JUDGMENT R. K. Gnlati. J. 1. THIS is a contempt petition filed under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The allegation is that the opposite parties have failed to act in terms of the order dated 30-3-1993 passed by this Court in writ petition no. nil of 1993, Hari Ram Gupta v. Chairman U.P. State Electricity Board Lucknow, which was finally disposed of with certain directions. So far as these proceedings are concerned, the relevant portion of that order is reproduced Below ; "....We are of the opinion that the petitioner may make a fresh representation to the concerned Chief Engineer. In case such a representation is made along with a certified copy of this order, we hope and trust, the same shall be decided within two months from the date of receipt of the representation. We have no doubt in mind, in case the petitioner's allegation is correct, the concerned Chief Engineer shall take necessary action in this regard. With these directions the petition is disposed of." 2. THE precise complaint in these proceedings is that the Chief Engineer, Bareilly zone, U. P. State Electricity Board, Bareilly, opposite party no. 2, has deliberately and wilfully failed to decide the representation which was filed by the petitioner applicant before him on 19-4-1993 alongwith a certified copy of the order passed by this Court. In order to appreciate the controversy up for consideration, it is necessary to set out few facts. THE applicant (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) is an Executive Engineer in the U. P. State Electricity Department and was transferred from Kanpur to Bareilly in June, 1992 initially under the Superintending Engineer, Tubewell and Electrification Circle, U. P. S.E.B., Janakpur, Bareilly and then he was transferred under the Superintending Engineer, .Electricity Urban Distribution Circle U. P. S.E.B. Bareilly where he joined on 30-9-92. THE petitioner had taken leave from 22-10-1992 to 27-10-1992 which he got extended from time to time due to his alleged ill health. According to the petitioner the Superintending Engineer, opposite party no 3, did not permit him to join his duties when he returned from leave. Consequently be made a representation dated 19-1-1993 to the Chairman, U. P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow, opposite party no. 1 on which no action was taken. According to the petitioner the Superintending Engineer, opposite party no 3, did not permit him to join his duties when he returned from leave. Consequently be made a representation dated 19-1-1993 to the Chairman, U. P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow, opposite party no. 1 on which no action was taken. THE petitioner also asserts that he had applied for a loan from his general provident fund in connection with the marriage of his daughter which was not paid to him dispite sanction and the marriage had to be postponed. With the case aforesaid, the petitioner approached to this Court by filing a writ petition in which the order, dated 30- 3-1993, was passed directing the concerned Chief Engineer to decide the representation within a period of two months from the date it was filed by the petitioner. It is this order which is alleged to have been violated in these proceedings. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 to whom the notices were issued in these proceedings have taken a common defence in the counter-affidavit filed by opposite party no. 3. In the counter- affidavit the charge of non-compliance or disobedience of the order dated 30-3-1993 has been denied. The parties are in agreement that the representation, date 19-4-1993 contained two grievances. Firstly, that the action of opposite party no. 3. namely, Sri R. L. Bhatia, Superintending Engineer, Urban Distribution Circle, U.P. State Electricity Board, Bareilly, in not permitting the petitioner to join his duties was wholly unjustified. Secondly, there was no justification to withhold the payment of the loan amount sanctioned to the petitioner. 3. AS regards the second grievances, it is no more in dispute that the petitioner was paid the loan amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- on 9-2-1994. However, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the payment was made in pursuance of the order dated 24-1-1994 passed by the civil court in original civil suit no. 1531 of 1993 filed in that behalf and not because of any order passed by opposite party no. 2 on the representation made by the petitioner. The argument is that opposite party no. 2 had failed to decide the representation and direct payment as he was obliged to do so in the light of the order, dated 30 3-1993. passed by this Court. 2 on the representation made by the petitioner. The argument is that opposite party no. 2 had failed to decide the representation and direct payment as he was obliged to do so in the light of the order, dated 30 3-1993. passed by this Court. The learned counsel contends that the opposite parties must be held guilcy for showing disobedience to the order of this Court and be punished. 4. I have considered this submission carefully. The defence taken in the counter-affidavit is that payment of the loan amount could not be made because of the delay in obtaining the funds from the U. P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow. It is pleaded that there was no wilful action or deliberate design on the part of the opposite parties. Having regard to the explanation furnished in the counter-affidavit this Court is of the considered opinion that the matter be left there and no action in these proceedings is called for. This brings me to the other issue. It is admitted to the petitioner that consequent upon his representation dated 19-4-1993 he was required by opposite party no. 2 by letter dated 11-5-1993 to appear before him in connection with the disposal of the representation. The petitioner did appear but on 14-5-1993 when his statement was recorded. There is also no dispute that on hearing the grievances of the petitioner, opposite party no. 2 by his order dated 1-6-1993 directed the petitioner to join his duties under opposite party no. 3 and the petitioner did join on 19-5-1993. What followed thereafter is a subject-matter of dispute on which the contesting parties have their own versions. According to the petitioner, opposite party no. 3 refused to countersign the charge-sheet which was accompanied by relevant documents, medical certificates etc. It is the petitioner's case that no account of this conduct of opposite party no. 3 the petitioner was virtually not permitted to join his duties for until the charge certificate is not countersigned by the concerned controlling authority, the formality of taking over charge is not complete. On the contrary, the opposite parties assert that the petitioner did not submit his fitness and medical certificate although he was specifically required to do so, instead he again proceeded on leave from 21-6-1993 without waiting for sanction of his application for leave and permission to leave the station and has not reported to his duties thereafter. On the contrary, the opposite parties assert that the petitioner did not submit his fitness and medical certificate although he was specifically required to do so, instead he again proceeded on leave from 21-6-1993 without waiting for sanction of his application for leave and permission to leave the station and has not reported to his duties thereafter. It is alleged that the two letters dated 17-7-1993 and 19-7-1993 were sent to the petitioner by opposite party no. 3 requiring him to remove the anomalies and objections with regard to his joining and leave, but the petitioner took no steps in that regard. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder affidavit. He has not denied the assertion that he had applied for leave on 21-6-1993. However, he asserts that by his letter dated 25-8-1993 he has already replied the letter dated 17-7-1993 of opposite party no. 3 and there is no communication to him thereafter. The petitioner alleges that because of the inaction, and in the absence of any decision by the concerned authority on the issue of his joining, he is not being paid his salary nor is he being permitted to join. The petitioner along with rejoinder affidavit has brought on record the copies of the fitness and medical certificates said to have been filed before opposite party no. 3 and also certain letters addressed to opposite party no. 2 requesting for an order in writing on his representation dated 19-4-1993. 5. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that until a formal order in writing is made on the representation of the petitioner, it may not be correct to hold that the order of this Court dated 30-3-1993 has been complied with. It was in this context that violation of the order dated 30-3-1993 was pressed and the learned counsel emphasised over and again that in the absence of any order In writing on the petitioner's representation, the charge of disobedience was clearly made out which was wilful and deliberate and opposite party no. 2 cannot escape the consequences of being punished by this Court. 6. THE contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner though technically may be correct, but considering the scope and the terms of the order of which the violation is alleged, in my opinion, cannot be accepted. 2 cannot escape the consequences of being punished by this Court. 6. THE contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner though technically may be correct, but considering the scope and the terms of the order of which the violation is alleged, in my opinion, cannot be accepted. In view of the events that subsequently followed after the representation dated 19-4-1993, it is difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner that the representation remained pending decision although no order in writing was passed disposing of the representation as such. It may be pertinent to observe that the complaint in the representation were twofold as observed earlier and both the complaints had been duly attended. THE petitioner had been paid the loan amount and he was permitted to join by the order dated 1-6-1993 passed by opposite party no. 2. Nothing further was required to be done on the part of opposite party no. 2 as regards decision on the representation. It is settled that summary jurisdiction in contempt should only be exercised when a clear case in that behalf is made out and, in a case of doubt the contemner is entitled to its benefit. To put it differently, jurisdiction of contempt must be exercised with care and caution and with greatest reluctance and anxiety only with the object of seeing that the dignity and authority of the court be not impaired. It is hardly necessary to stress that in order to justify an action in contempt, the petitioner must make out a clear and unambiguous case of disobedience or breach. In a given case the question whether an order or direction has been disobeyed or not, must obviously be decided in terms of the order of which the violation is alleged and not on what may be supposed to have been intended to be provided in the order. Every infraction of the Court's order does not amount to contempt of Court, To constitute a civi1 contempt as defined under section 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act it must be established that the violation was deliberate and wilful. THE want of contumacious conduct may be a good ground of let off a contemner even though technically a case of disobedience may exist. In the instant case a somewhat similar situation obtains THE petitioner was permitted to join on 19-6-1993 but he again proceeded on leave. THE want of contumacious conduct may be a good ground of let off a contemner even though technically a case of disobedience may exist. In the instant case a somewhat similar situation obtains THE petitioner was permitted to join on 19-6-1993 but he again proceeded on leave. It is not necessary to dwell upon the circumstances under which the petitioner proceeded on leave for disputed questions of fact are involved in it. Suffice it to say that the facts on which the dispute now exists were not the subject-matter of the writ petition but relate to the events arising subsequent to the date when the petitioner joined his duties on 19-6-1993. For the redressal of the dispute now arising, the petitioner was required to take separate steps in accordance with law with which we are not concerned in these proceedings. Before parting, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is considered in the interest of justice to observe that opposite party no. 2 which is the superior authority of both the petitioner and opposite party no. 3 ought to have taken steps to resolve the tangle by issuing appropriate directions in the matter in order to ensure that no one is permitted to exploit his position or situation and cause harm to the other. This Court is left with the feeling that the matter has been allowed to linger on for no good reason but for a bureaucratic approach to pass the blame to the other. This Court hopes and trusts that on receipt of a certified copy of this order, opposite party no. 2 will not permit the stalemate to drift and will take all steps as may be necessary to decide the outstanding issue one way or the other pending between the petitioner and opposite party no. 3 without any further loss of time. The petitioner shall also be paid his salary and permitted to join in pursuance of the decision of opposite party no. 2 and in accordance with law, provided the petitioner has not already been paid his salary and permitted to join. 7. WITH the above observations, the petition is dismissed. The notices issued to the opposite parties are hereby discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.