Judgement These two appeals arise out of a common judgment passed by the earned District Judge, Shillong in Title Suit No. 3(H)78 and 12(H)79. Title Suit No. 3(H) was instituted by the appellant against the respondents 1 to 4 and 6 and 3 others. Respondent No. 6 was a pro forma defendant. Pro forma respondent No. 6 died during the pendency of the appeal. No steps were taken for substitution. However, all his heirs are on record and his estate is well represented - Title Suit No. 12(H)79 was instituted by respondents 1 to 5 against the pro forma respondent and the appellant - The suit filed by the appellant was dismissed with a direction to return the sum of Rs. 69,000/- by respondent No. 1 (in FA 2(SH)86) within a period of 6 months from the date of judgment. If, however, respondent No. 1 failed to pay the amount, the appellant would be entitled to realise the money as a decree. 2. Two suits were filed by both appellants and respondents Nos. 1 to 5. Title Suit No. 3(H)78 was filed by the appellant and the Title Suit No. 12(H)79 was filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 5. The appellant instituted the suit for a declaration of his right, title and interest in respect of the suit property, recovery of possession and also for recovery of mesne profit etc. 1st to 5th respondents, on the other hand, filed the suit for declaration that respondent-defendant No. 1 late Bhagirath Bora had no saleable right to transfer the entire property and also for other reliefs. Both the suit relate to the same subject matter, i.e. a plot of land measuring more or less 176 acres with three residential houses standing thereon, situated at Dakland, Shillong within the European Ward of the Shillong Municipality covered by Plot No. 31 and Patta No. 15. 3. The case o2 the appellant in his suit (Title Suit No. 3(H)78), inter alia, was that Bhagirath Bora was the absolute owner of the suit property and he purchased the said property at a consideration of Rs. 69,000/- and late Bhagirath Bora executed a registered deed of sale in his favour. Thus he became the absolute owner of the said property. 69,000/- and late Bhagirath Bora executed a registered deed of sale in his favour. Thus he became the absolute owner of the said property. After execution of the registered sale deed Late Bhagirath Bora delivered possession by quitting from the cottage under his occupation and gave delivery of possession of the main house which Was lying vacant. However, 1st to 4th defendants picked up quarrel with late Bhagirath Bora after delivery of vacant possession of the cottage in his occupation and assaulted him. The matter was reported to the police and thereafter they illegally entered into the cottage by a back door and locked the door without legal and lawful authority. Besides they also broke open the lock put by the plaintiff-appellant in the main house and forcibly and illegally entered into the main house. The appellant further stated in his plaint that after the purchase of the property his name mutated in Mutation Case No. 99/77 vide Deputy Commissioners order dated 24-10-77. At no point of time the respondent-defendants raised any objection to the grant of mutation in favour of the appellant even though they knew it fully. After the mutation the plaintiffs name was also entered in the assessment register of Shillong Municipality as owner of Holding No. 85 (Dakland European Ward of Shillong). The appellant further stated that the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 (respondents 1 to 4) after their wrongful entry into the cottage illegally occupied and also let out a portion of the said house on rent to respondent No. 5. The said respondents thereafter, inducted defendants Nos. 6 and 7 in the main house as tenant and commenced realisation of rent. Hence he filed a suit for declaration, etc. 4. 1st to 4th defendants i.e. respondents Nos. 1 to 4 contested the suit by filing written statement. In the written statement respondents 1 to 4 disputed the claim of the appellant that Late Bhagirath Bora had. absolute title and ownership or even possession of the property. Besides, they stated that the Government of Assam made settlement of the land on the application of Late Bhagirath Bora. for the purpose of residence of late Bhagirath Bora and the members of his family although the Government gave patta in the name of late Bhagirath Bora. absolute title and ownership or even possession of the property. Besides, they stated that the Government of Assam made settlement of the land on the application of Late Bhagirath Bora. for the purpose of residence of late Bhagirath Bora and the members of his family although the Government gave patta in the name of late Bhagirath Bora. The respondents also claimed that the houses on the suit land were constructed with a substantial contribution of cash money, materials and labour from respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 4) and also some other members of the family. They further denied the averments made in the plaint to the effect that the main house of the suit property was lying vacant. Besides, the allegations of wrongful entry were false and these false statements were made just to get recovery of the property. These respondents further stated that during the service life