Judgment :- Aggrieved by the Order of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madras, in I.D. No. 218 of 1983 dated January 20, 1984, the petitioner/Management has preferred this writ petition. 2. The facts on which there is not much of dispute, are the following :- The second respondent, after retirement from service as a policeman, was taken into service by the petitioner initially on payment of Rs. 5/- per day which was subsequently raised to Rs. 6/- per day, from October 27, 1974. The second respondent claims that he was discharging the duties of not only ticket-canvasser but also the duties of time-keeper. According to the petitioner, the second respondent was only a ticket-canvasser in the bus-stand and not a regular employee, and he was not even in the muster-roll maintained by the Corporation. While the second respondent was working in the petitioner-Corporation, his services were abruptly and without any notice terminated on and from April 23, 1981. Aggrieved by that termination of service, an industrial dispute was raised and the Government, by G.O.Ms. No. 1328, Labour and Employment, dated June 4, 1983, referred the dispute for adjudication under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, to the first respondent. 3. Before the first respondent, the second respondent was examined as W.W. 1, and, on the side of the petitioner, one Balasubramaniam was examined as M.W. 1. On the side of the petitioner, Exx. M. 1 to M. 13 were marked, and, on the side of the second respondent, Exx. W. 1 to W. 12 were marked. 4. On the basis of the pleadings, evidence, both oral and documentary, the Labour Court, overruling the objections raised on behalf of the petitioner, found that the second respondent herein was a workman under the petitioner-Corporation, as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that the impugned order of termination was not justified, and that the second respondent is entitled to reinstatement with half backwages. Accordingly, an Award was passed by the first respondent. The present writ petition challenges that Award. 5. Mr. Accordingly, an Award was passed by the first respondent. The present writ petition challenges that Award. 5. Mr. S. Jayaraman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Corporation, submitted that the finding of the Labour Court that the second respondent was a workman under the Corporation was totally unsustainable on the facts and circumstances of the case, and in any event, in view of the admitted fact that the second respondent was employed by the Corporation after retirement, cannot contend that the termination was illegal and not in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to the learned counsel, any employment after retirement is contractual in nature and, therefore, the termination cannot be considered as retrenchment, to enable the workman to invoke the related provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. He also pointed out the inconsistencies in the findings of the Labour Court by inviting my attention to the finding at one place to the effect that the second respondent herein to the effect that the second respondent herein (petitioner before the Labour Court) was not a time-keeper but only a ticket-canvasser, and at another place, the finding given by the Labour Court that the second respondent was a time-keeper and a ticket-canvasser. At this place itself, I can deal with this factual aspect of the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner is not correct in his statement that the Labour Court has given inconsistent findings. It is true that the Labour Court has given a finding that the second respondent herein was employed by the petitioner-Corporation as Ticker-canvasser. But the subsequent finding of the Labour Court was on appreciation of the evidence of both W.W. 1 and M.W. 1 to the effect that though the appointment was a Ticket-canvasser, the second respondent was also discharging the duties of a Time-keeper. Therefore, there is no inconsistency as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner cited the following decisions : K. G. Mathew v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Calcutta reported in 48 FJR 419, Benoy Kumar Chatterjee v. Jugantar Limited reported in (1983-II-LLJ-8), Puri Urban Co-operative Bank v. Madhusudan Sahu reported in (1992-II-LLJ-6) (S.C.) and Edwin A. Daniel and another v. Labour Court, Coimbatore reported in 1993- 1 LLN 169. 7. Mr. Ltd., Calcutta reported in 48 FJR 419, Benoy Kumar Chatterjee v. Jugantar Limited reported in (1983-II-LLJ-8), Puri Urban Co-operative Bank v. Madhusudan Sahu reported in (1992-II-LLJ-6) (S.C.) and Edwin A. Daniel and another v. Labour Court, Coimbatore reported in 1993- 1 LLN 169. 7. Mr. K. Chandru, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, contending contra, submitted that it is well-settled that a finding arrived at by the Labour Court, on the basis of oral and documentary evidence, to the effect that a party before the Labour Court was a workman, cannot be interfered with by this Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction. For this proposition, he relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in The Management of Indian Bank v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (C) and another reported in (1990-I-LLJ-50). He submitted further that the contention that the second respondent was appointed after retirement is misconceived as the second respondent was not in the service of the petitioner earlier and after retirement from that service was re-employed. The second respondent was in some other service, and after retiring from that service, the petitioner-Corporation employed the second respondent for the first time. Therefore, learned counsel submitted that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner will have no application to the facts of this