JUDGMENT Taron Chatterjee, J. M/s. Mahindra Engineering & Chemical Products Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Company) is the appellant before us. The plaintiff/respondent Ashoke Kumar Ghosh, was appointed as Deputy Sales Manager of the Company by entering into a contract of service. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff/respondent, Ashokc Kumar Ghosh, was appointed as Deputy Sales Manager of the Company by entering into a contract of service. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff/respondent, Ashoke Kumar Ghosh against the Company for the following reliefs: (a) A decree declaring that the plaintiff has been illegally pressurised by the defendants to make over charge of his present post of Dy. Sales Manager on 20.9.94 in violation of the terms and conditions of his appointment letter and the plaintiff is still in his present employment at the Calcutta Office of the defendant No. 1 and entitled to monthly salary and other benefits which the plaintiff enjoyed so long: (b) ...... a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from terminating the service of the plaintiff from his present post of Dy. Sales Manager at Calcutta Office of the defendant No.1. 2. This suit was filed on 30th of September, 1994. On the same date an application for grant of temporary injunction under Order 30 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the plaintiff-respondent. The said application for temporary injunction was moved for an ex parte order of injunction restraining the company-appellant from terminating the service of the plaintiff-respondent from his present employment as Deputy Sales Manager till the disposal of the application for temporary injunction. By the order under challenge in this appeal, the learned Judge, 5th Bench, of the City Civil Court at Calcutta granted an ex parte ad interim order of injunction restraining the Company-appellant from terminating the service of the plaintiff-respondent as Deputy Sales Manager, till disposal of the application for temporary injunction. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the grant of ad interim order of injunction, the Company-appellant has come up to this Court in appeal. 4. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the grant of ad interim order of injunction, the Company-appellant has come up to this Court in appeal. 4. Before us two questions are raised on behalf of the Company-appellant against the aforesaid order under challenge in this appeal, the first ground of attack is that before granting ex parte injunction, the learned Judge ought to have recorded the reasons that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay if such ex parte injunction is not granted in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, the second ground is that in view of the admitted fact that the relationship between the plaintiff and the Company was that of an employee and employee of personal nature, the suit itself with the prayer for injunction cannot be said to be maintainable in view of Ss. 14 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, the question of grant of injunction in a suit of this nature cannot arise at all. 5. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent however, contests the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant company. 6. After hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and after going through the materials on record, including the plaint and the application for injunction, we are, however, of the view that the learned Judge erred in passing the order under challenge in this appeal. The reasons are as follows: So far as the grant of ad interim order of injunction is concerned, it is now well settled that before granting an ex parte ad intaim order of injunction, it is the duty of the Court to record the reasons that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay if such ex parte injunction is not granted to the plaintiff. In the case reported in 1993 (3) SCC 161 (Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Municlpal Corporation of Delhi & Ors.), the Supreme Court has observed at page 177 in paragraph 35 as under: "As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reason for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. But any ex parte order should be in force upto a particular date before which the plaintiff should be required to serve the notice on the defendant concerned * * * *" (Emphasis supplied). 7. In view of the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court, it was, therefore, mandatory on the part of the learned Judge, at the time of passing the ad interim order of injunction to give reasons for grant of such ex parte ad interim order of injunction. On perusal of the impugned order we do not find that any reason has been given by the learned Judge at the time of passing the ad interim order of injunction excepting that in one line it has been stated that delay would defeat the purpose of granting injunction. Therefore, on that ground alone the order under challenge is liable to be set aside without going into the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to an order of injunction in a suit of this nature in view of s. 14 read with s. 41 of the Specific Relied Act. But Mr. Chatterjee, at the time of hearing of the appeal, insisted us to go into this question at this stage and pressed for a decision on this question. Such being the stand taken on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent, we have no other option but to go into the question as to whether in a suit of the nature, order of injunction should be passed during the pendency of the suit. 8. In view of the prayer made by Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent, we take up the question as to whether, in the admitted facts of this case and in view of the reliefs claimed and the nature of the suit, the application for injunction can be allowed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. 9. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent submitted before us that although the relationship of the parties is of a master and servant, even then the Court has power in an appropriate case to grant injunction in a suit of this nature. In support of this contention, he relied on a decision reported in 1971 (3) All E.R. 1345 (Hill vs. C.A. Parsona & Co. Ltd.). Taking inspiration from the observations of Lord Denning, made in that decision, Mr. In support of this contention, he relied on a decision reported in 1971 (3) All E.R. 1345 (Hill vs. C.A. Parsona & Co. Ltd.). Taking inspiration from the observations of Lord Denning, made in that decision, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that in an appropriate case there is no bar to grant injunction even in a case of master and servant. He also relied in this connection on another decision in the case of Chappal and others vs. The Times Newspapers Ltd. and others [197 5 (2) All E.R. p. 233]. In our view, the aforesaid decision of Lord Denning cannot be applied in view of s. 14(1)(b) read with s. 41 of the Specific Relief Act. Furthermore, the said decision of Lord Denning (supra) was taken up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Dagree College, Shamli & Ors. vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. ( AIR 1976 SC 888 ). In paragraph 21 of the said decision, the Supreme Court, in respect of the aforesaid decision of Lord Denning has observed as follows: "As against this position Mr. Ramamurthi counsel for the plaintiff/ respondent submitted that in Hill vs. CA. Parsona & Co. Ltd. (1971) 3 All E.R. 1345 a declaration that the termination was invalid was granted by the Court. In that case, however, it was pointed out that the declaration was granted under very special circumstances of that case where the employee was said to be removed from service almost at the fag end of his carrer after serving for 35 years when he was due to retire only two years later. In that case, however, Lord Denning laid down that in the absence of any special circumstances, a declaration should not be granted. It is clear that in the instant case the respondent had worked in the College for only two years. In these circumstances therefore, this case does not appear to be of any assistance to the respondent." From the above mentioned observation of the Supreme Court it is, therefore, clear that Supreme Court distinguished the decision of Lord Denning in 1971 (3) All England Reports 1345 (Hill vs. C.A. Parsona & Co. Ltd.) by saying that in the special circumstances of that the injunction was granted. 10. We have carefully perused the plaint as well as the application for injunction. Ltd.) by saying that in the special circumstances of that the injunction was granted. 10. We have carefully perused the plaint as well as the application for injunction. On careful consideration of the plaint and the application for injunction, it is clear to us that in the instant case, the respondent has not made out any special circumstances for which an injunction should be granted to him. Apart from that, "it is also now on record that the order of termination was passed before the suit and the application for injunction were filed by the plaintiff/respondent. Such being the position. we are unable to agree with Mr. Chatterjee that in the admitted facts of this case the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to an order of injunction even if it is held that the Court can, in appropriate cases, grant injunction in favour of a person who has brought a suit for declaration and injunction. Again in 1985 (2) CHN 72 (Calcutta Spun Pipes and Industries & Ors. vs. Prasanta Kumar Mukherjee) it has been held by a Division Bench of, this Court that in a case of contract of personal service not being capable of specific performance, no injunction can be granted to prevent the alleged threatened breach thereof in view of s. 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act. It was held in that dedsion, that the remedy of the plaintiff in that event would be for damages. In paragraph 9 at page 76 of the said decision, Anil Kumar Sen, J. (as His Lordship then was) presiding over the Bench observed as follows: "The second obstacle for the plaintiff is s. 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act. Even assuming or a moment that the notice impugned is illegal, it is a notice as a prelude to the termination of the plaintiff's contract of the service with the defendant. If the rights to be en forced are under the ordinary law as claimed by Mr. Chatterjee and not under the Industrial Disputes Act, contract of personal service not being capable of specific performance, no injunction can be granted to prevent the alleged threatened breach thereof. The plaintiff's remedy in that event would be for damages * * *." 11. We have carefully perused the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff/respondent in the suit. Chatterjee and not under the Industrial Disputes Act, contract of personal service not being capable of specific performance, no injunction can be granted to prevent the alleged threatened breach thereof. The plaintiff's remedy in that event would be for damages * * *." 11. We have carefully perused the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff/respondent in the suit. Reading the relief, with reference to the substance of the above it "is seen that he prayed for an order of injunction restraining the defendant/Appellant from terminating the service of the plaintiff/respondent, as indicated by the defendant/Company in the letter of termination. Therefore, relying on the observation made by the Division Bench of this court with which we are in full agreement we must held that such a relief cannot be granted in view of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act referred to hereinbefore. In Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd., Rai Bareli and Anr. vs. Badri Nath Dixit & Ors., [ 1991(3) SCC 54 ], the Supreme Court on consideration of Ss. 14 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, has held that a contract of employment of personal nature is not specifically enforceable and the relief available to an employee against his employer is in a suit for damages. In