of late Bhagirath Bora, the husband and father of the respondents never took any interest in looking after the family matters. If was entirely left to his wife - the 1st respondent (defendant No. 4). After his retirement from service he became abnormally detached to the family and showed signs of insanity. Always he used to pick up quarrels with the members of his family and became violent especially towards respondents Nos. 1 and 2. In 1977 Bhagirath Boaras mental condition further deteriorated. At times he remained away from his house for a long period and because of the quarrel at the instance of some interested persons a proceeding was initiated under S. 107, Cr. P.C. against the answering defendants. The said 107 proceedings, ended in compromise and there was an agreement to that effect. However, taking advantage of mental sickness the plaintiff got the sale deed registered. 5. Respondents 1 to 5 instituted a suit (Title Suit No. 12(H)79) for declaration almost reiterating what was stated in the written statement filed by respondents 1 to 4 and sought declaration that 6th respondent (Late Bhagirath Bora) had no absolute saleable right, title and interest over the property even though the allotment was given in his name and also for other reliefs. In fact the settlement was given for occupation of the entire members of the family and the house were constructed not by Late Bhagirath Bora alone but with the contribution of the respondents, namely, respondents 1 and 2. In fact the settlement was given for occupation of the entire members of the family and the house were constructed not by Late Bhagirath Bora alone but with the contribution of the respondents, namely, respondents 1 and 2. In their suit also respondents 1 to 4 reiterated that respondents No. 6 (Late Bhagirath Bora) became mentally sick incapable of deciding the matter in proper perspective. Taking the advantage of the mental sickness of the respondent No. 6, the appellant managed to get a registered sale deed in his favour in respect of the entire property including the houses standing thereon even though the said houses were constructed with the money and labour contributed by respondents mainly respondents 1 and 2. During life time respondent No. 6 Late Bhagirath Bora also filed a written statement in support of the case of they plaintiff/appellant. 6. Several issues were framed. Parties adduced evidence in both the suits in their favour. Both the suits were deposed of by dismissing the appellants suit with a direction to the respondents to return the money. In case money was not returned there would be a decree for Rs. 69,000/- which was claimed to be paid on the basis of the registered sale deed. Hence the present appeals. 7. I have heard both sides. 8. Mr. B. P. Dutta, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that from the evidence on record the Court ought to have discarded the story of mental imbalance of pro forma respondent - Late Bhagirath Bora and the learned District Judge was wrong in holding that the suit property was a joint property of respondents and Late Bhagirath Bora in absence of any evidence on record. 9. Mr. H. Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the evidence on record were in abundance to show that at the time of execution of the does, the 6th respondent was suffering from mental sickness and even assuming that the property actually belonged to the 6th respondent, the execution of such deed would not be valid in view of the fact that the 6th respondent was suffering from mental sickness at the time of execution of the said deed. 10. In view of the submissions of the learned counsel of the parties now the points in the appeals for determination are as follows :- (1). 10. In view of the submissions of the learned counsel of the parties now the points in the appeals for determination are as follows :- (1). Whether late Bhagirath Bora - Respondent No. 6 was the sole owner of the suit property and had saleable right, title over the property. (2) Whether at the time of execution of the registered sale deed the respondent No. 6 was not mentally sound and whether execution of the sale deed conferred right, title and interest to the appellant. (3) Whether the appellant obtained possession of the property. 11. POINT NO. 1 In the suit filed by the appellants 1st to 4th defendants that is 1st to 4th respondents filed written statement. In the written statement the said respondents had taken a specific plea that late Bhagirath Bora had no absolute right to sell and transfer the suit property. Besides, in their written statement they stated that the then Government of Assam made settlement of the suit land. "For the purpose of his residence as well as for the residence of the answering defendants." They also stated, "The three houses on the suit land were constructed with substantial contributions in cash money, materials and labour from the defendants No. 4 and also from the other answering defendants". In the said suit the appellant examined 3 (three) witnesses, namely, the appellant himself as P.W. l, Dinesh Kalita as P.W. 2 and Collina Nongsiej as P.W. 3 and the respondents examined one witness, namely, Respondent No. 1 Smt. Sonabala Bara. In the suit filed by respondents 1 to 4 that is Title Suit No. 12(H) 79 the