case. Learned counsel further argued that in view of the common ground that no notice was given prior to the impugned order of termination and admittedly there is no compliance of the requirement of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the impugned order of termination has been rightly set aside by the Labour Court and consequential order has also been rightly passed. He also placed reliance on the following judgments to oppose the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the second respondent was employed only on a contractual basis and, therefore, not entitled to invoke the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act :- Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. Union of India reported in (1974-I-LLJ-367) (S.C.), State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramoney reported in (1976-I-LLJ-478), The Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. Shambunath Mukherjee reported in (1985-I-LLJ-36) and Punjab Land Devt & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd., etc. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh, etc. reported in (1990-II-LLJ-70). 8. I have considered the rival submissions. 9. Ltd., etc. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh, etc. reported in (1990-II-LLJ-70). 8. I have considered the rival submissions. 9. Before going into the legal aspects argued before me, let me set out the findings rendered by the Labour Court and the reasons given therefor by it. 10. The Labour Court first considered the question whether the petitioner before it, namely, the second respondent therein, was a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On that aspect, the Labour Court found that M.W. 1 had no knowledge as to under what circumstances the second respondent commenced to work in the Corporation, and that, admittedly, neither Attendance Register nor Wages Register was maintained for the second respondent. The Labour Court ultimately found that while it may not be strictly correct to state that W.W. 1 (second respondent herein) was a Time-keeper and was therefore liable to make these entries as part of his duties as Time-keeper, it appears, in view of the evidence of M.W. 1 about the hours of work of the regular Time-keeper that the Ticket Canvassers were also maintaining these statements outside the hours of the regular Time-keeper, either by convention or by virtue of some arrangement. xx xx xx xx Therefore, rejecting the said extreme contentions on both sides, the fact appears to be that W.W. 1 and Thiru Subbarao, though engaged as Ticket canvassers only, were also maintaining the collection and timing statement as part of their duties. The workman had called upon the management to produce these collection and timing statements for the period before his termination. The management had failed to produce the same, evidently because, if produced, they would prove the evidence of W.W. 1 about himself also having maintained these statements. 11. The Labour Court, in paragraph 13 of the Award, before giving a finding that the second respondent was a workman, had discussed on facts as follows :- "No doubt, there appears to be no specific order of appointment detailing the nature of responsibilities and duties. The contention for the management is that there are only 5 types of employees as mentioned in the Standing Orders of the respondent establishment, they being (1) Permanent (2) Probationer (3) Temporary (4) Apprentice and (5) Casual, and that W.W. 1 does not fall under any of the 5 categories and he would therefore not be an employee at all. The contention for the management is that there are only 5 types of employees as mentioned in the Standing Orders of the respondent establishment, they being (1) Permanent (2) Probationer (3) Temporary (4) Apprentice and (5) Casual, and that W.W. 1 does not fall under any of the 5 categories and he would therefore not be an employee at all. But in view of the earlier discussion there can be no doubt that W.W. 1 had been employed by the respondent for doing a particular item of work, i.e., as a Ticket Canvasser in the Dindigul bus stand and that he was being paid daily wages for that work, the respondent having a right of superintendence and control over the work of W.W. 1 with reference to the performance of such work on all days on which he would turn up for such work. Under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, a workman means any person (1) employed in any industry (2) to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work (3) for hire or reward (4) whether the terms of the employment be expressed or implied, etc. for the In the present instance, there can be no dispute that the respondent-Management is an industry. For the reasons discussed earlier, it is clear that W.W. 1 had been employed by the respondent in connection with its work, such employment being as Ticket Canvasser even if not as a Time-Keeper. The work of a Ticket Canvasser will be unskilled manual work. Such employment was for hire on daily wages. Such employment was under an express contract, though not in writing. There can therefore be no doubt that W.W. 1 was a workman under the respondent as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The work of a Ticket Canvasser will be unskilled manual work. Such employment was for hire on daily wages. Such employment was under an express contract, though not in writing. There can therefore be no doubt that W.W. 1 was a workman under the respondent as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The mere fact that the respondent did not choose to issue an order in writing in the prescribed proforma or did not choose to classify him under any of the 5 categories of workers as mentioned in its Standing Orders cannot deprive W.W. 1 of his status as a workman as defined under Section 2(s)."