Honble YADAV, J. — This instant Criminal Misc. Petition under sec. 482, Cr. P.C. has been filed against an order and judgement dated 9.12.93 passed by learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gaddi, District Banswara rejecting the application dated 10.6.93 moved by the present accused-petitioners claiming speedy trial emanating from Art. 21 of the Constitution of India, According to the petitioners, cognizance was taken by the court on 7.7.83 and immediately after service of summons, the present accused - petitioners put in their appearance in Court but due to non- appearance of other 14 accused-persons, they are being harrassed in the present case for more than 10-1/2 years. (2). Brief facts of the case leading to the present dispute, are as follows. (3). Respondent Smt. Anshumala filed a complaint against the present four accused-petitioners along with 14 other accused- persons for the offence under Sec. 494 read with Sec. 109, IPC in the Court of Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Banswara on 23. 6. 83 alleging therein that Smt. Laxmi had solemnised second marriage with Bal Kishan on 4.6.83 according to Hindu customs and rites and the present accused-petitioners alongwith 14 others accused- persons had abetted the commission of the aforesaid offence. (4). Learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate recorded the statements of PW-1 Smt. Anshumala under Sec. 200, Cr.P.C. and PW 2-Deepak Kumar, PW-3 Mangilal and PW-4 Dilip kumar under Sec.202, Cr.P.C. Learned Magistrate took cognizance of the aforesaid offence on 7.7.83 and ordered to issue summons to all the accused-persons including on the present accused-petitioners. The summonses were served on the present accused-petitioners on 26.9.83 and since then they are regularly appearing before the trial court and after lapse of more than 10-1/2 years, the case is not progressing further due to non-appearance of rest of 14 accused-persons. (5). It is important to mention that the original complaint was filed before the learned Munsif and Judl. Magistrate, Banswara on 23.6.83, which was registered by the court on 24.6.83 since then the aforesaid complaint is being transferred from one court to another and not at present it is pending before the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate Gaddi. (6). After expiry of about 10 years, the present accused- petitioners moved an application on 10.6.93 before the learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Gaddi praying therein that they may be discharged from the offence mentioned above. (7). (6). After expiry of about 10 years, the present accused- petitioners moved an application on 10.6.93 before the learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Gaddi praying therein that they may be discharged from the offence mentioned above. (7). The trial court by impugned order dated 9.12.1993 dismissed the. aforesaid application and refused to discharge the petitioners from the offence under Sec. 494/109, IPC. (8). Being aggrieved of the impugned order dated 9.12.93 passed by the learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate aforesaid the present accused-petitioners had invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 482, Cr. P.C. on the ground, inter alia, that prolonged litigation before the trial court amounts to abuse of process of the court and also in utter violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India according to which the present accused- petitioners are entitled to have speedy trial. According to argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an early investigation and for a speedy and fair trial. According to Mr. Pradeep Shah, learned counsel for the petitioners, if the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed in their letter spirit, there would be little room for any grievance. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, the case is still pending in the trial court for appearance of some of the accused-persons and no effective steps have been taken by the trial court to commence the trial. (9). In reply to the aforesaid argument, Mr. Himmata Ram Panwar, learned Public Prosecutor for the State invited my attention towards a decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak. (1). According to the learned Public Prosecutor, in Abdul Rehman Antulays case (supra), the Apex Court had formulated certain norms, so that, the accused-persons may not be denied of their right to speedy trial. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the case of the present accused-petitioners are not covered within the purvies of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, therefore the present petition is liable to be dismissed. (10). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid arguments advanced on behalf of the present accused-petitioners as well as on behalf of the State. I have gone through the entire order sheets from 24.6.83. (10). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid arguments advanced on behalf of the present accused-petitioners as well as on behalf of the State. I have gone through the entire order sheets from 24.6.83. Perusal of the various order-sheets from 24.6.83 uptil date lead towards an irresistable conclusion that the present case of the accused-petitioners falls in an unique category where delay is occurring in the trial, for which, neither the prosecution nor the present accused-petitioners are responsible. In the present case, neither the complainant nor accused-petitioners can be blamed but the system itself is responsible for such inordinate delay. It is true that the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an early investigation and for speedy and fair trial. If the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are religiously followed in letter an spirit, there would be little room for any such grievance of delay in the trial. The Apex Court in Abdul Rehman Antulays case (supra) observed that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial emanating from Art. 21 is properly reflected under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to their Lordships decisions, infringement of right of speedy trial is not sufficient to quash the charges or conviction but there are other modes available which should be followed by the courts after a close scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of each case. It would be expedient to reproduce para 54 of Abdul Rehman Antulays case (supra) in order to arrive at a correct conclusion in the present case: — "54 . In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guide-lines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are; 1. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates of right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. 2. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. 2. Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal revision and re-trial. That is how this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. 3. The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of the view of the accused are; — (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration perior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and pease, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, enquiry or trial should be minimal, and (c) Undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, dis-appearance or nonavailability of witnesses or otherwise. 4. At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, dis-appearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good-faith. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good-faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceedings is not a frivolous. Very often these stays obtained on ex parte representation. 5. While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on what is called, the systematic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. 6. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage., As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same ideal has been stated by White, J.in U.S. v. Ewell,(1966) 15 Law Ed 2d 627, in the following words; — "the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances". However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused Will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. 7. We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the demand* rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the Court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accuseds plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. 7. We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the demand* rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the Court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accuseds plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be plus point in this favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in U.S.A., the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases. 8. Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors-balancing test or balancing process and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. 9. Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order -including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. 10. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulder of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of Right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the sixth Amendment. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit in-effectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. 11. An objection based on denial of Right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis". (11). In the present case, the cognizance was taken by the learned trial court on 7.7.1983 and then, thereafter process was issued to the present accused-petitioners alongwith 14 other accused persons. All the petitioners, since the date of service on them i.e. 26.9.83, are regularly appearing in the trial court and now more than 10-1/2 years time has already elapsed, the case is still pending in the trial court for appearance of 14 accused- persons. Some of them had not been served or not turning in court. The learned trial court is not taking effective steps to conclude the trial. The case is being transferred from one court to another court and the present accused-petitioners are trunning from pillar to post, which is causing physical and mental agony to them including the financial burden for such a long period. (12). According to me, there can be an offence by an individual against himself, secondly , there can be an offence committed by an individual or body of individuals against an other individual or body of individuals and there can be third category of offences, which is committed against the society at large either by an individual or a body of individuals. The present offence under Sec. 494 read with Sec. 109., IPC is an offence against the society and if such accused-persons are exonerated by fixing some outer limit of speedy trial then marriage institution in this country would dis-integrate, which is required to be preserved religiously by the courts in public interest. (13). The present offence under Sec. 494 read with Sec. 109., IPC is an offence against the society and if such accused-persons are exonerated by fixing some outer limit of speedy trial then marriage institution in this country would dis-integrate, which is required to be preserved religiously by the courts in public interest. (13). Thus, in my humble opinion, it would be just, proper, reasonable and equitable if the trial court is directed to take effective coersive steps under the Criminal Procedure Code against the remaining 14 accused persons to ensure their attendance before the trial court, who are deliberately avoiding appearance before the court for such a long time. Due to some un- avoidable circumstances, if the attempt of the trial court to ensure attendance of remaining 14 accused persons before the court, is not made possible then such accused persons may be declared absconders according to law and trial of the present accused petitioners must be concluded within a period of six months from the date of production of the certified copy of this judgement to the trial court. (14). Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial court is directed to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused petitioners and they should be permitted to appear before the trial court through their counsel as contemplated under Sec. 205, Cr. P.C. (15). In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present Criminal Misc. Petition is finally disposed of at admission stage. (16). After dictation of judgment in open Court, members of the Bar present in court jointly made a request to make the present decision Reportable. Their request is allowed and the present decision is marked as Reportable.