plaintiff examined 3 (three) witnesses, namely, Sonabala Bora - Respondent No. 1 as P.W. l, P. N. Bhuyan as P.W. 2 and Rajendra Nath Mahanta as P.W. 3 and the appellant examined himself as D.W. 1 In the said title suit respondents 1 to 4 took the similar plea and sought a declaration accordingly. The appellant filed a written statement. In the said written statement he stated, inter alia, that late Bhagirath Bora was the absolute owner of the property. The Government of Assam gave allotment of the land to Bhagirath Bora and thereafter issued Patta and, therefore, definitely he had the right to transfer the property by way of sale. The appellant further stated that on the strength of the sale deed he derived title. The Government of Assam gave allotment of the land to Bhagirath Bora and thereafter issued Patta and, therefore, definitely he had the right to transfer the property by way of sale. The appellant further stated that on the strength of the sale deed he derived title. No specific issue was framed on this point. However, the parties, led evidence to that effect and both the parties were aware of the issue and, therefore, I propose to dispose of this point even though proper issue was not framed. 12. P.W. 1 Title Suit No. 3(H)78 simply stated that he purchased the property at a valuable consideration of Rs. 69,000/- on the basis of first. 1 registered sale deed. He proved the signature of Late Bora in Ext. 1. Thereafter, he got his name mutated. At the time of mutation there was no objection from the side of the respondents. However, he has not made any attempt to show whether this land was given to Late Bhagirath Bora solely for his use and use of the members of his family as claimed by the respondents. 13. P.W. 2 Dinesh Kalita was the Record keeper of Shillong Municipality. He deposed regarding transfer of holding from Bhagirath Bora to the appellant. Ext. 6 is the application dated 21-9-1977 from Bhagirath Bora with endorsement. Ext. 7 is the Certificate dated 3-11-1979. Ext. 8 is the notice addressed to Bhagirath Bora. He also stated that the mutation was granted on the basis of the patta and the sale deed. However, he was absolutely silent whether notice was given to the respondents and whether any enquiry was made regarding possession. On the other hand, he specifically stated that mutation was granted on the basis of the patta and the sale deed. He further stated, that respondent No. 1 filed objection. This witness had not stated anything about the ownership of the property. P.W. 3 Collina Nongsiej proved certain documents. However, he also has not stated anything with regard to the ownership of the land. Respondent No. 1 examined herself as D.W. 1 in the said suit. In her evidence she stated that in 1951 she, her husband and other members of the family were residing in a rented house at Garikhana, Shillong. P.W. 3 Collina Nongsiej proved certain documents. However, he also has not stated anything with regard to the ownership of the land. Respondent No. 1 examined herself as D.W. 1 in the said suit. In her evidence she stated that in 1951 she, her husband and other members of the family were residing in a rented house at Garikhana, Shillong. She further stated that she on coming to know that the Government of Assam was giving settlement of land to the Government employees and the members of their families she went personally to meet the then Revenue Minister, Assam and told him about their difficulties regarding accommodation due to financial constrain. As told by the Minister she advised her husband to give an application for settlement of a plot of land. The suit land was settled and patta was issued in the name of her husband though in fact it was given to the entire family. The patta was issued in the name of her husband to enable him to take loan by mortgaging the land for construction. She further stated in her deposition that she contributed a substantial amount for construction of the house. This amount belonged to her which she received from her parents in the marriage etc. After construction of the house they shifted to the said house. Her husband retired in 1963. She used to look after the children and maintain the expenses of their education. She used to earn extra money by sewing and weaving clothes etc. After retirement of her husband their pecuniary condition further deteriorated. Accordingly, she requested her husband to agree for construction of two additional cottages in the compound with a view to letting out the same so that they could maintain. their family with little comfort. She contributed some amount for construction of these cottages also. After completion of the construction of the two cottages she rented out the cottages to the tenants and out of the income she maintained the family. Her husband never used to take interest, etc. 14. In Title Suit No. 12(H)79 the respondent No. 1 in her deposition reiterated the same story. P.W. 2 P. N. Bhuyan was a practising Advocate in Shillong. However, he did not say anything whether late Bhagirath. Bora was the sole owner or not. P.W. 3 Rajendra Nath Mahanta stated that he worked with Lata Bora. 14. In Title Suit No. 12(H)79 the respondent No. 1 in her deposition reiterated the same story. P.W. 2 P. N. Bhuyan was a practising Advocate in