* In view of the foregoing discussion and in the light of the decision cited by learned counsel for the second respondent, namely (1990-I-LLJ-50), wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held (in paragraph 17) (p. 58) that the question whether the relationship between the parties is one as between the employer and the employee or between master and servant is a pure question of fact and the decision of the Tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article No. 226 of the Constitution unless it is fully unsupported by evidence; I do not think that the finding of the Labour Court on fact that the second respondent was a workman calls for any interference. 12. On the second issue, namely, whether the termination was justified or not, the Tribunal has found, on facts, that there was no enquiry, that no reason for the termination from service was given in the impugned order of termination, that only in the counter statement before the Labour Court, it was stated that the workman was not doing the canvassing to the satisfaction of the management, that the reason given in the counter statement warrants an enquiry and, therefore, the order of termination was illegal and invalid. In this connection, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner can now be looked into. 13. In this connection, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner can now be looked into. 13. In 48 FJR 419 (supra), a learned single Judge of this Court held that 'even if a contract of employment does not provide age limit for retirement, an employee cannot claim his appointment as one for life because the normal practice or usage prevailing in similar establishments should be taken to be part of the service contract'. 14. To get over the effect of the above ruling Mr. K. Chandru, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, apart from citing a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1985-I-LLJ-36) (supra), also submitted that the judgment 48 FJR 419) (supra) cannot apply to the facts of this case, in the absence of evidence on usage or practice regarding discharge of workers employed after retirement not from the service of the Corporation, but from some other service. In (1985-I-LLJ-36) (supra), the Supreme Court directed the Labour Court to submit a Report on a question whether there was any valid rule of retirement on superannuation at the age of 58 years for the employees of the category to which the workman in that case belonged. The Labour Court rendered a finding to the effect that there was no valid rule of retirement on superannuation at the age of 58 years. However, in that case, while the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, the workman died, and the learned Judges directed the wages to be calculated till the date of death of the workman. No doubt, their Lordships also pointed out that without deciding the issue as such, the wages in that case was calculated on the fact of that case. 15. (1983-II-LLJ-8) (supra) was a case where the Management re-employed the workman after retirement and the said workman was governed by express conditions. In that context, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have rejected a contention advanced on behalf of the workman that even though he was employed under a fresh contract, he was in continuous service thereafter for not less than one year and, therefore, must be regarded as having been re-appointed on the date of passing the impugned order. The facts in the case on hand are entirely different. Here, the second respondent was not originally in the service of the Corporation. The facts in the case on hand are entirely different. Here, the second respondent was not originally in the service of the Corporation. He was for the first time appointed in the petitioner-Corporation knowing that he was a retired person from some other service. This judgment of the Supreme Court was cited in another judgment of this Court reported in (1993-I-LLN-169) (supra). In 1993-I-LLN-169, the finding of the Labour Court was against the workman. The concerned workman was found to be a probationer when the order of termination was given. Therefore that case will have no application to the facts of this case. 16. (1992-II-LLJ-6) (supra) was cited to challenge the finding of the Labour Court that the second respondent herein was a workman. We have already seen the well-founded reasons given by the Labour Court to arrive at the conclusion that the second respondent was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of that finding supported by reasons, I do not think there is any case for interference as pointed out already. 17. In (1976-I-LLJ-478) (supra), while explaining the term 'retrenchment' defined under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that 'whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is has the employee's service been terminated ? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination, howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour of S. 25F and S. 2(oo). It is a common ground in our case that Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act has not been complied with. 18. In (1990-II-LLJ-70) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court again considered the definition of 'retrenchment' appearing in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 19. On the findings of the Labour Court, supported by reasons, I hold, in the light of the discussion made above, that no case is made out for interference. 18. In (1990-II-LLJ-70) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court again considered the definition of 'retrenchment' appearing in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 19. On the findings of the Labour Court, supported by reasons, I hold, in the light of the discussion made above, that no case is made out for interference. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.