided it on the ground that the order could not have been made without such implied decision having been arrived at, the plea of res judicata cannot operate or apply. But as pointed out by the learned Judge in this decision, the court below therein while laying down the general proposition to the effect that dismissal for default operates equally as res judicata and that dismissal even when the application is not pressed has the same effect has failed to take into account the difference between the dismissal of suits and dismissal of execution applications. Learned Judge also pointed out that non-pressing of the application docs not mean that the decree-holder has accepted the defendant’s objection, and there was no question of abandonment of the issue or any acceptance of the plea put forward by the judgment-debtor. The question that arose between the parties has not been decided cither expressly or impliedly. Whereas in the present case having asked for stay of the proceedings in one case till the disposal of the earlier action and not pressing the application would undoubtedly mean that the claim had been abandoned. 5. In Aftab Almed v. Naziruddin, A.I.R. 1977 Del. 121, a single Judge of Delhi High Court has held that the effect of O.23, Rule 1 read with Sec.141, C.P.C. is that once an application has been presented claiming a relief and it is not pressed and is dismissed, a subsequent application on the very same ground is barred. In Narain Singh v. Ram Gopal Madan Lal, A.I.R. 1981 Del. 88, along with a suit filed for a declaration under the Arbitration Act, the plaintiff (appellant) filed an application for injunction under O.39, Rules 1 and 2 restraining the defendants from proceeding with arbitration. On contest by the defendants the counsel for the plaintiffs did not press his application and got it dismissed by the court. There was no prayer for leave to file a fresh application on the same cause of action. On contest by the defendants the counsel for the plaintiffs did not press his application and got it dismissed by the court. There was no prayer for leave to file a fresh application on the same cause of action. The plaintiffs again filed a fresh application for injunction which was dismissed by the court for want of a prima facie case having been made out by the plaintiffs and also on the ground that no irreparable injury should be caused to the plaintiffs if the relief of injunction was not granted.On appeal by the plaintiffs against the order of dismissal of the application it was held that the said application for temporary injunction decided by the impugned order was barred under O.23, Rule 1(4) read with See.141 which made the procedure applicable to suits applicable to all civil proceedings such as an application of injunction. Hence the plaintiffs application was not maintainable. It therefore follows that an order on an interlocutory application at one stage of the case is, binding in all subsequent stages of the same proceeding under general principles of law, unless the order leaves the matter open for reconsideration at a later stage. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 993, even if the Rule of res judicata docs not apply it would not follow that on every subsequent day on which the suit stands adjourned for further hearing, the petition could be repeated and fresh orders sought on the basis of identical facts. I, therefore, find no merit in this civil revision petition. 6. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No cost.