Shillong. However, he did not say anything whether late Bhagirath. Bora was the sole owner or not. P.W. 3 Rajendra Nath Mahanta stated that he worked with Lata Bora. Late Bora had been serving in the Secretariat as Selection Grade U. D. Assistant and had been working in the Establishment Department where P.W. 3 was a Superintendent. In 1950-51 Government decided to allot land for their employee. He and Late Bora applied for settlement of some land. In the application for allotment it was specifically mentioned that they were married. On that basis he got the settlement in Bishnupur and Late Bora got land in Dakland. They paid a small premium for the land allotted to them. He further stated that the land was settled on family consideration. Though patta was given in the name of one person, but the right of the family was also there. The loan was not sufficient for construction of the house. This witness was not at all cross-examined by the appellant regarding the manner in which settlement was given. The appellant also examined himself as D.W. 1 He reiterated the same. statement as made by him in this deposition in Title No. 3(H)78. Respondent No. l in her evidence stated that the houses were constructed with substantial financial contribution of the respondents 1 and 2. Respondent No. 1 in her evidence further stated that the contribution financial help from her own source that is the money she received from her parents at the time of her marriage and also from her earning from sewing and weaving, etc. This fact was also not controverted by the appellant. There was no cross-examination whatsoever. One important thing which the appellant failed to do was proving of patta and the allotment order. It was the bounden duty of the appellant to prove the patta and the allotment order to show on what conditions the allotment was made. As the appellant claimed that he purchased the land from Late Bhagirath Bora at a valuable consideration he must have received all those documents. His failure to prove all those documents only show that if those documents were produced the case of the respondents would further be proved. As the appellant claimed that he purchased the land from Late Bhagirath Bora at a valuable consideration he must have received all those documents. His failure to prove all those documents only show that if those documents were produced the case of the respondents would further be proved. That being so, I find that the land was actually settled for the welfare of the family though in the name of Late Bora. Therefore, it cannot be said that Late Bora alone had the right, title and interest over the property. Secondly, there is a specific averment made regarding financial contribution made by respondents 1 and 2 which has also not controverted either by adducing evidence or by proper cross-examination. Therefore, taking the preponderance of evidence I hold that the houses standing on the and were constructed with the substantial contribution of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. In view of the above, Late Bora was not the sole owner of the property and he alone could not transfer the entire land to the appellate. Accordingly, the appellant had not right to sue. 15. POINT NO. 2 In the written statement filed in Title Suit No. 3(H)78 and in the plaint it Title Suit No. 12(H)79 the respondents took the plea that at the time of execution of the deed Late Bora vas suffering from mental sickness. In paragraph 16 of the written statement the respondents stated that in 1972 Late Bhagirath Bora made a will bequeathing his property to his sons and daughters. However, after a year or two the mental condition of Late Bora deteriorated and he became imbalanced in mind not knowing what he was doing. Respondents further stated in their written statement in the year 1977 the mental condition of Late Bora further deteriorated. The appellant in his deposition as P.W. 1 in Title Suit No. 3(H)78 did not make any attempt to show that on the date of sale Late Bora was mentally sound. It was his duty to make some attempt to show that at the time of execution of the deed his vendor Late Bora was mentally sound and fit to execute the deed. But from the evidence on record I find no attempt was made in this regard. The other P. Ws. examined in T.S./3(H)78 did not say anything about the mental condition of Late Bora. But from the evidence on record I find no attempt was made in this regard. The other P. Ws. examined in T.S./3(H)78 did not say anything about the mental condition of Late Bora. I find D.W. 1 Sona Bala Bora in her evidence specifically stated that from 1971 her husband was imbalanced in mind and in 1977 her husband instituted a criminal case under Section 107, Cr. P.C. against her and her sons and daughters which, however, ended in compromise. Besides, she stated that the transaction was done surreptitiously and fraudulently. She also denied the suggestion that her husband was not suffering from mental imbalance. In her deposition in Title Suit No. 12(H)79 she stated that two houses constructed by them were given on rent by the respondent No. l. She was collecting rent from the year 1971 when her husband developed mental unhappiness and became disinterested. She was not cross-examined on this point. No attempt was