paragraph 9 of the said decision, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the observations made by it in AIR 1976 SC 888 (Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors. vs. Lakshmi Narain & Ors.) and in paragraph 10 at page 59 the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "A contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against an employer. The remedy is to sue for damages. (See s. 14 read with s. 41 of the Specific Relief' Act, see Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts by Pollock and Mulla, 10th edn., page 983). The grant of specific performance is to rely discretionary and must be refused when not warranted by the ends of justice. Such relief can be granted only on sound legal principles. In the absence of any statutory requirement, courts do not ordinarily force an employer to recruit or retain in service an employee not required by the employer. The grant of specific performance is to rely discretionary and must be refused when not warranted by the ends of justice. Such relief can be granted only on sound legal principles. In the absence of any statutory requirement, courts do not ordinarily force an employer to recruit or retain in service an employee not required by the employer. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of a public servant dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution, reinstatement of dismissed worker under the Industrial Law, a statutory body acting in breach of statutory' obligations, and the like. (S. R. Tiwari vs. District Board, Agra ; Executive Committee of V.P. State Warehousing Corporation vs. Lashmi Narain see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn., Volume 44, paragraph 405 to 420)." (Emphasis added). 12. Now let us test whether the exceptions given by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid two decisions are applicable in this case. So far as the dismissal of service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution is concerned, it is not disputed that the plaintiff/respondent is not an employee of the Government, in fact he is an employee of a public limited company. So far as the re-instatement of a dismissed worker under the Industrial Law is concerned, can not say that the present case comes within this exception. So far as the question of statutory body acting in breach of statutory obligations is concerned, it is also an admitted position that the defendant/Company is not a statutory body but only a private limited company. In that view of the matter, the exceptions indicated in the aforesaid two Supreme Court decisions would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 13. Before we conclude, let us take up the other case on which Mr. Chatterjee relied on and which is reported in 1975 (2) All England Reporter 233 (Chappel and Ors. vs. The Times Newspapers Ltd. & Ors.). We have carefully gone through the said judgment and after going through the same, we are unable to find that the said decision is of any help to the plaintiff/respondent. Chatterjee relied on and which is reported in 1975 (2) All England Reporter 233 (Chappel and Ors. vs. The Times Newspapers Ltd. & Ors.). We have carefully gone through the said judgment and after going through the same, we are unable to find that the said decision is of any help to the plaintiff/respondent. In that case, it was held that since a contract of service involved mutual confidence between employer and employee, an order for specific performance of the contract would not normally be granted to either party and the remedy for the aggrieved party lay in damages only. It was further held in that decision that in the circumstances of that case, the employees had every reason to suspect the loyalty of the plaintiff and the case was not, therefore one which justified an exception to the general rule. It was further observed in that decision that in seeking an equitable remedy, the plaintiff had to be prepared to do equity and by refusing to give an undertaking not to disrupt newspaper production, they were in effect telling the employers that they must keep to their part of the contract even though the plaintiffs themselves were not ready or willing to keep to theirs. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances as stated hereinabove, in the said decision reported in 1975 (2) All England Reports 233 (Chappel & Ors. vs. The Times Newspapers Limited and Others), it was held that even though the plaintiff might not have been in breach of their individual contracts of employment they were not entitled to the equitable relief claimed in the interlocutory application. In the absence of any substance made out by the plaintiff in his plaint or in the application for injunction there was no question of granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. Therefore, the said decision which also held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an order of injunction in the facts and circumstances of that case can be applied to this case. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff/respondents is not entitled to an order of injunction on his application for injunction. 15. Accordingly, the impugned order, which is under challenge in this appeal is set aside. 16. The Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. 17. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff/respondents is not entitled to an order of injunction on his application for injunction. 15. Accordingly, the impugned order, which is under challenge in this appeal is set aside. 16. The Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. 17. Since the appeal itself arose out of an order granting ex parte ad interim order of injunction, and in view of the observations made hereinabove, it was now become useless for us to give any direction to the trial court for early disposal of the application for injunction which, however, would be decided by the trial court, applying the principles laid down by us, while disposing of the application for temporary injunction. 18. There will be no order as to costs. Sidheswar Narayan, J.: I agree. Application allowed.