made to show that at the time of execution of the deed the vendor of the appellant was mentally sound capable of executing the sale deed. There is no evidence - oral or documentary from the side of the appellant to show that. On the other hand there is some oral evidence in favour of the respondents to indicate that Late Bora was suffering from mental imbalance. Besides, the conduct of late Bora itself indicates that he was not a normal person in view of the fact that he instituted a case against his wife and children, picked-up quarrel with the members of his family/remained away from the house for a long period and transferred the entire property by way of sale rendering the members of the family homeless. These are few indications of improper mental condition. Of course, merely because a person instituted a case against wife and children or remained away from his house cannot be said to be indications of unsound mind. But if all these are taken together will surely indicate that Late Bora was not mentally sound at the time of execution of the sale deed and therefore, the sale deed executed by him did not confer any right, title and interest on the appellant. 16. POINT NO. 3. The appellant has not been able to show by adducing proper evidence that Late Bora could deliver the entire property. 16. POINT NO. 3. The appellant has not been able to show by adducing proper evidence that Late Bora could deliver the entire property. In view of the above, I hold that the appellant at no point of time occupied the suit property. I find no force in the appeals. Accordingly the appeals are dismissed and I affirm the judgment of the learned District Judge. 17. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed. AIR 1994 GAUHATI 105 "State of Assam v. M. S. Associates" GAUHATI HIGH COURT Coram : 2 J. N. SARMA AND SINGH NEELAM, JJ. ( Division Bench ) State of Assam and another, Appellants v. M/s. M. S. Associates, Respondent. Misc. Appeal (First) No. 159 of 1993, D/- 2 -5 -1994. (A) Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S.39 - Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), O.39, R.1, R.2 - INJUNCTION - Injunction against public authorities - Public interest should be considered along with other requirement for granting injunction. Injunction - Against public authorities Grant - Consideration. When a question of granting injunction against public authorities arises, not only the three ingredients for the grant of injunction should be considered, but in addition to it, the public interest and/or public policy also is to be considered. Otherwise, if the public interest or public policy is not considered, it will bring chaos to the society and cause distress to the public in general. The Court cannot be used as an instrument/tool to cause injury to the society and/or loss to the community, the requirement of the society, the demand of the society, must be considered the court must be cautious if its order affects a large chunk of the society. By exercising equitable jurisdiction to give benefit to somebody, a larger interest cannot be sacrificed. If injunction is granted, affecting the right of the community in general, it will be a dangerous precedent and court should not easily succumb to such prayer. (Para 9) (B) Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S.39 - CONTRACT - Injunction against cancellation of contract - Plaintiff contractor himself assessing damages he would suffer on cancellation of Contract - As on plaintiff own showing damages can be assessed - Question of granting injunction does not arise. Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), O.39, R.1, R.2. (Para 9) (B) Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S.39 - CONTRACT - Injunction against cancellation of contract - Plaintiff contractor himself assessing damages he would suffer on cancellation of Contract - As on plaintiff own showing damages can be assessed - Question of granting injunction does not arise. Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), O.39, R.1, R.2. (Para 10) (C) Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S.39 - INJUNCTION - Suit for permanent injunction - Courts to be cautious while granting temporary injunction in such suit - Should not grant temporary injunction as a normal course. Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), O.39, R.1, R.2. (Para 10) Cases Referred : Chronological Paras M. A. (F) No. 2 of 1991, D/- 3-2-1993 (Gauhati) 9 AIR 1959 SC 781 : (1959) 2 SCA 342 9 A. G., for Appellants; S. Medhi, P. Upadhya, for Respondent. Judgement J. N. SARMA, J. :- This appeal arises out of the order dated 24-8-1993 passed by the Assistant District Judge No. 2, Guwahati in Misc. (J) case No. 84 of 1993 arising out of the Title Suit No. 70 of 1993. By the impugned order, the learned Judge granted injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff. 2. The background of the case is that the plaintiff brought a suit against the State of Assam and Director of State Lotteries. The suit was only for permanent injunction as will be evident from the Cause Title. The prayers which were made are as follows : (a) to restrain the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from giving effect to the letter dated 26-8-1993 (b) pass a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents and assigns from taking any action against the plaintiff on the basis of the letter dated 30th July, 1993 and also the letter dated 20th August, 1993 and also the letter dated 26-8-1993 to rescind, revoke, terminate and cancel the contract/agreement entered into by the parties as have been detailed in the schedule below. 1. It is stated that the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the State of Assam through the Defendant No. 2 on 2-12-1991, whereby the plaintiff was appointed as the organising Agent for assisting the Government in conducting the lotteries in respect of Assam State Lottery for a period of 3 (three) years from the date of its first draw i.e. on 6-2-1992. The relevant conditions of the agreement are quoted in paragraph 4 of the plaint. We are not concerned for the disposal of this appeal with those clauses save and except clause 1 which will be discussed later on. 3. That. the defendant as per agreement approved 15 numbers of lotteries as given in paragraph 7 of the plaint. The first draw of the lottery was held on 6-2-1992 as per schedule approved by the Government. It is stated that the plaintiff spent a huge sum of money to establish the Assam State Lottery in the market and it was because of the effort and endeavour of the plaintiff, that the lottery was organised in a proper manner. Suddenly on 30-7-1993 the defendant No. 1 served a notice on the plaintiff whereby the defendant No. 1 wanted to terminate the agreement mentioned above. The notice inter alia states as follows : "Government is deeply concerned about numerous reports received on the harmful effect of lotteries, particularly, the daily draws where the winning last single digit offers a prize, from many parts of the State. Students organisations as well as women and Social Welfare Organisations have voiced their protests through letters and demonstrations and have expressed their deep anguish on the havoc caused in the lives of the people due to the lotteries. The Government has considered these and has come to the conclusion that the continuation of State lotteries is bringing disrepute to the State Government. Therefore, as provided under clause 1 of the Agreement signed between the State Government and you on 2nd December, 1991, Government has decided to terminate the agreement entered with you for organising State Lotteries. Before giving effect to this, Government has decided to give you an opportunity of being heard, and if you have anything to say against the proposed action this may be communicated to the undersigned within a period of ten days from the receipt of this letter." In reply to this notice, a reply was sent on 6-8-1993 where the plaintiff stated as follows : "We hereby give you notice that in case you do not withdraw the threat contained in your letter under reply, we shall hold you responsible for wrongful termination of the contract. In that case, we shall be entitled to damages against loss of profit to us which will be quantified if the necessity so arises. In that case, we shall be entitled to damages against loss of profit to us which will be quantified if the necessity so arises. In the meanwhile, we request you to please keep in mind the turn-over of the Daily Lotteries, on the basis of which, according to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India, the loss of profit would be calculated @ 15% of the turn-over." Thereafter by letter 26-8-1993 the agreement in question was terminated. Hence, this suit. 4. In paragraphs 28 to 34 the plaintiff has stated that though the plaintiffs agreement is terminable in nature, in view of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 an injunction can be granted with regard to the negative terms of the contract and clause 26 of the agreement prohibits the Government from making any amendment in the agreement without the consent of the plaintiff. Clause 26 reads as follows : "Any modification to this agreement shall be made only with the consent of both the parties to the agreement." Clause 27 of the agreement provides for Arbitration. So, a bare perusal of Clause 26 will show that for termination of the agreement the consent is not necessary. The consent is necessary only when a modification to the agreement is sought to be made. The application under Order 39, Rules. 1 and 2 which is filed contains only 6 paragraphs. Paragraph 3 speaks about suffering or irreparable loss and injury. Paragraph 2 speaks of regarding prima facie and balance of convenience. Nothing has been enumerated in this application for injunction how the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff, nor it has been mentioned how the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and injury. The application for injunction was filed in a slip-shod manner. Be that as it may, the objection was filed on behalf of the defendants wherein it was stated that the agreement for running lottery had to be cancelled because of lot of public complaints and because of the fact that it caused loss to the public in general. In the objection filed on behalf of the defendants in paragraph 5 of the objection it is stated as follows : "That Government received various complaints from various organisations for stopping the lotteries in the State of Assam. In the objection filed on behalf of the defendants in paragraph 5 of the objection it is stated as follows : "That Government received various complaints from various organisations for stopping the lotteries in the State of Assam. There was/is wide spread discontents or agitation all over Assam by various organisations, including the All Assam Students Union for closing the Lotteries. The Press also criticised the Government for allowing to continue the Lotteries and for that purpose to terminate the agreement with the plaintiff the Government issued letter No. FTX 164/91/pt 1/255 dt. 25th August, 1993 and directed the plaintiff to stop the sale of lotteries tickets in the State of Assam, in respect of Assam Express Lotteries w.e.f. 31-8-1993 and other Lotteries w.e.f. 3-11-1993, but a show cause notice was given to the plaintiff giving them opportunity to file objection by letter No. FTX 164/91/pt/1/235 dt. 30th July, 1993." Along with the objection a large number of paper cutting and other documents were filed to show how the complaints were received by the Government and how the Government was critisized for conducting the lottery. The whole contention of the Government was that these lotteries had to be banned for the public demand and for welfare of the public in general. 5. The learned Judge after hearing the parties granted the injunction as stated earlier. The learned Judge found as follows : "The losses suffered going to be suffered by the plaintiff, its sub-organiser, agents, subagents financially and on reputation cannot be repaired in terms of money." In this connection, the learned Judge referred to page 522 of Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edition Vol. 24. We will come to that aspect of the matter later on. The learned Judges found that though the lottery of the plaintiff was banned, other lotteries were being allowed to be run. Having arrived at this findings, in the last paragraph of the judgment, the learned Judge found as follows : "Under such circumstances I hold that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss to the plaintiff". According, the prayer for injunction was granted. 6. We have heard Sri S. N. Bhuyan, learned Advocate General, Assam for the appellant and Sri S. Medhi, learned counsel for the respondents. 7. According, the prayer for injunction was granted. 6. We have heard Sri S. N. Bhuyan, learned Advocate General, Assam for the appellant and Sri S. Medhi, learned counsel for the respondents. 7. At this stage, the decision of this matter has become almost academic inasmuch as the agreement in question has not been renewed by the Government and the plaintiff is not entitled to run the lottery on the basis of the said agreement and the lottery has been completely banned by the State of Assam throughout the State. All such lotteries have been banned in the State of Assam. But, yet the learned counsel for both the parties argued the matter before us and as such we are going to decide the matter. The learned Advocate General of Assam argued as follows : i) The contract is terminable as will be evident from Clause 1 of the agreement. As the contract is terminable, so under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, this contract cannot be specifically enforced and as this contract cannot be specifically enforced, the question of granting permanent injunction does not arise and that is also prohibited by Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act. ii) The next argument of learned Advocate General is whatever was done by the State of Assam was done for the public and for the welfare of the people and in taking into consideration the public demand, the court ought not to have granted injunction and he, submits that granting of injunction as was done in this case was absolutely arbitrary and capricious one and learned Judge did not apply his mind to the materials before him. 8. On the other hand, Sri Medhi, learned counsel for the respondent submits that under Clause 26 of the agreement, the agreement can be modified only with the consent of the parties. But in this case the consent was not taken and as such the impugned termination of the agreement is bad in law and he also relied on Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and argued that the injunction which has been granted is within the jurisdiction and it does not require any interference from this appellate court. 9. What is public policy was considered by the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 SC 781 Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya). 9. What is public policy was considered by the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 SC 781 Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya). In paragraph 23 the Supreme Court pointed out as follows at page 795 : "The doctrine of public policy may be summarised thus : Public policy or the policy of the law is an illusive concept it has been described as "untrustworthy guide," "variable quality", "uncertain one" unruly horse", etc. the primary duty of a Court of Law is to enforce a promise which the parties have made and to uphold the sanctity of contracts which form the basis of society, but in certain, cases, the court may relieve them of their duty on a rule founded on what is called the public policy, for want of better words Lord Atkin describes that something done contrary to public policy is a harmful thing, but the doctrine is extended not only to harmful cases but also to harmful tendencies." There is a judgement passed by the single Judge of this court in MA(F) No. 2 of 1991 (Azad Ali v. Housefed). The date of judgment is 3-2-1993 where this court pointed out that "in granting an injunction against the public authority, the court should be very cautious in considering the balance of convenience, the court should consider the matter regarding injunction in addition to other ingredients public interest is also to be looked into." We approve this decision by the learned single Judge and we reiterate that when a question of granting injunction arises, not only the three ingredients for the grant of injunction should be considered, but in addition to it, the. public interest and/or public policy also is to be considered. Otherwise, if the public interest or public policy is not considered, it will bring chaos to the society and cause distress to the public in general. The court cannot be used as an instrument/tool to cause injury to the society and/or loss to the community, the requirement of the society, the demand of the society, must be considered, the court must be cautious if its order affects a large chunk of the society. By exercising equitable jurisdiction to give benefit to somebody a larger interest cannot be sacrificed. If injunction is granted, affecting the right of the community in general, it will be a dangerous precedent and court should not easily succumb to such prayer. By exercising equitable jurisdiction to give benefit to somebody a larger interest cannot be sacrificed. If injunction is granted, affecting the right of the community in general, it will be a dangerous precedent and court should not easily succumb to such prayer. The leaned Judge relied on the passage of Halsburys Laws of England, but he did not consider the passage in its entirety. The passage is quoted in page 926 and it reads as follows : "926. Injury must be irreparable. Prima facie the court will not grant an injunction to restrain an actionable wrong for which damages are an adequate remedy. Where the court interferes by way of injunction to prevent an injury in respect of which there is a legal remedy, it does so upon either of two distinct grounds, first, that the injury is "irreparable, and second, that it is continuous. By "irreparable injury" is meant injury which is substantials and could never be adequately remedied or atoned for by damages, not injury which cannot possibly be repaired. The fact that the plaintiff may have a right to recover damages is no objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction by injunction, if his rights cannot be adequately protected or vindicated by damages. Even where the injury is capable of compensation in damages an injunction may be granted if the act in respect of which relief is sought is likely to destroy the subject matter in question; and the mere fact that, in order to avoid litigation, a party has offered to take a sum of money as the price of his rights does not preclude him from asserting that he will suffer irreparable damage from the continuance of the act complained of. However, if the plaintiff has himself shown by his conduct on a previous occasion, that the injury complained of is one which may in some way be compensated by money, the court may decline to grant an injunction." Extracting a particular sentence from that passage to use in the cases of the plaintiff should not have been done by the learned Judge. The learned Judge should have considered the entire paragraph and should have decided the matter on the basis of the law enunciated in the paragraph. 10. The learned Judge should have considered the entire paragraph and should have decided the matter on the basis of the law enunciated in the paragraph. 10. A bare perusal of the reply to the notice dated 6th August, 1993 will show (this has already been quoted), the plaintiff assessed the damage if the agreement is terminated, as the plaintiff themselves assessed the damages as will be evident from the paragraph quoted above, the question of granting injunction does not arise, because the law is settled that if the damage can be assessed, in term of money which or it can be compensated the question of granting injunction does not arise, In that view of the matter also, the injunction ought not to have been granted. Further the suit itself was for permanent injunction and in such suit temporary injunction must be granted in a cautious manner, because by granting temporary injunction relief in the suit is being granted. That should not be done by the court. No doubt, in specific cases temporary injunction may be granted. The procedure of granting temporary injunction should not be adopted as a general and normal course. 11. From whatever angle the matter is considered, this appeal is to be allowed. Accordingly, the injunction order dated 24-8-1993 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 2, Gauhati in Misc. (J) No. 84/93 arising out of the Title Suit No. 70 of 1993 stands quashed. Prayer of injunction is rejected. We make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.